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NO USELESS MOUTH

1During a July 1791 treaty negotiation, Timothy 
Pickering, a key figure in the development of  early U.S. food policy, misremem-
bered past instances of  Native and non- Native hunger while giving a “history 
lesson.” At this meeting on the Tioga River (which ran between present- day 
Pennsylvania and New York), Pickering met a group of  Senecas, one of  the 
six tribes of  the Iroquois Confederacy. “When the white  people came to this 
Island, the Indians lived chiefly by hunting and fishing,” he explained to Corn-
planter, one of  the Iroquois negotiators. On this “island” of  North Amer i ca, 
“the white  people immediately began to till the ground, to grow corn, wheat, 
and other grain . . .  and to raise abundance of   cattle, sheep and hogs.” In the 
past, Pickering explained, “the Indians continued to follow hunting and fish-
ing, growing only a  little corn. They  were often in want of  food,” and “ex-
posed to  great hardships.”1
Pickering met Cornplanter and the other Senecas in the midst of  a fight 
against hunger that began before colonists arrived in North Amer i ca and ended 
in the 1810s. In 1791 Pickering was a newcomer to Iroquois diplomacy. He had 
only been working as a negotiator for a year, and the learning curve had been 
steep.2 He started his job during a momentous shift in relations between Na-
tives and non- Natives, when the United States,  after a de cade of  weakness and 
uncertainty, was trying to gain the upper hand in its dealings with Indians. As 
a result, his speech to Cornplanter conveyed an inaccurate historical picture.
Introduction
Why the Fight against Hunger Mattered
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Cornplanter, for his part, likely knew that Pickering was misinterpreting 
the actions of  seventeenth- century En glish colonists, who had taken a while 
to become farmers. Their domesticated animals had died on the ships that trav-
eled to North Amer i ca. They had spent their first months in  Virginia search-
ing for inedible commodities, and in  Virginia and New  England they had 
turned into useless mouths dependent on Indians for farmed vegetables, gath-
ered berries, and hunted venison. Contrary to Pickering’s claims, it was the 
En glish colonists, not the Indians, who had strug gled to overcome hunger. It 
was odd for Pickering to make this speech to Native treaty participants, espe-
cially to one named Cornplanter,  because the Iroquois had grown corn in 
abundance long before encountering non- Natives.3
The Seneca negotiator sitting across from Pickering was known by several 
names. To Indians he was Gyantwahia or Kayéthwahkeh, which translates ap-
proximately to “where it is planted.” To non- Natives he was Cornplanter, 
John O’Bail, John Abeel, or John Abiel.4 He had a reputation for effective 
speechmaking and would have been familiar with his tribe’s spoken history. 
 These con temporary creation stories described the fall of  Sky  Woman onto 
the back of  a turtle and told of  how, with the help of  other animals, she had 
constructed an island on the turtle’s back. Sky  Woman had a  daughter. Some 
Iroquois said the  daughter’s son, Thaluhyawaku, learned to plant corn.  Others 
said that, while still in the womb, Thaluhyawaku’s twin  brother, Tawiskalu, 
maliciously de cided to leave his  mother’s body through her side. This birth 
killed Sky  Woman’s  daughter, but her early death yielded unexpected bounty 
in the corn, beans, and squash that sprang forth from the grave.5 Corn pro-
duction was intrinsic to the Iroquois past and pre sent.
Yet Pickering’s account minimized the history of  Iroquois farming and thus 
erased systematic Indian hunger prevention. Pickering shared his tale  because 
the U.S. government wanted the Iroquois to become farmers. Cornplanter, as 
his name suggests, could already farm, but he listened to this lesson on the 
benefits of  agriculture  because he was trying to maneuver to retain land in 
his dealings with the new United States.
Hunger’s impor tant role in Pickering’s false history should be unsurpris-
ing, considering that  people had long reckoned with it for vari ous environmen-
tal and man- made reasons. In the early modern period, cities  under siege 
could expect to be starved out, and they suffered more quickly during times 
of  crop failure or unanticipated changes in the weather. Famine resulted from 
extended periods of  hunger and was evident in instances of   actual deaths, food 
riots, high prices, property crime, and rising migration.6 During the eigh teenth 
 century most British  people suffered from hunger, but not famine. In North 
Amer i ca, some Eu ro pean observers perceived Native Americans as ravenous, 
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while  others thought them better able to deal with dearth. At the same time, 
slave masters deprived enslaved  people of  food  because they hoped to keep 
them weak and compliant.
No Useless Mouth is a book about how Native Americans, non- Natives, and 
 people of  African descent experienced hunger before, during, and  after the 
American Revolutionary War (1775–1783). It historicizes efforts to create, 
avoid, and withstand hungriness so as to better understand the moments in 
time when Native Americans and formerly enslaved  peoples gained enough 
power to shape food policies of  hunger prevention and creation, rather than 
just suffering from the ill effects of  new initiatives that men like Pickering envi-
sioned. This book’s exploration of  the many diff er ent contexts of  hunger dur-
ing the era of  the American Revolution uncovers how  these Native and black 
revolutionaries acquired so much power— and why they ultimately lost it.
Enduring, ignoring, creating, and preventing hunger  were all ways to exer-
cise power during the American Revolution. Hunger prompted vio lence and 
forged ties; it was a weapon of  war and a tool of  diplomacy. In North Amer-
i ca, Cherokee, Creek, Delaware, Iroquois (Haudenosaunee), Miami, and Shaw-
nee Indians grew and destroyed foodstuffs during the Revolutionary War, 
which forced their British and American allies to hunger with them, and to 
furnish provisions that accommodated Native tastes. By the 1810s the United 
States had learned how to prevent Indian hunger, to weaponize food aid, and 
to deny Indians the power gained by enduring and ignoring scarcity.
Indians won leverage during the Revolutionary War itself.  People of  Afri-
can descent gained some power by creating white hunger during the Revolu-
tionary War, but more so as formerly enslaved communities, primarily  after 
leaving the new United States and migrating to British colonies in Nova Sco-
tia and then Sierra Leone. At the end of  the war, British officials in North 
Amer i ca chose to transport formerly enslaved refugees to Nova Scotia. In the 
country that is now called Canada  these black colonists  were relatively pow-
erless, but they witnessed white colonists’ use of  food laws to assert author-
ity. Once abolitionists in  England turned their attention  toward ending the 
transatlantic slave trade by founding a self- governing black antislavery colony 
in Sierra Leone, and relocated black colonists from Nova Scotia to Africa, for-
mer slaves won the right to fight hunger directly. But  after white officials in 
Sierra Leone realized that colonists’ hunger- prevention efforts gave them too 
much freedom, black colonists lost their hunger- preventing rights. Black rev-
olutionaries managed for a short time to challenge the power regimes in place 
during the late eigh teenth  century.
This book similarly challenges how we think about the American Revolu-
tion. Its title comes from a 1780 letter by General Frederick Haldimand, the 
4  IntroduCtIon
governor of  Quebec, at a time when Britain’s Indian allies  were living through 
a refugee crisis in British forts. When Haldimand wrote that “no useless Mouth, 
which can possibly be sent away” could be allowed to remain at  these strong-
holds, he hoped that only Native warriors would spend the winter with Brit-
ish soldiers. Indians tested this assumption that only Native fighters  were useful 
by supplying their own communities and refusing and destroying their allies’ 
provisions, and they proved their usefulness again by fostering the spread of  
hunger among  enemy soldiers and civilians alike. Like Haldimand, historians 
are accustomed to thinking about white colonists as an increasingly power ful 
group, Natives as increasingly weak, and enslaved  people as individuals with 
relatively  little power.7 No Useless Mouth turns  these narratives on their heads. 
It instead finds more rather than less power in Indian communities from the 
1770s to the 1790s. It offers a new chronology of  the eventual decline in Na-
tive power against the U.S. government. I highlight a more condensed but strik-
ingly similar chronology of  power relations for formerly enslaved  people. 
And I trace myriad, useful efforts to fight hunger before the more widely stud-
ied humanitarian initiatives of  the nineteenth  century.8
The Revolutionary War was fought just as much on Indian terms as it was 
on British and American ones, and Indians continued to drive U.S. food poli-
cies  after the conflict. Famine- deterrence initiatives evolved through U.S. co-
operation with Native Americans, and similar efforts emerged among formerly 
enslaved communities as black men and  women moved out of  the United 
States and across the ocean once the war concluded. All parties  were at vari-
ous times producers, consumers, and destroyers of  food, which means that a 
study of  hunger offers an opportunity to understand not only the big moments 
of  power shifts in land cessions and trade negotiations, but also the smaller 
day- to- day activities that engendered them. In other words, hunger exposes 
the contingency of  power relations in the late eigh teenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.
“I hope you  will have taken effectual methods to secure you an abundant sup-
ply of  provisions. That seems to be the pivot upon which all your operations 
turn.” Secretary of  War Henry Knox sent this advice to General “Mad” An-
thony Wayne in 1794, near the end of  a decade- long war between the United 
States and a confederated force of  Delaware, Miami, and Shawnee Indians— 
but he might have urged similar preparations during the Revolutionary War. 
The conflict between the new United States and  these Indians was a direct 
result of  the Revolutionary War, in which both Knox and Wayne also fought. 
Throughout the latter half  of  the eigh teenth  century, all military considerations 
turned on the quest for food and the consequences of  its absence, hunger. 
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The position of  all negotiating parties during times of  war and peace can-
not be understood without knowing  whether they  were hungry and to 
what degree. If  Native Americans  were less hungry than historians have ad-
mitted, for example, or if  formerly enslaved black colonists  were legally em-
powered to fight hunger themselves, then both groups possessed more 
authority than scholars have supposed. The American Revolution becomes an 
era characterized at vari ous points by resilience, re sis tance, conflict, continu-
ity, and change.9
This reinterpretation requires taking a long view of  the revolutionary pe-
riod. Beginning it in the late 1750s, during the Seven Years’ War, and ending it 
in the 1810s encompasses a sixty- year period when diplomatic practices  were 
most in flux. Such disruption allowed Native Americans during the Revolu-
tionary War to emphasize and shape food- related negotiations, while enabling 
them— now joined by formerly enslaved Africans—to participate in the ani-
mal theft and crop destruction that had characterized the seventeenth and early 
eigh teenth centuries. This narrative continues through the 1780s and 1790s 
 because Native Americans and U.S. officials worked together to formulate U.S. 
hunger- prevention strategies, and  because it was also during the 1790s when 
ex- bondpeople earned the po liti cal and  legal right to fight hunger on their own 
terms. By the 1810s, however, Indians and formerly enslaved  people had lost 
their  battles against hunger.
My periodization has been driven by my teaching on the American Revo-
lution in a system of  higher education that does not require both halves of  
the undergraduate U.S. history survey (which usually runs from 1492 to 1865 
or 1877, and then from 1865 or 1877 to the pre sent).10 I differentiate the Revo-
lutionary War from the American Revolution. The former stretched from 1775 
or 1776 (depending on  whether the start of  the war begins at Lexington and 
Concord or with the Declaration of  In de pen dence) to 1783 with the signing 
of  the Treaty of  Paris by  Great Britain and the United States. The longer 
timescale of  the American Revolution assumes that to appreciate the full ef-
fects of  the war, scholars must look back to the 1750s and forward to the 
1830s.  After all, the war’s chronological bound aries  were largely irrelevant to 
the Indians and enslaved  peoples who participated in it. And the end of  the 
war was just the beginning of  newly emancipated black colonists’ strug gle 
for po liti cal rights in the British Empire.
This periodization also addresses several interpretive prob lems that need 
to be solved in retelling the history of  Native Americans’ and enslaved  peoples’ 
involvement in the American Revolution.  These prob lems appear in histories 
of  food and hunger, U.S. foreign relations, and the American empire. Histori-
ans of  foreign relations have omitted Native Americans, jumped from covering 
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Indian affairs in the 1790s to discussing Indian affairs in the 1830s, or missed the 
continuities between British and American Indian policies  because they privi-
lege the history of  the United States  after the end of  the Revolutionary War.11
This elision has meant that power relations between the 1780s and 1810s, 
centered around food and hunger, have been  either misinterpreted or omit-
ted entirely.12 Such a decision risks assuming that Indians possessed  little le-
verage against the United States, and misses impor tant continuities and changes 
in British and then American interactions with Native Americans from the 
1750s through the 1820s. U.S. officials persuaded Native Americans to attend 
treaties by working hard to replicate colonial- era British diplomacy, but they 
did so during a time when food diplomacy had grown indispensable, and when 
 mistakes in practicing it invited major consequences. Federal U.S. Indian agents 
agonized about the violent insecurity that arose during times of  famine in In-
dian towns and villages, and warned that if  the federal government could not 
provide food aid, it needed to prepare for war. In No Useless Mouth I make clear 
that colonial and postrevolutionary Indian affairs must be analyzed as foreign 
affairs, and that diplomats’ efforts to address Native hunger informed  these 
daily interactions between Natives and non- Natives from the 1750s to the 
1810s. Reexamining  these food- related negotiations has the effect of  exposing 
the untenable position of  the United States during the 1780s and 1790s, and 
explaining the steps it took to intervene in Native hunger- prevention efforts 
from the 1790s onward.
In addition to histories of  U.S. foreign relations is the scholarship on the 
American empire during this period, which blames settler colonists for expand-
ing that empire by seizing land from Native Americans—as Americans did in 
1779 when they moved into Iroquois  houses  after John  Sullivan’s summer cam-
paign against them.13 Studies of  the American Revolution agree that  after the 
war, the U.S. government quickly constituted its own “Empire of  Liberty.” His-
torians disagree about  whether this decision was radical or not, and they 
strug gle to assign responsibility for the American empire’s consolidation. They 
concur that squatters, unscrupulous traders, and individuals in the interior of  
the continent drove the formulation of  policy at the federal level, such as the 
government’s decision in 1787 to create the Northwest Ordinance for organ-
izing new territory beyond the Appalachian Mountains.14 But they have yet to 
fully describe the federal and Native negotiations that enabled  these settler co-
lonial land grabs. This book makes clear that Indians could not lose their land 
to settler colonists  until they had lost the fight against hunger with the federal 
government.15
As a concept, settler colonialism is deficient in several re spects: first,  because 
the idea of  settlement should not be used to describe exclusively non- Native 
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be hav ior; second,  because Indian affairs  were foreign affairs; third,  because Na-
tives actively  shaped U.S. policies; and fi nally,  because scholars have not yet 
clarified  whether their definitions of  eighteenth- century settler colonialism 
describe a staggered pro cess of  land seizures or a daily milieu of  oppression. 
Indians, like non- Natives,  were settled folks; they produced corn, pork, and 
beef  on land to which they periodically returned, hunted for game in predict-
able patterns and locations, and did not recognize the government’s right to 
sell their territory.16 Using the word settler to critique non- Native be hav ior thus 
creates a false dichotomy between Indians and non- Indians, and reproduces 
the language of  eighteenth- century land grabbers.
Further, in a structure of  settler colonialism, the colony is separate from 
but still tied to the  mother country; internally rather than internationally fo-
cused; the be hav ior of  settler colonists dictates policy back in the metropole; 
and colonialism is something that happens to indigenous  peoples.  After the 
Revolutionary War, however, the federal government had severed relations 
with  Great Britain, viewed Indians as separate nations with whom it conducted 
foreign policy, and responded to and anticipated the be hav ior of  its land- hungry 
non- Native inhabitants.17 Native Americans did not passively experience  these 
policies and landgrabs; they intervened to shape policy and critiqued illegal 
land cessions. It was inaccurate ideas about Native crop and meat production 
and anxiety about the results of  Native hunger that gave rise to the fiction that 
Indians improperly used their land and therefore required less of  it. During 
the 1790s, U.S. officials— including Timothy Pickering— mischaracterized Na-
tive hunger- prevention efforts with the explicit purpose of  legitimizing a food 
policy that facilitated the federal government’s acquisition of  Native land. In 
this book, settler colonialism consolidated the territory of  the American em-
pire while, si mul ta neously, the U.S. government enacted a federal Indian food 
policy that met the expectations of  Native Americans and its settler colonists.
No Useless Mouth’s exploration of  the relationship between empire, Native 
American history, and U.S. foreign relations also requires a reconsideration of  
the po liti cal economy of  the late eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Before the Revolutionary War, the mercantilism of  the British Empire had re-
stricted North American colonists’ abilities to trade outside of  established 
British imperial networks. Freedom to trade  after the war enabled the United 
States to make trade agreements with other nations, including Indian nations. 
However, tensions remained between  those who wanted unrestrained foreign 
and domestic exchange, and economic nationalists who believed that the U.S. 
government had to intervene in the economy by fixing prices and wages and 
enacting trade barriers through protectionist legislation. This debate over trade 
policy colored U.S.- Indian commercial relations as it became less clear where 
8  IntroduCtIon
Indian nations fell within the U.S. commercial orbit. Native Americans in North 
Amer i ca wanted the ability to practice unrestricted trade with the United 
States, but also with British, French, and Spanish officials in North America. 
They also asked the U.S. government to fix prices for the deerskins they sold in 
a rapidly evolving fur trade; power ful Indians pushed for economic policies that 
allowed them to trade freely while enjoying the benefits of  protectionism.18
To understand how  these histories of  empire and foreign relations fit to-
gether with histories of  slavery, scholars must reexamine how enslaved and 
formerly enslaved  people traded, produced, stole, transported, and regulated 
foodstuffs. The historians who have recognized that the institution of  slavery 
(and its expansion) contradicted eighteenth- century authors’ claims that the 
Empire of  Liberty was a peaceful empire have been less invested in tracking 
the contradictions of  black imperialism abroad.19  Others have not considered 
the importance of  black runaways in shaping foreign policy between British 
and American officials during the war itself. When British forces invited en-
slaved Africans to run away and join them in the fight against rebel American 
colonists, and to then steal food from the plantations of  former masters, they 
initiated a chain of  events that would lead some British military leaders to re-
interpret retaliatory food deprivation as American acts of  war against Britain. 
When the war ended, the exodus of  former slaves from the United States to 
present- day Canada caused considerable disagreement between British and 
American military leaders. When formerly enslaved  people tried to fight hun-
ger in Sierra Leone, they did so by enacting protectionist legislation that ele-
vated their foodstuffs over  those grown and prepared by Africans. The white 
Sierra Leone Council failed to anticipate the tensions that black colonists’ an-
tihunger regulations would create between colonists and Africans— whom 
black politicians characterized as foreigners whose buying practices merited 
diff er ent pricing policies.
This broad reinterpretation of  hunger- prevention initiatives as domestic and 
foreign policy tells a very diff er ent story from histories of  single food com-
modities, which explain how  these commodities changed history.20 Scholars 
have undertaken impor tant work on food and power, but the era of  the Amer-
ican Revolution remains largely unexplored. Histories of  food from the six-
teenth to the twentieth  century have also been less interested in hunger.21 
General surveys of  hunger pay insufficient attention to North Amer i ca, or ar-
gue that hunger became preventable only during the mid- nineteenth  century 
onward. It would be easy to assume that state hunger prevention was an 
achievement only of  the mid- nineteenth or even twentieth  century.22 U.S. of-
ficials, Native Americans, British officials, and formerly enslaved black colonists 
clearly tried to prevent hunger in the late eigh teenth  century, demonstrating 
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that although many of  the tactics for fighting hunger remained the same as 
the colonial period’s, the composition of  the groups who battled scarcity and 
the power they lost and gained changed significantly.
Three key be hav iors changed and  were, in turn, changed by evolving ideas 
about hunger. Detailing  these be hav iors should help readers understand how 
the American Revolution both fostered continuity and changed hunger- 
prevention initiatives, consequently destabilizing power relationships.  These 
modes of  be hav ior— food diplomacy, victual warfare, and victual imperialism— 
exist on a spectrum between accommodation and vio lence  because it is im-
possible to talk about hunger without considering peaceful and aggressive food 
exchange and destruction. Depending on context, some degree of  accommo-
dation and some degree of  vio lence was pos si ble. Diplomacy usually accom-
panies discussions of  war, and, indeed, eighteenth- century diplomats often 
undertook negotiations to prevent past vio lence from spiraling into cycles of  
revenge. They also understood that diplomacy was crucial in stopping  future 
conflicts.
On the more peaceful end of  this scale, then, is food diplomacy, defined as 
the sharing of, or collective abstention from, grain, meat, or alcohol in order 
to create or maintain alliances. In this book I characterize food diplomacy so 
as to include a shared experience of  hunger  because Native Americans attached 
so many meanings to the idea of  starvation and  because the absence of  food 
thus informed food- sharing activities.23 Vari ous terms describe similar pursuits: 
gastrodiplomacy, culinary diplomacy, po liti cal gastronomy, and food aid. Food 
diplomacy is the best option for the revolutionary period. Gastrodiplomacy 
conjures images of  statesmen negotiating over  grand meals, and misses the 
ordinary  people who participated in the Revolutionary War. Gastronomy is 
about delicate eating, while the word culinary references kitchens.24 Food aid 
is distributed to civilians in reaction to a crisis, so it was part of  revolutionary 
customs, but the phrase is not broad enough to describe all forms of  coopera-
tive exchange, such as distributions of  rations to Indian warriors.25 Food di-
plomacy encompasses the po liti cal culture of  eighteenth- century diplomacy 
that extended beyond protocol and court etiquette, such as the alliance- making 
of  government officials, the forest diplomacy of  Native war and peace chiefs, 
and the maneuvering of  traders. It includes the reactive nature of  British and 
American food aid, as well as the Indians who in turn gave food gifts to non- 
Natives. And it applies to the war time men and  women who ate unsavory fare 
of  salt pork, boiled beef, cornmeal mush, and moldy bread far away from kitch-
ens. The inclusion of  alcohol in definitions of  food diplomacy also poses chal-
lenges, given its separate historiography and the ramifications of  alcohol use 
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in Native communities.26 This history deals with drink only when  people con-
nected alcohol disbursement to food or hunger.
Hunger brought  people together, but it also divided them. The most bel-
ligerent form of  food- related be hav ior was victual (pronounced “vittle”) war-
fare. It often occurred when food diplomacy failed, though the two customs 
did sometimes take place at the same time. Victual warfare entailed stealing, 
withholding, or destroying grain or animals (or threatening to do so) with one 
of  two outcomes in mind: to create hunger, instability, and chaos; or to pre-
vent one’s own hunger or the hunger of  one’s allies. Victual warfare has gone 
by vari ous names: the feedfight, warfare against vegetables, scorched- earth 
campaigns, and total war.27 But victual warfare is preferable to its precursors 
 because the word victual can be used as a noun or a verb, so that the meaning 
includes the crops, animals, and salted meat that  people destroyed, as well as 
attacks against forms of  production and supply.
The last of   these practices, victual imperialism, is an idea unique to this book. 
Victual imperialism could be collaborative or antagonistic, depending on the 
time and context. It was the use of  hunger- prevention food policies— including 
the circumscription of  hunting habits, institution of  price- fixing food laws, and 
introduction of  “civilization” programs— either to seize land or to disrupt and 
transform trade. Its land- related results thus refer to be hav iors classed as formal 
imperialism, while its trade- related results fall  under the remit of  informal im-
perialism.28 Victual imperialism was designed to preempt warfare and stop hun-
ger; often, it had the effect of  reducing food aid or negatively affecting another 
group’s freedom to produce, market, or eat what and how they wished. Though 
this book does not suggest that historians should abandon settler colonialism as 
a concept of  analy sis, adding victual imperialism to this discussion reveals the 
more conscious choices that Indians made to cooperate with non- Native gov-
ernment officials as they chose from several less than ideal survival strategies.
 These terms naturally raise questions about the value of  imposing them 
on the historical narrative, when the  people who practiced food diplomacy, 
victual warfare, and victual imperialism did not use them in the eigh teenth 
 century. I recognize the complications that such terms invite, while asserting 
that the historian’s job is to make the past more comprehensible to present- 
day readers, using words that she has carefully considered. I am not suggest-
ing that  people in the eigh teenth  century used  these terms, nor am I arguing 
that they would have recognized terms like food aid or food relief. I have applied 
 these terms  because they facilitate understanding of  hunger’s ever- changing 
contexts. In theorizing them, it is impor tant to insist that they existed in prac-
tice if  not in name before the late eigh teenth  century, that they changed 
before then, too, and that they are specific to period and place.
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Some antecedent for each of   these activities might be traced to diff er ent 
times and places in early modern British history, and in some cases even  earlier; 
 these examples are most relevant  because this imperial power interacted the 
most with the groups discussed in this book. Food diplomacy changed before 
the revolutionary period and was not applicable to every one in Britain or North 
Amer i ca. En glish men and  women of  all classes gave edible gifts during the 
medieval period, though not all gifts served diplomatic purposes.29 Food di-
plomacy with Native Americans before the Revolutionary War involved dis-
tributing food aid, sharing meals, hosting feasts at treaty gatherings, and 
providing rations to broker alliances with Native Americans. Power ful Indi-
ans expected non- Natives to learn and replicate  these practices even when In-
dians did not need food.  These conventions became crucial during the 
Revolutionary War  because other types of  diplomacy, such as trade diplomacy, 
became less effective. Revolutionary food diplomacy copied and then added 
to colonial customs. British and Patriot officials who needed the assistance of  
Creek, Cherokee, and Iroquois allies tried harder to accommodate Native 
tastes and etiquette. In rare cases, allies hungered together— sometimes de-
liberately, by destroying each other’s food supplies—to strengthen military co-
ali tions. Food diplomacy was not pertinent to enslaved  people during the 
colonial period or the Revolutionary War. Between the 1780s and the 1790s, 
federal agents labored to reproduce  these cooperative, revolutionary food cus-
toms during their work in U.S. Indian affairs, but confusion flourished  because 
officials for the states sought an advantage over the federal government, and 
 because federal and state officials had learned to associate Native hunger with 
outbreaks of  vio lence. By the late 1790s, when the U.S. government’s Indian 
food policy won out against the states’ policies, its food diplomacy entailed 
reducing alcohol distributions and trying to cut food aid while limiting the use 
(and cost) of  military campaigns against Indians.
In the early modern period it was En glishmen who  were victual warriors, 
and the strategic aims of  war determined the permissibility of  destroying 
crops. En glishmen during sixteenth- century campaigns in Ireland targeted 
crops  because they wanted the Irish to submit but not starve. By the mid- 
seventeenth  century, crop eradication was designed to starve and annihilate 
Irish noncombatants, but by the end of  the  century civilian deaths again be-
came unacceptable, even as attacks against crops continued. In the Amer i cas, 
the En glish regularly waged scorched- earth campaigns against Native Ameri-
cans (and, sometimes, other civilian populations). Indians also committed vict-
ual warfare: once they came to know how highly Eu ro pe ans valued their 
domesticated animals, they aimed their vio lence at cows and pigs.30 When Eu-
ro pe ans convinced Indians to fight alongside them, Indians avoided the use 
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of  victual warfare against other Indians— even their enemies. Revolutionary 
victual warfare increased in scale in terms of  the  people who carried it out 
and the  people who bore the brunt of  it. American forces executed unpre ce-
dented, wide- reaching operations against the Iroquois and Cherokees, and In-
dians became likelier to attack other Indians’  cattle and grain fields. Formerly 
enslaved  peoples developed a striking relationship with victual warfare. Dur-
ing the war, Britons encouraged bondpeople to run away from rebel masters, 
fostering the rise of  victual warriors who attacked former masters’ systems 
of  food production.  After the Revolutionary War, the types of  victual warfare 
did not change, but some of  the prac ti tion ers did. Maroon communities of  
runaway slaves persisted in their raids on white plantations. Britons and Amer-
icans no longer attacked each other’s crops and  cattle. Soldiers continued to 
incinerate Native fields and gardens throughout the 1790s in some places, such 
as the Ohio Valley, but in the northern and southern regions non- Native civil-
ians replaced military victual warriors and often engaged in unsanctioned vio-
lence against Indian foodstuffs  because they wanted land that did not belong 
to them.
Of   these three be hav iors, victual imperialism represents the most signifi-
cant change  because it was only during the late eigh teenth  century that hunger- 
prevention initiatives and land seizures began occurring si mul ta neously. 
During the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, governments in  England 
and Scotland tried to restructure land use, which then altered crop- , dairy- , 
and meat- production methods and prompted price- fixing initiatives. 
Seventeenth- century En glishmen transplanted depictions of  nonfarming bar-
barians to the New World so they could falsely claim that Native Americans 
misused their lands, which helped colonists to justify taking territory. Invad-
ers enjoyed some success convincing Indians to raise domesticated animals— 
some  cattle, but predominantly pigs— but they did not introduce  these animals 
in concert with land seizures.31 Native Americans did not take non- Native land, 
and when Indians took land from or ceded it on behalf  of  other Indians 
before the Revolutionary War—as in the case of  the Iroquois- Delaware 
relationship— they did not interfere with food choices.32
During the war, British and American officials knew they had to try to avoid 
offending their Native allies. This knowledge had  limited their victual imperi-
alism. By contrast, in the new United States, Nova Scotia, and Sierra Leone, 
reformers tried to change land use and the agriculture and animal husbandry 
that yielded grains and meat. In the former American colonies, U.S. officials 
became the victual imperialists. Formerly enslaved  people encountered vict-
ual imperialism in Nova Scotia, where white Loyalist refugees (American col-
onists who had sided with the British during the war) passed food laws that 
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kept ex- bondpeople from making use of  land. It was when self- liberated black 
men and  women entered a wider Atlantic World in West Africa that they, too, 
realized how to become victual imperialists. They practiced victual imperial-
ism by creating food laws that bore striking resemblance to the laws  under 
which they had suffered in Nova Scotia. It was in Sierra Leone that victual im-
perialism transformed from land- to trade- related be hav ior.  Free black colo-
nists began passing food laws while trying to take African land, but over time 
the focus shifted to trying to change trade.
In the era of  the American Revolution, food diplomacy, victual warfare, and 
victual imperialism explain how enslaved  peoples and Native Americans waged 
and lost their fights against hunger, and thus how they won and lost power. 
Misunderstandings between Natives and non- Natives during the colonial pe-
riod drove British efforts to adhere to Native negotiating rituals, including food 
diplomacy. No one enjoyed a clear advantage, and so the British did not try to 
distinguish between the many conflicting interpretations of  Indian appetites, 
while Indians did not depend on non- Natives to prevent famine. During the 
Revolutionary War, American Patriots tried to gain an edge with protracted 
strikes of  victual warfare against Britain’s Indian allies, destroying their vege-
tables and prompting refugee crises. They miscalculated. Iroquois Indians won 
more authority by expanding food diplomacy to include the acts of  fighting 
hunger, and creating and then coenduring it. Creeks and Cherokees, mean-
while, fostered confusion by destroying provisions and fed themselves by steal-
ing domesticated animals. Blundering British and American officials who 
tried to control quantities of  rations distributions instead found themselves 
apologizing for stinginess. Enslaved  people, meanwhile, earned some power 
by allying with the British and fighting white hunger with stolen crops and 
animals, and to a  limited extent by avoiding hunger through theft, migration, 
and  labor. Mostly, they strug gled,  because they expected to endure dearth.
 After the war, Native Americans continued to gain power during the 1780s 
and mid-1790s. As the nascent United States strug gled to form a government 
and as a pan- Indian confederacy  rose in the northwest, wrong- headed ideas 
about violent, famished Indians motivated American officials to generously 
distribute food at meetings and as aid  because they feared the results of  not 
 doing so: victual warfare. Non- Native federal agents became better able to in-
tervene in conversations about hunger deterrence  because their diplomacy 
outdid that of  state officials; they had studied Native appetites.
U.S. federal agents began to claim more knowledge about Native hunger 
during the mid-1790s, as Timothy Pickering did in his meeting with Corn-
planter. This new authority, in concert with U.S. military victories and grow-
ing pressure from white settler colonists, motivated the federal government 
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to bid for power by crafting a foreign policy that misrepresented Native agri-
culture and Native hunger. By the early 1810s, the federal government no lon-
ger cared about establishing  whether or not Indians truly  were hungry, and 
so it de- emphasized the customs of  cooperation that addressed Native fam-
ine. Federal officials now conflated diplomacy with hunger prevention, which 
in turn allowed them to use food aid that fostered diseases, thus providing a 
cheap, destructive alternative to military campaigns. The U.S. Supreme Court 
may have declared Indians domestic and uncivilized in the 1820s and 1830s, 
but U.S. officials had started that pre ce dent from the 1790s onward.33 The gov-
ernment’s food diplomacy had become victual imperialism.
Victual imperialism’s relationship to power was slightly more ambiguous 
with re spect to how formerly enslaved  people encountered it. Black colonists 
in Nova Scotia suffered as white Loyalist refugees blocked their access to land 
while also curtailing their access to food. Hunger endurance rather than avoid-
ance remained the norm. Former bondpeople fi nally gained power in Sierra 
Leone,  after a series of  negotiations with white officials granted them the right 
to enact their own food laws that forestalled hunger.  These laws  were tempo-
rarily successful,  until they also targeted African  peoples’ trade in foodstuffs— 
particular that of  the Susu and Temne. This victual imperialism was 
unsuccessful,  because in the late 1790s Susu and Temne began to practice vict-
ual warfare against black colonists. White colonists grew unwilling to autho-
rize black colonists’ antihunger legislation,  because they  were reluctant to 
destabilize the Sierra Leone Colony’s position of  encouraging Africans’ trade 
in legitimate commerce, and so they removed black colonists from power by 
deeming them rebellious in 1800. By portraying black colonists’ food laws as 
illegal, white British officials elided history in much the same way as Timothy 
Pickering did in his conversation with Cornplanter. Memories of  hunger- 
prevention initiatives  were subject to all sorts of  manipulation.
No Useless Mouth is structured around three overlapping periods of  shifting 
power dynamics,  because food diplomacy, victual warfare, and victual impe-
rialism created systems of  power relationships that every one had a chance to 
work, with diff er ent degrees of  power, in their interests. The book’s first sec-
tion describes the baseline notions of  hunger that food diplomacy and victual 
warfare helped create during the colonial period. Then it explains how the 
bonds between Natives and non- Natives changed during the Revolutionary 
War as Iroquois Indians gained power using food diplomacy and Creeks and 
Cherokees practiced victual warfare with similar results. Power relationships 
fluctuate in the second section of  the book. During the war, self- liberated slaves 
earned freedom and became victual warriors but felt almost as if  they  were 
re- enslaved  after fleeing to Nova Scotia and encountering white victual impe-
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rialists. Cherokee, Creek, and Iroquois Indians continued to use food diplo-
macy and victual warfare to improve their bargaining positions with the United 
States during the 1780s and 1790s, but Delaware, Miami, and Shawnee Indi-
ans won and then lost control in a final campaign against a new U.S. army. In 
the final section of  the book, Native Americans and black colonists strug gle. 
Indians started to lose the  battle against hunger when the new United States 
hijacked hunger prevention initiatives in the 1790s, 1800s, and 1810s. Black col-
onists won several victories in the fight against hunger in Sierra Leone, begin-
ning in 1792, but they lost the war, which lasted less than a de cade.
Historians cannot understand the American or British position in the Amer-
ican Revolution without reckoning with histories of  enslaved  peoples and 
Native Americans  because  those groups’ power strug gles  were so entwined 
with British and American foreign affairs. From the 1770s to the 1810s, food 
diplomacy and victual warfare respectively granted Native and black revolu-
tionaries the most leverage, but both groups suffered when white officials in-
troduced victual imperialism. Native Americans held enormous influence 
over British and American officials before, during, and  after the Revolution-
ary War, which in many re spects was merely a blip in Indians’ longer history 
of  negotiating and fighting with non- Natives. Black colonists’ efforts to win 
po liti cal and  legal power  were no less remarkable, not least  because their situ-
ations changed so much in the space of  a generation.
Any history of  bondpeople and Native Americans must wrangle with the prob-
lem of  sources: most documentation about enslaved  people and Indians 
comes from Eu ro pe ans. Accounts produced by Eu ro pe ans observed Indians’ 
actions but not their thoughts. This challenge offers readers at least three so-
lutions: they can read  those documents with skepticism and accept or reject 
assessments of  Indians depending on the existence of  corroborating evidence; 
they can claim that historians  will never uncover the true story of  what hap-
pened, but that  these sources give us some sense of  the time period  under 
consideration; or they can use Indian sources to create an Indian- centered 
narrative. This book offers a fourth option: hunger- related actions become an 
additional base of  information about  people who left  behind too few written 
rec ords in comparison to their white contemporaries. By reading documents 
skeptically and cross- referencing assertions about Indian and black hunger with 
food- related actions, historians can try to discern the intentions of  Native 
Americans and enslaved  peoples through their responses to and preparations 
against hunger.34
In the pages that follow, readers  will note the reliance on archival sources 
based mostly on twenty- one archives in eigh teen towns and cities. I have 
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focused on  these sources despite the preponderance of  edited document col-
lections on the American Revolution.  There is  little reason to think that edi-
tors of   these decades- old collections  were concerned with food, enslaved 
 people, or Indians,  because only recently has it become commonplace to ac-
knowledge that the War for In de pen dence  shaped, and was  shaped by, the ac-
tions of   these folks. Moreover it is only recently that it has become acceptable 
to write seriously about food and hunger. Military sources— letters of  com-
manding officers, soldiers’ diaries, papers relating to Indian affairs, and mis-
cellaneous letterbooks— proved the most revealing in retelling the story of  
revolutionary hunger. The daily necessity of  feeding thousands of  mouths 
pushed the men in charge to write a lot about burning, butchering, farming, 
preserving, rationing, spoiling, and stealing. In this book I concentrate on 
the  peoples for whom food seemed most impor tant, and I confine its discus-
sion primarily to land action, addressing the British Navy only when its move-
ments affected  those onshore—in large part  because other authors have 
ably addressed this topic.35
No Useless Mouth considers a wide range of   peoples: Indians, including the 
Six Nations Iroquois, Cherokee, Creek, and Western Confederacy (mostly Del-
aware, Miami, and Shawnee)  peoples;  free black colonists; enslaved Africans; 
rebel American Patriots; and Britons. At vari ous points  these groups separated 
into more factions, and it grows challenging to describe their identities. The 
Cherokees broke into blocs of  neutral and Chickamauga Cherokees, and the 
Iroquois also divided. Hessians fought for the British, as did the Irish and Scot-
tish who at times  were considered British and at other times claimed more 
regional identities for themselves. Loyalties shifted, particularly for the self- 
liberated bondpeople who allied with Britons and Americans, and who fought 
more for freedom than they did for patriotism.
Historians have gone back and forth about proper terminology for indig-
enous  peoples. In keeping with current accepted practices, this book uses In-
dian, Native American, Native, and indigenous  peoples, but refers to specific tribes 
when the sources made it pos si ble to identify them. No Useless Mouth uses Iro-
quois and Six Nations interchangeably  because they  were the most commonly 
utilized titles of  the time, though  these  people would  today refer to themselves 
as Haudenosaunee. In this book I employ the plural when talking about Indi-
ans: Creeks, rather than Creek, for example (and Creek, rather than Musk-
ogee),  because using the singular obscures the fact that tribes  were often 
divided.  Because Indians  were so divided, I avoid using the word Loyalist to 
refer to them; many Indians offered military assistance not  because they felt a 
sense of  allegiance to non- Natives, but  because  doing so served their own in-
terests. British- allied or American- allied are better phrases.36
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The book’s terminology follows similar conventions when discussing en-
slaved  people. Although the term enslaved is preferable to the term slave  because 
it grants enslaved  peoples greater agency, switching between enslaved Africans, 
bondpeople, and slaves provides variability in the text. In this book I try to note 
when someone was  free or not, and to provide a name when the documen-
tary sources have revealed one. I do not use the word Loyalist to refer to self- 
liberated black  people during the American Revolution, nor do I do so when 
discussing the time period when  these former bondpeople lived in Nova Sco-
tia.  After the war,  people became black Loyalists (which in this book is syn-
onymous with Nova Scotians) as they emigrated out of  Canada and forged new 
identities in Sierra Leone as British subjects.37 This monograph does not use 
the term African American  because the black Loyalists did not conceive of  them-
selves as such; they tried to set themselves apart from Africans as well as from 
American colonists.
Before the American Revolution,  people expected to encounter hunger; dur-
ing the early modern period, crops failed, famine ensued,  people died, and 
 others survived. Black and Native American revolutionaries, by contrast, fought 
hunger, even if  their successes  were fleeting. The men and  women whose ac-
tions are chronicled  here  were not hungry, useless mouths; they sometimes 
refused food, sometimes ignored hunger, sometimes created it, and sometimes 
defeated it. Their fights mattered  because they  were so diff er ent from  those 
that preceded and followed them, and  because U.S. and British officials mis-
represented  those  battles.  Those false histories created pernicious pre ce dents. 
This book exposes them.
No Useless Mouth’s baseline for understanding hunger starts with conflict-
ing information. This story begins before the Revolutionary War, when a man 
named George Croghan was trying to teach British officials about Native ap-
petites. Native Americans did not require support from non- Natives to survive, 
but colonists and British officials depended a  great deal on Indians. Two cen-
turies of  food diplomacy and victual warfare had taught En glishmen precious 
 little about Indian methods of  dealing with hungriness, and so their percep-
tions  were riddled with misunderstandings that require unraveling.

Part One
Power Rising
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Chapter 1
Hunger, Accommodation, and 
Vio lence in Colonial Amer i ca
 After years of  trading with Indians, traveling 
among them, and having sex with them, Irish fur trader and land speculator 
George Croghan could assert that hungry Native Americans resembled hun-
gry Eu ro pe ans. When asked, “Is the Appeal of  the Indians for food, greater 
or less than the Eu ro pe ans?” he answered, “I have Never observed thire ap-
petites to be Greater than ours,  unless  after Liveing a Long Time very Scanty 
or without food . . .  particklerly  after a Debach of  Drinking.” He claimed that 
Indians ate no more than their Eu ro pean counter parts  unless they had gone 
on a drinking binge— consuming alcohol that British officials had provided as 
a diplomatic gift, or that unscrupulous traders had supplied to con Indians out 
of  skins or land. Croghan was responding to a set of  queries presented by a 
man named Dr. William Robertson, of  Edinburgh, who was writing a multi-
volume history of  the Amer i cas. Croghan had spent three de cades interact-
ing with Illinois and Ohio Valley Delawares, Miamis, Ottawas, Shawnees, and 
Wyandots as deputy superintendent of  Indian Affairs, although he was retired 
from this position by the time he wrote to Robertson in 1773.1
Other En glish colonists described Indians whose appetites might have 
shocked Croghan, depicting them as pitiable, helpless, and hungry. Non- 
Natives lacked a consensus about Indian hunger  because multiple discourses 
of  Native hungriness existed: that of  the hungry and useless civilian; that of  
the warrior using hunger as a meta phor before proving his military usefulness; 
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and that of  the Native  woman whose utility Eu ro pe ans strug gled to under-
stand,  because Native  women shouldered the responsibility for producing 
crops and preventing hunger at a time when Eu ro pe ans believed it inappro-
priate for  women to farm. Between the 1500s and 1700s, two varying ap-
proaches  toward dealing with food and hunger— accommodating and violent 
food- related acts— allowed inconsistent ideas about hunger to form, which 
in turn influenced how Natives and non- Natives exchanged food and de-
stroyed it.2
Before the Revolution, Native Americans and Eu ro pe ans enjoyed a relatively 
equal degree of  power, but in the realm of  hunger prevention, non- Native in-
tervention failed to improve Eu ro pe ans’ bargaining position. Eu ro pe ans and 
Indians gave and received edible items in ways that fit into their other diplo-
matic interactions. From the de cades  after the arrival of  Columbus to the mid- 
eighteenth  century, food functioned together with the alcohol, furs, trade 
goods, and wampum that Indians and Eu ro pe ans imbued with practical and 
symbolic meanings.  These cross- cultural dealings ensured the existence of  a 
type of  Native and non- Native diplomacy called forest diplomacy— and thus 
of  peace. Food sharing, like other practices, could work within the framework 
of  a commodity- exchange economy and a gift- exchange economy. The over-
lap between  these two economies permitted creative misunderstandings and 
cooperation, while also fostering conflict.3
Cooperative food exchange was paralleled by  battles over commodities, in-
cluding the destruction of  crops and attacks against domesticated animals. 
Eu ro pe ans employed victual warfare against other Eu ro pe ans during military 
conflicts of  the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries; in North Amer i ca, In-
dian warriors, soldiers, and colonial civilians practiced victual warfare. Whereas 
food diplomacy continued to change during the colonial period, the use of  
victual warfare remained relatively stable: it was a way for colonists and Indi-
ans to fight each other. The participants, however, did shift,  because Eu ro pe-
ans mostly  stopped using victual warfare against each other while continuing 
to employ it against Indians. The absence of  victual imperialism during this 
period underscores the relative evenness of  power among colonists and Indi-
ans, and a significant power imbalance that favored enslavers over the enslaved. 
Mainland colonists did not practice victual warfare against enslaved Africans 
 because they did not need to; they simply controlled access to food. Slavehold-
ers ensured that bondpeople went hungry by restricting consumption and 
limiting their abilities to use land to grow garden produce.
Discourses of  hunger buttressed contradictory ideas about usefulness. In 
the eigh teenth  century the Swiss- born military theorist Emer de Vattel de-
scribed useless mouths when writing about sieges and civilian populations. If  
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generals hoped to reduce “by famine a strong place of  which it is very impor-
tant to gain possession, the useless mouths are not permitted to come out,” 
he explained.4 His definition encompassed civilian  women and  children and 
was tied to intertwined ideas about war and famine. By the eve of  the Ameri-
can Revolution, some of  the men responsible for Indian affairs believed that 
Native  children and  women— and some Indian men— were hungry, useless 
mouths. Other British Indian agents, like George Croghan, assumed that In-
dian appetites  were similar to  those of  Eu ro pe ans, while also admitting the 
necessity of  symbolically distributing large quantities of  food at key moments 
to secure useful military assistance from Native allies. Without the knowledge 
to definitively assess and address Native hunger, and often lacking the know- 
how to conduct other diplomatic rituals, Eu ro pean negotiators depended on 
Indians to guide them, and Native power continued to grow.
To understand how this shifting baseline of  hunger  shaped and was  shaped 
by food- related customs, it is necessary to examine the broader diplomatic ef-
forts of  the colonial period. Many En glish officials based their cooperative 
approaches on Iroquois protocols, and then copied them when meeting with 
other Indians. Iroquois practices stemmed from the ideas of  Gayaneshagowa, 
on which the Iroquois League was founded, and Guswenta, which emerged 
 after contact with Eu ro pe ans. Deganawidah, the Iroquois prophet whose his-
tory is chronicled in several conflicting legends, created the Iroquois League 
on six princi ples expressed in three terms: peace, righ teousness, and civil 
authority. Together,  these comprised Gayaneshagowa, or the  Great Law of  
Peace.5
During the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries, Gayaneshagowa allowed 
Indians to pre sent a neutral face to the Dutch, French, and En glish while cul-
tivating non- Native relationships, serving on military campaigns in ways that 
advanced Indian interests, limiting Iroquois deaths, and replacing dead kin with 
captives. Even when allied to competing Eu ro pean empires, Iroquois warriors 
agreed not to attack other Iroquois. Guswenta became an extension of  Gay-
aneshagowa that applied to Eu ro pe ans with whom the Iroquois wished to deal. 
Guswenta acknowledged that Natives and non- Natives could maintain friend-
ship and peace by not interfering in each other’s government, religion, or 
lives. It enabled the Iroquois to teach Eu ro pe ans to use forest diplomacy to 
create recognizable but differently interpreted practices— mourning ceremo-
nies, the smoking of  peace pipes, the exchange of  wampum, the use of  meta-
phors, and the dispensation of  alcohol, trade goods, and food goods.6
At least since 1645,  those whom death left  behind had performed a mourning 
ceremony that meta phor ically covered graves, wiped tears from mourners’ 
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eyes, and (usually) prevented the proliferation of  violent reprisals. When Eu-
ro pe ans met Indians they took part in this condolence ceremony before 
moving on to the meta phorical brightening of  the chain of  friendship and a 
rehashing of  past agreements. Only then did participants begin new business. 
Sometimes during such meetings, as in the region near the Mississippi River, 
 people shared a calumet, or peace pipe. Southeastern Creeks and Cherokees 
occasionally attached the pipe to a white eagle- tail fan, or “white wing,” which 
they held while delivering speeches. Speechmaking, and the figurative language 
and meta phors employed therein, featured prominently at  these gatherings. 
Meta phors helped  people communicate at the same time that they opened the 
door to misunderstandings when interpreted in diff er ent ways.7 The Dutch, 
following Iroquois direction, called themselves “ brothers” to the Iroquois in 
order to nurture kin relationships, while the French governor accepted the ti-
tle of  “Onontio” (“ father”). Once the En glish defeated the Dutch in the An-
glo Dutch Wars and took over New Netherland in the 1660s, they too assumed 
the role of  brethren— albeit less convincingly—as they competed with the 
French for Iroquois trade. “We are all unanimously determined forever here-
after to hold fast the Covenant Chain, & live in peace & friendship with the 
En glish,” said Cayugas at a 1770 meeting. The Iroquois famously described 
their relationship with the British as a silver chain (previously a chain of  iron, 
with the Dutch) which became known as the Covenant Chain.8
Other Indian meta phors abounded. Creeks and Cherokees let Eu ro pe ans 
know they had failed at diplomacy by portraying poor relations as crooked or 
red roads, and sent positive messages by describing amicable feelings as straight, 
white paths. Cherokees talked of  their “nakedness” not  because they lacked 
clothing, but  because they sought trade goods to conspicuously consume. 
Speechmakers described taking up hatchets, passing them on to allies to en-
courage them to take sides—as the Delaware Captain White Eyes did at a 1776 
meeting with the Iroquois— and burying them at the end of  conflicts. Stock-
bridge Mahicans and Iroquois Onondagas talked about bad birds that spread 
rumors of  discord. Edmond Atkin, who became superintendent of  Indian Af-
fairs in the southern district, described himself  to Catawba Indians as “the 
King’s Mouth” to indicate his ability to speak for colonists in the Carolinas, 
Georgia, and  Virginia. Atkin positioned British officials as useful mouths who 
recited speeches to convey authority.9
Wampum made from seashells (which  women and  children gathered, men 
fashioned, and  women strung) featured heavi ly during such oratories, from 
New  England to the  middle colonies to the southeast. The display of  a new 
wampum  belt or string accompanied each idea or section of  a speech, and its 
appearance is often recorded in manuscript documents with the phrase “a 
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string.” Speakers used the amount of  wampum to connote importance— large 
 belts signified crucial messages— and the color to convey peaceful or violent 
sentiments; black wampum, for instance, suggested death or war. Returning 
a  belt without proffering a new one rejected the speaker’s proposal. In 1768 
Sir William Johnson, superintendent of  Indian Affairs in the northern region 
(and Edmond Atkin’s counterpart), worried about the “verry dangerous ten-
dency” of  “Several  Belts” circulating in Indian country.10
Of   these many diplomatic practices, the exchange of  trade goods was what 
Eu ro pe ans strug gled the hardest to learn. Trade goods may have served as 
mnemonic place markers that enabled better recall when memorizing long 
talks. An Indian’s refusal of  goods, like his rejection of  wampum, also served 
a diplomatic purpose: Indians accepted medals as a gesture of  allegiance, but 
returned them to suggest dissatisfaction or severed  unions. In South Carolina, 
trade was so impor tant that a trader marked the start of  Cherokee country 
with the trade depot at Keowee, the first of  the Cherokee Lower Towns. Be-
tween depots, traders and officials endeavored to protect goods from rain or 
snow— “a piece of  Oil Cloth” sufficed— and  drivers  were supposed to carry 
extra “Horse Shoes, Nails, Hammer, and spare Ropes” in the event of  acci-
dents.  There  were many diff er ent types of  goods, including guns, gunpowder, 
and assorted weaponry. A 1758 report from Pennsylvania listed Stroud man-
tles, stockings, knives, shirts, silver truck, wampum, gartering, and vermillion 
among the items given to Indian warriors as “pre sents” in return for their mil-
itary ser vice.11
As is clear from the fact that Indians received “pre sents” for military con-
tributions, the trade diplomacy that was part of  forest diplomacy could func-
tion in a gift- exchange economy or a commodity- exchange economy— which 
at times blurred together and created disagreements about Indians’ usefulness. 
In a gift- exchange economy, participants are repeatedly allied, interdependent, 
and of  similar rank. Gifts are passed down, and participants cannot reject a 
gift. Although something is expected in return, the exchange symbolizes “some-
thing for nothing.” In a commodity- exchange economy,  people are temporar-
ily allied, in de pen dent, and of  diff er ent rank. Goods are individually owned 
and kept. The giving of  goods precedes the acquisition of  material wealth: it 
is a “something- for- something” trade.12
Early Eu ro pean colonists viewed trade as commercial, and so disliked the 
Indian practice of  using trade to seal alliances in a gift- exchange economy. Brit-
ish, Dutch, and French fur traders encouraged Indians’ participation in a 
commodity- exchange economy by taking their furs in return for cash or goods. 
In this second system, trade goods became a type of  payment.13 When Indi-
ans came to William Johnson asking to be “pitied”—to be given goods to 
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strengthen their alliance with the British without expecting reciprocity— 
Johnson distributed goods and then petitioned Natives for military aid; he in-
sisted on a tradeoff. Sometimes officials withheld goods from southern Indians 
 until  after a military engagement, underscoring the use of  goods as compen-
sation. During the 1760s a group of  Cherokees and Catawbas learned that they 
would receive “large Pre sents” only  after a par tic u lar “Campaign as a Reward 
for your good Ser vices, and a signal Mark” of  King George III’s friendship. De-
spite Eu ro pe ans’ efforts, Native Americans retained power in  these relation-
ships. Iroquois Indians used the market for furs to play Eu ro pe ans off  of  each 
other, thus managing to procure premium trade goods. Sometimes, they even 
demanded bespoke items.14
Natives and non- Natives also acted as if  trade diplomacy operated within 
gift- exchange economies. During the early colonial period Eu ro pe ans found 
themselves obligated to reciprocate gifts that Natives offered  because—as the 
seventeenth- century Indian leader Wahunsenacawh (also known as Powhatan) 
reminded colonist Captain John Smith— Indians maintained a strong hold on 
desirous commodities, from edible corn to valuable copper, and better con-
trol over potentially hostile indigenous populations. Trade- good exchanges al-
lowed power to flow through goods, but more importantly through the kin 
networks and personal connections that gift exchange created. Upon receipt 
of  some goods Native Americans forged relationships— redistributing gifts to 
other Indians as marks of  esteem, prestige, and evidence of  their own po liti-
cal authority. The Dutch grumbled but took part in a gift- exchange economy 
by giving trade goods as material necessities to maintain commerce; the French 
gave gifts with more enthusiasm  because their regulated fur trade meant In-
dians received lower prices for their furs and needed additional incentives to 
sell to Frenchmen. In 1755, one man wrote to William Johnson and said that 
 because “the frenchman had given a  great gift to the Indians,” he found him-
self  “ashamed” and asked Johnson for “somewhat more pre sents.” The En-
glish presented gifts to compete with the French. The overlap between  these 
two economies resulted in balanced power dynamics.15
At the heart of   these negotiations, misunderstood exchange economies, and 
diplomatic relationships was Sir William Johnson. Johnson, who was of  Irish 
descent, moved to the colonies as a young man, and by 1756 had become su-
perintendent of  Indian Affairs for the northern colonies. Mohawk members 
of  the Iroquois called him Warraghiyagey, or “he who does much business.” 
He ate Indians’ food,  adopted Iroquois dress, lived with his Mohawk common- 
law wife, Molly Brant, and learned about Indian diplomacy. Johnson Hall 
(built in 1763), in New York’s Mohawk Valley, sat between New York City and 
the Mohawks’ territory. He entertained Indians  there but also traveled often 
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to conferences, where, working closely with Deputy Superintendent George 
Croghan, he habitually spent £1,000 on diff er ent types of  gifts to establish and 
maintain alliances. His  union with Brant and willingness to study and prac-
tice forest diplomacy allowed Johnson to strengthen kinship networks, thus 
forming and maintaining British alliances with Indians. His distributions of  
trade goods became crucial to British diplomatic efforts.16
Eu ro pe ans, with Indian guidance, learned how to cooperate during the co-
lonial era, but they remained ignorant in several re spects. In 1758, one cap-
tain stationed in Pennsylvania described a cache of  trade goods for the Indians 
as evidence of  “the strongest Tye we can possibly have upon them.”17 The 
goods did not form the ties; the practices of  distribution did. Non- Natives puz-
zled over the overlap between commodity- and gift- exchange economies, and 
they failed to grasp the full significance of  trade- good etiquette. Indians proved 
their usefulness to Eu ro pe ans who wished to ally with and employ them on 
military campaigns, but in a sense Eu ro pe ans who  were compelled to work 
within a gift- exchange economy did not have the clout to comment on Indi-
ans’ utility. The officials who practiced diplomacy lacked the power to treat 
Indians as useless,  because they needed them to fight their enemies.
Food and drink played a role in  these practices, but it is challenging to analyze 
consumable items and their role in diplomacy for two reasons. First,  because 
eighteenth- century Britons did not always recognize the significance of  food 
exchange, sometimes even conflating trade goods and food goods. Second, 
 because some of  the foodstuffs that  people exchanged  were more valuable 
than  others. In 1766 an observer assumed that Onondagas viewed “Rum, pipes 
and Tobacco as provisions” and had to “have them also.” British rec ords of  
Indian pre sents included butter,  cattle, corn, flour, hams, Madeira, peas, pork, 
rice, rum, sheep, sugar, and tea— but they also included inedible blankets, gar-
tering, knives, thread, and  needles. Corn was central to Iroquois, Cherokee, 
and Creek diets and highly prized in religious rituals, but sometimes Indians 
wanted non- Native commodities they could not produce themselves— such 
as alcohol. Alcohol has an extensive, separate historiography; it destroyed In-
dian communities, but it also fit into Indian practices, such as dreaming. Other 
elevated foodstuffs included the dogs consumed in ceremonial feasts and the 
 human flesh of  Iroquois enemies. Game animals conferred prestige, but so too 
did the nuts and berries  women gathered.18 Food gifts also made for tricky pres-
tige items  because once consumed, they created the sort of  “pre sent” that no 
one wanted to reuse.
Attitudes  toward meat— such as beef, pork, and mutton from domesticated 
animals— varied. By the mid- eighteenth  century, some Creeks, Oneidas, and 
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Mohawks began raising  cattle, hogs, and  horses. To a smaller extent, Senecas 
also raised  cattle, chickens, hogs,  horses, and a few pigs. The fact that many 
Oneidas  were Christian may have made them more amenable to  cattle  because 
Christian Indians lived in sedentary, agricultural settlements, where it was eas-
ier to store manure. It should, however, be acknowledged that much of  non- 
Christian Native agriculture was also sedentary, and  because farming in  these 
communities required no plows, avoided soil disturbance, and preserved or-
ganic  matter, it did not need manure for crops to thrive. Sometimes animals 
preceded colonists’ imperial expansion (so Indians maimed them), sometimes 
they  were status symbols for Indians interested in new forms of  property 
owner ship (so they accumulated them for re distribution), and only sometimes 
 were they meat or manure sources.19
The starting point of  Eu ro pean knowledge about what, how, and why Na-
tive Americans ate— and consequently, when they hungered— was informed 
by other diplomatic practices.  People incorporated food diplomacy into for-
est diplomacy and the princi ples of  Guswenta, and food diplomacy functioned 
within both a commodity- and gift- exchange economy. Sir William Johnson 
learned to distribute provisions at treaties, to visitors at Johnson Hall, at In-
dian feasts, to warriors  going on expeditions, and as aid to villages when war 
caused disruption.  Those familiar with Indian etiquette knew “that no public 
officer” could “avoid feeding them.” As soon as a treaty was scheduled,  people 
began writing to Johnson to inquire about “the Quantity of  Provisions” he re-
quired. On the treaty’s first day  people made condolence speeches, performed 
greeting ceremonies, and smoked the calumet. Colonial negotiators distrib-
uted small glasses of  wine or punch, and the Iroquois provided impor tant 
Anglo- American newcomers with Indian names. Attendees then ate supper 
and went to bed, rather than beginning discussions. The next day the treaty 
began, and often lasted weeks; non- Native officials fed attendees for the dura-
tion. Afterwards, Indians got back on the road with “Provisions to carry them 
home.”20
Building on other meta phors at treaties, Indians employed food language. 
When they called themselves “naked,” they also said they  were “starving.” The 
“one dish and one spoon” (sometimes “eating out of  one dish” or “eating out 
of  the same dish”) meta phor described alliances of  fairly equal power from 
the  Great Lakes to the Carolinas to New  England. The common- dish trope 
changed upon contact with Eu ro pe ans. Before 1701, the phrase signified war: 
enemies boiled each other in  kettles. Afterward, the meta phor shifted to a 
peacetime one that symbolized the goal and foundation of  cooperation. Eat-
ing out of  one dish meant being bound together in a symbiotic relationship 
of  usefulness that included kinship ties, war time alliances, and willingness to 
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share hunting territory. When the one dish was empty, every one went hun-
gry by mutual agreement.21
Meta phorical speechmaking helped to solidify treaty agreements, and trea-
ties could end conflict or encourage Indians to join with British and French 
allies against their Eu ro pean enemies. In 1757 a captured French marine re-
vealed that the French provided “as much feasting as the Indians please at  going 
out, & on their Return,” guns, clothing, and “as much provisions as they please, 
or can Eat.” This generosity was significant; according to the Frenchman, their 
own provisions  were “Scarce in general,” bordering on the “very Scarce.”22 
French readiness to provide for indispensable Native allies— even when the 
French themselves hungered— was part of  the one- dish alliance. British offi-
cials, including Johnson, feared that  these Indians’ appetites would disrupt Brit-
ish military operations by pushing their allies  toward the French.
Although  there  were similarities between food and trade diplomacy,  there 
 were also times when food diplomacy seemed diff er ent. Trade goods and furs 
tended to flow in one direction; Eu ro pe ans gave goods to Indians, and Indians 
gave them to other Indians, but Natives rarely offered trade goods to Eu ro pe-
ans. Furs likewise followed a one- way route from Indian towns to Eu ro pean 
markets. Natives and non- Natives both produced food, which again under-
mined accusations of  Indians’ uselessness. Permanent and intensive pre- 
Columbian indigenous cropping systems in North Amer i ca created large crop 
yields. Natives received food, but their agricultural abilities also enabled them 
to grow and gather crops, such as the wild rice they distributed to Europeans— 
who  were not good at growing it themselves. Indians could shoot game and 
supply themselves and non- Natives with venison, as Powhatans did in 
seventeenth- century  Virginia, as Creeks did in mid- eighteenth- century Geor-
gia, and as the Iroquois did when they came to stay in British forts.23 Whereas 
they seldom offered trade goods, Native Americans could source food as pay-
ment and as a gift, thus decreasing the symbolic bargaining power of  the co-
mestibles that Eu ro pe ans produced. Eminent Indians may have looked to the 
British for pre sents of  food more than some of  their brethren, but  these pre-
sents indicated their status of  strategic usefulness, not need.
As  people exchanged, discussed, and learned about food goods, they defined 
the power relationships that underscored Native abilities to deal with hunger. 
Seventeenth- century Pilgrims, for example, shared their first harvest with 
Wampanoag Indians at the much- mythologized first Thanksgiving, but the In-
dian chief  Massasoit’s return gift of  five freshly killed deer undermined Gov-
ernor William Bradford’s authority. Massasoit, by giving the venison to each 
of  the colony’s leading members, made it impossible for Bradford to distrib-
ute them himself, which reminded En glish colonists that they needed Indian 
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allies to feed themselves. Indians remained self- sufficient during other times 
of  real scarcity.  After Jacques- René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville’s 1687 at-
tack against the Iroquois, in which the French burned Seneca villages and 
claimed to have destroyed 1.2 million bushels of  stored and standing corn, the 
Senecas dispersed. Warriors moved into the woods while civilian Mohawks 
went to live with Oneidas, and Senecas with Cayugas and Onondagas. Dur-
ing a significant famine in 1741 and 1742, Senecas skipped Eu ro pean meetings 
at Montreal and Pennsylvania, where food supplies would have been plenti-
ful.24  These dominant Indians did not need food goods from Eu ro pe ans.
In the eigh teenth  century, Britons became better informed about giving 
food and food- related gifts but remained unable to gain the upper hand in 
power strug gles,  because Indians continued to feed themselves. “ Women of  
the Six Nations . . .  provide our Warriors with Provisions when they go 
abroad,” even when warriors fought alongside Eu ro pe ans, Johnson learned. 
Officials intermittently gave symbolic gifts of  food to  women,  children, and 
significant chiefs. In 1774 one major reported feeding Native  women and 
 children near Detroit: “the Custom is to give them a Brick of  Bread, and [a] 
Dram.” Impor tant Native leaders and their families received “a few Rations 
of  Provisions.” Nearby inhabitants thought it was “an exceeding good sign,” 
to see the Indians “bring in Meat. & stay about the Fort in Winter,” where they 
consumed some British offerings. Native Americans obtained meat for their 
stay, and  women continued to produce crops for tribal consumption. Even In-
dian requests for British gift- giving  were couched in the language of  utility. A 
1761 speech by a Six Nations Indian named Otchinneyawessahawe, delivered 
by the White Mingo, described Otchinneyawessahawe’s loss of  all his “pow-
der & Lead,” along “with a quantity of  goods” when his “Cannoe split.” He 
asked for “a  little powder and Lead,” without which he worried the Indians 
“must starve.”25 Otchinneyawessahawe asked not for more goods, but for am-
munition to hunt game meat. His request suggests that Native petitioners 
sometimes had to remind non- Native officials of  their ability to be useful to 
themselves.
Diplomatic food exchange nurtured the development of  contrasting ideas 
about Native hunger and usefulness. Indians told Eu ro pe ans they  were hun-
gry or starving even when they  were not,  because guests  were supposed to 
exaggerate need so that hosts did not appear proud. Thus when Mohawks 
“complained much of  the want of  provisions,” Johnson recorded providing 
them with powder, not foodstuffs, and when Oneidas and Tuscaroras came 
to see him “in a Starving Condition”  because their crops had failed, he did not 
feed them immediately but gave them cash to purchase provisions. Yet British 
officials also had to ensure that provisions satisfied Native expectations. 
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Eighteenth- century officials concluded that at treaties, Indians could and did 
eat twice as much per day as colonists— and some men refused to make cal-
culations  because they said Indians “eat more than ten of  our Men.” Swiss- 
British official Col o nel Henry Bouquet complained about the cost of  provisions 
they distributed, at the same time calling Indians “Idle  People.”26
In 1765,  after the British had defeated the French in the Seven Years’ War, 
at  great cost and with significant vio lence between Natives and non- Natives, 
Sir William Johnson described British abilities to address Native hunger. He 
complained, “all the Bull feasts ever given at Albany would not now draw down 
Ten Indians.”27 Johnson’s statement could be read in three ways: he might have 
been suggesting that British offerings  were too stingy; he may have thought 
that  these Indians  were not hungry; or he may have known how well  these 
Indians could provision themselves. On the one hand, British officials, includ-
ing Johnson, sometimes witnessed Indians’ enormous appetites. On the other 
hand, sometimes even hungry Indians refused to do what the British wanted 
them to do—in this case, to come to William Johnson ready to fight for the 
British.
An examination of  pre- Revolutionary food diplomacy, bound up in the pol-
icy of  forest and trade diplomacy, thus reveals several conflicting baselines of  
Indian hunger: hungry, contributing Indians; self- sufficient, nonhungry ones; 
and Natives in need of  food aid from other Indians  after a Eu ro pean attack. 
 These conflicting ideas stretched back at least to descriptions of  Indians in the 
1600s. Rather than offering a definitive assessment of  pre- Revolutionary In-
dian hunger, it is more productive to conclude that before the 1770s  there  were 
two prevailing Eu ro pean perceptions of  it. One strand of  Eu ro pean thought 
found Indians not as hungry as they described themselves. The other strand 
of  thought believed that Indian hunger was greater than Eu ro pean hunger, 
and that Indians possessed excessive appetites. At times  people married the 
concept of  nonhungry Indians with useful ones, and hungry Indians with use-
less mouths, but during other moments unpredictable ideas about usefulness 
emerged.  These incompatible perceptions continued to exist in the mid-1770s, 
when men like George Croghan worked to convince their peers that the por-
trayal of  self- sufficient, less ravenous Indians was the more accurate one. But 
how  people used food to foster cooperation is only one half  of  the story of  
non- Natives’ interactions with Indians.
Food- related be hav ior also resulted in conflict. Victual warfare was the  counter 
to food diplomacy, and it originated in the so- called Old World, not the Amer-
i cas. In Eu rope, armies burned villages and crops and withheld food—or 
prevented it from reaching other  people—to cause hunger. Similar tactics 
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characterized New World victual warfare when colonists arrived, but  people 
also stole grain, introduced destructive domesticated animals, stole or maimed 
 those animals, and in some cases even poisoned each other. In the New World, 
in contrast to the Old, not all practices related to victual warfare  were designed 
to create hunger; sometimes they just helped aggressors to assert power.
Victual warfare was part of  early modern Eu ro pean military tactics. Dur-
ing the mid- sixteenth- century En glish subjugation of  the Irish in Munster, the 
En glish leveled charges of  paganism and critiqued Irish customs, habits, and 
agricultural practices, which laid the groundwork to declare Ireland’s  people 
barbarians and their laws invalid. The En glishman Sir Humphrey Gilbert had 
his men kill noncombatants  because their agricultural  labor fed the Irish and 
kept them from famine. War in seventeenth- century Ireland was less consis-
tent in its use of  victual warfare; some campaigns included indiscriminate vio-
lence, and some  were characterized by more commonly accepted laws of  
war. When Thomas  Cromwell and his Parliamentarian troops arrived in Ire-
land in 1649, he  adopted a twofold approach of  denouncing the Irish while 
reassuring them that the army would behave; he discouraged pillaging by 
hanging disobedient soldiers, and he tried to make the army pay for the goods 
it took from local populations. At the siege of  Drogheda, his soldiers killed 
civilian inhabitants. In 1651, Governor Col o nel John Hewson encouraged 
the En glish to target the countryside, to destroy crops, and to kill livestock 
in the districts of  Tipperary, Wicklow, and Wexford,  because  these actions 
kept the Irish  enemy from obtaining supplies. They made famine conditions 
worse and encouraged the spread of  disease, including the plague.28
In the New World, a hodgepodge of  early modern writers influenced col-
onists’ evolving understanding of  war, but Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel 
stand out from the rest for the extent to which colonists read them. Dutch-
man Hugo Grotius’s most famous work, The Law of  War and Peace, was pub-
lished in Latin in 1625 and translated into En glish in 1654. His evaluation of  
war as just or unjust was tied to jus ad bello ( just cause, or why war is waged), 
and jus in bellum ( just conduct, or how it is waged). Drawing on the laws of  
nature and nations, Grotius insisted that warfare abided by a set number of  
princi ples. A  century  later, Emer de Vattel’s The Law of  Nations appeared in 
French in 1758 and in En glish in 1760. Vattel challenged and elaborated on Gro-
tius’s understanding of  property transfer and the treatment of  noncomba-
tants.29
The writings of  Grotius and Vattel informed the ways that armies targeted 
foodstuffs, and such strategies shifted over time and space. In sixteenth- century 
 England,  people destroyed crops to control the countryside and undermine 
an  enemy’s ability to fight, but without intending to starve the local popula-
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tion. Grotius sanctioned destruction of  noncombatants’ property if  such ac-
tions  were necessary to sustain the troops.30 By the 1640s, when the En glish 
garrisoned Dublin and cut off  supplies to  every town within a twelve- mile ra-
dius, a change had occurred: military strategy was designed not only to force 
submission and dependence but also to exterminate “savage” Irish noncom-
batants through starvation.31 By the late seventeenth  century, however, delib-
erate starvation of  noncombatants fell out of  practice in Western Eu rope.32 
Provisions, according to Vattel, belonged to the realm of  peace (gunpowder 
and soldiers’ clothing, by contrast, belonged to the realm of  war). Even so, he 
declared it lawful for the army to take provisions from an unjust  enemy, and 
to destroy what the army could not carry away, while at the same time calling 
for moderation “according to the exigency of  the case.”33 Thus, at first, early 
En glishmen targeted crops to force submission but not starvation, then tar-
geted crops to engender starvation and eradication of  Irish noncombatants, 
and then continued to attack crops, but without intending to kill civilians.
Despite early modern efforts to regularize methods of  waging war, strange 
contradictions emerged about fighting Native Americans. Part of  the prob lem 
stemmed from the fact that although Hugo Grotius established separate rules 
for Christian warfare and non- Christian warfare, he nowhere explained which 
set of  laws applied when a Christian nation fought a non- Christian one. Vat-
tel condoned a “law of  retaliation” against “a savage nation” that observed no 
rules and gave no quarter. He even suggested that  because Native Americans 
hunted, they possessed no right to land, and, invoking John Locke, he con-
cluded that another nation was morally obligated to take their land from them. 
Few  people in the colonies cared that Indians actually did grow crops, offer 
quarter, and take captives, or that some Indians— Stockbridges, Moravian Del-
awares, Oneidas— were Christian. Eu ro pe ans thought Indian torture was 
shocking and their treatment of  dead bodies despicable. They asserted that 
Indians  were a diff er ent type of   enemy; by transposing concepts of  savagery 
onto Native Americans, they justified attacks against them. Targeting Native 
noncombatants to starve them became an integral component of  colonial 
strategies.34
 Because many Eu ro pe ans assumed that Indians  were barbarous, military 
officials and colonists normalized victual warfare in North Amer i ca. The 
French invaded Iroquoia on four separate occasions before 1700 to burn homes, 
crops, and food stores. Five En glish expeditions out of  Jamestown,  Virginia, 
in 1610 resulted in burned villages, pilfered crops, and dead Algonquians— 
including the  children of  a Paspahegh werowance, whom the En glish shot. 
During the Pequot War, En glishmen accomplished huge destructions of  Na-
tive corn.35
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 These methods of  vio lence eventually became linked with results so effec-
tive that both Natives and non- Natives began to use them. Colonists and Indi-
ans alike targeted crops and animals during King Philip’s War in the 1670s. The 
Cherokee War of  1759–1761 pitted Carolinians against Cherokees. A 1761 at-
tack destroyed fifteen towns and approximately fourteen hundred acres of  
corn. In  Virginia, Governor Lord Dunmore led a 1774 expedition against the 
Shawnees of  the upper Muskingum River, burning cabins and cornfields along 
the way.36 Crop destruction and animal theft practiced for the explicit purpose 
of  attacking noncombatant populations, engendering hunger, and asserting 
dominance had long characterized strategies of  vio lence by the 1770s.
Domesticated animals also became potent food- related targets of  vio lence. 
Animals, or “creatures of  empire,” came to symbolize colonists’ incursions 
onto Indians’ lands at the same time that they became desirable commodities 
to own, and sometimes eat. Indians from the Chesapeake to the Mohawk Val-
ley thus ate  cattle, pigs, sheep, and sometimes  horses, but they also stole, 
maimed, or destroyed them. During periods of  war it became common for 
Indians to target a farm, capture as many  people and animals as pos si ble, kill 
the rest, and set fire to crops and farm buildings before moving on to the next 
farm. During times of  peace, British military officials complained that Shaw-
nees in Pennsylvania stole  horses. In the 1720s, Delawares in the mid- Atlantic 
criticized the Germans whose  cattle destroyed Native cornfields. They may 
even have retaliated; during the Seven Years’ War, Dutch and German farm-
ers charged Indian warriors with killing their livestock. Indian farmers reported 
British soldiers who let army  cattle wander through their fields. Alabama 
Creeks killed  cattle.37
This range of  activities suggests that official warfare and unpredictable out-
breaks of  vio lence sometimes blurred together, especially by the mid- 
eighteenth  century, when North Amer i ca witnessed a rise in Indian- hating. 
Colonists’ warfare consisted of  three diff er ent approaches: they practiced ex-
tirpative war making, created specialized units to fight Native Americans, and 
rewarded scalp taking to motivate private expeditions.38 Colonial soldiers as 
well as Indian warriors could and did disobey  orders. They sometimes went 
too far in their destruction of  crops, maiming of  animals, and execution of  
noncombatants. The impermanence of  colonial military entities, along with 
colonists’ land hunger, meant that former soldiers could transition easily into 
hunting Indians and taking their scalps for profit. Victual warfare allowed Brit-
ish and American soldiers to attack colonial farms and fields to appropriate 
grain and moveable meat supplies. It condoned the be hav ior of  Indians em-
ployed by Americans and Britons for the same reasons. For de cades, victual 
warfare also justified the actions of  colonists who lived beyond the control of  
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military authority, and the activities of  Native warriors who sometimes ignored 
the po liti cal and peacemaking arms of  Native governments.
Years of  victual warfare prompted changes in Indian husbandry. Although 
 women tended to take responsibility for growing crops,  after the Seven Years’ 
War even some Native men, such as the Oneidas, could be found working on 
their farms. Some  women ceased planting corn, beans, and squash in small 
mounds, while men took up plowing. Mohawks, surrounded on all sides of  
their territory by colonists, started fencing cornfields to prevent damage from 
 cattle. Vio lence between Indians and colonists interfered with Indians’ hunt-
ing and planting. Native men would not go out to hunt when they feared at-
tacks on their villages. Indian raids against colonists’ towns resulted in similar 
effects: colonists grew wary when planting, and protective of  the domesticated 
animals that belonged to them. Iroquois Indians in the 1760s broke into gar-
dens and threatened to take every thing that had been planted  until they  were 
paid for the land on which the garden had been built.39 Conflicts over crops 
existed before the Revolution, but the increasing value that Indians placed on 
diminishing farmland made the situation more volatile.
In 1761, during the Cherokee War,  future lieutenant- governor of  Florida 
John Moultrie described burning  houses and “destroying fine fields gardens 
[and] orchards” belonging to Cherokee Indians. He also, in the same breath, 
confessed to “making  free” with a “Cherokee Squawh,” raising questions about 
an unnamed Native  woman’s lack of  consent during this invasion.40 Crop and 
animal destruction became more than mere military actions; they became in-
stitutionalized forms of  vio lence that created hunger, readjusted power dy-
namics, and granted  future politicians the license to abuse authority.  These 
be hav iors  were not yet victual imperialism, which was largely absent from co-
lonial North Amer i ca. Colonial governments and the individuals living in 
 those colonies encroached on Native land, but during this period non- Natives 
failed to consistently interfere with Native food sovereignty.
And what of  accommodation and vio lence with re spect to enslaved  peoples? 
 People of  African descent, like Native Americans, also produced and consumed 
food, but during the colonial period on the North American mainland, enslaved 
 peoples’  labor to produce foodstuffs did not grant them much power. In addi-
tion to growing cash crops such as tobacco, enslaved Africans plowed fields, 
grew rice, cooked their masters’ dinners, and hawked food. The marketplace 
was a venue where whites sold black bodies, but it was also a place where black 
men and  women sold produce. When pos si ble, enslaved  people grew such pro-
duce on their private pelicula, then sold it at market to whites and  free blacks. 
Bondpeople planted vegetable gardens, raised chickens for meat and eggs, and 
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supplemented their diets with hunting and fishing. Although differences in 
foodways existed between the Lowcountry and the Chesapeake— Lowcountry 
slaves ate less maize and meat from domesticated animals, grew more vegeta-
bles, foraged more frequently, and  were likelier to incorporate African 
influences— enslaved  labor in both of   these regions produced some of  the food 
that made it to masters’  tables. Lowcountry slaves’ fishing activities cornered 
the market. In many instances southern slave hucksters’ prices for dairy, meat, 
and perishable goods  rose higher than  those set by whites  because slaves had 
more customers.41
Despite  these contributions to the food system, food diplomacy was not 
applicable to enslaved and  free black colonists, who lacked sufficient leverage 
in their interactions with slaveholders. Although bondpeople claimed power 
by stealing food and refusing to eat, the entrenched nature of  slavery made it 
all too easy for enslavers to enact greater vio lence by controlling black mouths, 
which they did by force- feeding  people and withholding food.42 Slaveholders 
did curtail enslaved  peoples’ access to food, but  there was  little land, save for 
enslaved garden plots, to take away from them— which made victual imperi-
alism similarly irrelevant. The fact that mainland slaveholders did not need to 
practice victual warfare, the fact that enslaved  peoples in North Amer i ca  were 
not yet victual warriors themselves, and the fact that victual imperialism 
was not yet effective— none of   these conditions should undermine the utility 
of   these analytical terms. To the contrary, the emergence of   these practices 
among black mi grants in the late eigh teenth  century becomes all the more 
striking as commentary on the ways that hunger creation and prevention 
changed during the Revolutionary War. Before the late eigh teenth  century, en-
slaved  people suffered from hunger— but they also embraced and ignored it.43
Before the War for In de pen dence, food diplomacy does not stand out for 
its notable successes, but confusion over the best way to practice it within the 
constraints of  forest diplomacy— which resulted from differences between 
commodity- and gift- exchange economies— exposed several strands of  Eu ro-
pean perceptions of  Indian hunger. Eu ro pe ans described starving Indians, they 
wrote about hungry Native allies, and they talked of   those with insignificant 
appetites. According to En glishmen, starving Indians required provisions when 
victual warfare and crop failures interfered with Indians’ food supply— but 
 those En glishmen also called Indians starving when they hosted them at trea-
ties,  because that is how Indians described their own needs. The non- Native 
observers who said Indians had normal or insignificant appetites depicted In-
dians who, during times of  famine, avoided de pen dency on Eu ro pe ans and 
ignored their own hunger, who  were unexcited by promises of  feasts, and who 
seemed likelier to refuse food. At least in the 1750s, 1760s, and 1770s,  these 
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last ideas about hunger seemed to prevail among  those who worked most 
closely with Native Americans.
George Croghan’s own observations about Indians emphasized that Indi-
ans remained self- sufficient— they  were useful to themselves while appearing 
useful and useless to Eu ro pe ans. Even before Croghan’s 1773 claim about Na-
tive Americans’ reasonable appetites, he witnessed Indians repeatedly prove 
that they did not feel compelled to accept British provisions for survival. In 
times of  very extreme weather, many Indians chose to stay in their villages 
rather than make the journey to British forts for pre sents. “The Expence of  
Indians this Winter has been but trifling,” Croghan wrote to Henry Bouquet 
in 1762. “It  will be so  every Winter as they  will be a hunting.” Bouquet prob-
ably welcomed the news that he could avoid giving more provisions to Indi-
ans. In 1765 Croghan likewise informed William Johnson that he had not found 
himself  saddled with the task of  feeding Indians at Fort Pitt  because the harsh 
weather had curtailed Indians’ mobility. As a result of  “So Sevair a Winter and 
Spring att this plese Since I have been aquainted with this Country,” he said, 
“butt fewe Indians” had arrived. During the summer they became more de-
manding, he conceded, but only  because they had  little  else to do “but travel 
about.” When Indians did not “go to Warr” they went “Visiting their friends,” 
and while on their move they arrived at En glish forts with “Expectations.”44
The knowledgeable Croghan suggested that food exchange did not form 
the crux of  British policy in North Amer i ca. Yet it is telling that he failed to 
convince his Edinburgh correspondent, Dr. Robertson, of  his claims about Na-
tive appetites. Robertson accepted Croghan’s assessment only partially in his 
history, writing, “The strength and vigour of  savages are at some seasons im-
paired by what they suffer from a scarcity of  food; at  others they are afflicted 
with disorders arising from indigestion and a superfluity of  gross aliment.”45 
At times the doctor thought Indians’ health deteriorated due to a lack of  food, 
and at other times he critiqued them for overeating. Robertson, like other ob-
servers, remained ambivalent in his assessment of  Native hunger.  These con-
flicting British, Indian, and American notions of  hunger, and thus of  food 
diplomacy and victual warfare, would transform in the coming de cades as the 
war got underway.
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Iroquois Food Diplomacy in the 
Revolutionary North
“The number of  Indians victualled at Niagara is 
prodigious, and if  not by some means reduced, must terminate very disagre-
ably.” So wrote General Frederick Haldimand, governor of  the British Prov-
ince of  Quebec, in September 1780. “No useless Mouth, which can possibly 
be sent away” could be allowed to “remain for the Winter,” he concluded, be-
fore asking for “a Minute Return of   every Person upon the Ground, exclusive 
of  the Troops, for whom Provision is drawn.”1 A year before Haldimand wrote 
this letter, during the summer of  1779 (and in the  middle of  the Revolution-
ary War), the rebel American army mounted a devastating victual- warfare 
campaign, known  today as the  Sullivan Campaign, against Britain’s Iroquois 
allies. By autumn of  that year, Iroquois refugees had moved from burned vil-
lages into British forts, where they expected their military partners to feed 
them. Haldimand’s alarm deviated from George Croghan’s assessment of  Na-
tive appetites less than a de cade previously. Haldimand, like some of  his pre-
de ces sors writing during the 1750s and 1760s,  imagined noncontributing, 
ravenous Indian civilians whose useless hunger took food out of  the mouths 
of  indispensable British soldiers.
What is striking about Haldimand’s complaints is how in effec tive they ul-
timately  were. Rather than losing power, Iroquois Indians gained it in the wake 
of  the  Sullivan expedition, and they did so partly by promoting their own in-
terpretation of  Native hunger. Shifting British perceptions of  Indian hungri-
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ness changed food diplomacy and reworked the related military idea of  the 
useless mouth. Iroquois guidance on British hunger- prevention efforts conse-
quently increased British food aid to Indians.  Here, too, however,  were rum-
blings of  a nascent American hunger policy, born out of  the ashes of  the 1779 
campaign.  Under  future president George Washington, that policy aimed to 
cause Native hunger for the explicit purpose of  legitimizing food- aid distribu-
tions to conquered enemies.
Diplomacy itself— with all its fluid, improvisational qualities— had started 
to collapse in the two de cades before the start of  the war. Signs appeared in 
fur scarcities, land  battles, divisions among officials in North Amer i ca and be-
tween them and their superiors in  England, and conflicts over trade goods 
 after the Seven Years’ War. Goods became scarce in the 1760s and early 1770s, 
but  after shots rang out at Lexington and Concord in 1775, Britons and Amer-
icans had to move fast to secure allegiances with Indians.2  Because trade di-
plomacy was becoming less effective, they needed additional means to secure 
strategic connections. Food diplomacy provided the answer, but it, too, re-
quired adjusting in light of  new war time power relationships.
Early in the war, food diplomacy did not change much; Americans and Brit-
ons replicated the practices that Natives and non- Natives had created to-
gether during the colonial period. British officials relied on symbolic gifts of  
food at strategic moments to maintain the loyalties of  impor tant Iroquois In-
dians (also known as Six Nations). The Americans deployed food meta phors 
while asking for Iroquois neutrality before haphazardly distributing diff er ent 
types and quantities of  provisions. Neither Britons nor Americans regularly 
gave the Six Nations large amounts of  food.  After 1779  these strategies proved 
untenable, and Frederick Haldimand became unable to avoid feeding  those 
whom he called “useless mouths.” American campaigns had forced the Iro-
quois from their homes, resulting in a situation that allowed Indians to create 
a new form of  food diplomacy that drew on revised notions of  hunger.
The 1779 campaign was more effective than previous instances of  victual 
warfare in North Amer i ca in its ability to create significant, enduring famine. 
Two major related changes occurred  after the expedition. First, British descrip-
tions of  Iroquois hunger by the 1780s allowed most officials to envision Indi-
ans as useful mouths who could overlook hunger while also requiring more 
provisions. British Indian agents ignored Haldimand’s contention that the Six 
Nations needed to be removed from British strongholds and instead bowed 
to Indians’ insistence that war was a time to stay together to share experiences 
of  dearth in forts and on campaigns.
This altered perception of  Iroquois hunger created a second change: a re-
working of  Iroquoian food diplomacy into something more violent than its 
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previous iterations. Indians started to deprive their allies— rather than their 
enemies—of  food when it suited them.  People had destroyed  enemy food-
stuffs since the colonial period but did not often target their military allies. Iro-
quoian food diplomacy in the American Revolution was thus constituted, 
in part, by mutual fasting— a policy the Indians sometimes had to enforce 
through the use of  aggression. This diplomacy took Indian requests for cer-
tain types of  provisions into account, obliging non- Natives to go out of  their 
way to accommodate Native tastes. By the time the northern military cam-
paign came to a close,  these be hav iors  were apparent among other Indian 
nations, who also used them in their interactions with the British.
The American Revolution ravaged Indian communities, including Iroquois 
ones, but, during the war, changing British perceptions of  hungry Indians al-
lowed the Iroquois to challenge the state of  power relations at a time when 
contemporaries assumed they  were powerless in the face of  crop destruction 
and land losses.3 Iroquois abilities to ignore and endure hunger made it im-
possible for their British allies to think of  them as useless mouths;  those who 
did not hunger could not eat uselessly. It is impossible to say what prompted 
Indians to alter their approach to hunger endurance, but non- Native misun-
derstandings of  Indian hunger  were crucial to British and Indian food diplo-
macy. Indians used hunger to fight back.
Iroquois strength had fluctuated during the colonial period. In the 1650s the 
Iroquois had waged a series of  wars that resulted in their alliance with the 
Dutch, the defeat of  the Hurons— their major competitor in the fur trade— 
and a cycle of  captive- taking and vio lence that rearranged the Native popula-
tions of  North Amer i ca.  After  these conflicts, which are known as the Mourning 
Wars, many Indian refugees went to live with the Iroquois, or in entirely new 
villages. Up  until 1680 or 1690, the Iroquois claimed dominance over tribes 
such as the Delawares, Shawnees, and Susquehannocks.  These tribes gained a 
respite from Iroquois interference in 1681, when the colony of  New York split 
from Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvanians,  under the influence of  Quaker Wil-
liam Penn, offered them protection from the Six Nations. Two peace treaties 
in 1701, between the Iroquois and the En glish, and the Iroquois and the French, 
helped to consolidate the strength of  the Six Nations. By 1736 William Penn 
had died, and Pennsylvania also recognized the Six Nations’ right to cede the 
land of  other tribes. Although  there is some disagreement over  whether  these 
Iroquois actions constitute  those of  a formal empire, it is clear that victual im-
perialism was not a  factor in  these power strug gles.4 The Iroquois may have 
taken land from other Indians, but they did not try to change  those Indians’ 
food choices.
 IroquoIs Food dIploMaCy In the reVolutIonary north 41
By the 1760s, between sixty- four hundred and ten thousand Iroquois claimed 
the region south of  Lake Ontario (it is difficult to estimate population num-
bers of  Native towns  because officials frequently omitted  women and  children 
in their surveys). The Mohawks occupied the villages of  Canajoharie and Tion-
onderoge in the Mohawk Valley, and the Oneidas and Tuscaroras shared the 
Susquehanna Valley region and the area around Oneida Lake. Further west, 
the Cayugas and Onondagas dwelled by the Fin ger Lakes, while the Senecas, 
the most numerous members of  the Iroquois, lived in the Genesee and Al-
legheny River valleys and around the Seneca and Canandaigua Lakes.5
The Seven Years’ War (1754–1763) and the subsequent conflict known as 
Pontiac’s War (1763–1766) prompted changes in Indian affairs  because of  declin-
ing French influence, Indians’ inabilities to play imperial powers off of  each 
other, and new British trade policies. Thereafter, clashing empires, imperial 
agents fighting with ill- informed En glish politicians, declining trade, and land 
hunger undermined many diplomatic rituals. The Seven Years’ War in North 
Amer i ca stretched from Nova Scotia to the interior of  the Ohio Valley, with 
Guy Johnson, “Map of the Six Nations,” 1771, The Documentary History of the State of New- York, 
ed. E. B. O’Callaghan (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1851), vol. IV, 1090. The Mohawks and 
Tuscaroras are not pictured; the Tuscaroras lived between and below the Onondagas and Oneidas, 
and the Mohawks east of the Oneidas. Courtesy of the Institute of Historical Research, London.
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other conflicts reverberating around the globe. By the war’s end the British 
claimed land around the  Great Lakes, the Ohio Valley, and present- day Canada. 
Throughout the conflict French and British officials fought over Native alliances. 
The British increased their diplomatic efforts  because the Iroquois controlled 
the waterways over which the British needed to move their cannons. French of-
ficials’ inabilities to cooperate with each other, combined with austerity mea-
sures passed down from Versailles, ensured a British upper hand. By 1757 most 
Natives refused to assist the French in  future campaigns at the same time that 
the French became more cautious about employing them. By 1758 most Indians 
agreed to a truce at Easton, Pennsylvania. Crucially, by the time the En glish de-
feated the French, the Iroquois expected not only symbolic gifts of  trade goods, 
but also larger amounts of  goods as evidence of  En glish officials’ sincerity.6
Although the British maintained Indian alliances, their ability to use trade 
goods to do so decreased in the 1750s and 1760s. At the same moment, the 
fur trade began to suffer too. It is uncertain which game animals died out fast-
est; some beaver, deer, and otter populations dropped as early as 1670. It is 
hard to count seventeenth- century beaver numbers  because of  Indians’ ten-
dencies to use meta phors to exaggerate their poverty. Skins of  smaller 
animals— “raccoons,” “otter[s],” “Musquashes” (muskrats), and “Cats”—do ap-
pear for sale in William Johnson’s correspondence, but Johnson also contin-
ued to rec ord sales of  beaver pelts and deerskins. Seneca hunting transitioned 
from beaver to white- tailed deer before 1750. In 1762 Mohawks further east 
reported that deer  were scarce.7
What is clear, even if  precise numbers for animals remain elusive, is that 
the trade changed. In the 1750s, a growing French presence in the Ohio Valley 
threatened to keep En glish traders from the fur market. Furs, which in the 
first half  of  the  century had constituted more than 25  percent of  all New York’s 
exports to  England, plummeted to 2  percent of  exports by 1775. Transform-
ing deer- hunting practices disrupted gender divisions in Native communities; 
in Creek and Iroquois country, power shifted from the sachems in charge of  
hunting and the  women who prepared skins to younger male warriors. The 
Iroquois continued to overhunt game, but the scarce nature of  pelts challenged 
Natives’ abilities to control the value of  the furs they exchanged and, conse-
quently, the prices of  the trade goods they bought.8
Trade goods remained similarly elusive, and trade diplomacy became un-
workable for non- Natives. In some regions, like the Pays d’en Haut, trade goods 
had been scarce as early as 1745. Britons’ destruction of  French shipping in-
hibited French abilities to transport and distribute goods. French influence fur-
ther inland in turn prevented British goods from reaching Indians. In 1758 
Col o nel Henry Bouquet told a group of  Delawares that  because “we are at 
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War with the French,” the British “ can’t send Traders amongst you as we for-
merly did, to be robbed and plunder’d by the  Enemy.” He promised  future 
trade goods but provided none at the time. By 1761 Sir William Johnson re-
layed Indians’ complaints about “the dearness of  goods, & extortion of  the 
Traders.”9 He knew something had to be done.
In response to Indians’ complaints, Johnson, with Commander- in- Chief  Jef-
fery Amherst’s approval, issued regulations to reform trade to Native Ameri-
cans’ benefit. He  limited commerce to British posts, appointed commissaries, 
and fixed prices for skins at vari ous strongholds from Pennsylvania to present- 
day Ohio in an attempt to standardize exchanges of  furs for trade goods.10 
Word of  his changes spread from official to official at Detroit, Niagara, and 
Oswego, and the atmosphere seemed to improve. In the main, however, British 
efforts to maintain forest diplomacy did not go well  because Jeffery Amherst 
took Johnson’s trade regulations too far— thus provoking Pontiac’s War. In 
August 1761, Amherst, in addition to encouraging Johnson’s directives, wrote 
to Johnson and instructed him “to avoid all pre sents in  future,” demanding 
that officials abolish the practice of  gift giving to cut costs. Amherst, like  others 
before him, did not recognize the overlap between the commodity- and gift- 
exchange economies of  Indian diplomacy. William Pitt’s military policies had 
increased Britain’s debt. Although Johnson agreed with the idea of  restricting 
gift giving, he worried about any abrupt changes to Indian Affairs. When he 
objected, Amherst overruled him.11
Amherst’s actions accelerated the conflict that came to be known as Pon-
tiac’s War. Although the war bears his name, the Ottawa chief  Pontiac es-
poused the teachings of  Neolin, a Delaware Indian hundreds of  miles away, 
who preached that Native Americans needed to distance themselves from Eu-
ro pean influences. During a time when Native Americans, affected by the 
First  Great Awakening, sought new modes of  spirituality, Neolin advocated 
for renewed attention to Indian rituals, a rejection of  British trade, and the 
gradual abandonment of  European- made goods. He also promoted venison 
consumption over pork and beef, and abstinence from alcohol. This boycott 
was significant  because it demonstrated Indians’ attention to what non- Native 
commodities they consumed and how they did so.12
Neolin’s followers severed alliances. A group of  Cherokees fought against 
their former British allies from the late 1750s  until 1761. In April 1763 Pontiac 
convinced Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas to strike British forts through-
out the Ohio and Illinois country. Although most of  the Iroquois avoided the 
conflict, the Senecas participated. Other non- Iroquois Indians— Delawares, 
Hurons, Kickapoos, Mascoutens, Miamis, Mingoes, Ojibwas, Ottawas, Pi-
ankashaws, Potawatomis, Shawnees, Weas, and Wyandots— readily “took up 
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the hatchet,” as they might have described it. Indians seized  every British post 
west of  the Appalachians with the exception of  Detroit, Niagara, and Fort Pitt. 
The war stretched  until 1764, when most of  the Indians made peace.13
In the aftermath, forest diplomacy momentarily recovered. British Indian 
Affairs officials, led by William Johnson, articulated the need for a four- pronged 
policy that enforced land bound aries, regulated trade, resolved disputes, and 
assigned Indian agents who could make decisions without needing approval 
from London. At the Treaty of  Augusta in 1763, Scottish agent John Stuart 
managed to distribute gifts, discuss trading arrangements, and confirm peace 
with Catawba, Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indians. Further 
north, William Johnson set about redistributing gifts with a generous touch. 
By 1764 the London Board of  Trade had accepted many of  Johnson’s initial 
recommendations, and imperial agents on the ground in North Amer i ca en-
forced them at the key posts that had been rebuilt following Pontiac’s War. 
And in the early years of  the 1770s, Amherst’s hated policies drifted into 
disuse.14
This calm was not to last. Whereas in 1764 Whitehall seemed amenable to 
Johnson’s recommendations for trade, by 1768 the ministry formally rejected 
them. Reverberating debt from the Seven Years’ War siphoned money from 
Indian Affairs. Johnson retained his position as superintendent, and thus offi-
cial management of  Indian diplomacy, but the ministry allowed each individ-
ual colony to become responsible for regulating trade.15
Colonial governors proved more interested in acquiring Indian land than 
in protecting Indians from land- grabbers. The King’s Proclamation of  Octo-
ber 7, 1763, was designed to stymie white encroachment beyond the Appala-
chians, and the 1768 Treaty of  Fort Stanwix, which Johnson helped to negotiate, 
was supposed to reassert this demarcation line. In theory the Fort Stanwix 
treaty created a “line of  property” that protected Native American land inter-
ests in the northwest, separated Indians from colonists, and opened present- 
day West  Virginia and Kentucky to white farmers. Further to the south, Natives 
and non- Natives set a similar dividing line between the Cherokees and North 
and South Carolinians by 1768. In real ity, colonists continued to ignore estab-
lished bound aries, and squatters from  Virginia and Pennsylvania flooded into 
the Ohio area. Large portions of   these lands, which the Iroquois sold despite 
Shawnee and Cherokee claims to them, became contested in Dunmore’s War, 
a 1774 attempt by Virginians to seize territory by provoking the Shawnees to 
vio lence.16
It was during a council at Johnson Hall on July 11, 1774, in the midst of  
trying to convince Iroquois leaders to limit vio lence in Dunmore’s War, when 
William Johnson collapsed. Two hours  later, he died. Johnson’s death threw 
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the British Indian Department into an uproar. His son, John Johnson, was of-
fered the position of  superintendent of  Indian Affairs, but he refused it. Al-
though Guy Johnson, William Johnson’s cousin and son- in- law, smoothed 
 things over by agreeing to take over the job, no one would ever be able to reach 
the diplomatic heights that Sir William had previously attained.17 It is impos-
sible to say  whether Johnson’s death, prob lems stemming from unclear land 
bound aries, and divided policies between North Amer i ca and London would 
eventually have proved surmountable had war between Britain and the main-
land colonies not broken out— but it did. It represented  little change at first to 
Native Americans, who had been fighting colonists and each other since 
the 1750s.
William Johnson may have had a sense of  the impending conflict and its 
ramifications for Indian relations, but  others  were less prepared. Non- Native 
fighting began at the  Battles of  Lexington and Concord in 1775, and in July 1776 
the Continental Congress voted for in de pen dence. Before 1775, rebel Ameri-
can officials may have considered vio lence against Indians, but few had trained 
themselves to think about Native American diplomacy. American negotiators 
who wished to ally with Indians would find that their own nonimportation 
policies, combined with the Continental Congress’s lack of  funds, made it dif-
ficult to obtain requisite gorgets, glass beads, medals, vermillion, and cloth-
ing for gifts.18 Once military campaigns against the Americans began, British 
ships sank or, on occasion, fell into the hands of  the colonists— which in turn 
curtailed British gift- giving abilities. Land prob lems did not dis appear. When 
goods once again became less obtainable, diplomacy disintegrated almost be-
yond repair.
As officials strug gled to practice diplomacy, food became a more useful com-
modity in alliance building. Many practices resembled colonial ones and 
granted Native Americans leverage. British military leaders knew to provide 
some rations to warriors, and officials sent foodstuffs into individual villages, 
as they had in previous years. But in contrast to  earlier de cades, military forts 
at all times of  year  housed huge quantities of  nonwarriors, who stayed for lon-
ger periods and appeared to consume more provisions. Their presence 
prompted renewed discussions about the usefulness of  Native allies. Ameri-
can rebels, lacking significant stores of  food to distribute and insufficient ex-
perience to broker allegiances, practiced a less nuanced food diplomacy that 
used meta phors to connote ideas of  cooperation.
Diplomacy constituted part of  broader efforts to partner with Indians, who 
held their own meetings and made decisions too. As early as September 1774, 
the British considered asking Natives to aid them; they implemented that plan 
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in 1777  under the direction of  the new imperial secretary of  state, Lord George 
Germain. Part of  cementing this  union involved giving the Iroquois massive 
gifts of   cattle, flour, and rum. The Americans also made plans. In July 1775, 
Congress delegated liaisons with the Six Nations and their allies to the North-
ern Department, with the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws to 
the Southern Department, and with all other tribes to the  Middle Department. 
Eventually most Oneida and half  of  the Tuscarora members of  the Iroquois 
sided with the Americans, and most Cayugas, Mohawks, Onondagas, and Sen-
ecas supported the British. Iroquois warriors and clan  mothers— including 
Mohawk Molly Brant, William Johnson’s  widow— took part in this decision- 
making pro cess.19
Americans (and, to a lesser extent, Britons) strug gled to administer diplo-
macy with  limited funds and foodstuffs. Congress established the Continen-
tal Army in June 1775, but disagreements between the army, state troops, 
and militia meant that it became difficult for Americans to regulate food 
supply and distribution.  There was more than one account of  bread that 
contained “some villainous drug . . .  that took all the skin off ” men’s mouths. 
Bad, frequently “impassable” roads blocked provisions convoys. Heavy snow, 
driving rain, destructive pests, and stifling summers interfered with storage. 
In 1778 the Hessian fly devoured  Virginia and Mary land wheat before buzz-
ing north to New York. Violent storms compounded the prob lem by de-
stroying Virginian mills, which made it difficult to pro cess surviving grain 
into flour.20
The British Army strug gled for diff er ent reasons. During the Seven Years’ 
War the military had procured grain and animals from the colonial country-
side, but the army had trou ble getting rebel enemies to produce provisions 
for them. The British believed they could not plant crops near Indians’ towns 
without violating the 1768 Treaty of  Stanwix, and thus British- Indian alliances. 
In this instance, the British prob ably misunderstood Iroquois ideas about hos-
pitality, which allowed allies and tenants to grow food on Indian lands. This 
misunderstanding contributed to food- production prob lems, which worsened 
in 1781, when the army’s northern food caches  were “devoured by Caterpil-
lars” and “Hay, Corn & Vegitables . . .  suffered in common.”21
On the supply end of   things, whereas roads both ered the Americans, tacti-
cians in Britain disagreed about how many provisions to ship from  England, 
which commodities to send, and how frequently to send them. Initial ship-
ments of  flour  were actually “American Flour,” prob ably sent from the colo-
nies before British- American relations soured. The flour was already quite old 
when British contractors shipped it back to North Amer i ca for their soldiers. 
Sometimes it “got wet on the Wharfs” and was then “sold & bought again by 
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the Commissaries and served out to the Troops.” Even when the navy sent 
vessels through Cork, Ireland, bread continued to spoil. The opening of  the 
southern campaign in 1780 invited the prospect of  purchasing provisions from 
Jamaica, but West Indian colonists who had lost access to mainland grain and 
meat remained reluctant to export foodstuffs  because they feared food short-
ages, hunger, and thus, potentially, slave revolts.22
Additional inconsistencies in British food diplomacy occurred  because the 
British Indian Department functioned in tandem with, but officially separate 
from, the British military. Although General Burgoyne had curtailed his use 
of  Indians on the battlefield  after his defeat at Saratoga, the autumn of  1777 
and spring of  1778 witnessed an increase in the Indian Department’s use of  
British- allied Iroquois in raids and guerrilla warfare. Letters from Daniel Claus, 
who mediated with the Six Nations, and Major John Butler, who worked fre-
quently with Mohawk Joseph Brant (Molly Brant’s  brother), revealed that  these 
Indians consumed poorer provisions compared to British troops.23 Butler wor-
ried that the Indians tasted “very  little” fresh meat, except “the heads, Offals, 
& feet” of   cattle flesh “too poor to be issued to the Garrison.” Fresh meat 
marked for the Indian department instead went to the garrison at Niagara. Jo-
seph Brant, who operated a group of  Indians and Loyalists known as “Brant’s 
Volunteers,” suffered the disdain of  British officers  because his unit was un-
paid and had to scavenge at Niagara for their rations. Initially such inequali-
ties did not cause Indians prob lems,  because Iroquois  women continued to 
produce enough corn, squash, and beans to sustain their  people. Iroquois In-
dians produced large crop yields in comparison to their Anglo- American con-
temporaries.24
By 1778, however, effective British policy also meant providing food aid to 
individual towns. That spring British officials reported that “almost all the In-
dian Villages” stood “in a distressed condition for want of  Victuals.” Younger 
warriors had “neglected” their spring hunting season, which meant that Iro-
quois Indians had been eating stored corn instead of  venison. Even though 
the Indians  were not starving, British aid increased: twenty- seven hundred Na-
tive  women and  children came to Detroit, where they ate “all the Beef  . . .  in 
six or seven days.”  After he fed them, one lieutenant col o nel reflected that he 
had felt obligated to do so. If  he had refused, “this Garrison must have been 
distressed or the Savages offended,” and “cou’d have joined the Rebels,” he ex-
plained.25 Whereas before the war officials had sporadically distributed food 
relief  to individual villages, now officials expected to supply Natives at British 
forts whenever they showed up, and excessive consumption became more 
common. Britons who misjudged Native appetites risked losing their military 
partners, so it was better to be generous.
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As the British strug gled to balance strategic sustenance with high provisions 
costs, the Americans also tried to maneuver with the Six Nations, employing 
Indian meta phors to describe their hopes for peace with Britain. Representa-
tives of  twelve of  the colonies met Oneida, Tuscarora, and some Mohawk 
members of  the Iroquois in 1775 (on the Indian side of   things some Stock-
bridges also attended, and on the American side Georgia was missing). Offi-
cials Philip Schuyler, Oliver Wolcott, Turbutt Francis, and Volkert Douw led 
the del e ga tion, though they required the assistance and translation of  Samuel 
Kirkland and James Dean. Speaking through translators, the Americans said, 
“If  our  people  labour in the fields, they  will not know who  shall enjoy the crop. 
If  they hunt in the Woods, it  will be uncertain who  shall taste the meat or have 
the skins.” Implying that Britons had made it hard for colonists to farm and 
hunt, they used the pos si ble absence of  flesh and grain to explain their rebel-
lion. Colonists, they concluded, “cannot be sure  whether they  shall be permit-
ted to eat drink and wear the fruits of  their own  labour and industry.”26 
Officials expressed their hope that in the  future their relationship with Britain 
would mend so that they would be able to “eat and drink in peace” with them. 
By gesturing to the Indian meta phor of  a common dish, the rebels signaled 
their desires to end conflict with the British at the same time that they main-
tained their claim to British- controlled land.
Indians’ responses at this meeting indicate that  these meta phors proved un-
convincing. Abraham, a sachem of  the Lower Mohawk  Castle, complained 
of  decreased trade opportunities. “The shops are  every where empty,” he said, 
and Indians “cant get any Cloathe or necessaries which we want.” The Amer-
icans reminded him that war time was diff er ent. “You  Brothers in Time of  war 
do not hunt so much as in Time of  peace,” they responded. Colonial officials’ 
description of  the conflict in terms of  game scarcity justified their reasons for 
rebellion, but cognizant of  the weakness of  their meta phor, they did not re-
quest assistance from the Six Nations. Instead, they asked the Indians “to re-
main at home and not join on  either side.” It proved difficult for them to obtain 
even this promise,  because they did not possess sufficient financial backing or 
organ ization.27
By January 1776 rebel American colonists distributed  actual foodstuffs to 
the Natives to remain competitive with British diplomacy. One American In-
dian commissioner recorded providing Mohawks with victuals enough for 
thirty  people, “11 Cayugoes and 1 Onnondaga” with three meals each, and 
120 unnamed Indians with 36 pounds of  bacon, “2 Fat Swine,” and “70 Loaves 
of  Bread.” Perhaps he supplied the Mohawks  because he hoped to undermine 
British negotiations, or perhaps he did not know enough to identify the likeli-
est allies. Americans became more efficient in their distributions by March 1778, 
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when “3 or 400 of  the Warriors of  the six Nations” joined the continental ser-
vice, and Albany commissioners resolved “to furnish” them with “provisions 
from Time to Time.” At first  these  were slapdash allocations— meals  here, a 
pig  there— because in early 1776 a state of  war was not yet official. During 
the war, however, lists of  con temporary provisions indicate that Indians re-
ceived rum, beef, and bread in ration- like quantities  after returning from Wash-
ington’s camp.28 This decision, like the Britons’ decision to provision Iroquois 
 women and  children, was likely a symbolic gesture rather than a full supply 
of  food on which Indians depended.
At the start of  the war in de pen dent Iroquois retained power as they had 
done for centuries: by drawing on Gayaneshagowa and Guswenta. Iroquoian 
food diplomacy remained consistent with  earlier eighteenth- century practices. 
The Six Nations used meta phors to communicate; they requested edible goods; 
and they supplied British and American troops with provisions, which at times 
allowed them to influence the actions of  the soldiers who depended on them. 
The Iroquois, in contrast to Americans and Britons, used food to communi-
cate with enemies as well as allies  because Iroquois neutrality remained para-
mount. At a 1778 meeting between American- allied Oneidas and American 
commissioners, Oneidas reflected that although “It is probable that  there are 
some . . .  who are inimical to us and who would wish to give Information” to 
British Major John Butler, they would willingly “cause them to be supplied 
with provisions” and rum for “the Journey to Niagara.” The Oneidas worried 
that other Iroquois might report details of  their meeting, but they still planned 
to supply them with food and drink for the trip. Before the Revolution and at 
least since the late seventeenth  century, the Iroquois had  limited Iroquois- on- 
Iroquois vio lence, refusing to fight against their brethren when France and 
 England warred.29  After conflict began between  Great Britain and the Ameri-
can colonies, Oneidas treated food and drink as necessary components of  this 
nonaggression pact, which suggests the continuing importance of  Gayane-
shagowa.
Iroquois Indians also continued to accept food as payment for ser vices ren-
dered to non- Natives. By requesting consumables, Natives reminded military 
officials that they needed to purchase Indians’ allegiance. In September 1778, 
a group of  British- allied Onondagas desired “provision to carry on the Ser-
vice.” The Onondagas wanted food and ammunition sent to “Irondaquat Bay 
in Lake Ontario”  because it was “nearest to the Seneca & 6 Nations Country.” 
They stated their willingness to fight and then asked for the sustenance to do 
so. They even stipulated a location for British distribution. That August, On-
ondagas had told American commissioners of  their intention “to remain in 
the strictest friendship with the United States,” despite the influence of  the 
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“ great many evil Birds among us.”30 That  these events occurred within a month 
of  each other underlines both the factious nature of  relations within tribes and 
the Indians’ inclinations to say what they needed to say to obtain supplies. Brit-
ish and Patriot officials had been right to worry that refusing provisions to 
Indians might result in a shift in allegiance— not  because Natives required food 
but  because diplomatic protocols mattered to them. It is also pos si ble that non- 
Native officials  were too ill- informed to identify factions within the Iroquois 
and thus confused divided groups with the act of  switching sides.
Native Americans also supplied food to Americans and Britons, which non- 
Natives sometimes accepted as gifts and sometimes purchased from Indians 
to cultivate alliances. Although Iroquois  women’s control of  provisions had 
decreased before the revolution (in part  because of  William Johnson’s efforts 
to become the main distributor),  women still acted as key producers. Iroquois 
oral histories  today tell the story of  Oneida Polly Cooper, who went with other 
Iroquois to feed the Continental Army at Valley Forge in 1777–1778. Cooper 
supposedly showed the Americans how to prepare corn for soup, and  later re-
ceived a bonnet, hat, and shawl from Martha Washington as thanks. The Brit-
ish also required supplies that winter, particularly at Niagara. One officer 
reported that he had felt “obliged to buy up all the  cattle the Indians had to 
spare,”  doing “every thing in [his] power to keep the Savages in good Temper.”31 
His use of  the word obliged likely indicates that he purchased  cattle from Indi-
ans to broker good relations by overpaying and overfeeding them.
Occasionally, Britons encountered difficulties obtaining something to eat 
from British- allied Indians, even when out on joint expeditions. One man’s 1778 
journal lamented that while on the march with “about 300 Indians of  diff er-
ent tribes, chiefly Senecas and Delawares . . .  we many a time had very hun-
gry times.” Repeatedly, he went “into a wigwam and waited for the Hommany 
 Kettle with the greatest impatience to get a trifle and was as often disap-
pointed,” he complained.32 Sometimes Natives charged what the British con-
sidered to be exorbitant prices, and sometimes Indians did not feed them at 
all. Native  women doubtless wondered why useless British mouths could not 
be fed by non- Native  women. Where food was concerned, Indians could sup-
ply food and accept it, and the rec ords provide evidence that some Britons de-
pended on Indians rather than the other way around.
If  food diplomacy granted the Iroquois the most power and the rebels the 
least power, then victual warfare also continued to test power relationships. 
Americans used victual warfare by attacking Indians’ towns and villages—as 
they had during the colonial period— and sometimes by stealing Natives’ ani-
mals. In 1777, Molly Brant was “insulted & robbed of   every  thing she had in 
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the world by the Rebels & their Indians” for the role she played at the  Battle 
of  Oriskany in August of  that year. She had warned the British of  American 
movements, and her information ratcheted up the number of  American and 
American- allied Iroquois deaths.  Legal depositions from 1778 reveal the exten-
siveness of  New Yorkers’ punitive thefts of  crops and animals from the Mo-
hawk Upper  Castle at Canajoharie during the fall of  1777. Peter Deygart, 
chairman of  the Tryon County Committee of  Safety, spent three days “Rid-
ing Indian Corn & Potatoes from the Canajohary Indian fields.” Someone  else 
saw “Old Christian young, pulling up and Distroying Potatoes, Turnips, Cab-
bage, and other Gardian Stuff.” They dug barrels of  flour up from the ground, 
and took  those too. The New Yorkers also stole sheep and hogs.33
Non- Natives persisted in using victual warfare against Indians  because they 
characterized them as a savage  enemy. They also, however, convinced Indians 
to act as proxy victual warriors in their attacks against other non- Natives 
 because it exonerated them from blame. Americans used their Iroquois allies to 
target British supply wagons. In April 1779, Joseph Brant relayed a warning that 
some “of  the ill disposed Trib[es] of  the Six Nations” planned “to cut off or in-
terrupt” a British “convoy of  Provisions and Store.”34 Brant used his knowledge 
of  British supply networks to prevent the other Iroquois from carry ing out the 
action as well as to demonstrate the Mohawks’ value to the British.
To fill their own stomachs, the British encouraged Native allies to pilfer 
 cattle,  horses, and grain from American farms and supply wagons. During a 
July 1778 expedition near Wyoming, Pennsylvania, rangers and Indians “killed 
and drove off  about 1000 head of  horned  Cattle, and sheep and swine in  great 
numbers.” By destroying and stealing the animals that pulled plows and yielded 
meat, John Butler speculated, “we can prevent the  Enemy from getting in their 
grain,” and “their  Grand Army (who are already much distress’d) must dis-
perse and their Country of  course become an easy prey to the King.”35 The 
British hoped that causing hunger in the American countryside would limit 
supplies to the American army. This strategy echoed En glish attacks against 
the Irish in Dublin over a  century  earlier, but now Britons used Indians to at-
tack civilian food caches in order to make the rebels starve and to feed British 
soldiers.
Not every one was comfortable with this decision. In 1778 Daniel Claus im-
plored Frederick Haldimand to make sure that only Indians participated “in 
the glory of  such pe tite guerrers as burning and destroying,” and he claimed 
it “would look much better in the eye of  the public” if  such actions came 
“rather from Savages than whites.” Men fighting in the combined unit of  Natives 
and non- Natives known as Butler’s Rangers asked that the phrase “To Serve 
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with the Indians” be struck from the terms of  their commissions  because 
they worried about the consequences of  being linked with such tactics if  the 
Americans captured them.36 Both Britons and Americans seemed to have a 
sense that victual warfare was unacceptable when used by non- Natives 
against non- Natives, but they got around this dilemma by urging Indians 
to practice it.
Their encouragement led to Indians practicing victual warfare against other 
Iroquois. Oneida Indians also took part in the retaliatory attack against Molly 
Brant in 1777. Led by Oneida chief  Hanyery, or Tehawenkaragwen, Oriska 
Oneidas joined the rebels in plundering the Mohawk  castle at Canajoharie. The 
Oneidas’  orders stated that if  in the past they had “lost, one Cow, Ox,  horse 
Hogg Sheep . . .  that we should take two in liu thereof.” Oneidas reacted 
against the actions of  Mohawks by participating in animal theft, stealing twice 
as many animals as the Mohawks had taken from them. Escalations of  this 
kind threatened to do more than send a symbolic message; they may actually 
have hurt Mohawk meat supplies. Whereas in some con temporary instances 
of  inter- Indian food diplomacy the Oneidas expressed their willingness to feed 
 enemy Indians,  here they received instructions to steal as many animals from 
the Mohawks as they could. This event was unusual.37 Even in this instance, 
the Oneidas waited  until the Mohawks left Canajoharie; they attacked crops 
but not  people.
By 1779, all parties knew that the destruction of  crops and thefts of  domes-
ticated animals made for an effective method of  causing chaos. Joseph Plumb 
Martin, the white private who had described prob lems with adulterated bread, 
even named the absence of  grain and meat: he called it “the monster Hun-
ger.”38 Yet hunger had thus far been a manageable foe for the Indians and Brit-
ons who fought it. British food diplomacy had involved giving Indians 
symbolic gifts of  food that did not make up the majority of  their diets, even 
if  British officials felt obliged to offer such gifts frequently  because they knew 
they had to continually reaffirm Six Nations’ fidelity. Indians used food to talk 
to each other,  whether that meant diplomatically promising food supplies to 
traveling enemies or stealing animals as signs of  victual warfare when other 
Indians’ actions  violated the standards of  acceptable be hav ior. They had proved 
capable of  disrupting supply, demanding food when they felt justified in  doing 
so, and stealing it when necessary. But 1779 was a year with all the right con-
ditions for a food crisis.
In 1779 Americans’ summer incursions into Iroquoia ushered in food short-
ages that coincided with a harsh winter and sparked an Indian refugee dias-
pora. Thereafter, ideas about hunger and the protocols of  food diplomacy both 
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changed.  These civilian refugees arrived at British forts ready to consume larger 
quantities of  provisions  because Americans’ victual warfare had increased to 
such an extent that it became effective at causing Native famine; Iroquois In-
dians began to die. In a paradoxical twist, this hunger made British- allied Iro-
quois more capable of  enforcing a new version of  food diplomacy, which came 
to mean the use of  or forced abstention from grain, meat, and alcohol to forge 
or maintain connections between allies. Natives chose to alter how British 
troops and officers fought alongside them by curtailing Britons’ access to food. 
Rather than voicing their need for and dependence on British food supplies, 
Indians refused provisions, destroyed stored grain, crops in fields, and  cattle, 
and welcomed starvation, thus challenging British ideas about Native hunger 
and military ser vice.
In July British strategists found that they could not drive “off   Cattle from 
the  Enemy’s Frontiers,” as they had during  earlier years,  because the rebels 
had protected  those  cattle with “a Chain of  Forts,” which made raiding for 
animals dangerous. The “considerable Quantity” roaming through “Indian 
Country” the previous fall, John Butler observed, had “been chiefly consumed 
by the Indians themselves.” Bark from elm and basswood trees, birds, boiled 
bones, dogs, eels, mussels, muskrats, and even rotten meat  were more con-
ventional famine foods, but sources such as Butler’s imply that at least some 
Iroquois ate beef  during times of  hunger. Now this option had dis appeared. 
To add to  these issues, the Indians had not planted “the usual Quantity” of  
“Corn, Pulse, and  things of  that Kind”  because a combination of  military ser-
vice and colonial attacks had prevented Native men from being able to pro-
tect their towns as  women planted corn.39 Scattered settlement patterns had 
given the Iroquois many years to stockpile emergency caches, but an Ameri-
can attack could still prove problematic.
And attack they did. The 1779 campaign was a crusade of  devastating vict-
ual warfare against British- allied Seneca and Cayuga Six Nations’ towns and 
villages that signaled Americans’ growing interest in causing hunger and strat-
egizing about its consequences. George Washington instructed Major Gen-
eral John  Sullivan that the campaign’s “immediate objects are the total 
destruction & devastation of ” noncombatant “Settlements.” He anticipated 
that the men and  women  Sullivan assaulted would “in their distress” welcome 
“supplies of  Provisions.” Washington hoped to create hunger and then distrib-
ute food aid, but he also warned  Sullivan against offering  either provisions or 
peace before  Sullivan’s men had accomplished “the total ruin” of  their villages. 
 Later, when it seemed such aid would not convince the Iroquois to break with 
their British allies, he would charge  Sullivan with the task of  “throwing [the 
Indians] wholly on the British  Enemy.”40
54  Chapter 2
In April, Col o nel Goose Van Schaick moved west from Fort Schuyler to begin 
the intrusion into Iroquoia, striking the main Onondaga village, where he and 
his troops killed a dozen  people and took another thirty- three noncombatants 
prisoner— some of  whom the Onondagas accused soldiers of  raping and 
then killing. During the summer three armies  under direction from Congress 
and led by  Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton, and Col o nel Daniel 
Brodhead raced across New York.  Sullivan destroyed at least seventeen Sen-
eca settlements between Chemung and Genesee  Castle, and Brodhead’s men 
razed eleven settlements on the Allegheny River. This operation hearkened 
back to the sixteenth  century in its design to force submission of  the Indians, 
their dependence on the British, and their extermination, when pos si ble.41
American rebels spent the summer burning the evidence of  Iroquois 
 women’s  labor— their letters committed their actions to history.42 They torched 
“very fine and extensive” cornfields. Soldiers wrote letters and diary entries 
about making “large fires with parts of   houses and other woods” and “piling 
the corn on the fire” to ensure total destruction. On August 13 at Chemung 
they lit “a glorious bonfire of  upwards of  30 buildings at once” before cutting 
down “about 40 acres” of  the fields. In another town “called Kanegsae or Yuck-
sea,” they burned corn for four hours on September 13. It must have been a 
sleepless night; they  rose at six the next morning to spend eight hours burn-
ing twenty thousand bushels at the Genesee Flats. At Chemung and Oswego 
they “destroyed all their crops,” and near Canadasago they “girdled the fruit 
trees” (so they would not produce fruit in  future years) “and destroyed the 
corn.”43 Some soldiers found the task of  mutilating fruit trees too extreme and 
asked  Sullivan to excuse them, likely  because Emer de Vattel singled this act 
out (along with tearing down vines) as one of  savage barbarity.  Sullivan forced 
them to do it anyway.44 Fi nally,  after burning “the Genesee Village and 
destroy[ing] the Corn,” the Americans retreated. By September the expedition 
had consumed Iroquois villages. To add to the distress of   these physical at-
tacks, Natives also suffered the  mental anguish of  knowing they would be un-
able to return home: by October, white American reavers had moved into the 
abandoned dwellings in the Lower Mohawk  Castle, finding serenity in the 
“ great plenty of  Grain; several Horses, cows and waggons” that the Ameri-
can army had left in place for the non- Native invaders.45
 Sullivan claimed his men destroyed at least 160,000 bushels of  corn, other 
vegetables, and animals. His men did not distinguish between the destruction 
of  stored and standing corn, so it seems pos si ble that the campaign scorched 
large portions of  grain reserves. Each Iroquois person ate approximately 6 
bushels of  corn per year.46 Even if  one takes the lower pre- Revolution popu-
lation estimate of  sixty- four hundred  people, the Iroquois required 38,400 
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bushels of  corn per year— and  Sullivan prob ably destroyed four times that 
quantity. The campaign resulted in abrupt losses of  food and life and altered 
 future diplomatic relations. In the immediate wake of  the attacks, Indian com-
munities fought and reexamined their vari ous loyalties. Americans had as-
serted their dominance but also possibly frightened the colonial- allied Oneidas 
and Tuscaroras— who perhaps never  imagined how completely the colonists 
would destroy the towns of  their brethren. British- allied Indians, of  course, 
possessed better reasons to reassess their position, given the severe conse-
quences of  supporting His Majesty’s troops.
As a result of  the campaign, the Americans achieved their goals of  evicting 
the Six Nations from their villages, pushing them  toward the British, foster-
ing famine, and, consequently, killing Indians. Hundreds would die of  starva-
tion and related diseases that winter. On his return to Niagara, John Butler 
sent word that “all the Indians with their Families are moving in, as their Vil-
lages & Corn are Destroyed.” More than five thousand Iroquois Indians ar-
rived at Fort Niagara alone.47 General Haldimand noted that this phenomenon 
was not confined to the Mohawk, Onondaga, and Cayuga Indians at Niagara; 
“old men,  women and  children . . .  of  the Shawanese & Delawar Nations” 
faced “the Same Predicament at Detroit,” further to the southwest.  These mi-
grations affected other Native  peoples; as refugees reached Detroit,  Grand 
River, Niagara, Pensacola, Saint Augustine, Saint Louis, and Schenectady, 
 others headed west beyond the Mississippi, requesting Spanish permission to 
resettle. Such population shifts had a domino effect as  these mi grants then en-
croached on the land of  Apaches, Comanches, Osages, and Pawnees in the 
Native- Spanish borderlands of  the southwest.48
Reports of  British- allied Iroquois sentiments from this period are contra-
dictory. John Butler was “happy to acquaint” Frederick Haldimand that the In-
dians appeared “Still unshaken in their Attachment to His Majestys Cause.” 
“As Soon as they have placed their  Women &  Children in Security,” he reported, 
they planned to “go and take Revenge of  the  Enemy.” Butler’s missive belied 
conditions on the ground, as evidenced by the fact that when Guy and John 
Johnson arrived at Niagara, the Iroquois chiefs at first refused to conduct the 
diplomatic welcoming ceremony that always attended the start of  a meeting.49 
Some Iroquois had questioned the strength of  their British allies and signaled 
that diplomatic customs required reform.
The  Sullivan expedition likewise prompted the British to reexamine their 
relationship with their homeless Native supporters. Haldimand proposed pro-
visioning Indians less frequently. He was prob ably motivated by animal scar-
cities, crop failures near Detroit and Niagara, and qualms about the economic 
and military costs of  feeding Indians. The “quantity consumed by the Savages 
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is enormous,” he complained. He asked John Butler to remind the Indians “that 
all our distress . . .  proceeds from the amazing quantity of  provisions they con-
sume” at the same time that he de cided against supplying Butler’s Rangers 
with more rations. By September he was asking that the Indians “make 
demands for Provisions as seldom, and as moderate as their wants  will 
admit of.”50
Haldimand objected to feeding Indians  because his definition of  usefulness 
turned on military assistance, and he thought that food diplomacy interfered 
with other military operations. He argued that the cost of  supplying the Indi-
ans “far Exceeds all ordinary and Extraordinary Expences in this Province, in-
cluding [the] army, navy, Enginieer & all Departments.” To have the troops 
be “obliged to abandon the Purpose of  their Enterprize for want of  Provi-
sions,” he wrote, “would be followed by much more fatal Consequences than 
if  they had never undertaken it.”51
Whereas before the war Britons noted excessive consumption predomi-
nantly at treaty meetings, now some military leaders viewed any Indian as an 
enormous eater who threatened their  whole enterprise. The presence of  In-
dian warriors and noncombatants collected at Niagara and Detroit placed Hal-
dimand reluctantly  under “the Necessity of  Feeding” them to keep the 
warriors from changing their allegiance. In the fall of  1780 Haldimand penned 
the lines that titled this book, in which he demanded “that no useless Mouth” 
would remain at Niagara for the winter.52 Seeking to avoid a repeat of  the pre-
vious year, Haldimand sought to decrease the number of  Indians he would 
need to feed. He now conceived of  useless mouths as not only too hungry 
and costly but also easy to resettle.
Haldimand failed in this quest to evict Iroquois allies and promote his def-
inition of  uselessness,  because Indians’ attitudes  toward hunger and ser vice 
also changed. Their actions implied that they  were useful partners to the Brit-
ish; they portrayed hunger for strategic reasons and could teach their allies to 
better deal with it. The aftermath of  the 1779 campaign was similar to and 
diff er ent from the colonial period. It was similar  because the British officials 
who tried to curtail Indian hunger did not succeed. Natives reminded Britons 
of  the one- dish meta phor, and they accepted food as a gift without recipro-
cating with military ser vice. By September 1779 one official related that John 
Butler had encountered “difficulties” obtaining food and thus in “assembling 
the Indians.”53 Indians continued to eat in ways that deviated from British ex-
pectations of  reciprocity— but British perceptions also changed.
The months  after 1779  were therefore diff er ent from the colonial pe-
riod for two reasons: First,  because of  the increase in British provisions to 
Indian warriors in addition to noncombatants’ provisions during previous 
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de cades. Second,  because the campaign had transformed Indian and Brit-
ish attitudes about Native hunger. Whereas in previous years Britons as-
sumed that they would feed Iroquois  women and  children symbolic gifts 
while men hunted game and  women grew crops and managed war provi-
sions, during and  after the winter of  1779–1780 the British expected to 
feed nearly all Indians. In February 1781, Indians around Niagara would 
arrive “upon us sooner than could be wished”  because of  their lack of  suc-
cess “on their hunting grounds” and “the severity of  the last winter.”54 Na-
tives now arrived at military forts in time for winter, and Britons planned 
to host them for its duration.
The first real signs of  this uptick in Iroquois power came during the 1779 
campaign, when one lieutenant col o nel reported that someone at Niagara had 
“endeavoured to persuade the Indians . . .  that they  were paid too small a price 
for their  Cattle,” Indians chose to charge more for the few  cattle they possessed, 
and British purchasers chose to pay  those prices. Other reports indicated Indi-
ans’ growing discontent with Haldimand’s vision for British food diplomacy; 
British unwillingness to supply them looked too much like bad faith. British- 
allied Indians resented all the worry over food, warned that “they could no 
longer fight the King’s  Battles,” and voiced annoyance that the British “talked 
of  nothing but Provisions.” Britons, concluded their Indian allies, “could have 
no excuse for not assisting them,”  because they possessed a quantity of  extra 
food at Quebec.55 At this point in the war the Six Nations charged the British 
more for the beef  they supplied to them and manipulated the British for more 
provisions when they could. Once British unwillingness to feed Indians became 
 actual inability, the situation gave the Iroquois the upper hand.
Six Nations Indians implied that allies should share the experience of  hun-
ger when food was not available for every one. At the same time that they ac-
cepted more British foodstuffs, Natives also proclaimed themselves less hungry, 
more willing to undergo scarcity, and more insistent that the British should 
abstain alongside them. By making it impossible for the British to feed them, 
the Iroquois challenged power relations. It is difficult to say what prompted 
this change. Certainly the shift followed the 1779 expedition. Perhaps warriors 
accustomed to fasting before attacks sought to extend that be hav ior to British 
engagements.56 Perhaps in 1779 the meta phor of  sharing a common dish 
meant  going hungry when the dish was empty. Perhaps the Iroquois knew that 
their allegiance was so valuable that they could dictate the terms of  their mil-
itary ser vice. Or perhaps they simply sought to prepare themselves for starva-
tion. What ever their motivations, this new form of  food diplomacy, which 
included mutual abstention from provisions, altered con temporary ideas about 
hospitality as well as British food policies.
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In response to the campaign and the growing refugee crisis, officials first 
attempted to remove Indians from their forts to save money. At an October 
meeting Guy Johnson and John Butler tried to convince the Iroquois at 
Niagara to go to Carleton Island and other parts of  present- day Canada 
 because the lateness of  the season meant trou ble shipping “a sufficient Quan-
tity of  Provisions across the Lake.” Daniel Claus proposed sending warriors’ 
families to Montreal.  After citing transportation costs, officials tried to tell the 
Six Nations that leaving Niagara was their best chance for receiving comesti-
bles. In November Guy Johnson fi nally “prevailed on” some fifty Indians to 
depart for Carleton Island and several hundred  others to go out hunting.57
For the most part, the British did not succeed in removing the Indians 
 because the Iroquois privileged their proximity to each other. Indians declared 
that they would simply withstand hunger.  Those remaining stated their lack 
of  interest in provisioning prob lems. The Cayuga Twethorechte told British 
officials, “We of  the Six Nations have been much cast down by the  great Loss 
we have sustained in the Destruction of  several of  our Villages and Corn- 
Fields.” He appreciated “what has been said on the Score of  Provisions,” but 
said that the Indians “cannot think of  separating.” If  the Indians had “to suf-
fer for Provisions we cannot help it.” They felt “determined to persevere in 
the Cause,” and would “endeavour in some Mea sure to help [them]selves by 
Hunting.” Although Johnson worried that the Indians seemed “already to com-
plain that your Allowance of  Provisions is small,” most of  the Indians made 
plans to stay put.58 Indians ignored British worries about costs and set an ex-
ample of  weathered soldiers willing to experience hardship. Crucially, the Iro-
quois  stopped emphasizing their hunger and made it impossible for the British 
to feed them at the precise moment when starvation became a real ity. Tweth-
orechte’s words indicated that Indians may have been motivated by concerns 
other than food.
At this point in time, Iroquois Indians’ military ser vice changed. Indians 
 were the counterpart to white soldiers who rioted over absent rations, but they 
did so much more effectively  because they  were better at convincing observ-
ers that monstrous hunger did not scare them, and  because they  were not sub-
ject to penalties for disobedience and desertion.59 By the end of  1779 Iroquois 
Indians  were  going beyond voicing doubts about British food diplomacy and 
trying to obtain more provisions from British officials; they  were making their 
British allies hungry by damaging pilfered food supplies in the field and leav-
ing joint expeditions too early. In August 1779 John Butler reported on an ac-
tion with Mohawk Joseph Brant and a number of  Delawares and Senecas.  After 
failing to persuade the Indians to retreat, Butler lamented having “Scarcely 
time to dress a few Ears of  Corn” before attacking. Once the action failed, 
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“many of  the Indians made no halt, but proceeded immediately to their re-
spective villages.”60 In this instance, the Delawares and Senecas dictated where 
and how they would stand against the  enemy; they ate only a tiny snack be-
fore they fought; and upon retreat they privileged their return to their villages 
over an orderly retreat with the British, no doubt to see  whether the rebels 
had succeeded in destroying their villages’ food stores, as they had in so many 
other Indian towns.
Indians’ be hav ior forced their British allies to experience deprivation. In 
1781 a combined party of  Indians and rangers met at Oswego, and the Seneca 
Indian headmen “held a council . . .  without advising” the British of  their plans. 
They informed two British officers that they would go to Monbackers (in 
present- day Rochester, New York) and “to no other place,”  because they  were 
“in a starving condition” and  because it was “a verry rich country.” One offi-
cer even remembered that he felt obliged to go with them, “altho contrary to 
my Instructions.”  Here the threat of  hungry Native allies seemed to loom 
large, but given what happened next it is not clear  whether the Senecas  were 
 really starving or  whether their starvation was meta phorical.61
Once the action commenced, the Indians at first pursued only one aspect 
of  victual warfare: ruining food supplies, rather than stealing or eating them. 
The party destroyed “thirty large store houses,” grain, and animals. In encoun-
tering a fort defended by the Americans, the attackers chose to burn the party 
of  rebels, with the “large quantities of  grain” inside of  it, rather than giving 
quarter to the troops. The officer retelling the story tried to save face by re-
porting that he had suggested the destruction of  grain  houses  because he did 
not have enough men to take the forts. In real ity he had lost control of  the 
situation: a few days  later,  after the Indians had stolen some  cattle, the offi-
cers  were horrified “to see the Indians kill and take the greatest part of  the 
 cattle that  were captured by the Rangers,” leaving the rank and file in “a starv-
ing situation.”62 The men in charge could do nothing to stop them. Even dur-
ing moments when Indian hunger seemed paramount, Indians themselves 
avoided eating and then  stopped their allies from  doing the same. The British 
officer was less interested in the fact that the Senecas had stolen some  cattle; 
what mattered to him was the fact that the Indians violently caused British 
starvation.
Over time this conduct manifested among Indians who  were not Iroquois. 
In June 1780 a group of  Shawnees and  Great Lakes Indians arrived at the 
American- held Fort Liberty with Britons Henry Bird and Alexander McKee. 
Before they entered the fort, the Indians agreed to let the British take “the 
 Cattle for Food for our  People, and the Prisoners.” While McKee and Bird  were 
inside the fort finalizing plans for the following day, however, the Indians 
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“rushed in,” killed several of  the civilians, and slaughtered “ every one of  the 
 Cattle, leaving the  whole to stink.” The Natives’ obliteration of  all of  the food 
stores ensured that the British could not appropriate any of  them. They re-
peated  these actions at the next fort, where “not one pound of  Meat” survived. 
Bird recorded that they “had brought no Pork” and  were “reduced to  great 
distress.” The prisoners stood “in danger of  being starved.”63 Although food 
stores  were scarce in the wake of  the 1779 campaign, Indians in the archival 
rec ord persist in destroying allies’ access to meat and grain. The most persua-
sive explanation is that Native Americans throughout the northern theater of  
war had come to associate hunger with times of  combat, and that  these Indi-
ans did not view beef   cattle as acceptable sources of  meat.
Some British officers missed the connection. Frederick Haldimand was in-
furiated by the Indians’ be hav ior. He had conceived of  the Shawnee opera-
tion as a way “to cheque the Encroachments of  the  Enemy, so loudly 
complained of  by the Indians.” Instead, he concluded, that by “killing and de-
stroying the  Cattle,” the Indians “not only prevented Captain Bird from pur-
suing his Success, but reduced him to the last Extremity for want of  Provision.” 
Haldimand did not consider the fact that his military purposes might have dif-
fered from the Indians’ goals. By killing the Americans’  cattle, Indians  were, 
in fact, revenging themselves for this encroachment, much the same way as 
Native Americans in the  earlier colonial period acted out their anger against 
similar “creatures of  empire.”64 Haldimand also misunderstood why the Indi-
ans had worked to deprive his men of  ready, mobile food supplies.  These use-
ful mouths went where they wanted, and they continued to teach Britons 
how to hunger— sometimes violently.
By the 1780s British food diplomacy had turned away from Haldimand’s at-
tempts to reduce supplies. In spite of  Haldimand’s complaints, commands, and 
entreaties to officers working in Indian Affairs, the British kept making plans to 
feed Indians. Haldimand was even shocked to find that Iroquois Indians who 
 were “Intermarried, with  those of  Canada” had received provisions twice— 
once as Indians belonging to the Seven Nations of  Canada, and again as Indians 
belonging to the Six Nations. Increasingly, Britons sought to discover and ac-
commodate noncombatant Natives’ food preferences. Officials expanded food 
distribution. Each month the superintendent of  Indian Affairs assessed how 
much food villages required by sending men to obtain a headcount; Indians then 
received tickets from the commissary, which they could redeem for provisions.65
The British also tried hard to accommodate Native tastes. Haldimand’s cor-
respondence reveals a summary of  Indian preferences: corn was best, “as the 
Indians would rather have it than flour.” If   there was no corn, Six Nations pre-
ferred baked bread to flour supplies. Commissaries tended to issue more pork 
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than beef, suggesting another opinion about taste. Natives voiced their desire 
for salt provisions or fresh provisions when it suited them. Indians did not like 
“the Effect of  living entirely upon Salt Meat,”  because they found themselves 
“getting sickly.” As early as 1778 the Mohawks had convinced one official to 
give them half  fresh and half  salt provisions  after receiving only salt provisions 
for half  of  the year. By 1780, however, Indians around Montreal  were request-
ing five days of  fresh provisions out of  each week— more than twice what 
they had received in previous years.  These Natives complained that a salty diet 
threatened their health, and, by inference, their manpower. In spite of  the lo-
gistical prob lems involved in preserving and transporting fresh meat, Hal-
dimand granted their request less than a week  later. British expenditures on 
supplies to Niagara increased from £500 New York currency at the start of  the 
war to £100,000 in 1781.66
Native Americans would also, to an extent, refuse to grow food themselves. 
In May 1781, the British distributed hoes and corn for the use of  the Six Na-
tions, the Delawares, and the Shawnees to encourage them to plant crops at 
their home at Buffalo Creek. In December of  that year, however,  these Indi-
ans again appeared at Fort Niagara, claiming, “The Trifling quantity of  Indian 
Corn Issued” was their “reason for coming in to be Supply’d with provisions.”67 
In effect, Indians suggested that the amount of  seed the British gave them in 
the spring was too paltry to produce an abundant crop or to sustain them with 
the strength to carry out the task of  planting rows of  corn.
It is also pos si ble that the British supplied them with the wrong kind of  
hoes.  There  were many diff er ent types of  hoes— for tobacco, rice, and sugar 
production— and Native American hoes  were diff er ent from West African hoes, 
which  were, in turn, distinct from European- produced utensils; not all hoes 
 were designed for corn production. British officials discovered as much in 1784, 
when someone observed that axes and hoes produced near Montreal  were 
much smaller than  those that came from Eu rope, and Indians would not use 
Eu ro pean tools  until they had been reforged.68
 These  were some of  Indians’ reasons for not growing corn, which allowed 
them to claim British support over the winter. Two years  later they offered 
additional justification: Guy Johnson wrote that “the rememberance of  their 
late losses . . .  were too recent for their entering with alacrity on planting.” He 
was talking about the  Sullivan expedition; he explained that even  those Indian 
“Towns that escaped the Rebel invasion” now required British aid,  because 
other refugees had turned to them for supplies.69 In sum, Indians refused to 
plant corn when they could receive provisions from the British. They  were not 
lazy, hungry, or dependent; they  were traumatized communities who expected 
the rightful terms of  their partnership.
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Meanwhile, Americans continued to make clumsy use of  victual warfare 
and food diplomacy. They used the 1779 campaign to remind their Six Nations 
allies of  the consequences of  hunger. “For their Breach of  the Covenant Chain,” 
commissioners told the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, British- allied members of  the 
Six Nations found themselves “without Food or Shelter,” “driven from their 
Country,” and forced to “wander in the wilderness. This,” they concluded, “is 
the constant Reward of  Treachery!”70 The Americans revised history to suggest 
that the Covenant Chain had been forged between the Iroquois and the Ameri-
cans, rather than between the Iroquois and the En glish or the Iroquois and the 
Dutch, and implied that  those who “became” traitors by switching sides would 
suffer scorched- earth campaigns. Knowing as they did that opposing factions of  
the Iroquois continued to communicate with each other, they prob ably hoped 
that the Oneidas and Tuscaroras would pass along the message. As long as the 
Americans  were  doing well in the war, they could afford to hold the threat of  
burned ground over the heads of  supporters and enemies.
Americans’ continued use of  food meta phors that drew on the shared ex-
perience of  scarcity may eventually have worked to their advantage. At a meet-
ing between commissioners and American- allied Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and 
Caghnawagas in 1781, the non- Native officials described how the “long War 
has impoverished us.” But what differentiated American from British food di-
plomacy was rebels’ willingness to undergo deprivation with their Native al-
lies. Of  course, the former colonists possessed  little choice in the  matter of  
hunger,  because the war was fought in their towns and throughout their farm-
lands. But this position ironically gave them a better chance of  using food di-
plomacy,  because Indian allies might have empathized. Although the Americans 
promised “that your way hereafter [would] be better supplied with provision 
and necessaries,” they also guaranteed that when “hardships are inevitable,” 
the Indians should “be of  good comfort: We suffer with you.”71 The Ameri-
cans evinced their willingness to eat when  there was food, and to go hungry 
when  there was none. Yet this meeting also demonstrated Indians’ abilities to 
alter American food diplomacy. No longer could U.S. officials rely on meta-
phors to maintain Natives’ allegiance; they also promised a  future delivery of  
provisions.
Six months before the Seneca named Cornplanter listened to Timothy Pick-
ering’s misuse of  history in 1791, he sent George Washington his own history 
of  Iroquois relations with the United States. Unlike Pickering, Cornplanter was 
more interested in recent events. “When your army entered the country of  
the Six nations, we called you the town- destroyer; and to this day when that 
name is heard, our  women look  behind them and turn pale, and our  children 
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cling close to the neck of  their  mothers.” Cornplanter knew his  people’s his-
tory of  the 1779 campaign, how harrowing it had been for the civilian mem-
bers of  the Six Nations. He also knew Washington’s Iroquois name: 
“Conotocarious,” meaning “town destroyer” or “devourer of  villages.” Wash-
ington’s choices had consumed Iroquois territory. Timothy Pickering knew 
all  these  things too,  because the reason historians have a copy of  Cornplant-
er’s message is that it was enclosed in a letter to Pickering.72
Notions of  history  were expansive in the eigh teenth  century, when oral his-
tory, storytelling, and personal knowledge mattered just as much as if  not 
more than what got written down. William Johnson’s death was so disruptive 
immediately before the Revolutionary War  because no one  else possessed his 
depth of  knowledge about Iroquois protocols. In the 1760s, when Johnson 
watched as power relationships fluctuated and diplomatic customs faltered, 
he prob ably knew what to do— but he died before teaching  others how to copy 
him. Food diplomacy offered a workable alternative to colonial practices, but 
it required a revision of  colonial pre ce dents. The Iroquois stepped in to engi-
neer  those changes, and the power they gained from  doing so helped them 
survive the  Sullivan campaign.
 After John  Sullivan’s 1779 burnt- corn expedition, the Iroquois fought against 
hunger, they fought to create it, and they fought for a role in making hunger- 
prevention policies. They altered their food diplomacy to dictate the terms of  
their military ser vice, to make demands about food supply, and to make the 
British starve when it suited them. They succeeded in enacting  these reforms 
 because non- Native ideas about Indian hunger and usefulness had shifted. Two 
previously separate strands of  Eu ro pean perceptions had fused together. Brit-
ons began to think of  Indians as enormous eaters at the same time that they 
described Indians as capable of  withstanding hunger. Indians did not, however, 
become dependent on British foodstuffs. Iroquois decisions to refuse food and 
endure hunger at key moments forced the British to recognize that Indians 
 were still useful to them. As a result, officials went out of  their way to accom-
modate Indian demands about eating specific foods. In 1783, when the Iroquois 
claimed that they could not plant  because the memory of  their losses— the 
newest chapter in the tribe’s history— was still too upsetting, the British dis-
tributed food aid.
The American Revolution was not merely a war fought between Ameri-
cans and Britons, but also one that embroiled some 150,000 Native Americans 
living east of  the Mississippi, with ramifications for Indians further west.73 
Changing discourses of  hunger underscore the degree to which the Iroquois 
retained their power in a disastrous situation. By 1781  people increasingly prac-
ticed food diplomacy according to Indian notions rather than British or 
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American ones— they paid attention to Native tastes, and they hungered to-
gether  whether they wanted to or not. During the war itself  every one had the 
potential to grow, eat, and destroy food, and thus it became harder to tell who 
was dependent and who was in de pen dent.
Indians  were useful mouths who portrayed their hunger in specific ways, 
ignored it, and tried to avoid starvation. Although Iroquoian food diplomacy 
allowed Indians to maintain power in their alliances with Britons and Ameri-
cans, the physical act of  eating was not impor tant everywhere. And in some 
cases, even food diplomacy proved less impor tant. In the southern colonies, 
hunger— and non- Natives’ perceptions of  it— continued to  matter, but food 
diplomacy rapidly became in effec tive. For this reason, Creek and Cherokee 
Indians defaulted to an almost constant state of  victual warfare, and violent 
episodes predominated.
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Cherokee and Creek Victual Warfare 
in the Revolutionary South
In August 1775 rumors abounded among South 
Carolinian colonists that the British  were working to secure Cherokee inter-
ests. Some Indians seemed unwilling to ally with Britons, but  others, like the 
Overhill Cherokees,  were “preparing to Fight for the King.” “In short,” wrote 
Minister William Tennent to Henry Laurens— the recently elected president 
of  the South Carolina Council of  Safety— the British and their Native support-
ers  were “preparing a  great Dish of  Blood for you.” Tennent had been trying 
to ascertain potential threats in the event of  war between the colonies and 
 England, and his letter encapsulated the state of  southern Indian relations. It 
revealed that Indians remained divided over the question of  what to do. The 
letter, prob ably without meaning to, evoked the one- dish meta phor that Na-
tives and non- Natives used to suggest military alliance and re spect for land 
bound aries. Tennent’s message also transformed the meta phor. This was no 
shared meal; the bloody dish represented the connectedness among power 
strug gles, confusion over who was in charge of  Indian Affairs, vio lence, and 
hunger in the southern theater of  war.1
In Georgia, North and South Carolina,  Virginia, and West and East Flor-
ida, food diplomacy failed almost entirely, in spite of  vari ous attempts to prac-
tice it. It was not for a lack of  trying that food diplomacy proved unfeasible. 
Officials and Indians championed continuity in diplomatic practices, and reb-
els and Britons kept up some distributions of  food goods and gifts. By the 1780s 
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some officials even invoked the meta phor of  shared hunger and sent food to 
meetings  because they knew they needed to host attendees. In a few instances, 
southern Indians even destroyed the foodstuffs of  their allies so that every one 
suffered together. At the same time, infighting among both the British and the 
rebels grew frequent, resulting in diplomatic blunders. Non- Native officials, 
 after considering  these multiple obstacles to good relations, tried to block each 
other’s food diplomacy rather than practicing it themselves. When this tactic 
did not succeed, Britons and Americans turned to victual warfare— against 
each other, and against Indians whom they considered disloyal. Whereas Iro-
quoian food diplomacy won out in the north, a bloody dish of  victual warfare 
prevailed in the southern colonies and then states.
Victual warfare— the burning of  grain, the destruction, maiming, or theft 
of  domesticated animals, and the deployment of  threats to engage in  these 
actions— broke out when food diplomacy faltered, and helped Native Ameri-
cans claim power more effectively than non- Natives. Food diplomacy’s short-
comings did not cause victual warfare, and sometimes interactions related to 
vio lence and peacemaking occurred alongside each other. Non- Natives who 
could not practice food diplomacy with their Indian allies recognized the stra-
tegic value of  creating hunger among their Native American enemies. They 
hoped that by destroying Indians’ corn— and thus inducing famine— they could 
force southern Natives into compliance. In a few instances, they also hoped 
to appear benevolent by distributing food aid to  enemy Indians  after such at-
tacks. They miscalculated,  because victual warfare had an unpredictable rela-
tionship with hunger. In the south, Britons and Patriots discovered that 
although they practiced victual warfare primarily to create hunger, Indians 
practiced victual warfare to create and fight hunger.
Three periods of  bad food diplomacy, victual warfare, or a combination 
of  the two methods of  communication— during 1775–1778, 1779, and 
1780–1782— illustrate how confused policy, hunger, and vio lence became in-
tertwined. The first time span reveals inadequate food diplomacy and changes 
in victual warfare. Indians’ be hav ior shifted from killing and maiming animals 
to stealing, butchering, and eating them. During the second period previous 
changes, in combination with the death of  John Stuart— the southern agent 
for British Indian Affairs and a key official among the Creeks— disrupted Anglo- 
Indian alliances. This year was characterized by extreme confusion caused by 
shoddy British food diplomacy, and by increased American attempts to create 
Native hunger, which they did by intensifying their victual warfare and circum-
scribing food- aid distributions. From 1780 to 1782 power relations  were hard 
to predict. As British military leaders deprioritized Indian diplomacy, Ameri-
can states grew more likely to use the threat of  victual warfare to try to cre-
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ate hunger and control  people. At the same time, the states’ Indian policies 
became inconsistent. Unsuccessful food diplomacy had three results: it created 
confusion, it made white Americans reluctant to distribute food aid, and it 
forced  people to associate victual warfare with famine creation, famine pre-
vention, and vio lence.
The prewar land prob lems and changes in trade that had affected the Iroquois 
also destabilized southern Indian affairs. Edmond Atkin— William Johnson’s 
counterpart as southern superintendent of  Indian Affairs— made efforts to re-
form trade, just as Johnson had. In the late 1750s Atkin recommended imple-
menting additional controls on traders, building permanent forts and outposts, 
destroying French forts, and creating a southern Indian confederacy that would 
mirror the diplomatic might of  the Iroquois.2 It was a tall order.
The fourteen thousand Creeks and the twelve to fourteen thousand Cher-
okees living in North Amer i ca by the 1770s enjoyed less room to maneuver 
than the Iroquois. The Creek confederacy was young, having emerged dur-
ing the early eigh teenth  century. The 1763 Peace of  Paris that ended the Seven 
Years’ War impeded the Creeks’ practice of  triple- nation diplomacy: their abil-
ities to play British agents off  of  French and Spanish ones. Creek attacks 
against colonists in December 1773 and January 1774 prompted the British to 
embargo the trade of  the Creeks who lived in present- day Alabama, Florida, 
and Georgia.3 Relations with the Cherokees had been fraught since campaigns 
against them in 1760 and 1761. The  causes of   these conflicts seem clear. Vir-
ginian and South Carolinian colonists, who privileged their landgrabs over In-
dian sovereignty, embarked upon scorched- earth campaigns that perpetuated 
a cycle of  retaliatory vio lence between them and Overhill and Lower Chero-
kees. By 1775 a Cherokee population gutted by warfare and disease had 
dropped from twenty- two thousand  earlier in the  century. The Creeks ceded 
land in 1773, and the Cherokees sold away most of  Kentucky and  Middle Ten-
nessee in 1775. Georgia’s white population qua dru pled between 1745 and 
1760, and by 1775 eigh teen thousand colonists stood primed to invade Creek 
lands.4
When war broke out, British and rebel American officials scrambled to gain 
control of  an already chaotic situation. Congress had made plans to divide In-
dian Affairs into three departments in 1775, allotting ten thousand dollars to 
the southern portion and placing the Irish- born trade agent and go- between 
George Galphin in charge. Only in August 1776 did South Carolina learn about 
this plan. John Stuart, a Scots immigrant to South Carolina, had taken over 
for Atkin in his role as superintendent for the southern tribes in 1761; he re-
mained employed for the British. He would eventually command a com pany 
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of  Loyalists “Wholly Annexed and Attached” to the Indian department; they 
fought alongside Indians.5 Galphin and Stuart found that the American Con-
gress and ministers in  England, respectively, sent instructions that  were often 
at odds with conditions on the ground.
To a small extent, food diplomacy continued to  matter in the southern re-
gion. In October 1776, for example, John Stuart de cided to redirect Creek ef-
forts away from war with Cherokees and Choctaws, and  toward assisting the 
British against the rebels. He set about trying to supply himself  with “neces-
saries, for engaging the Indians firmly in his Majesty’s interest,” including “a 
supply of  provisions.” Although in 1778 he criticized the Creeks for wavering 
loyalties, he still felt that he could not afford to refuse to feed them. Indeed, 
Stuart wrote that “Many of  the Creeks remain  here the  whole Winter for the 
sake of  Provision.” They  were joined by “about five hundred Cherokees,” caus-
ing “a very  great Expence of  Pre sents and Provisions.” In 1779 Alexander 
Cameron, Indian agent to the Cherokees, procured corn from Cherokee towns 
that he described as “Neutral” to redistribute to other Cherokees, while at the 
same time proclaiming the “Neutral” Cherokees’ inclination “to serve me as 
ever.”6 The British distributed rations to Native warriors to gain alliances and 
to maintain them, and they fed the Native civilians who arrived at British 
strongholds during pauses in the war. They also sometimes overestimated their 
influence with their Indian allies.
William Barker and Mathew Carey, “Georgia, from the latest authorities” (Philadelphia: Mathew 
Carey, 1795). Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
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Rebel government officials also made diplomatic overtures; they substituted 
domesticated animals and alcohol for trade goods and gunpowder, promised 
to regulate trade irregularities and colonists’ land encroachments, and used 
food meta phors. In July 1776 members of  the Georgia Council of  Safety ob-
served that Indians would “expect to be well paid, even for neutrality.” Geor-
gians knew that Natives would prefer “Ammunition & Cloathing” but also 
acknowledged their inability to provide  those articles. Their solution came in 
the form of  “ Cattle as a substitute.” In September 1777, when word arrived in 
North Carolina that nearly three dozen  Middle, Overhill, and Valley Cherokees 
planned “to wait on the General Assembly,” the governor’s office agreed “to ap-
point a Commissary to furnish the said Indians with provisions.” At a 1783 meet-
ing with the Cherokees, Georgia governor Lyman Hall used as many meta phors 
as pos si ble. He offered goods to the Cherokees so that Cherokees and Georgians 
could “embrace each other as Friends . . .  Eat out of  the same Dish and drink 
out of  the same Cup,” and “have a plain open Path to you and you to us.”7
Indians also attempted to employ food diplomacy during the war. They 
used food to delineate the terms of  their military contributions, used the one- 
dish meta phor, and requested and distributed goods and foodstuffs. In the win-
ter of  1776, when John Stuart sought the aid of  the Creeks, “their Answer 
was ‘That they  were willing to assist us but it must be in their own Way . . . 
with White Men who would furnish them with Provisions.’ ” The Creeks also 
warned that “any  great Number of  Red Men could not subsist in a Body to-
gether.” In the same letter Stuart wrote that another group of  Indians would 
only agree to attack “Georgia, as soon as a sufficient Quantity of  Corn could 
be got to support them upon the Expedition.”8 Indians demanded additional 
fighting men and rations, refused to commit to extended terms of  ser vice, 
waited to fight  until they could be sure of  their supplies, and stated their ex-
pectations that non- Native military commanders would accept the fact that 
Indians fought differently.
Southern Indians also continued to use food meta phors. During a 1782 
meeting with Georgians, an Upper Creek named the Tallassee King expressed 
a desire for “a white and straight” path before proclaiming, “that it was or-
dained that our  Children should eat out of  one Dish that is one with a Red 
Hand and the other with white.” Indians who asked for trade goods, like their 
northern counter parts, called themselves “naked” or “hungry” to underscore 
the generosity of   those who provided gifts. British and rebel officials, however, 
likely remained confused about  whether  these Indians  were hungry or not.9
 These practices make clear some of  the similarities between the northern 
theatre of  war and the southern colonies, but food diplomacy in the Revolu-
tionary south was diff er ent  because its efficacy in maintaining peace proved 
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short- lived. It is unclear  whether, in 1779, when Alexander Cameron sent corn 
to Cherokees, they  really  were willing “to serve” him, given Indian attitudes 
 toward military ser vice. Georgian Lyman Hall did well to use mutually com-
prehensible food meta phors, but  because Hall and his associates gestured to 
 future rules for regulating trade, rather than setting them  there and then, read-
ers must be skeptical of  Georgians’ negotiating efforts  because Indians likely 
 were too.10 The shared experience of  hunger, which was so crucial to north-
ern Indian relations, did not seem to  matter as much during the moments 
when  people in the south used food diplomacy. Officials could not escape the 
fact that their food gifts made poor substitutes for the guns and ammunition 
that southern Indians preferred. Whereas an Iroquoian form of  food diplo-
macy dominated the New York region by 1780, southern inhabitants by that 
time had not institutionalized comparable practices, and divisions between reb-
els, British officials, and Indians contributed to outbreaks of  vio lence in the 
form of  victual warfare.
Between the beginning of  the Revolutionary War and the end of  1778, failed 
food diplomacy and an expedition of  victual warfare against the Cherokees 
prompted some changes and revealed other continuities. Rebel colonial lead-
ers tried to block British diplomacy rather than replicate colonial practices, and 
then further undermined their negotiations with a Virginian, North Carolin-
ian, and South Carolinian scorched- earth campaign against the Cherokees in 
1776.  These  factors created a split between the Cherokees, which represented 
not only a joining of  Cherokees with Britons and British- allied Creeks, but also 
an event that deprived rebel- allied Cherokees of  provisions. Victual warfare 
in this region differed from its northern counterpart. The 1776 campaign il-
luminates mostly preemptive (rather than retaliatory) attacks on edible sup-
plies. Whereas the Americans struck Iroquoia to punish Indians for their 
alliance with the British, they targeted Cherokee towns even  earlier to create 
fear and hunger, and  because southern colonists had a longer history of  at-
tacking southern Indians. The motivations  behind Indians’ victual warfare also 
changed: during the late 1770s, Creeks and Cherokees shifted from killing 
 cattle to stealing them, which  stopped their own hunger and presaged famine- 
prevention efforts  later in the war.
In July 1775 South Carolinians seized British Indian Superintendent John 
Stuart’s estate as “a security for the behaviour of  the Indians in the Southern 
Department.” Then they attempted to pressure him into providing “copies of  
all my correspondence on Indian affairs,” which, citing his “duty to the King,” 
he refused to do. Colonists correctly suspected that Stuart was trying to se-
cure the southern tribes to the British interest (he denied that he was also at-
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tempting to arm slaves and Indians). One of  the confiscated letters revealed 
that Stuart hoped to gather the Creeks and Cherokees together in St. Augustine, 
East Florida, where he would use “all pos si ble means . . .  for engaging the 
Indians firmly in his Majesty’s interest.” He feared that he would “find difficulty 
in getting a supply of  provisions,”  because he knew that he would need food 
to solidify alliances.11 Stuart wanted to court the southern tribes; colonists 
did, too, which is why they tried to limit his contact with Indians.
Southern rebel colonists also tried to stem the flow of  diplomatic trade 
goods. In July 1775 colonists’ schooners intercepted two British ships bound 
for Georgia bearing “Arms, Ammunition and Indian Trading Goods.” This let-
ter did not describe the goods seized, but con temporary letters suggest that 
“goods” often included food supplies—so it is pos si ble that this event involved 
the confiscation of  provisions as well as trade pre sents. Creeks needed gun-
powder to hunt deer for the venison they ate and for the deerskins they sold 
to non- Natives. The following year, when the Georgia Council of  Safety con-
templated substituting  cattle for trade goods, they  imagined that the swap 
would be most successful “if  the communication” between the Creeks “& our 
Enemies  were cut off.”12 It was easier for South Carolinians to interfere with 
the diplomacy of  other imperial officials rather than try to maneuver with In-
dians, and easier for Georgians to improve the appeal of  their pre sents by 
limiting British- Creek contact.
Soon southern American colonists proved uninterested in pursuing an ac-
commodating Indian policy. The Cherokee Dragging Canoe had raised a war 
standard at Chota and raided the Holston, Clinch, and Powell Valleys in 
May 1776. In the summer of  1776 fears that Indians would mount a more ex-
tensive assault resulted in a concentrated strike against Cherokee towns. The 
aims of  Americans’ campaign mirrored the 1779 expedition into Iroquoia: “a 
Corps of  at least fifteen hundred men” sought “the destruction of  the Crops 
of  the lower Nation” and to provoke “necessary terror.” Henry Laurens de-
scribed the burning of  towns, crops, and stored grain as “the only pos si ble way 
of  reducing the Barbarians.”13 In this instance, as in  earlier En glish campaigns, 
aggressors justified their military decisions by portraying Indians as savages.
Three separate groups of  soldiers proceeded into the Cherokee towns. A 
 Virginia and North Carolina force  under Col o nel William Christian headed 
 toward the Overhill villages, while North Carolinians  under General Griffith 
Rutherford moved against the  Middle and Valley towns, and a South Carolina 
army led by Major Andrew Williamson struck out for the Lower towns. None 
of  the American columns met with serious re sis tance (Andrew Williamson’s 
suffered some casualties in two ambushes). In general, most Cherokees 
dispersed and refused to come to close quarters with the rebel militia. In 
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September and October 1776, forces destroyed more than thirty- six Chero-
kee towns.14
Americans might have portrayed this campaign as a revengeful one. No 
such claim could be made the following year, when the rebels fell once more 
“upon the poor distressed Cherokees,” destroying “their Villages and Crops.” 
Rebel officials would only deign to make peace in 1777, South Carolinians and 
Georgians at the Treaty of  DeWitt’s Corner, and Virginians and North Caro-
linians at the Treaty of  Holston. The Cherokees who signed  these treaties of-
ficially split from the Cherokee Dragging Canoe, who formed a British- allied 
polity of  Cherokees, Creeks, and self- liberated bondpeople often called the 
Chickamauga Cherokees.15 John Stuart, who described  these distressed Cher-
okees, argued that the rebels had attacked British- allied Indians overaggres-
sively. His tone implied that the Americans may already have succeeded in 
subduing their  enemy by the time they attacked again in 1777; he denigrated 
preemptive American war tactics. No one could deny their terrible efficacy.
This more violent victual warfare initiated conversations about the Indian 
hunger such campaigns  were designed to cause. Rebel soldiers’ destruction of  
Cherokee crops and villages tested even Chickamaugas’ loyalty to the British. 
Dragging Canoe sent word that “they cou’d not be of  any Ser vice” to the King, 
and that, further, “if  they shou’d not raise Bread this Year the white  People 
nor no one  else wou’d have occasion to kill them for they wou’d all die with 
Hunger.” Dragging Canoe’s message lacked the meta phorical tropes that In-
dians used to request provisions.  These Native families  were not “naked,” nor 
 were they “starving”; some of  the Indians had already felt “obliged to eat 
Horses & Dogs & any  Thing they can get,” and some  were “dead already.”16 
 These  were famine conditions. Dragging Canoe’s information about  dying 
Cherokees evokes similar worries of  Iroquois men in 1779; in that instance, 
too, Natives questioned their trust in British allies. The Iroquois had critiqued 
Britons’ obsession with provisions, expressed their willingness to withstand 
 future hunger, and destroyed allies’ foodstuffs to strengthen alliances. Chick-
amauga Cherokees questioned their support for the British by emphasizing 
deaths by starvation. In both instances, hunger tested alliances.
Despite Dragging Canoe’s doubts, he and the rest of  the Chickamaugas ul-
timately chose to assist the British. He was joined by his  brother,  Little Owl, 
along with Bloody Fellow, Hanging Maw, Young Tassel ( John Watts), Kitegiska, 
and Outacite. Older Cherokees opposed this move, as did many Cherokee 
 women. This division also resulted in blocked food aid: British officials provi-
sioned the five hundred hungry Chickamaugas but prevented  these supplies 
from reaching other Cherokees.17
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Indians had to explore new ways to fight hunger, which is why the late 1770s 
witnessed increased domesticated- animal use, particularly  cattle owner ship, 
among them. Native Americans  were about a  century late to the beef  craze; 
in  England, long- distance  cattle trade from the Scottish Highlands and Low-
lands to London’s Smithfield Market increased significantly  after the 1707 Act 
of  Union, and in North Amer i ca, by the end of  the seventeenth  century, beef  
consumption had risen from 14 to 58  percent of  meat consumed in the Ches-
apeake. In some towns Creeks  were acquiring  horses (but prob ably few  cattle) 
by the 1760s, and a “New Order” of   cattle ranching and slaveholding made 
animals more impor tant during and  after the American Revolution. Some 
Cherokees had encountered  horses,  because Dragging Canoe mentioned 
 people eating them. It was likely as a result of  the Treaty of  DeWitt’s Corner 
that additional  horses and  cattle entered rebel- allied Cherokee towns. One ar-
ticle of  the treaty stipulated that Cherokees could keep the  cattle,  horses, and 
goods belonging to any unlicensed trader in Cherokee country  after they 
turned such traders in at Fort Rutledge. The treaty also demanded a return of  
 horses and slaves stolen from South Carolina, Georgia, North Carolina, and 
 Virginia, indicating that an increase in animal thefts preceded the treaty.18
Given the fluctuating symbolic and practical meanings of  domesticated ani-
mals in the mid- eighteenth  century, it is unlikely that Creeks and Cherokees 
always viewed  cattle as food sources. Some animals functioned more as sta-
tus symbols; they signified the ability to accumulate property. Natives also used 
 cattle in ways that differed from colonists’ practices. When Scots- Creek leader 
Alexander McGillivray tried to bequeath his  cattle and  horses to his sons, the 
matriarchs in his  mother’s clan ended up with the animals. Yet it would have 
been pos si ble for  cattle to take on symbolic meanings as property without los-
ing practical value as meat sources. Creeks expected provisions while travel-
ing through lands they had ceded to the British— a practice they recognized 
as part of  hospitality, but which non- Native inhabitants viewed as hostility. 
In a 1763 talk an Upper Creek called the Mortar explained that Creeks killed 
“the  Cattle they meet in  these lands”  because “their Buffalo, Deer and Bear” 
 were “being drove off  the Land and killed.” “They fill their Bellies when they 
are hungry having nothing  else to do with it,” he concluded.19 Indians, when 
denied hospitality, might have preferred game meat, but due to declining 
game populations they hunted  cattle instead. During a time of  game scarcity 
it is clear that some beef  made its way into Indian cooking  kettles.
Obviously, some Indians did acquire  cattle and eat beef  before the Revolu-
tion, as the Mortar’s talk implies. This tendency is also confirmed by the fact 
that in 1769 Georgians considered a bill to prevent “the Stealing and driving 
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away [of] Horses and  Cattle.” For the most part, in the de cades prior to the 
Revolutionary War, Indians killed  cattle. A 1733 law stated that when traders 
chaperoned Indians on visits to Georgia, the trader would be expected to 
“make good all Damages done to any of  the inhabitants by such Indians . . . 
by killing of   Cattle or other wise.” Stolen animals did not pose a significant 
enough prob lem to merit explicit mention. By 1750 Creeks, acting in concert 
with Yuchis,  were spotted “plundering” cornfields but still killing colonists’ 
 cattle. A 1771 talk by George Galphin to the Lower Creeks criticized the Indi-
ans for stealing  horses but destroying  cattle and corn.20
The proliferation of   cattle thefts during the war is consequently arresting, 
and reveals how British- allied Indians obtained  these animals. “The Creek In-
dians have broke with Us,” wrote one Georgian correspondent to Henry Lau-
rens in October 1778.  These Indians “killed & cruelly butcher’d upwards of  
thirty of  our Inhabitants,” drove “off  large Gangs of  our Horses &  Cattle,” 
and shot down what they could not “con ve niently carry away.” This strategy 
combined the tactics of  animal mutilation and destruction that had charac-
terized previous de cades with newer thefts of  animals— either to prevent other 
 people from taking them or to restock Indian herds. Often, Indians acted in 
concert with British allies; a South Carolina report explained how a combined 
force “carried off  a considerable number of  Negroes and not less than two 
thousand head of   cattle.”21 Whereas Iroquois Indians used vio lence to make 
their allies hunger in a way that highlighted Native indispensability, Creeks and 
Cherokees used vio lence to obtain animals from their enemies, which in turn 
prevented their allies from calling them useless.
The British had more success than the Americans at managing alliances with 
power ful southern Indians during this first phase of  the war, but even British ap-
proaches to working in Indian Affairs required adjusting between 1776 and 1779, 
as two letters to Superintendent John Stuart demonstrate. In May 1776 General 
William Howe wrote to Stuart to say that  because Howe was working from 
“such a distance” in the northern military theater, he trusted Stuart to make de-
cisions about Indian negotiations “without expecting par tic u lar directions from 
me.” In 1779, by contrast, Lord George Germain complained to Stuart from 
Whitehall, London, that “the Expence of  your Department has increased so 
prodigiously that it is become a  matter of  public and parliamentary observa-
tion.” As new alliances formed, as the Americans mounted preemptive cam-
paigns of  victual warfare, and as Indian vio lence grew more pronounced, the 
British position changed. When British spending on co- campaigns increased, 
high- ranking officials demanded more oversight. British- Indian attacks from 
St. Augustine into Georgia continued throughout the 1770s and early 1780s.22 
This uncertainty made crucial the presence of  officials like Stuart who remained 
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capable of  working with their Indian allies—at the same time that it made Lon-
don ministers ner vous. Germain had good reason to worry,  because John Stuart 
never read his letter; he was dead before it arrived.
In 1779 the death of  Superintendent John Stuart created im mense confusion 
in British Indian Affairs, which reduced the effectiveness of  British food diplo-
macy and moved rebel food diplomacy further along  toward the violent end 
of  the accommodation- violence spectrum of  be hav ior. Reports of  famine 
among the Creeks beginning in the summer of  1778 necessitated generosity 
during 1779, the precise moment when British officials,  because of  adminis-
trative mix- ups, could not secure funds for food gifts.23 Stuart’s work with 
Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws had lent stability to British re-
lationships with southern Indians, but his successors strug gled to transition 
into their roles as intermediaries. British food diplomacy never fully recovered 
 after Stuart’s death, and officials, in desperation, fell back on the practice of  
trying to block rebel diplomacy. The Americans seized on the confusion in the 
British Indian department to again set fire to extensive stretches of  Cherokee 
cornfields, and then to offer a new, less compromising form of  food diplomacy 
to force Creeks and Cherokees back into a state of  neutrality. By this point in 
the war the food diplomacy of  the rebel southern states did not include distri-
butions of   actual foodstuffs; the Americans instead tried to portray their “gen-
erosity” as restraint from victual warfare.  Because Creeks and Cherokees 
possessed new, aggressive ways to avoid hunger, results proved disastrous.
In March 1779 British brigadier general John Campbell reported the death 
of  John Stuart. The  whole Indian department stood “in the greatest Confu-
sion.” It is difficult to say how Indians reacted to the news, but the fact that 
Stuart had intermarried into the Cherokee Long Hair Clan and been  adopted 
by them suggests that his demise was likely troubling. In their reor ga ni za tion 
of  the department, the British split it in two. In October Alexander Cameron, 
who had  until Stuart’s death acted as superintendent for the Cherokees, be-
came superintendent of  the Choctaws and Chickasaws; Col o nel Thomas 
Brown was appointed to the Catawba, Creek, and Cherokee Indians. They 
each received a salary and could employ deputies and interpreters. Brown got 
£1,000 as “allowance for pre sents, Rum, Provisions, Carriage and all other con-
tingencies.” Cameron feared that such changes would hinder British- Native 
alliances. He received a sum of  £1,450, which he found “barely sufficient to 
defray the Sallaries of  Officers,” let alone satisfy “Visiting parties of   those Na-
tions  under my management.”24
For one  thing, British leaders had been critiquing John Stuart’s overspend-
ing for several years; £1,450 was not likely to go far for Cameron or Brown. 
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For another, Indians tended to engage with the diplomacy practiced by the men 
whom Native  women had married; Mohawks had been tied to Sir William John-
son, Creek loyalties had been tied to Stuart, and Alexander Cameron had been 
responsible for the Cherokees. Now Johnson and Stuart  were dead. By moving 
Cameron from his position among the Cherokees, the British weakened this 
node of  patronage and ignored the fact that it would take Cameron time to cul-
tivate ties with the Choctaws and Chickasaws. “The Cherokees  will all return to 
the Rebels,” wrote Cameron, as “soon as they are informed that I am deprived 
of  the Management of  their Affairs.” Cameron worried that his departure 
would push Cherokees to reestablish alliances with another imperial power, so 
he delayed acting on his  orders. By September the Indian department was again 
“in Confusion”  because Cameron had not yet left the Cherokee nation.25
Even if  Indian loyalties  were secure, Britons would soon find that they did 
not possess the means to maintain them, in part  because they could not pro-
cure food. In September 1779 a ship “laden with 300 Barrels of  Provisions And 
a considerable Quantity of  Rum . . .  ha[d] unquestionably fallen into the 
 Enemy’s Hands,” and the Indians could not be employed “for want of  Provi-
sions” on the Mississippi. Spain declared war on  Great Britain in 1779, and 
Bernando de Gálvez, Spanish governor of  Louisiana, de cided to launch pre-
emptive attacks against the British at Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez to 
protect the valuable port of  New Orleans. The Indians in this report may 
have been Chickasaws, and the  enemy Spanish rather than American, but the 
overall sentiment was the same: theft resulted in British inabilities to secure 
Indians’ assistance. And this letter was the same letter that reported on the 
confusion that resulted from Cameron’s dithering. When supplies made it 
through, distribution prob lems occurred. Stuart had died in debt. In Febru-
ary 1780 five hundred barrels of  pork destined for the Indian department had 
been sent to Stuart’s attention instead; this slip in address meant that the pork 
was “seized upon” by Stuart’s executor and “ will prob ably be sold by him as 
private Property.” “This Pork would be of  the utmost advantage” at an up-
coming “Congress with the Indians,” complained another official— but the 
pork was unrecoverable.26
To add to the chaos, right before this bureaucratic change in the British In-
dian department, Virginians had mounted a scorched- earth campaign, which 
they followed with offers of  curtailed food diplomacy. They attacked neutral 
Indians and British- allied Chickamaugas with equal vigor. In April 1779, Vir-
ginians attacked “Chicgamaga a New Settlement,” where they “surprised the 
 Women &  Children,” killed five  people, destroyed “Their Homes & Corn,” 
and “carried off ” all the Indians’ “Horses &  Cattle.” According to Alexander 
Cameron, this action reduced the Cherokees “to the utmost distress.”27
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When Cameron arrived at the Chickamauga towns at the end of  May, he 
“found  matters in very  great Confusion.” He discovered that “a Commissary 
appointed by the Stadtholders of   Virginia to Superintend the Cherokee” was 
laboring, “Through the Mediation” of  the Cherokee warrior Oconostota, to 
convince the Indians to take him up on his offer “to Support them with Provi-
sions and all the Necessaries of  Life providing they would return to their Old 
Towns and live Neutral.” Luckily for the British, Cameron’s arrival precipitated 
the American agent’s departure: “not Chusing to risque his Safety in my Neigh-
bourhood,” the man “returned to  Virginia” when Cameron appeared. Cam-
eron convinced the Cherokees not to agree to peace and provisions, but to 
wait for their own corn to ripen, when “we should then march to Carolina or 
Georgia and take Revenge.”28 According to Cameron  these homeless Chero-
kees had no corn, no  horses, and no  cattle. The disarray of  the Indian depart-
ment meant that Cameron could not offer to provision the Cherokees in 
exchange for their ser vice. In this case, however, he invoked Cherokee cycles 
of  planting and warfare to get them to agree to the timing of  this expedition.
What happened next was not to Cameron’s  favor. The rebels had heard of  
this  future attack and sent South Carolinian general Andrew Williamson and 
his cavalry to march  toward the Chickamauga Cherokee settlement.29 Upon 
arrival Williamson promised the Cherokees “that he did not mean to hurt 
them or their Effects, providing they would lay neutral” and allow him “to take 
or destroy” Cameron and his men (Cameron discovered that the Indians had 
received  these talks  after the fact, when it was too late).30 Cameron prepared 
for a fight between the Americans and his com pany of  approximately three 
hundred Indians and forty Loyalists, only to encounter “the  Enemy . . .  in 
Three divisions, and Five Hundred  horse men in each Division.”31 They  were 
outnumbered.
At first the Cherokees seemed to privilege the prevention of  their own hun-
ger over their promise to fight with Cameron. It seemed that  these Chero-
kees did still have some corn,  because they called a council and de cided to send 
two of  their own “to treat for Peace and save their Corn.” Williamson told 
them that if  they would deliver Cameron “into his Hands,” he would agree 
not to burn their crops. But then the Cherokees told Williamson “that if  he 
would not treat upon any other Terms, he might burn their Towns as soon as 
he pleased.” Williamson accordingly “Burned Six of  their Towns and destroyed 
their Corn . . .  after which he offered them  every assistance and Protection 
they could wish for Providing they would return to their Old Towns and live 
in peace.”32 Cameron escaped.
The disorder in the British Indian department made it difficult for the Brit-
ish to try to remedy the situation with food aid. Cameron explained that he 
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had hoped to gather the Indians together “and revenge the loss of  their Corn.” 
In October he fi nally managed to purchase three hundred bushels for the 
Chickamaugas from the other Cherokees— “ those Indians who lie neuter and 
listen to the  Virginia Folks.” If  the Chickamauga population consisted of  five 
hundred families, each  family would have received two thirds of  a bushel of  
corn. It is difficult to estimate the weight of  a bushel of  corn, especially with 
such a brief  description. Britons and Americans mea sure bushels differently 
 today, and Cameron was a Scot working for the British in North Amer i ca, so 
it is hard to say which mea sure ment he might have used. Mea sure ments for 
American bushels range between 56 pounds per bushel of  shelled corn and 
from 35 to 70 pounds for corn in the ear. This would mean that each  family 
received between 33.6 pounds if  Cameron obtained shelled corn, and between 
21 pounds and 42 pounds if  the corn was unshucked. Given that each Iroquois 
person (not  family) consumed six bushels per year, and that a  future attack 
against the Cherokees destroyed fifty thousand bushels at once, three hundred 
bushels does not seem like a significant quantity of  food relief.33
In any case, Cameron’s plans to provide additional foodstuffs and to lead a 
retaliatory attack  were foiled by his receiving word that he was no longer in 
charge of  superintending the Cherokees. The funds he possessed could not 
be spent on more corn or anything  else for the Cherokees. Cameron professed 
himself  “much afraid that few of  the Indians of  this District  will join or give 
Assistance to His Majesty’s Troops this Season.” In October he reported that 
the Chickamaugas  were “living in the Woods upon Nuts and what ever they 
can get besides.”34 Their corn supplies from the neutral Cherokees had dwin-
dled. Failures in British supplies could have offered Andrew Williamson an 
opportunity, but he chose to assert power through destruction.
The attack against the Chickamaugas provides evidence of  alterations in 
vio lence and peacemaking, and continued misunderstandings of  Native hun-
ger. Southern rebels’ policy regarding Natives consisted of  engaging in aggres-
sive, preemptive victual warfare, reneging on promises made, and, once a 
campaign successfully ended, offering terms of  peace. Americans now offered 
postattack “assistance” to  enemy Indians, but, in a move that anticipated 
George Washington’s instructions to John  Sullivan, they did so only once they 
 were confident of  Indians’ defeat and  future neutrality. The British, represented 
by Cameron, strug gled to provide provisions. Cameron had to encourage 
Cherokees to plant their own crops. Cherokees, in contrast to Britons and 
Americans, and like the Six Nations, continued to use food diplomacy some-
what effectively and may have continued to overstate their hunger to non- 
Native observers. The fact that the Chickamaugas possessed some corn for 
Williamson to destroy, and the fact that Cameron obtained corn from neutral 
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Cherokees to give to their Chickamauga brethren, testifies to the existence of  
corn and the importance of  grain in retaining bonds between factions of  south-
ern Natives. Given the uncertain conditions of  crop production, however—
no one could say  whether the corn would be allowed to ripen without suffering 
another scorched- earth attack,  whether the weather would turn too soon, or 
 whether the harvest would fail— hungry neutral Cherokees may not have had 
much to spare.
The absence of  provisions, incompetent distribution of  what  little food-
stuffs the British obtained, and infighting prolonged the confusion. In De-
cember 1779 Alexander Cameron complained that a group of  Creeks had 
visited him and requested food, which he could not deliver  because he was 
not their superintendent. Desperate, he wrote to Governor Peter Chester at 
British- held Pensacola and recommended that Chester “Order at least provi-
sions and Ammunition to be Issued to  those Indians” as a  matter of  “Interest 
and Safety of  your Province.” Cameron warned that without provisions, the 
colony at Pensacola would “become a prey to” the Creeks, who would retali-
ate with vio lence that interfered with “Communication betwixt this place and 
Savannah through the Creek Nation.”35 Governor Chester ignored this warn-
ing from an Indian agent, and not for the first or last time.
Chester had refused to provide ammunition and provisions to a group of  
Creeks in 1774. Part of  his stubbornness can be explained by a general lack of  
funds; when, in the late 1770s, Chester requested troops from British secre-
tary George Germain, Germain said no  because he assumed that previous sup-
plies to Indians would suffice to convince Native warriors to help Chester. 
But Chester also made his own  mistakes. In 1780 he went as far as to refuse to 
receive the Creek Indians who came to visit him. By 1780 one official success-
fully convinced Chester “to incur a small expence to keep our red allies in a 
good temper,” but it seems that  those efforts did not content the Indians.36
 After Chester gave in and used part of  his annual allowance of  £1,000 to 
furnish “them with a  little Provision,” the Creeks, “being disatisfyed with their 
Reception . . .  began to kill the  Cattle about Town.” They had also “sold most 
of  their provisions for Rum,” and “when drunk” became “very insolent and 
Riotous.” This destruction of   cattle is striking in its resemblance to Iroquois 
and Shawnee  cattle destruction at almost the exact same moment. It is pos si-
ble that Creek motivations  were diff er ent. Perhaps they remained ambivalent 
about  cattle owner ship. But it is also pos si ble that  these Creeks, like the Iro-
quois and Shawnees, destroyed foodstuffs provided by their allies  because sym-
bolic vio lence and hunger endurance  were as impor tant as hunger prevention. 
The subsequent decision to privilege rum purchases over provisions suggests 
a continuing disinterest in eating and the increasing temptation of  alcohol. By 
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February 1780 Chester had started to seize Creek lands and distribute them 
to “his Favorets and Dependents.” That month Creeks  were spotted “Plun-
dering the En glish Inhabitants of  this Province.”37  These actions might have 
symbolized retaliation— which is how some Britons understood them— but 
they might also have represented Creeks taking animals as the expected gifts 
of  non- Native hospitality, or destroying them to ensure a shared experience 
of  hunger. The year 1779 gave rise to a host of  contradictions, which had not 
resolved themselves by the  Battle of  Yorktown.
On the day in 1781 that the American siege of  Yorktown ended in British 
surrender, a man named St. George Tucker wrote a poem. Tucker, a Bermuda- 
born  Virginia  lawyer who had recently been wounded in the nose by an ex-
ploding shell, appeared rather glum, despite the American victory.38 He wrote:
See Terror stalking through the’ affrighted Land!
Grim Rage and fell Revenge his Steps pursue,
Rapine, and harpy— Famine join the Band,
And Murder, leading on his hellish Crew:
 The wretched Victim’s  dying Groans,
 The  widow’d Matron’s tender Moans,
 The Virgins plaints, the orphans cries,
 Ascend in Concert to the Skies:
 There hollow want in anguish pines,
No more relieve’d from plenty’s chearing Hoard;
 There pale Disease the parting Breath resigns,
And Desolation waves around her flaming Sword!39
Even as the Americans triumphed against the British, Tucker’s iambs personi-
fied the characters of  murder, rage, rapine, revenge, terror, and famine— 
always famine. His verse concluded with additional references to want and the 
absence of  relief. The twelve months of  1779 had been characterized by in-
competent diplomacy on almost all fronts, and although Yorktown marked a 
turning point, the war was still not over. Now, Indians’ victual warfare had re-
sulted in an unintended consequence: it encouraged fears of  murderous, ter-
rifying, and power ful Indians.
During the early 1780s,  people in the revolutionary south proved incapable of  
practicing food diplomacy. Britons, who suffered a major defeat at Yorktown 
in 1781, fell back on trying to undermine rebel negotiations with Indians. 
Southern American states strug gled  because of  individual states’ failures 
to cooperate, which resulted in mixed messages of  peaceful overtures, self- 
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congratulations for withholding victual warfare, and intermittent attacks. 
Rebel- allied Indians used peaceful food meta phors that British- allied Natives 
contradicted by committing victual warfare. Non- Natives, consequently, be-
came unable and unwilling to distinguish between the Indians responsible for 
mediation and  those responsible for war. British and American representatives 
complained about Indians who seemed peaceable one month and then, 
confusingly— sometimes “treacherously”— switched their allegiance and de-
stroyed crops and animals. The Americans usually erred in  favor of  attacking 
rather than attempting to figure out which Native Americans wanted peace. 
During  these  later years of  the conflict, non- Natives’ fears of  Indian vio lence 
became interwoven with their anx i eties about hungry Indians.40
Life was chaotic in the early 1780s.  After Cornwallis’s defeat at Yorktown 
the military conflict was effectively over for the southern British troops, but 
other sorts of  hostility continued; 1780 to 1782 was the most violent part of  
the conflict. During the last part of  the war Britons continued to interfere in 
rebels’ negotiations with Native Americans. In September 1782, more than two 
hundred Creeks from Cusseta, Okfuskee, and Tallassee met Americans in Au-
gusta, Georgia. They agreed to return stolen animals and enslaved  people, 
but before the parties formalized the arrangement, the British distracted them. 
They “Sent up an Indian” who told them “to come and gett goods” from the 
British, who knew “they ware in  great want of  goods.” Many of  the Creeks 
who seemed friendly to the Americans now de cided to head to St. Augustine 
to meet the British.  Those who remained on their way to Augusta expected 
“that they  will gett goods boath as pre sents and for them to have a treat, or 
they say it  will be impossible for them to give the satisfaction Required.”41 Brit-
ish promises of  additional goods divided the party of  Creeks.
The Indians who still seemed willing to meet the Americans traveled with 
increased expectations that trade goods would function as payment and pre-
sents. Americans would be unlikely to supply them, and without trade goods 
they possessed few additional options but vio lence. Alexander Cameron died 
on December 27, 1781, eliminating yet another person capable of  brokering 
British diplomacy with Indians. George Galphin died in 1782, which prompted 
a similar situation for the Americans.42 Spanish involvement, noticeable since 
the late 1770s, became more prominent  after Yorktown, which hurt not only 
the British but also the southern states  because it offered Creeks more lever-
age in their negotiations with imperial powers. Peace seemed elusive indeed.
Divisions between American states contributed to a lack of  cooperation, 
which led to inconsistencies in food diplomacy and Indian policy. In the early 
1780s North Carolinians and Georgians both sought to make peace with vari ous 
Cherokee factions, with minimal success. In July 1781 one North Carolina 
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official reported the arrival of  “Some of  the principal Head- men of  the Cher-
okees” to Holstein River for a treaty. He worried, “The Commissioners are 
exceedingly embarrassed for want of  money”  because the  Virginia trea surer 
was “refusing to pay.” During Indian treaties, he remarked, “not only the Am-
bassadours, but their Wives, and their Train &c; has to be fed by the Eu ro-
pean negociator.” He pointed out the strategic necessity of  “amusing and 
keeping two numerous Indian Tribes still, or in suspense, during this critical 
Campaign”— likely referring to American efforts up and down the coast that 
would culminate in the siege at Yorktown— but worried that this goal would 
prove impossible to achieve without food supplies.43
The following year it was North Carolinians who disappointed Georgians 
by failing to appear at a meeting between Georgia and the Cherokees. A Geor-
gia man described not getting “the Busnes Compleated as was Expected 
upon the account of  the faithless North Carolina Men not Meeting agreeable 
to their Repeated Promises.” He feared that “the scarcety of  Provisions”— 
which may also have impeded the treaty’s success— coupled with an absence 
of  ammunition placed Georgians in a “totering situation” along “our fron-
teers.”44 In both cases one state’s inability to cooperate with another state 
combined with a food shortage to undercut the stability of  Indian affairs.
By 1782 some southern officials’ food diplomacy consisted of  telling Indi-
ans they should be grateful for an absence of  victual warfare. This policy 
lumped Indian allies together with antagonists. Andrew Pickens, a  future fed-
eral Indian commissioner, spent part of  1782 touring Cherokee country, some-
times delivering talks to Indians himself  and sometimes sending them with 
other messengers. In one talk sent to the  Middle and Valley Cherokees, Pick-
ens’s representative referred to a previous expedition where the man in 
charge “did not hurt any of  the Red  People nor suffer his men to pull an ear 
of  their Corn.” The Americans claimed that “by that means we thought to 
convince your nation that we did not wish to hurt you,” and only push “the 
Rogues & bad White Men . . .  out of  your Country.” Soon  after that, com-
plained the speaker, Cherokees attacked, intending “to burn & destroy the 
 whole Country,” though they  were prevented when Americans fired upon 
them.  These Indians “run home”  after “burning a few Houses & Stealing Some 
Negroes.”45
This was a telling exchange. Pickens, speaking via this go- between, congrat-
ulated the Americans for refraining from vio lence and the destruction of  
 Middle and Valley Cherokee crops— during a campaign whose history he may 
have modified to downplay rebel atrocities— and  after differentiating some 
Cherokees from Cherokee “Rogues” and white traders working for the Brit-
ish, he then criticized all Cherokees for the attack. Pickens assumed that he 
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knew the Indians’ intentions, when in fact their actions suggested plans for a 
small raid rather than a larger, more damaging strike. He refused to distin-
guish between peaceful American- allied Cherokees and the Chickamaugas and 
Creeks who moved against American towns, and he was unwilling to allow 
them to retain the  cattle they stole to feed themselves. Pickens  later demanded 
that the Indians show good faith by returning domesticated animals stolen dur-
ing the war.46
Interactions with the Creeks in Georgia proved even clumsier. Like Pick-
ens, Governor John Martin blamed one faction of  Indians for the actions of  
another. In a July talk to the Creek headman the Tallassee King, he blamed 
the British- allied “Treacherous” Emistesigo, who, “for the sake of  a few tri-
fling pre sents . . .  Did wantonly fall on our Warriors in the Night.” Although 
Martin admitted that Emistesigo, what ever his motivations, acted without con-
sulting the Tallassee King, Martin blamed the Tallassee King for the damage. 
He also demanded compensation for the victual warfare of  other Creeks. Once 
the Tallassee King agreed to “deliver up . . .  all our Negroes,  horses &  Cattle 
that are among you,” Martin looked forward to “Burying the Hatchet, Bright-
ening the Good old Chain of  Friendship, & mak[ing] the path streight, Fair 
and open, so that we  shall live like friends &  Brothers, living upon the same 
land and Eating out of  the Same Dish.”47 It is pos si ble that Martin held the 
Tallassee King responsible  because Okfuskee Creeks also possessed  horses and 
 cattle and enslaved  people as their property. It is also likely, however, that Mar-
tin could not be troubled to differentiate between Creeks. Like his contempo-
raries, Martin used many meta phors, some of  which relied upon the one- dish 
trope to portray shared territory.
Martin may have been echoing the Tallassee King, who had made overtures 
of  friendship to Georgians only a week  after news of  a Creek and Chickam-
auga Cherokee attack in Georgia that May. The Tallassee King warned Mar-
tin of  a new attack by a combined party of  Creeks and Cherokees. At the 
meeting— which both Upper and Lower Creeks attended— the Tallassee King 
used the one- dish meta phor to convey his hopes for peace. The “ordained” 
nature of   children eating “out of  one Dish” with a combination of  a white 
and “a Red Hand” reminded listeners that some of  the Upper Creeks remained 
loyal to Georgia— though the Tallassee King did not attempt to apply the state-
ment to all Creeks. The Tallassee King’s maneuvering illustrates the two 
growing factions of  Creeks  after the Americans took Savannah. The prob lem 
was that even in light of  this talk, Georgian motives remained questionable. 
When the Tallassee King and several other Creeks arrived in Augusta around 
October, the Georgians had no goods to distribute.48 This dish cried out for 
blood.
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Georgians also emphasized their attacks against the Cherokees as a threat 
to the Creeks, and admitted that they currently had few provisions to distrib-
ute. “See what the Cherokees are now reduced to, by their folly and pride,” 
said Governor Martin to the Tallassee King and several warriors and headmen 
of  the Upper and Lower Creeks in 1782. “They are almost brought to noth-
ing.” He prefaced this warning with a reminder that the Georgians had already 
demanded their “horses,  Cattle and Negroes.” He could provide no food— 
“We have just been able to raise provisions for our pre sent support,” he said— 
but soon Georgians would “raise plenty of  Rice,” and “Ships from all nations 
 will flow in upon us, and we  shall be able to supply you with goods of  all kinds, 
and take your Skins in return.” Martin’s portrayal of  a free- trade United States 
emphasized the link between food and trade goods while mentioning his gov-
ernment’s current inability to mete out  either. He even went as far as to try to 
limit the number of  men who intended to accompany the Tallassee King on 
a visit to see Martin in Savannah. Martin noted that “we have neither provi-
sions, nor pre sents to give them.” Martin died shortly thereafter. By January, 
when the Tallassee King’s arrival was fi nally imminent, and the Tallassee and 
Fat King had complied with Georgian  peoples’ requests and “chearfully gave 
up” slaves, provisions remained in short supply. All attempts to purchase corn 
from “the Publick” had “been in vain.”49 The procurer in charge doubted his 
ability to find even enough grain for the Tallassee King alone.
Such blundering not only helped to provoke victual warfare but also en-
sured a continuous cycle of  it, in which non- Native attacks destroyed Indian 
foodstuffs, and Indians then committed victual warfare to steal grain and  cattle 
that would prevent hunger— which, in turn, prompted retaliatory campaigns 
against them. In 1780, North Carolinians sent five hundred men against the 
Chickamauga towns; in 1781  Virginia and North Carolina also attacked, tar-
geting  houses and provisions specifically. Men led by John Sevier pursued the 
Cherokees into present- day  middle Tennessee and Northern Alabama, burn-
ing towns and killing noncombatants. In the spring of  1782 Indians responded. 
Chickamauga Cherokees and Creeks attacked Georgia. They burned  houses, 
stole “two & a half  Waggon loads of  Corn,” destroyed a “Potator  house & 
turned in a number of  hogs to Distroy what Remaind.” They also killed two 
 people, wounded three, and took four prisoners.50  These Indians destroyed and 
stole foodstuffs  because they found victual warfare useful for the dual purposes 
of  hunger creation (among the Americans) and hunger prevention (among 
themselves).
Suppose that St. George Tucker was a more prolific poet, and had composed 
lines to precede and follow his Yorktown ode: what might they look like? Per-
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haps he would have penned some sorrowful words on the state of  his nose.51 
If  the muses had inspired him to write about Indian affairs up  until 1779, he 
might have introduced readers to the monsters Failure, Thievery, and Confu-
sion. From 1775 to the end of  1778, British and rebel failures to practice food 
diplomacy occurred alongside increased instances of  victual warfare in which 
Americans preemptively attacked Creeks and Cherokees, and Indians stole 
 cattle. A reexamination of  this period suggests that Indians practiced some as-
pects of  victual warfare to prevent their own hunger, which allowed them to 
gain power even during times of  reported famine. It is difficult to say  whether 
bad diplomacy caused victual warfare. What readers can conclude is that failed 
diplomacy and increases in victual warfare occurred in close connection to 
each other, and they both destabilized power relationships.
The following years  were characterized by worse vio lence that was birthed 
from the confusion  after John Stuart’s death. His absence made diplomatic so-
lutions nearly unobtainable at the exact moment when the British most 
needed them. Although Stuart had understood the stakes of  feeding Indians, 
his successors  were fairly useless at employing food to negotiate. Meanwhile, 
American food diplomacy became more closely bound to aggressive crop de-
struction; it came to mean restraint in scorched- earth campaigns, and send-
ing  limited food aid to the  enemy villages that had suffered the brunt of   those 
attacks. The last phase of  the war can be linked to the erasure of  Indian fac-
tions from con temporary historical rec ords. Beginning in the late 1770s both 
British and southern state officials strug gled to distinguish allies from enemies; 
they became incapable of  identifying the  people who practiced victual war-
fare. Times of  confusion  were difficult times to preserve accurate rec ords of  
the past.
St. George Tucker’s final poem would have needed to reveal a final mon-
ster: the Master who enslaved other  people.52 Numerous Patriot officials ob-
served that in addition to Creek and Cherokee tactics of  sharing grain with 
 enemy Indians and stealing  cattle, Indians worked together with formerly en-
slaved  people to attack the Americans. White American slaveholders some-
times portrayed  these acts as “stealing” slaves, and sometimes as encouraging 
enslaved  people to run away.  These black men,  women, and  children consti-
tute the last group of   people whose relationships with hunger and usefulness 
during the War for In de pen dence merit readers’ attention— but in contrast to 
Native Americans,  people of  African descent enjoyed less power during the 
war itself.

Part Two
Power in Flux

89
Chapter 4
Black Victual Warriors and Hunger Creation
Food is omnipresent in Revolutionary- era sto-
ries about bondpeople and  free black men and  women. In 1781 a cook named 
Dinah supposedly made such a delicious, slowly served fried chicken break-
fast for British officer Banastre Tarleton and his men that it gave a messenger 
time to  ride to the rebels and warn them of  the arrival of  the British troops. 
A diff er ent Dinah was said to have protected her master’s home in Poughkeep-
sie, New York, “by ‘softening’ British hearts with her freshly baked bread.” In 
another tale, George Washington visited Fraunces Tavern in New York City, 
where someone— sometimes Samuel Fraunces, the  free black tavern owner, 
and sometimes a girl named Phoebe, said to be his  daughter— “thwarted an 
assassination attempt against Washington by throwing a plate of  poisoned peas 
out the win dow to the chickens.”1 None of  the heroes in  these apocryphal sto-
ries are depicted eating bread, peas, or chicken themselves.  These myths re-
semble real occurrences during the Revolutionary War when enslaved  peoples 
and self- liberated men and  women used food to shape the war in ways that 
failed to address their own hunger.  People of  African descent gained only a 
marginal amount of  power during the war itself; they proved themselves to 
military entities by saving soldiers from deaths by starvation and related dis-
eases, but they often did so while ignoring their own appetites.
Enslaved  people could make themselves useful to the British Army  because it 
was the British who first granted them a chance at freedom. In November 1775, 
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before the colonies declared in de pen dence,  Virginia governor Lord Dunmore 
issued a proclamation that offered freedom to slaves of  rebel masters, setting 
the stage for an exodus of  thousands of  self- liberated men and  women from 
colonists’ homes and plantations to British lines. Dunmore’s Proclamation 
was also responsible for changing white colonists’ and British officers’ ideas 
about hunger prevention and just war.  Because southern masters conflated 
the loss of  slaves with the loss of  other “property,” like domesticated ani-
mals, it became easy for colonists to equate “stealing” slaves—or encourag-
ing them to run away— with other acts that decreased their access to 
foodstuffs and fostered hunger. Rebel Americans, in turn, changed British 
ideas about victual warfare between members of  the same nation. When their 
slaves ran to British ships, colonists  stopped provisioning the British sailors 
aboard. The British then described the decision to withhold food and the re-
fusal to sell it at a fair price as acts of  war. Once  these  matters  were settled, 
the British had to try to create a coherent military strategy that united former 
slaves, Loyalists, and Indians against American Patriots.2
Dunmore’s Proclamation affected white colonists and Britons less than it 
did  free black folks, enslaved  people, and former bondpeople.  People of  Afri-
can descent played vari ous roles in the conflict, though not all documents in-
dicate  whether someone was enslaved or  free, or  whether that person served 
as a soldier allowed to bear arms, or as a waggoneer, cook, waiter, or camp 
follower. Dunmore’s offer turned some men into victual warriors capable of  
creating and preventing white hunger. When food ran short, commanders sent 
soldiers out of  camp on foraging expeditions for the army, which offered the 
additional strategic benefit of  allowing soldiers to feed themselves by pilfer-
ing grain and domesticated animals. In the south, black victual raiders often 
set out first  because  those men knew where on the plantations of  former mas-
ters they could find movable, edible goods.
This pillaging approach, which ameliorated British hunger with stolen food-
stuffs while si mul ta neously creating hunger among the American rebels, en-
gendered two results. First, it put  free blacks and escaped slaves at  great risk 
of  suffering the wrath of  white colonists, who now had to deal with a large 
gap in southern provisioning. Second, it made black men more mobile. Hus-
bands left wives and  children to undertake dangerous missions, or took up 
butchering or marketing work that necessitated living apart from their fami-
lies. Their responsibilities as thieves, cooks, and waiters forced them to range 
farther from military forts but also made them privy to meetings of  higher- 
ranking officers when they remained in or returned to camp. By procuring pro-
visions,  these ex- bondmen improved their skills in acquiring and sharing 
information.
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Black  people’s involvement in the war transformed  these men and  women 
from relatively powerless actors in one food system into active creators of  a 
new food system that they  were somewhat more capable of  using to their ad-
vantage. As slaves, bondpeople had labored against white hunger by produc-
ing and selling garden produce and by growing cash crops that whites sold for 
provisions. Their newer hunger- prevention efforts  were extralegal; former 
slaves achieved them through  labor, migration, and theft, but not yet by law. 
Throughout the war, self- liberated men and  women did not enjoy the luxury 
of  worrying overmuch about their own appetites— and sometimes, hunger 
seemed immaterial. But their experiences created the knowledge that would 
 later become necessary to institutionalize a food system that granted black col-
onists the po liti cal authority to fight hunger.
While London ministers weighed the costs and benefits of  invading the colo-
nies, British colonial governors considered making appeals to slaves— just as 
they had to Native Americans—to shore up support in case the British Army 
arrived. In April 1775 the governor of   Virginia, John Murray, third Earl of  Dun-
more, infuriated colonists with his decision to remove gunpowder from the 
Williamsburg powder magazine. He claimed that he had moved it to protect 
white Virginians in the event of  a slave rebellion. Skeptical colonial leaders ar-
gued that the absence of  powder would instead encourage revolt, which 
southern colonists constantly feared. “Some wicked and designing persons 
have instilled the most diabolical notions in the minds of  our slaves,” they ob-
served that month in the  Virginia Gazette newspaper. By May Dunmore was 
admitting privately that he intended to encourage rebellion. He had claimed, 
“with a Supply of  Arms and Ammunition [he] should be able to collect from 
amongst Negroes Indians and other persons a force sufficient if  not to sub-
due Rebellion at least to defend Government.”3
He put this plan into action in his November 1775 proclamation. He invited 
“ every person capable of  bearing arms to resort to his Majesty’s STANDARD,” 
including “all indented servants, Negroes, or  others (appertaining to rebels) 
 free, that are able and willing to bear arms.”4 By specifying that he would wel-
come only slaves belonging to rebels, Dunmore may have hoped to maintain 
good relationships with Loyalists. Determined enslaved  people ran from loyal, 
neutral, and rebel masters alike. Slaveholders possessed good reasons to be ner-
vous,  because Dunmore’s Proclamation produced palpable results— though 
they  were more vis i ble in the long term. At first the proclamation offered self- 
liberated men only the freedom to die; in December  1775 the “Ethiopian 
regiment,” as Dunmore called it, had suffered staggering losses at American 
hands.5
“By his Excellency the Right Honourable John Earl of Dunmore, his Majesty’s Lieutenant and 
Governour- General of the Colony and Dominion of  Virginia, and Vice- admiral of the same. A 
proclamation,” 7 November 1775. Courtesy of American Memory, the Library of Congress.
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Following additional efforts to recruit them, enslaved  people ran to the Brit-
ish in unpre ce dented numbers, and they ran farther and farther afield. By 
1777  Virginia planter Robert Car ter estimated that fifteen hundred bondpeo-
ple had “availed themselves” of  Dunmore’s offer. In April 1778 the British in 
Boston contemplated raising a regiment to welcome runaways. At the Siege 
of  Savannah in 1779, armed slaves “did won ders in the working way and in 
the fighting.” Henry Clinton’s 1779 Philipsburg Proclamation promised “full 
Security” and “any Occupation which he  shall think proper” to “ every Negroe 
who  shall desert the Rebel Standard.” Not all of   these efforts worked to Brit-
ain’s advantage; Clinton’s decision in par tic u lar pushed other wise loyal white 
inhabitants into supporting the rebels. Estimates of  the number of  former 
slaves who ultimately joined the British cause range from fifteen thousand to 
twenty thousand. Almost a fourth of  the pre- Revolutionary slave population 
migrated out of  South Carolina and Georgia. Men and  women also ran from 
Mary land, North Carolina, and  Virginia.6
Dunmore’s Proclamation damaged good relations with colonists, but the 
announcement also altered how Britons and southern colonists thought about 
food and hunger in two significant ways. Slaves ran, and took refuge onboard 
British ships. Only  after British naval officers ignored colonists’ protests about 
runaways and continued to harbor escapees did colonists stop supplying pro-
visions, thus curtailing the ease with which British ships and sailors traveled 
along rivers and coasts. First, therefore, the proclamation led to colonial lead-
ers’ refusal to victual British ships, which in turn prompted British naval lead-
ers to interpret withholding food and setting high prices as acts of  war. Second, 
Dunmore’s Proclamation underscored the crucial role slaves played in the 
southern food system. White rebel colonists, who  were relatively useless at 
producing food without enslaved  labor, conflated voluntary flight with “thefts” 
of  their animals and stored provisions  because  these episodes threatened food 
security.
Word of  Dunmore’s Proclamation travelled quickly. In December 1775 the 
South Carolina Council of  Safety resolved that if  British leaders “continue[d] 
to receive and detain slaves,” they would order that the supplies of  provisions 
for the British navy “be discontinued.” Mid- December, Henry Laurens, act-
ing as president of  the council, revealed to the captain of  the British ship the 
Tamar that South Carolinians saw “less reason . . .  for supplying provisions at 
this time”  because of  the “robberies and depredations committed” by “white 
and black armed men, from on board some of  the ships  under your com-
mand.” The decision to shelter runaways encouraged former slaves to plun-
der southern colonists’ plantations. Colonists  were outraged. The Council 
of  Safety resolved that  because the British persisted in sheltering runaway 
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slaves, the colony was justified in its decision “to cut off  all communica-
tion” with the British. In January  1776 the Cherokee joined the Tamar, the 
Raven, the Syren, and an unnamed vessel called a sandwich packet, and the 
ships sailed from South Carolina to Georgia in search of  foodstuffs. “Since 
the practice of  harbouring & protecting our Negroes on board the Cherokee,” 
wrote Henry Laurens, “we have refused to Supply them.” He expected that 
the British  were bound for Georgia “to obtain provisions of  Bread.”7 It was a 
victory of  mixed emotions for South Carolina rebels. They had forced the 
British to move elsewhere— but also facilitated former slaves’ passage on the 
departing ships.
By the end of  the month the British  were interpreting the provisioning is-
sue as an act of  revolt. Andrew Barclay, the commodore of   those ships, de-
creed that inhabitants who refused “to Supply provisions or attempt an hostile 
defence” would “be deemed & treated as Rebels.” He equated fighting with 
not provisioning his men; the choice to withhold food had in this context be-
come a declaration of  war. Barclay warned Governor Wright of  Savannah 
“That if  they coud not be Supplyd with provisions” they would “if  in their 
power attack” Savannah and “destroy it.” Wright was prob ably willing to al-
low the British into Savannah; he remained loyal to  Great Britain, and in March 
he would attack the port with Barclay’s assistance. In January, however, Geor-
gian inhabitants had forced Wright to flee the colony, so even had he wished 
to do so, Wright could not stop inhabitants from controlling the food supply. 
In February it became clear that colonists had begun to rethink their respon-
sibility to prevent imperial officials’ hunger during a time of  tension between 
colony and metropole. That month Barclay wrote to Wright and angrily com-
plained that anyone residing in “his Majesty’s Dominions” should be able to 
obtain provisions at “the Market Price.”8
At first it was unclear  whether the colonists’ refusal to provision British ships 
or sell food at lower prices actually constituted rebellion. In times of  peace 
some governments may have let civilians decide local prices, but during previ-
ous periods of  war and famine governments had intervened to fix prices to 
prevent hunger. During the Revolutionary War, the rebel government strug-
gled to regulate civilian food prices. June 1777 witnessed “a considerable num-
ber” of  North Carolina merchants making “it their business To deny up all 
the necessaries of  life in order to fix what price they please.” “If  we  were as 
virtuous as we  ought to be,” commented Henry Laurens’s son, John, in 1778, 
“ those who are enriching themselves by Commerce, Privateering and Farm-
ing” would instead want to supply the army “with  every necessary and con-
ve nience at a moderate rate.” His  father received a letter that begged him “to 
put a Stop to the practices of   those miscreants the Monopolizers of  Food.”9 
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Even during the war, when the rebels could not regulate their own prices, they 
did not accuse  these monopolists of  rebelling against them.
The question of  military purveyance further complicated  matters. By the 
late medieval period, En glish subjects came to accept that the crown had the 
right to seize goods and ser vices without paying for them immediately; legis-
lation existed to regulate this practice, but it existed to discourage corruption 
and ensure timely compensation, not to clarify when seizures  were allowable. 
Military theorist Emer de Vattel said that a nation in want of  provisions could 
compel its neighbors to provide them at a fair price, or that it could take them 
by force. Neutral nations  were not supposed to deprive one nation something 
provided to another nation. Vattel also wrote that a nation had “no obligation 
to furnish an ally” with provisions when the first nation required them for its 
own purposes, and he argued that the nation that was asked for corn could 
refuse to supply it if  so  doing would exacerbate its own food shortages.10 When 
British ships began welcoming escaped slaves aboard in late 1775 and early 
1776, the colonies had not yet declared war on Britain, so it was unclear 
 whether ship captains had the authority to demand certain prices, and un-
clear  whether the law of  nations required colonists to provision British ships. 
Americans who still identified as British subjects could point to their own pro-
visions scarcities to avoid feeding the British navy, or they could imply that 
Britain was a hostile foreign power whom they  were not obligated to supply.
In 1776, the Model Treaty, which John Adams helped to draft, stated that if  
one party was at war and another party was neutral, the neutral party could 
trade with the enemies of  the party at war, as long as the items traded  were 
noncontraband items (food stores  were characterized as noncontraband items; 
enslaved  peoples themselves would be deemed contraband, but not  until the 
Civil War in the mid- nineteenth  century). Noncontraband items on neutral 
vessels could not be seized, but such items on vessels belonging to nations at 
war could be.11 This rationalization adjusted expectations again, making it jus-
tifiable for both British and American sailors to seize foodstuffs from each oth-
er’s ships. Ultimately, rebel politicians chose to suggest that  because British 
officials did not run the colonial government, the Patriots had  little motiva-
tion to set prices fair enough to prevent British hunger— thereby redefining 
who was responsible for dealing with it.
As British officials in North Amer i ca continued to welcome former bond-
people into their ranks, rebel colonists took violent steps to try to stop them, 
warning that slaves who ran would suffer whipping, transportation out of  the 
colonies, or execution. In July 1775 North Carolinians moved to appoint pa-
trollers to search for  people away “from their masters Lands without a pass,” 
and gave  these patrollers the power to administer “thirty nine lashes or less if  
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they think proper.” An enslaved person “found with any fier arms or aminition 
in his or her possession,” and who did not “willingly surrender their arms,” was 
liable to be shot.12 Some of   these regulations merely continued longstanding 
practices from the colonial period— but  after Dunmore’s Proclamation, bond-
people with guns, colonists reasoned, could have received them from the British.
In December 1775 the  Virginia Committee of  Safety decreed that any slave 
found “in arms against this colony, or in the possession of  an  enemy, through 
their own choice” would suffer transportation “to any of  the foreign West In-
dia islands.”  Later that month, an act of  the General Assembly proclaimed 
“that all Negro or other slaves, conspiring to rebel or make insurrection,  shall 
suffer death, and be excluded all benefit of  clergy.”13 As time went on, Virgin-
ians, Carolinians, and other southern colonists instituted more and more stri-
dent punishments to deter  those eyeing the chance at freedom with the British. 
 These punishments reveal a number of  fears: that enslaved  people would 
obtain guns, commit vio lence, or flee.
As it became clear that assaults on slave  labor threatened food production, 
Britons and colonists started to have trou ble separating thefts of  slaves from 
other forms of  victual warfare, such as thefts of   cattle and  horses. Bondpeo-
ple who fled forced southern slaveholders to wait on themselves, to grow their 
own crops, and to cook their own meals. Some slaveholders would have been 
more helpless than  others; Lowcountry slavers did not regulate  labor beyond 
allocating the daily tasks of  black men’s and  women’s work and thus may have 
possessed  little knowledge about day- to- day rice production. Chesapeake mas-
ters worked more closely with enslaved farm laborers and may have been 
able to manage on their own.14
In October 1777 Georgians’ “Domestics” ran to the British while “Their 
Scouts & Indians . . .  carry off  our Stock.” When South Carolinian and  future 
governor Arnoldus Vanderhorst reported his damages in the wake of  a Brit-
ish attack, he recorded “Stock of   Cattle sheep Hogs Horses” and “30 Negroes 
2/3 grown.” He valued the animals at £2,000 and the enslaved  children and 
adults at £1,200. Vanderhorst’s claim reveals that some adults fled alongside 
 children and teen agers;  these may have been families on the run. Resident Paul 
Trapier also lost “10 young Negroe men.” Immediately  after listing  these run-
aways, he described losing “Almost the  whole produce of  . . .  Rice, Corn, Oates 
&ca” as well as “ Cattle & sheep” and other “ Cattle, Hogs & Goats.”15 Slave-
holders’ claims listed vari ous  horses,  cattle, and bondpeople missing, in addi-
tion to bushels of  corn burned, liquor stolen, and buildings destroyed. “Thefts” 
of  slaves resulted in further losses of  crops,  because no enslaved  people re-
mained to grow them, and in losses of  animals,  because no one remained to 
guard them.
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Documents relating to Indian affairs make clear that British- allied Creeks 
and Cherokees  were heavi ly involved in “stealing” enslaved  people (as the 
Americans might have called it) or encouraging them to run away (as the Brit-
ish likely understood it).  These associations between Indians and formerly 
enslaved  peoples worried American rebels who had spent much of  the eigh-
teenth  century trying to foster antipathy between Natives and slaves— often 
by employing Indians to catch runaway bondpeople and using enslaved  people 
to defend against Indian attacks. In 1776, for example, the South Carolina 
Council of  Safety asked Catawba Indians to scout for runaways in the parishes 
of  St. George, Dorchester, St. Paul, and St. Bartholomew. In March, South Car-
olinian Stephen Bull opined that runaway slaves “had better be shot by the 
Creek Indians, as it . . .  will establish a hatred or Aversion between the Indi-
ans and Negroes.” Self- liberated men and  women defied colonists’ attempts 
to encourage hostility and banded together with Indians during the Revolu-
tionary War. In August 1776 British and unidentified British- allied southern 
Natives made “alarming incursions into Georgia, carr[ying] off  a considerable 
number of  Negroes and not less than two thousand head of   cattle.”16 Many 
of   these bondpeople likely chose to ally with the Indians.
British- allied Indians, by facilitating escapes for  people whom rebels con-
sidered their property, attacked colonists’ day- to- day existence while adding 
to their own possessions of  enslaved  people and domesticated animals. Bond-
people likely ran not only  because a chance at freedom was more attractive 
than slavery, but also  because  there is evidence indicating that Indian slavery 
offered more autonomy than being a bondperson in a white British colony. 
David George, a man who eventually made his way to the British lines, was 
first enslaved during the colonial period before he ran away to Creek country. 
He was a captive among the Creeks, where he labored as if  he  were a Creek 
 woman. “I made fences, dug the ground, planted corn, and worked hard,” he 
recalled, “but the  people  were kind to me.” When his white master’s son came 
to reenslave him, George ran. A 1790s account related that in Creek villages 
on the Flint River, black Creek men owned  cattle— sometimes as many as one 
hundred— and made butter and cheese from cows. Enslaved  people in Creek 
country paid only a small portion of  their crops to Indian masters and kept 
the rest as property to eat or sell. In helping Indians by farming and stealing 
animals, bondpeople made themselves useful, creating a space for themselves 
in Native communities. Other black men and  women who ran to the Creek 
nation won freedom for their  children, who became property holders of  sig-
nificant stock as well as dairy producers.17
As the war continued, and runaway slaves threatened the food system 
with their physical absence, southerners took steps to protect their access to 
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foodstuffs. North Carolina placed an embargo on “all Beef  Pork Bacon & 
Common salt” leaving the state in April 1778, excepting supplies sent to the 
Continental Army or North Carolinian troops. South Carolina placed an em-
bargo on provisions, including rice, in June 1778, extended it in October, and 
continued it  until January 1779. In 1780 a broadside in Thomas Jefferson’s name 
informed Albemarle,  Virginia, residents of  a “specific tax” that obliged them 
to provide “a supply of  provisions, and other necessaries for the use of  the 
army.” Jefferson, channeling Vattel, reminded  people of  the “compulsions of  
the law” requiring them to provide salted meat and other items, though he 
also tried to be persuasive by mentioning that “the prices offered are gener-
ous.” But Jefferson was in for disappointment; Horatio Gates wrote to him, 
wishing he “could say the Supplies from  Virginia” had arrived, but in fact both 
 Virginia and North Carolina  were guilty of  “unpardonable Neglect.” They had 
sent nothing, and Gates urged that “Flour, Rum, and Droves of  Bullocks, 
should without Delay be forwarded to this Army or the Southern Department 
 will soon want one to defend it.”18 To be sure, some southern colonists likely 
managed well during the war, and their failure to send provisions to the army 
suggests that perhaps their hunger was overexaggerated. Some rebels who re-
fused to provision the Continental Army  were keeping some of  their pro-
duce for themselves— but  others  were reckoning with food shortages.
It is clear that rebel Americans feared the flight of  enslaved  peoples from 
their plantations, even trying to bribe bondpeople to convince them not to run. 
Before the Revolution, enslaved  peoples’ diets  were unhealthy and unchang-
ing. Most men and  women received a pound of  salted fish, preserved beef, or 
preserved pork, and a pint of  cornmeal or rice per day. Sometimes, however, 
men and  women chose to remain in bondage when they could readily obtain 
meagre sustenance and good treatment. Samuel Massey, a literate man enslaved 
by Henry Laurens, wrote to Laurens to tell him that his slaves at one plantation 
“can hardly be purswaided to Stay.” At another plantation called Mepkin, how-
ever,  people  were “all for Staying at home as Both your field and thear oan are in 
a flurishing way.” Bondpeople sometimes lingered where their gardens and 
fields yielded produce, but they  were motivated by more complicated desires as 
well. When Henry Laurens’s informers described the connection between hun-
ger prevention and enslaved  peoples’ willingness to stay put, they also revealed 
the other  factors at play. Samuel Massey admitted that although the slaves at one 
plantation enjoyed plentiful crops, “the negroes does not want to Stay with mr 
camel.”19 Slaves who disliked a par tic u lar overseer may have wanted to run, even 
if  their supplies of  provisions seemed secure. Hunger prevention, in other 
words, was not always the top priority for bondpeople.
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In other instances slaveholders tried to retain bondpeople merely by prom-
ising them  future sustenance. In July 1776,  after a British ship appeared on the 
Potomac River, Robert Car ter went to his Cole’s Point plantation and called a 
meeting. First, he warned the enslaved  people  there that Dunmore was un-
trustworthy and planned to reenslave and sell  those who ran. He likely pres-
sured them into admitting, “We do not wish to enter into Ld D’s Ser vice . . . 
but we all fully intend to serve you our master.”  After hearing such pleasing 
declarations of  allegiance, Car ter told them that if  any of  Dunmore’s men 
landed on Cole’s Point, the men should take their “wives,  Children, male & 
female Acquaintances, beding & tools, removing all into private places . . .  and 
send a person off  to Nomony Hall . . .  to advise me at wt Place ye are gotten 
too.” If  they served him well in this regard, he would “give Directions, tend-
ing for [their] imediate relief.”20 Car ter urged  these men and  women to hide 
and to secure valuable farm tools, and in return he promised to send them 
enough to survive.
None of  them deserted him, for the moment. Car ter attempted to use sup-
plies (which must have included food) as a bargaining tool. Only if  his slaves 
apprised him of  their whereabouts would he send them “relief.” Robert Car-
ter’s promise, however, belied his weak position. If   people ran, they would of  
course take food with them. And depart they did: thirty- two men and  women 
in total when the British came close enough to Car ter’s plantation. Landon 
Car ter, Robert’s  father, was similarly unlucky; eight bondpeople liberated 
themselves from his plantation, a fact that Landon chronicled in his diary with 
no small degree of  venom.21
Some of  the enslaved chose to remain on plantations, not  because masters 
fed them well but rather  because the location offered opportunities. Some who 
stayed stole food from absentee or distracted masters. Obviously, historians 
know more about what happened to  those whom authorities caught. One Sa-
vannah slave named March was detected stealing rice. The “desperate fel-
low,” according to Henry Laurens’s friend, John Lewis Gervais, “Cut off  his 
left hand above the Thumb” before threatening an overseer with a knife. It is 
difficult to say why March maimed himself. Perhaps he hoped to avoid being 
sold, or maybe by “punishing” himself  he sought to preclude further reprisals 
from whites. The  Virginia Gazette reported that one slave, who was “tried and 
found guilty of  sheep- stealing,” was “sentenced to be burnt in the hand.” 
Branding a slave in the hand was permissible in lieu of  execution if  the per-
son accused could recite a Bible verse, thus claiming benefit of  clergy.22 Per-
haps March preferred a quick self- amputation to the prolonged burn of  
branding. Thus, at times, enslaved  peoples lingered on plantations and stole 
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to prevent hunger, and at other times adequate food supplies  were not enough 
to compete with the power ful lure of  freedom among the British.
In the face of  mounting runaways, American rebels acknowledged the stra-
tegic value of  adding enslaved  peoples to their own military units. African 
American veterans, in their postwar pension rec ords, recalled serving with the 
Patriots most frequently in the  Battles of  Monmouth, Stony Point, and York-
town. Typical black soldiers served with the infantry as privates, and some-
times without arms. About 250 slaves bet their lives on the chance for freedom 
and joined Rhode Island’s black battalion. Connecticut, too, formed an all- black 
com pany, the Second Com pany of  the Fourth Regiment. Mas sa chu setts and 
New Hampshire also sent slaves to war. For the most part, slaves serving in 
the American military worked in mixed regiments throughout the northern 
states, and sometimes in tandem with Indians, as they did in Rhode Island and 
Connecticut.23
The inclusion of  black regiments  rose and fell with the tides of  war. Im-
mediately  after Lexington and Concord, the Americans began to accept slaves 
into military units, but by early 1776 state militias passed acts that excluded 
blacks, mulattoes, and Indians. By the end of  that year, however, Dunmore’s 
Proclamation had forced Americans to reconsider. By early 1777, even the 
southern states  were partially amenable: Virginians recruited  free blacks, and 
many enslaved  people passed themselves off  as  free in order to join. In 1778 
John Laurens proposed taking some of  his  father’s “able bodied slaves” to form 
a group he conceived of  romantically as “defenders of  liberty.” Henry Lau-
rens, himself  a prominent slaveholder, initially refused his request, but John 
Lewis Gervais proposed a similar slave regiment. John Mathews, governor of  
South Carolina, followed suit with a similar plan in 1782; at least a few white 
men took the notion seriously.24
The forward- thinking enthusiasm of  slaveholders in the southern states 
should not be overstated. Laurens made public his son’s proposal, but the Con-
tinental Congress rejected the plan in 1779. Rather than recruit black men, 
South Carolina considered bribing potential white enlistees with the promise 
of  giving them one enslaved person (who would be enslaved for life) for each 
year of  the white man’s ser vice, and offering a bondperson to anyone who 
could “procure Twenty Five Recruits to Inlist.”25 Americans’ adoption of  slaves 
as soldiers occurred piecemeal when it happened at all. British numbers  were 
higher  because Dunmore acted sooner.
Dunmore’s Proclamation created a world of   people on the move. George 
Galphin, who had taught the Patriots how best to cultivate Creek interests and 
was labelled “an Antiloyalist” for his efforts, fled his Silver Bluff  Plantation 
when the British approached Savannah. David George, whom Galphin had en-
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slaved, chose that moment to strike out for British lines.26 Dunmore’s offer of  
freedom was impor tant  because it encouraged be hav ior that bestowed power. 
American rebels failed to separate thefts of  and by slaves from thefts of  ani-
mals and grain. Their anger pushed them to withhold food from British ships, 
which prompted the British to include American food deprivation and price 
fixing in their concept of  acts of  war— which in turn expands this book’s defi-
nition of  eighteenth- century victual warfare.
By early 1776, victual warfare included not merely the destruction or theft 
of  foodstuffs but also the refusal of  purveyance, even to a military entity not 
yet officially at war with the colonies. The proclamation made colonists more 
aware of  their own hunger when slaves ran, both  because of  a decline in food 
production and as a result of  increased acts of  black victual warfare. It also 
prob ably increased Americans’ animosity  toward Native Americans.  These 
changes, which paralleled the inclusion of  slaves into the British and Ameri-
can militaries, foreshadowed further transformations in the southern food 
system.
Before the Revolutionary War, enslaved  people prepared meals for their own 
families and for white masters. During the colonial period bondpeople  were 
part of  a food system in which they enjoyed  little say in their access to provi-
sions. Their responsibilities for stealing food during the war gave them the le-
verage to help shape a food system of  hunger creation and prevention. Before 
the conflict many slaves traveled from big- house kitchens to southern colo-
nists’  tables to markets and to the open- air religious meetings where black 
bondpeople worshipped. They could share news over several hundred miles 
in a week or two.27 During the war  these travel networks expanded  because 
commanders expected the black soldiers in their militaries to absent themselves 
for longer periods when obtaining provisions for troops.  After Dunmore’s 
Proclamation, self- liberated slaves and  free black  people became victual war-
riors who traveled from forts to plantations to raid for food and create white 
hunger among American rebels. Thereafter they also moved from camp to 
camp to transport provisions and feed soldiers. Ex- bondpeople leveraged their 
relationship with provisioning networks to become the butchers who wan-
dered along roads and to and from markets, the waggoneers with easy access 
to extra flour, and the cooks and waiters who overheard valuable information. 
As they transformed the food system, former bondpeople maintained an un-
predictable relationship with their own hunger— alternately ignoring, dealing 
with, and preventing it.
Once rebels and Britons incorporated black soldiers into their armies, they 
needed to decide how to feed them. On the one hand, it could be said that 
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with the exception of  some black soldiers’ rations (such as  those of  the Black 
Pioneers— the escapees who formed small groups or companies,  were assigned 
to British and provincial regiments, and then eventually relocated to Nova Sco-
tia and Sierra Leone), provisions  were inferior to  those that white soldiers 
received. Dunmore reported possessing “four Ovens and pretty good Barracks 
for our Ethiopian Corps” in 1776. In 1778 when John Lewis Gervais proposed 
a black Patriot regiment, he suggested that the men could survive on one 
pound of  meat and a quart of  rice per day. In 1780 Henry Clinton decreed that 
“ those Negroes who belong to Rebels . . .  are to work in the Departments with 
adequate Pay, Provision, and Cloathing.”28
As evidenced by this relatively late assertion from Clinton,  people in charge 
rarely articulated a coherent strategy for feeding  these men in the same way 
that they did for white soldiers (and eventually for Native Americans). Some-
times they continued to refer to black men as property (note Clinton’s use of  
the term belong). Sometimes they figured out how to procure bread but not 
meat, and when they apportioned rations the meat component was sometimes 
the same as that provided to white soldiers, but the rations contained no bread, 
no flour, no alcohol, and less starch than a white soldier’s ration. Black refu-
gees serving in the army found their own food and built their own shelters. 
Charles Cornwallis’s orderly book shows that freed bondpeople in the south-
ern campaign received peas instead of  flour, which, like rice, proved harder to 
cook without camp  kettles; two such  kettle shortages occurred in 1779. Al-
though the writing in Cornwallis’s orderly book is at times disorderly, readers 
can see, scrawled between general  orders, an admission that “Grat abusses” 
 were observed “in vitling the Nigroas.”29
On the other hand, it could also be said that black participants’ rations im-
proved over time, and that in some instances the men in charge went out of  
their way to feed black soldiers. British observers might have perceived for-
mer slaves as useless mouths— similar to the way they characterized Indians— 
when in fact the former slaves’ relationships with food and hunger 
underscored ineffable power dynamics. The Black Pioneers from South Caro-
lina and Georgia received weekly rations and  were entitled to shares of  plun-
der taken from rebels, even during the campaigns when they  were not paid or 
provided with provisions. White Loyalists found  these rights difficult to accept. 
In 1779 British brigadier general Augustine Prévost in Savannah felt “obliged 
to victual almost all of  the Loyal Inhabitants and many Negroes,” even though 
the cost “bore hard upon our Provisions,” given the fact that food stores for the 
troops stood in a state of  “urgent distress.”30 This report appeared during the 
same time that Indian affairs  were in confusion, in the south  because of  John 
Stuart’s death, and in the north  because of  the Iroquois refugee crisis—so it is 
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worth pausing to emphasize the significance of  British provisioning in this 
instance.
Former slaves  were responsible for obtaining food for the army. Early in 
the war, bands of  Dunmore’s followers— called “Dunmore’s banditti”— 
descended on the plantations of  former masters, carry ing off  livestock and 
crops. News of   these raids broke about a month before Henry Laurens made 
the decision to stop supplying British ships with provisions, so Americans likely 
associated provisions shortages with black soldiers’ raids. Many of  the raid-
ers’ names are unrecorded, but some are known. Titus, who was enslaved by 
a man named John Corlies, ran to Dunmore in 1775, and though he died be-
fore the end of  the war, in 1778 he became known as Col o nel Tye, leading 
other victual warriors in New Jersey as they searched for food and other nec-
essaries. Augustine Prévost, in his 1779 proposal for the Black Pioneers’ re-
sponsibilities, made contradictory comments about the usefulness of   these 
men. He wrote that during the Siege of  Savannah they had been armed and 
“very usefull” in “the working way and in the fighting.” He also described 
them as “an useless burthen upon us or plundering the country.”31 He char-
acterized black soldiers as useful during the siege when they  were working 
and when they  were fighting, but  after this event he associated only their vio-
lent  labor with utility.
Perhaps some Britons, in their decision to harbor and provision former 
slaves,  were driven by an early form of  humanitarianism. Maybe some thought 
them uniformly useless. It seems clear that some observers alternated between 
perceptions of  escaped slaves as useless and views of  them as useful to the ar-
my’s strategy, particularly when their raiding proved tactically valuable for 
the psychological and physical challenges it posed to the Patriots.
Black men and  women also appear in the rec ords procuring and preparing 
foodstuffs through nonviolent means.  Women worked as cooks, laundresses, 
and maids, and men cooked, foraged for food, and waited on officers in army 
camps. Shadrack Furman offered provisions to the British. William Allen, aged 
twenty- three, a “Stout Man” bound for Halifax in 1783, cooked for them on 
board the Nancy.  After David George made his way to Savannah, he and his 
wife Phillis took turns supporting their  family. Phillis George took in washing 
for General Henry Clinton, and “out of  the  little she got maintained” them. 
Together they raised corn with their compatriot, George Liele, who traveled 
between the Piedmont and the Lowcountry.  After the siege of  Savannah, when 
David George caught smallpox and told his wife to leave him to die, she lis-
tened.32
He recovered, they re united, and using money from the sale of  a steer 
that his wife’s part- Indian  brother had gifted them, he began buying and 
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butchering meat for the British. He was able to move again  after borrowing 
money “from some of  the Black  people to buy hogs,” which he killed and 
sold to the British to broker safe passage for the  family to Charleston. David 
and Phillis George, like the unnamed families on Robert Car ter’s plantation 
and in Arnoldus Vanderhorst’s claim, separated, worked together, and drew 
on larger networks with Native Americans to ensure their  family’s survival 
during the war.33
British- allied men  were not the only ones to obtain provisions. Boyrereau 
Brinch (sometimes called Jeffrey Brace or Jeffrey Stiles) detailed his kidnapping 
in Mali in the 1750s, his enslavement in Amer i ca, and his Revolutionary War 
ser vice to the Patriots. He remembered “plundering” a British store before the 
evacuation of  New York and coming away with “seven loads of  excellent Pro-
visions.” He also managed to steal a Tory farmer’s hog. Johnson Green, who 
served the Americans in the northern campaign, recalled stealing butter, 
cheese, and choco late near West Point, New York, in 1781. Charles Grandi-
son cooked for the Americans, and Levi Burns and James Coopers waited on 
American officers and served them food. Scipio Handley sold fish in Charles-
town.34
Throughout the conflict, escaped slaves did what they could to fill their bel-
lies. By late 1775  there  were approximately five hundred black runaways liv-
ing on  Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, where they supplied themselves with 
crops and stolen  cattle. In December Col o nel William Moultrie planned “a Se-
cret Expedition” against the island with a detachment of  150 men. Moultrie 
instructed the major in command to seize every one, set fire to their buildings, 
and drive off  or destroy all the livestock. The expedition took place  later in 
December. Afterward, Henry Laurens reported “such a check . . .  as  will serve 
to  humble our negroes in general.” Soldiers “burnt the  house in which the 
banditti  were often lodged, brought off  four negroes, killed three or four, and 
also . . .  destroyed many  things which had been useful to the wretches in the 
 house.” Despite the obvious risks, runaways created temporary communities 
where they could gather together and supply themselves.35
Black soldiers also found ways to keep themselves from  going hungry while 
serving in the British army. Some of   these men in  Virginia and North Caro-
lina  were responsible for loading wagons and shelling corn. In 1781 British 
commissaries observed that “by the Carelessness and  little Pilferings of  Con-
ductors, Waggoners, &c,” “about 600 gallons of  Spirits and 7000 Pounds 
Weight of  Flour  were lost at diff er ent Times.”36 Although they made the con-
nection between the fact that black men loaded wagons and the fact that food-
stuffs loaded onto wagons  were likely to dis appear,  there seems to have been 
 little effort to punish  these laborers for stealing. In a world where soldiers lived 
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a few delayed provisions shipments from starving, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that black soldiers took advantage of  lapses in surveillance to help them-
selves to extra provisions, just as white soldiers did during their ser vice.
The rebel army seemed less tolerant of  black thievery,  whether undertaken 
to avoid hunger or for other reasons. When Johnson Green stole, he explained, 
“I only was detected . . .  and punished by receiving one hundred stripes.” Green 
was eventually executed in 1786  after embarking on a post- Revolutionary 
bender during which he reported taking no less than “near a bushel of  meal,” 
“three or four dozen herrings,” “two cheeses,” “thirty weight of  salt pork” (and 
another twenty or thirty pounds in two other instances), “a quarter of  mut-
ton,” and “one case- bottle of  rum.”37 It is unclear  whether Green became such 
an avid thief   because he was hungry, or  because he enjoyed the subversive-
ness of  stealing so much.
Quests for food, illicit or other wise, enabled former bondpeople and  free 
black men and  women to pick up key bits of  intelligence. British- allied Mo-
hawks captured Charles Grandison near Montreal in September 1779. Gran-
dison stated that he was  free and had lived with an American rebel named 
Col o nel Warner as his cook. Although “ every  thing was kept a secret from the 
Men” in camp, Grandison related that “he heard the Officers talk over at  Table” 
and was thus privy to their plans. By explaining that he was a cook who also 
waited  tables, Grandison could reasonably claim to possess privileged knowl-
edge. Loyalists in the mid- Hudson Valley in 1777 knew enough about black 
information networks to warn fellow Loyalists that they should hold their 
tongues while around “Blacks in the Kitchen.”38
Perhaps the men to whom Grandison spoke remembered previous meals, 
during which they too had blabbed while waiters brought food to the  table. 
Whereas middling white soldiers ate their meals crouched outside of  tents and 
around campfires, Charles Grandison ventured into officers’ tents and over-
heard their mealtime conversations. Black cooks and  table waiters could use 
their invisibility to consume and then circulate news. Grandison’s information 
garnered credibility  because the British  were already aware of  American John 
 Sullivan’s punitive 1779 campaign against the Iroquois. His report on  Sullivan’s 
expedition “against the Indians” established his credibility, which made believ-
able his warning about “an Expedition intended this Winter against Canada.” 
Daniel Claus, the British Indian agent who examined him, concluded that he 
was “most Intelligent.”39 The word conveyed a double meaning in this in-
stance: Grandison was smart, but he also used his wits to convey  actual 
intelligence to  those who mattered. Given the hunger that the 1779 cam-
paign created in Iroquoia, the British would likely have welcomed advance 
warning—or confirmation—of  any additional attack. Black allies’ mobility 
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as waiters, con vey ors of  food to the troops, and buskers at vari ous markets al-
lowed them to travel through friendly and  enemy territory with ears and eyes 
usefully open.
 After the War for In de pen dence some escapees remained unaffiliated vict-
ual warriors. In 1787 South Carolinians and Georgians found themselves in-
undated by attacks from a group of  escaped slaves—or “the daring banditti,” 
as one brigadier general called them— who ensconced themselves on an island 
on the Savannah River. The raiders had been known to “carry off  whole stacks 
of  rice at a time” from Georgia and South Carolina. Southerners worried about 
“The  free booty they reap” as well as the fact that “their numbers”  were “daily 
increasing.” This was an extralegal community of  hunger preventers, perhaps 
even extant since the war.  Because the possibility of  such a lawless body was 
too terrifying for any southerner to imagine, Georgia and South Carolina acted 
quickly to stamp out the black settlement once they learned about it. An early 
May expedition comprised of  whites and Catawba Indians “left six of  their 
head men, dead on the ground.” The expedition wounded several  others and 
removed all “Their baggage & provisions.”40 For self- liberated men and 
 women—as for Native Americans— the War for In de pen dence continued be-
yond its formal conclusion in 1783. The journey from bondpeople to formerly 
enslaved men and  women to hunger- preventing and hunger- creating victual 
warriors had taken nearly a de cade.
When Dunmore’s 1775 proclamation enticed enslaved  peoples away from 
plantations, colonists interpreted British actions as a two- pronged assault on 
the established colonial food system: one strike that deprived colonists of  pro-
ducers, and another that made  those formerly enslaved producers into food 
destroyers. Both aspects created white rebel hunger while offering strategies 
for the British to better supply themselves. Ultimately, it was this attack on 
American slavery that prompted the colonists to withhold food from British 
ships and that helped tip the balance  toward war. Rebels refused to supply the 
British with provisions  after Dunmore’s proclamation not simply  because they 
 were angry but also  because the proclamation was something they viewed as 
an act of  victual warfare. The British, in turn, examined the Americans’ deci-
sions to charge high prices for food and then withhold it, and called  these 
choices acts of  war, perhaps  because con temporary theorists such as Vattel 
could not help observers clarify the foreign- policy relationship between colo-
nists and Britons.
Black soldiers who survived on irregular rations, butchers who needed to 
obtain hogs, waggoneers who transported provisions, and black waiters in 
camp tents shared something: they  were real  people with families whose pres-
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ence in the archival rec ord shows them traveling between and beyond liminal 
spaces. During the American Revolution useful black food networks encour-
aged the growth of  parallel information networks. Former bondpeople 
depended on black and Native communities to obtain food and information, 
and pursued roles that retained and strengthened  those connections. They 
received provisions in return for their ser vice, but so too did they obtain, 
produce, prepare, and do without vari ous types of  foodstuffs.
Black soldiers, like Iroquois, Cherokee, and Creek Indians, attacked white 
farms and plantations and stole food for the British. Unlike Indians, however, 
black men and  women may not have had to use hunger for protest  because 
during much of  the war they could provision themselves. Sometimes former 
slaves benefitted when Britons went out of  their way to feed them, and some-
times they ate poorer provisions than white combatants. Useful black mouths 
helped hungry British soldiers to stave off starvation. Although Americans may 
have watched for escaped slaves so that they could capture them, black vict-
ual warriors became  adept at obtaining provisions while avoiding reenslave-
ment.
 There is also evidence suggesting that black hunger, like Indian hunger, was 
diff er ent from white soldiers’ hunger—at times black hunger did not  matter. 
When South Carolina– born Boston King heard of  a “dreadful rumour” from 
New York stating “that all the slaves, in number 2000,  were to be delivered up 
to their masters” in light of  the peace between Britain and the United States 
in 1783, he could not have eaten even had he wanted to. “We lost our appetite 
for food,” he remembered, “and sleep departed from our eyes.”41 Black sol-
diers avoided hunger through  labor, theft, or migration, but they also at times 
placed hunger prevention much lower on their scale of   human requirements. 
They  were not yet capable of  fighting for a coherent, formal,  legal food sys-
tem to prevent hunger; that would come  later, at the end of  the Revolution, 
when the vicissitudes of  war took them far away from the original thirteen 
colonies.
In April 1783 Frederick Haldimand wrote that the United States and  Great 
Britain had agreed to the terms of  peace that would cause Boston King so 
much distress. Haldimand was also worried,  because of  the rumor that the 
Indians “are not considered in the treaty.” Ex- slaves, it turned out, would be 
considered, but for the moment the British worried more about their Native 
American allies. One brigadier general understood the implications almost in-
stantly. When he wrote to Haldimand  after seeing the peace terms, he pre-
dicted, “the Indians  will be outrageous.” Officials in the new United States 
assumed that they had won a transfer of  all lands stretching to the Mississippi 
River— lands occupied and claimed by British- allied Natives who  were unlikely 
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to recognize such a cession.42 Such land transfers  were complicated. The trans-
fer of  food diplomacy from the British to the Americans occurred only hap-
hazardly, when it happened at all. In the 1780s and 1790s, Americans would 
have to negotiate with Indians. They had their work cut out for them as they 
set about trying to prevent useful mouths from becoming hungry, vengeful 
enemies.
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Fighting Hunger, Fearing Vio lence  
after the Revolutionary War
In 1792 James Seagrove, a U.S. commissioner of  
Indian Affairs, described conditions in Creek country: “The  great drought 
which hath been all this Summer with the Creek nation & also the upper part 
of  this Country, makes a famine much dreaded. I find I  shall be obliged to give 
 those Indians Corn to carry home with them to prevent their families from 
starving.” Seagrove warned that “ unless assistance is given by the United States 
in this way . . .  many of  the unfortunate  people of  the Creek nation must per-
ish as their crops of  Corn are nearly destroyed.” He wondered “ whether it 
would not be policy as well as  great humanity in our Government to send a 
supply of  Corn from the Northward. . . .  It cannot be had in Georgia at any 
price.” Seagrove was writing to the secretary of  war, and he stressed the im-
mediate relevance of  potential armed conflict. “Should a change of  affairs 
make it necessary to assem ble a force on this frontier (at this time) they must 
be fed from some other country than Georgia.”1
Seagrove was paranoid and perhaps uninformed. He said that drought had 
demolished Creek corn, and the separate “country” of  Georgia was unable 
or unwilling to assist with a delivery of  food aid. Seagrove slipped from dis-
cussing food relief  into anticipating a frontier campaign, suggesting that he 
associated unfed Indians with vio lence. He described a drought, but he warned 
about a  future famine rather than a current one. He made no mention of  Indian 
food reserves, such as the Creek  houses containing  whole rooms for storing 
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corn, potatoes, and other vegetables, in addition to nuts, dried grapes, and 
persimmons.2 Creeks might have been on the brink of  famine, but they might 
also have been meta phor ically describing their hungriness to Seagrove. In 
any case, it is evident that Seagrove’s fears of  Indian starvation informed his 
assessment of  Indian relations, which in turn influenced his opinions about 
best practices for federal policy.  After the Revolutionary War, Native Ameri-
cans increased their authority by working with the U.S. government to circum-
vent hunger. The federal government failed to win power  because it cost so 
much to distribute food aid, and the government was not yet power ful enough 
to refuse to do so.
Postwar Indian country was a place of  simultaneous resilience and desola-
tion; although burned villages and scattered tribes provide plentiful evidence 
of  disruption,  there  were numerous sites where Indian power waxed, at least 
 until the mid-1790s.3 Approaches to Indian affairs, which included food pol-
icy, varied from state to state and evolved in three separate regions in the 1780s 
and 1790s: the southern states of  Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
and  Virginia, the mid- Atlantic states of  New York and Pennsylvania, and the 
old northwest region of  the Ohio Valley. Food negotiations reveal similarities 
between federal and state approaches, but also demonstrate that it was the 
competition between the states and the federal government that by 1795 left 
Native Americans more willing to accommodate U.S. officials in a joint coop-
erative fight against hunger.
In the southern region, from the  Battle of  Yorktown  until 1785, much re-
mained the same: officials built their food diplomacy on promises of  food and 
food meta phors, rather than the physical article, and continued to point to 
scorched Cherokee villages as threats when dealing with the Creeks. South-
ern Natives persisted in stealing animals and attacking state inhabitants. Dur-
ing the war American and British officials prevented each other from practicing 
diplomacy;  after it, southern states interfered with each other instead. When, 
in 1785, the United States appointed its own Indian commissioners, southern 
officials and U.S. officials began to compete with each other for Native 
loyalties— often by trying to block each other’s access to Indians.
Further north and northwest, the British undermined American negotia-
tions with Indians— a tactic that did not last. By the 1790s, U.S. Indian agents 
had conducted enough research about protocol to know that feeding Indians 
depended on more than merely satisfying hunger. They used this new 
knowledge to replicate British diplomacy, and also tried and largely failed to 
curtail Native consumption and its costs. In the Ohio Valley region Ameri-
can food diplomacy failed among Western Confederacy Indians, though 
more as a result of  British interference than  because of  American inepti-
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tude. Western Confederacy Natives’ victual warfare evolved from a defen-
sive strategy that involved the destruction of  their own foodstuffs to an 
offensive strategy built on attacking American soldiers’ food convoys. Non- 
Native officials learned the costs of  waging a losing war against Indian ene-
mies and the continuing effectiveness of  scorched- earth campaigns. They 
discovered how to transition from generous distributions of  foodstuffs 
at  treaties to stinginess. They also began to take seriously the Native 
 women— particularly Creek and Iroquois  women— who appear in the archi-
val rec ords during  these de cades.
Robert Sayer and John Bennett (Firm), “The United States of Amer i ca with the British possessions 
of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland divided with the French, also the 
Spanish territories of Louisiana and Florida, according to the preliminary articles of peace signed 
at Versailles the 20th of Jany. 1783” (London: Printed for Robert Sayer, 1783). Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress.
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The overarching theme for the 1780s and 1790s is that of  the unexpected: 
Native Americans refused or ruined provisions when non- Natives thought they 
needed them, and ate too much when officials tried to reduce food aid.  These 
unanticipated reactions to hunger underscore the need to reassess con temporary 
claims about hungry Indians so that power relations can be described more 
accurately. Negotiations in the north show that supplying the Iroquois with 
food went beyond preventing starvation; diplomats had to practice proper 
etiquette and overfeed Indians too. Western Confederacy Indians destroyed 
rather than stole food, which emphasized their continuing ability to go with-
out it. To some extent they could wreck American foodstuffs  because they re-
ceived provisions from the British, but it is crucial to note that the Indians 
who welcomed British beef, pork, and corn did not always welcome British 
advice. British food aid failed to give the British the degree of  influence over 
Indians that they might have liked. Non- Native southerners’ attempts to in-
voke white hunger to obtain Creek and Cherokee lands provoked a set of  In-
dian responses that ranged from outbreaks of  animal theft to accepting state 
officials’ treaty hospitality while ignoring their demands for land.
The transfer of  power from Britain to the United States was not smooth in 
the north. In 1783 British- allied Iroquois lived in three clusters: at Loyal Vil-
lage, south of  Fort Niagara, at Buffalo Creek, close to where Lake Erie met 
the Niagara River, and at Cattaraugus, near the bottom of  the southeast tip 
of  Lake Erie. Migrations  were underway. The American- allied Oneidas who 
remained to the south of  Oneida Lake gradually lost territory to land- hungry 
white inhabitants. Senecas remained in the Genesee Valley. In 1784 the British 
purchased 2,842,480 acres of  land from Mississauga Indians. This territory ran 
“about Six Miles on each Side of  the  Grand River called Oswego.” Mohawk 
Molly Brant’s  brother, Joseph Brant, tried to convince the Iroquois to unify at 
this waterway, but when he deferred to the clan matrons, they chose instead 
to split the Six Nations— Brant’s Mohawk faction would reside on the British 
side of  the Niagara boundary line, near  Grand River, and the other half  would 
live on the American side. The Treaty of  Stanwix between some Iroquois and 
the United States, also in 1784, further divided the Six Nations by pleasing the 
Oneidas and angering Buffalo Creek Iroquois  because it dispossessed them of  
their villages at Cattaraugus.4
The British, in violation of  1783 peace terms between Britain and the United 
States, maintained their forts in Upper Canada  because Indians threatened 
bloodshed if  the British surrendered them. British officials continued to culti-
vate Indian goodwill by providing meat, grain, and alcohol to satisfy commod-
ity- and gift- exchange expectations. In July 1783 Frederick Haldimand, who 
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had tried to reduce Iroquois eating  after the  Sullivan Campaign, received re-
quests from his men for flour, pork, and butter supplies at Niagara, Carleton 
Island, and Detroit.  These provisioners assumed they would “Continue to Vict-
uall the Same Number of  Troops and Indians we have done.” At Niagara, 
some three thousand Indians collected rations each day in August. The Mo-
hawks in Montreal received fresh meat (which they likely preferred) rather than 
salted  because of  “a Scarcity of  Salt,” and their “small Allowance of  Rum” con-
tinued “as usual.”5
Upon moving into  Grand River in 1784, Brant asked the British to “assist 
them with a reasonable Quantity of  Provisions.” That same year Frederick Hal-
dimand asked Brant to find out what American “Commissioners from Con-
gress”  were saying, and to “report the same to him.” Brant provided the 
information in exchange for provisions, but he also procured food for his  people 
by other means: by encouraging non- Natives— mostly Loyalists—to  settle and 
farm at  Grand River, where they paid Mohawks rent with the produce they 
raised.6 Many Iroquois men and  women in the 1780s thus prevented the 
tribe’s hunger—as they had before the Revolutionary War— with rent paid to 
them in crops and garden produce, which they supplemented with British 
rations.
Britons frustrated would-be American diplomats by thwarting their at-
tempts to negotiate with Indians. In August 1783, U.S. commissioners tried to 
reach the Iroquois, bringing boats “Loaded with Rum to trade at the Upper 
Posts” and documents granting passage from New York officials. British brig-
adier general Allan Maclean refused to grant them passage through Niagara 
and was pleased to report that one of  “Our Indian friends,” mistaking an En-
glishmen for one of  the American commissioners, drunkenly asked him, “You 
damn Yankee what brought you  here.”7 The rum was impor tant in this in-
stance  because it might have been used to open meetings at the welcoming 
ceremonies that forest diplomacy required. Gifts of  food and drink had long 
featured at such negotiations, but they nearly always began with a symbolic 
drink. Blocking American rum prevented the meeting from starting and made 
 future encounters more difficult. Officers happily related instances when Indi-
ans critiqued Americans— even if  they mistakenly identified their nationalities.
At the federal level U.S. Indian policy was one of  conquest. At the 1784 
Treaty of  Stanwix— which bore  little resemblance to its 1768 namesake— the 
Americans made it clear that they expected fealty, obedience, and land from 
the Iroquois. They confirmed Haldimand’s worries about the 1783 peace treaty 
between Britain and the United States, observing that in that agreement, “no 
mention [was] made by the King of   Great Britain of  any Indian nation or tribe 
whatsoever.”8 “You are a subdued  people,” the Americans crowed. “You have 
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been overcome in a war which you entered into with us, not only without prov-
ocation but in violation of  the most sacred obligations.” American commis-
sioners at Fort McIntosh in 1785, similarly, told Chippewas, Delawares, Ottawas, 
and Wyandots, “we claim the Country by conquest, and are to give not to 
receive.”9  These  were rhetorical tricks.  Because they had not considered them-
selves subjects of   Great Britain, Indians disagreed that they shared the same 
fate of  the country the Americans had defeated.
Fortunately for Native Americans, the early U.S. government lacked the 
organ ization to enforce this cant of  conquest  under the Articles of  Confed-
eration, which  were in effec tive in the realms of  foreign and domestic policy. 
Congress did not establish a Department of  Foreign Affairs  until 1781, when 
it consisted of  a secretary and four employees; the secretary could attend Con-
gressional sessions but was barred from asking questions and proposing ac-
tions. The short- lived post gave way to the secretary of  state, whose role 
expanded at a much slower pace than roles in other departments. The Arti-
cles made it tough for the federal government to levy domestic taxes, which 
left  little in the way of  funds for the pre sents and provisions of  foreign trea-
ties with Indians, and still less to pay soldiers to go to war against Native Amer-
icans. U.S. officials who wanted an advantage over individual states thought 
about both of   these options, which remained impor tant to agents like James 
Seagrove even  after the Constitution replaced the Articles. The Articles pre-
vailed  until 1789 (1788 in New York). Without sufficient financial and military 
capabilities, the federal government had to backpedal on this position of  trans-
ferred sovereignty by the mid-1780s.10
When politicians realized that they did not possess the leverage to make 
unequivocal demands, they tried to improve relations with Indians while the 
Articles of  Confederation stood. In March 1785 Congress passed an act ap-
pointing United States Indian commissioners.11 Federal politicians knew that 
they needed to prevent settler colonial and state landgrabs, and to  counter the 
overtures from other imperial powers— the British among the Iroquois, and 
the Spanish and British among the Creeks and Cherokees.12 The prob lem, how-
ever, was that state commissioners  were bound to butt heads with U.S. agents 
as they competed for Indians’ attention.
 Under the Articles of  Confederation, Congress’s power to manage Indian 
relations covered only Indians who  were not “members” of  the thirteen ex-
tant states. State officials, who could expand their state’s geography during 
boundary disputes with other states, stood to benefit. Native Americans would 
have laughed at the idea of  belonging to a state—it would have been more 
accurate to say that states belonged in Indian country— but the states never-
theless asserted authority over the federal government in their dealings with 
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Indians  because they assumed that direct dealings with Indians would yield 
more favorable land cessions. Some made more effective efforts than  others 
to establish good relations. New York governor George Clinton studied the 
treaty diplomacy of  opening ceremonies, speeches, wampum use, private con-
ferences, and pre sents to ingratiate his state with the Iroquois. New York’s 
congressmen claimed the Six Nations as their own and tried to interfere with 
treaty negotiations from Stanwix onward. In 1785, the Seneca Cornplanter 
moved his faction away from Buffalo Creek to two villages near the western 
portion of  the New York- Pennsylvania border. When the national capital 
moved to Philadelphia in late 1790, Cornplanter’s followers enjoyed better ac-
cess to federal Indian officials.13
State and federal policies evolved against a backdrop of  environmental 
changes. Crops failed in Connecticut, Mas sa chu setts, New Hampshire, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and the area in present- day Canada from Niag-
ara to Quebec and into the Maritimes in 1782, 1784, 1787, 1788, and 1789. 
Drought and crop failures in 1785, 1789, 1791, 1792, and 1794 also pervade the 
sources on Cherokees and Creeks. At times Iroquois clan  mothers pressured 
other Indians into ceding land  because they wanted “peace and food relief, 
which hinged upon the state’s goodwill,” as they did in 1785 at Fort Herkimer. 
The 1789 crop failures resulted from the return of  the Hessian fly in 1788, 
which destroyed the wheat harvest. Shortages became evident  after a cold 1789 
spring and worsened  after rumors sparked a surge in grain prices. Native Amer-
icans had delayed their planting that year  because relations with non- Natives 
 were so bad that they feared a repeat of  the 1779 campaign.14
Yet previous Iroquois actions— such as destroying British foodstuffs or re-
fusing British provisions— suggest that Indians’ eating habits  were more com-
plicated than mere de pen dency on food aid to address hunger. The Iroquois 
may have treated with New Yorkers  because New Yorkers provided food aid, 
but they might also have treated with New Yorkers  because New Yorkers  were 
good at practicing other types of  diplomacy. Stored corn reserves should also 
be considered in assessing the extent of  Indian hunger,  because the Hessian 
fly eats wheat, barley, and rye, but not corn.15
The diplomacy of  federal officials suggests that distributing provisions at 
the proper time and place was just as impor tant as providing a lot of  food; 
 these  were not uniformly starving Indians gorging on provisions. Six Nations 
 housed at Buffalo Creek and led at vari ous points by Captain Pollard, Corn-
planter, Farmer’s  Brother, Red Jacket, and Young King spent time teaching food 
protocols to federal agents, implying their willingness to work with  those 
agents, first, in addition to state ones, and eventually, instead of  them.16 In the 
1790s  these federal officials replicated previous British and Indian practices. The 
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Iroquois did not destroy foodstuffs or demand that Americans hunger along-
side them, but as they did during the Revolutionary War, they  shaped the di-
plomacy that non- Natives practiced to address Indian hunger.
When he began work as a federal Indian commissioner,  future secretary 
of  war Timothy Pickering required instruction from Natives. He began his ed-
ucation before a meeting to cover the graves of  two murdered Seneca men. 
Pennsylvania footed the bill for the condolence pre sents, but the U.S. govern-
ment assumed the more expensive cost of  hosting the council. As he prepared 
to meet Senecas in November 1790, Pickering received a message from Indian 
runners.  Little Billy informed him of  the impending arrival of  a large number 
of  Senecas. He asked Pickering to have “provisions prepared for them” at two 
locations called the Painted Post and Newtown Point.  Little Billy depicted this 
act of  “hang[ing] some  kettles” as one of  “Antiant customs.” In addition, he 
requested “a  little Staff ” or “walking staff.” The  kettles symbolized food— 
sometimes grain, sometimes meat, sometimes cooked, sometimes not— and 
the staff  was watered- down alcohol.17
The British would already have known to anticipate  these customs of  pro-
viding for Indians as they journeyed to and from meetings. Pickering cautiously 
stepped into a similar negotiator’s role. He promised to “have ready plenty of  
beef, flour & corn . . .  and Some rum,” but warned that “the provisions fur-
nished at  those two places can be no more than what  will be absolutely neces-
sary to enable them to come on to this place.”18 Like Jeffery Amherst and 
Frederick Haldimand, Timothy Pickering tried to limit Indians’ consumption. 
Soon he too would learn the error of  attempting to do so.
 After sending this message Pickering panicked  because he worried that dis-
satisfied Senecas would commit victual warfare. New York resident Bezaleel 
Seely told Pickering that Indians dealing with a “lack of  Provisions” could be 
found “killing & pilfering” the “property” belonging to the town’s inhabitants. 
Seely did not appear to know that Indians took foodstuffs  because they ex-
pected them as part of  hospitality, but he was sure that thefts of  animals and 
vegetables would provoke retaliation. Rumors “that the Indians  were coming on 
in good humour” made Pickering anxious to keep them that way, “and appre-
hensive that the restricted provision . . .  would be insufficient,” he dispatched 
someone “to procure all necessary additional Supplies” to contend with the Sen-
ecas’ “voracious eating.”19 Even during this period of  relative calm, Pickering, 
like James Seagrove, feared the violent result of  ignoring Native hunger.
Once every one arrived and observed the condolence ceremony together, 
Farmer’s  Brother put Pickering in an awkward situation.  After Pickering had 
welcomed the Seneca men, Farmer’s  Brother observed, “Our  women expect 
you  will Show them equal attention . . .  you may See one who may please 
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you.” Although Indian agents frequently enjoyed the sexual com pany of  Na-
tive  women, Pickering declined the offer. The invitation evoked “a general 
laugh” from  those pre sent, though rec ords do not indicate how the Seneca 
 women reacted. They would have attended and influenced the outcome of  
such meetings before the Revolutionary War, but since the 1760s men like Sir 
William Johnson had tried to silence the  women who participated. Pickering’s 
response was crucial. He dealt with the situation not by accepting sexual gifts 
but by offering consumable items. “I invite you to my quarters, where we may 
eat & drink together in friendship,” Pickering recorded telling the  women. And 
walking around and shaking hands “with  every  woman pre sent,” Pickering 
said, “I now take you by the hand as my  sisters.”20 He showed re spect to the 
Senecas by inviting them to dine. By calling them his  sisters he evoked a kin-
ship meta phor that negated sexual overtures and acknowledged the bargain-
ing position of  Native  women.
It is pos si ble that Pickering assumed he had won control of  the situation 
while the Indians assumed that Pickering was a generous host. Ultimately he 
had to study “to please” the Indians “in  every  thing,” provisioning 220  people 
at a cost of  £150.21 During this moment, six years  after American commission-
ers told the Iroquois that they had defeated them, federal agents scrambled to 
build relationships with Senecas. The balance of  power remained uncertain.
Americans continued to try to improve their be hav ior at  future meetings, 
and this research on diplomatic practices yielded additional opinions on Na-
tive tastes, diet, and hungriness. American- allied Natives such as Captain Hen-
drick Aupaumut, a Stockbridge Mahican, assessed the sorts of  provisions 
non- Natives could supply. His observation that Indians preferred pork to beef  
confirmed  earlier British claims. Benjamin Rush, the renowned American doc-
tor, sent Timothy Pickering questions about Indians, including queries about 
diet. Pickering described Indians’ alimentary (and sometimes excretory) hab-
its, relating that  those who had eaten “often, & a  great deal” experienced “ex-
cretions by Stools . . .  more frequent than  those of  the white  people.” He 
explained that Indians handled food shortages by “tying their  belts closer & 
closer” and eating “Spikenard root, which allays hunger.” In preparation for 
such periods, Indians ate “two or three pounds of  beef  a man per day, besides 
bread and vegetables” when they could get them.22
Observers  were struck by the fact that, compared to white soldiers, Indi-
ans could eat two to three times the quantity of  meat. When Henry Knox re-
ceived a letter about Native appetites, his correspondent underlined the fact 
that each person “expects double rations.”23  These post- Revolutionary stud-
ies reveal two non- Native perceptions of  Indian hunger: first, that Indian ap-
petites  were at times greater than  those of  non- Natives, and second, that 
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Indians could deal with hunger but could not stop it from happening. Such 
details drove government decisions to spend a lot of  time and money on In-
dian affairs.
During most meetings Indians held the advantage. In the summer of  1791 
Pickering was supposed to meet the Senecas again, this time in the com pany 
of  a number of  other Iroquois Indians on the Tioga River. It was at this event 
that Pickering delivered his false history of  early En glish industry and Native 
American starvation. Once more, before the gathering Seneca messengers 
asked Pickering “to hang on the  kettles & furnish them with a walking Staff ” 
at a certain location. Pickering responded that it would “be exceedingly diffi-
cult” to fulfill their request  because “the lowness of  the  water of  the Tioga 
river” made “the goods and provisions” impossible to transport without get-
ting  horses and oxen to drag canoes  behind them. In what he thought was a 
compromise Pickering proposed to hang the  kettles fifteen miles closer, where 
the Indians would find “beef  & corn in plenty . . .  a quantity of  potatoes,” 
and a “walking Staff.” When the Indians arrived, the Oneida named Good 
Peter chided Pickering, supposing “that the business of  holding treaties 
with Indians was novel to me, or I should have hung on the kittles for their 
refreshment.”24
Good Peter implied that although Pickering had provided the walking staff, 
he needed to study up on food distributions, and he guilted Pickering by say-
ing that he had been “obliged to ask for provisions at Canadasago.” Chastised, 
Pickering paid Good Peter for the food the Indians had purchased. He also had 
to listen to the Seneca Red Jacket’s assessment of  his history lesson. Red Jacket 
criticized Pickering for a “discourse . . .  intermixed with friendship and trou-
ble.” “In ancient times,” Red Jacket remembered, “We did not repeat misfor-
tunes, when brightening the chain” of  friendship.25 Red Jacket did not explic itly 
call Pickering a liar, but he disagreed with Pickering’s approach to recalling 
the past when practicing diplomacy. This meeting included 1,050 Iroquois. At 
its end Pickering sent them home with “one barrel of  rum for a walking Staff ” 
and a promise of  “hanging on the  kettles for them at Sundry places.” Despite 
the fact that “the  great expences of  the treaty mortif[ied]” him, Pickering sal-
vaged the situation.26
Additional exchanges of  food continued throughout the 1790s. In 1790 a 
small number of  Senecas— Cornplanter, Half- Town,  Great Tree, Guyasuta, 
and two  others— went to Philadelphia for a visit that lasted from October to 
March while they met with federal and state officials. In 1791 Timothy Pick-
ering again invited “four, five or Six . . .  of  their most able & prudent chiefs” 
to Philadelphia. A larger group of  Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, and 
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Tuscarora Iroquois met federal officials in Philadelphia in 1792, staying for over 
a month.27 In sum, large numbers of  Indians proved willing to meet with 
American officials  because  those officials seemed amenable to learning Indian 
diplomacy, which in turn familiarized non- Natives with Native abilities to with-
stand hunger— but not stop its occurrence.
Southern officials also scrutinized and sometimes misunderstood Indian ap-
petites. Cherokees and Creeks requested provisions from state and federal of-
ficials, who proved quick to compete with each other in their quests for 
Native land. Almost immediately  after the appointment of  federal commis-
sioners, states began trying to outdo federal negotiators. In June 1785 one 
Georgia assemblyman learned that Creeks led by the Tallassee King and the 
Fat King  were headed  toward Beard’s Bluff, “with a request that we would have 
provisions ready for them.” The meeting was intended to  settle a “boundary 
line” between Georgia and Creek territory. Georgians said that the meeting 
was “of  the first Consequence to the state . . .  as the Commissioners from Con-
gress  will shortly be on the same errand.” “If  we get through with this before 
they Commence,” Georgians speculated, “it may be a capital point gained.”28 
 These rec ords reveal that Creeks, like the Iroquois, expected  people to pro-
vide food on their way to a meeting, that some non- Natives knew about  these 
protocols, and that state officials  were animated by a spirit of  competition 
against the federal government. State representatives needed to negotiate sep-
arately with the Creeks— and wanted provisions as part of  this process— 
because their delimitation of  land bound aries differed from the U.S. 
government’s. Small won der that James Seagrove thought of  Georgia as a 
separate country a few years  later.
Other state politicians also championed their own interests. Before a 1789 
meeting with Creeks and Cherokees, William Blount, North Carolina state 
senator, argued that  because the Cherokees  were “the only Indians that are 
troublesome to  here,” state commissioner John Steele needed to speak to them 
first  because “such as are first treated with fare best as to Provisions and Pre-
sents.” If  Steele prioritized this meeting, North Carolina could potentially sign 
“a better Treaty” with them. Blount separated provisions from pre sents but 
acknowledged that hospitality and treaty gifts  were both necessary to lead to 
an outcome beneficial to the state. The U.S. Congress, however, had antici-
pated North Carolina’s actions, and had “absolutely forbidden” state com-
missioners from demanding land.29 This order meant that even if  North 
Carolinians succeeded in reaching the Cherokees before U.S. officials did, 
 there was  little for the state to gain.
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In contrast to the northern states, southern state inhabitants seemed to ex-
pect more vio lence between Natives and non- Natives. “We  shall make their 
Towns Smoak with fire, and their Streets run with blood— the  whole  will be 
consumed in one general conflagation [sic],” promised Georgia governor 
George Handley in 1788. State campaigns continued to focus on burning Na-
tive villages, and white inhabitants’ domesticated animals destroyed the crops 
untouched by soldiers’ firebrands. By 1790 it had grown difficult for southern 
state agents to maintain the fiction that they cared about Indians’ interests. 
That year, the Intercourse Act prohibited land sales between Indians and indi-
viduals and between Indians and the states, supposedly establishing the fed-
eral government as the sole entity capable of  signing treaties with Indians.30
As in the north, federal officials in the south nurtured Indian alliances 
 because they feared Indian hunger and  because they worried about the grow-
ing influence of  the states. By spring of  1786 reports of  Indians stealing  horses 
appeared in North Carolina. Accounts from 1787 depicted Chickamauga Cher-
okees and Creeks cutting down crops, stealing  horses, killing hogs and  cattle, 
and murdering white inhabitants. Additional intelligence circulated into the 
1790s. It is not coincidental that reports of  crop failure and Indian starvation 
 were both prevalent during this time. In 1792 U.S. commissioner James Sea-
grove suggested to Secretary of  War Henry Knox that the United States needed 
to supply corn to Creeks to prevent famine. By 1794 other officials worried 
about starving Cherokees. In August 1792 Knox had Seagrove relocate to Creek 
country to counteract dissension with “Goods, Corn, and Money.”31
Although the expense of  feeding Indians increased, and although federal 
agents remained worried about Indian vio lence and interference from the 
states, they remained unable to reduce the amounts of  provisions they pro-
vided.  After a 1786 meeting with Cherokees, Andrew Pickens, Benjamin 
Hawkins, and Josiah Martin said that to prevent them from “starving, through 
indolence,” they would work with the Cherokees’ interpreter and four chiefs 
to facilitate their “procuring provisions” on their way home. They had also 
“supplied them with provisions on the road” to the meeting.32  These men sup-
plied food even to the Indians they characterized as lazy.
Seagrove attempted to regulate food distribution in 1791. When the U.S. 
government agreed to send corn from Philadelphia for Creek consumption, 
Seagrove informed them that in order to obtain the corn, the Creeks would 
have to come to him. Once met, they would “make arrangements for distrib-
uting the provision . . .  Which your  people can receive at any time afterwards.” 
Seagrove, unlike his British counter parts, did not envision a food- aid system 
in which officials visited villages to distribute provisions. He tried to prevent 
the appearance of  the  women and  children who usually accompanied men to 
 F IghtIng hunger,  FearIng VIo lenCe 121
meetings— and thus the additional cost of  hosting them. “No greater num-
ber than what I have mentioned may attend at our meeting,” he wrote, “as a 
croud of   people only prevent business being done.”33
Nine months  later, given the “Critical situation at this juncture,” Seagrove 
explained that he had “been obliged” to accommodate Creeks’ “craving dis-
positions”  because he “thought it would be bad policy to fall out with  those 
 people, and let them go home discontented.” No one “who is not an Eyewit-
ness to the enormous eating of  Indians can have an Idea of  it,” he wrote. At 
one point Seagrove tried to limit Creeks to the equivalent of  military meat 
rations: “a pound of  Beef  [per] Man each day, but found it would not do.” The 
Indians “got out of  all tempter with that mode, and threatened to leave me, 
if  I would not give them their belly’s full.” “ There is no  middle road with  these 
 people,” he warned. “So soon as the United States decline purchasing their 
friendship as above; I would recommend by all means that they have a force 
ready to oppose them in the field.”34  Here again, Seagrove associated empty 
bellies with the need for vio lence. His anxiety helps explain why men like 
Hawkins and Pickens  were so ready to provision Native Americans.
One of  the definitive  battles over the  future of  southern Indian relations 
occurred not between Native Americans and federal officials, but between fed-
eral and Georgian agents. Readers may be familiar with the fight over federal 
versus state power in the 1820s, which preceded Cherokee removal in the 
1830s. Conflict between the states and the federal government was also evi-
dent de cades  earlier, at the 1796 Treaty of  Colerain between U.S. commission-
ers, Georgia commissioners, and Creek Indians. Although discussions at the 
treaty involved land, it was also a food fight in which Georgians invoked their 
own hunger in a gambit for Creek territory.
In 1796, in an effort to broker peace in the midst of  Georgians’ unscrupu-
lous dealings in the Yazoo Land Fraud—in which former governor George 
Mathews and other Georgian politicians sold territory in present- day Alabama 
and Mississippi to their friends at low prices— the United States and Georgia 
acted together. They invited the Creeks to a treaty at Colerain, on the St. Mary’s 
River. In April, James Seagrove, by now the superintendent of  Indian Affairs 
in the Creek nation, sent a talk to the Upper Creeks, Lower Creeks, and Sem-
inoles that requested their attendance. George Clymer, Benjamin Hawkins, 
and Andrew Pickens joined him as U.S. agents— they  were from Pennsylva-
nia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, respectively. James Hendricks, James 
Jackson, and James Simms acted for Georgia. Seagrove remained invested in 
cutting costs: “Plenty of   every  thing that is good  will be provided,” he prom-
ised Creeks before the meeting, but only for “The principal men of   every 
Town.” The season was “a time of  the year when you seldom go a hunting,” 
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he argued, so the men could “leave your  Women and young  people to make 
your Corn.”35 Seagrove anticipated Indians’ excuses for not coming to the 
treaty and preempted them, and he also tried to limit attendance.
The Georgia commissioners, meanwhile, planned to outdo federal agents, 
sending periodic reports to the governor, Jared Irwin. Georgia’s commission-
ers expected 7,000 Indians and  were ready to host them. State agents exam-
ined “vari ous accounts of  the quantity of  Beef  an Indian would devour.”  After 
learning “that from five to seven pounds  were daily given them,” they figured 
that each Indian prob ably ate three rations and “wasted or jerked” the remain-
der “for the Nation.” The state’s figures for Indian meat consumption  were 
higher than  those for the Iroquois and higher than Seagrove and Pickering had 
previously reported. Georgia’s contractor had to make additional trips for ex-
tra provisions once state agents made their estimates. Georgians at Colerain 
 were prepared to be generous even though they  were paying for half  the costs 
of  treaty provisions. Luckily for Southern bud gets, the Indians’ numbers came 
closer to 430 than 7,000, including 31  women and 29  children.36 Creeks ignored 
U.S. commissioners’ instructions to leave their  women and  children at home, 
temporarily giving Georgia the advantage of  appearing more welcoming.
U.S. commissioners, like the British around Niagara, tried to control 
other officials’ access to Indians. On May 31 Georgians denounced the  orders 
that Hawkins and Clymer posted on the garrison gates: U.S. agents had de-
cided that no man could speak to the Creeks without a permit issued by one 
of  them. Other regulations forbade  people from selling or gifting alcohol, or 
engaging in “any Commercial Traffic” with Indians. The Georgians coun-
tered that the treaty grounds stood in Georgia, “ under the  actual jurisdic-
tion of  the State.” Benjamin Hawkins replied that Georgian authority was 
subservient to federal authority.37 U.S. commissioners, by asserting federal 
power in trade negotiations with Indians and standing between the Geor-
gians and the Creeks, circumscribed Georgians’ maneuvering through forest 
diplomacy.
Although the Georgians arrived at Colerain ready to feed the Creeks, they 
came to the treaty unprepared to pre sent an acceptable talk: they intended to 
demand serious concessions from the Indians while misusing a hunger meta-
phor. In a calculated move, U.S. commissioners “helped” by reading and ap-
proving the offensive speech before the Georgians delivered it. Georgians  later 
claimed that Seagrove had undermined state authority by holding a private 
meeting with the Creeks at his residence at Muscogee, “where the Commis-
sioners of  Georgia, owing to the regulations before protested against, had no 
access.”38
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Notes from the  actual recitation of  the speech do not exist in the state com-
missioners’ papers, so one must read the draft talk while imagining Native 
reactions to it. Before the treaty began, the state commissioners had collected 
lists of  the slaves,  cattle, hogs, and  horses taken in acts of  revolutionary vict-
ual warfare from all the counties in Georgia. They began their message with 
a demand that Indians return bondpeople and animals, and then continued:
The Nation which has fewest  people & most land,  ought to part with a 
 little of  it, to the other nation at a reasonable price . . .  we have not land 
enough, to raise corn for all our  people. . . .  No Red man would refuse 
a white man something to eat, if  he came hungry to his Cabin, and yet 
a refusal of  this land,  will be like a denial of  bread to many hungry fam-
ilies, who want to raise corn on it, to feed themselves . . .  your hunts 
we are told are not very profitable on this land . . .  it is fit for the pur-
pose we want it . . .  to raise corn for our hungry  people. . . .  We have 
brought you a large parcel of  goods . . .  if  we can agree about the 
land. . . .  They  will comfort your Wives &  Children, &  will be of  more 
value to you, than the profits of  many years hunts, on the lands we wish 
to get from you.39
The speech blended American and Native ideas. The Georgians suggested that 
the Creeks should cede land to be hospitable and  because they could sympa-
thize with non- Native hunger. The talk relied on figurative language (“like a 
denial of  bread”), which, though not a precise one- dish simile, would prob-
ably have been recognizable. But the Georgians erred by suggesting that Creeks 
only hunted and non- Natives only farmed, by privileging Georgian hunger 
over Creek hunger, and by asking for a reversal of  victual warfare in the re-
turn of  domesticated animals and ex- bondpeople.
Given the in effec tive ness of  meta phorical food diplomacy, the maneuver-
ing of  U.S. officials, and the long history of  vio lence in Georgia, the odds  were 
stacked against the state commissioners, despite the extensive and generous 
provisioning plans they had made for the treaty. Georgian officials’ ability to 
keep treaty attendees from  going hungry would not make them capable of  
making every one happy.
On June 18, 1796, the Creeks gathered in the treaty square (or tcoko- thlako) 
appointed by the U.S. commissioners to hear what the Georgians would say. 
 Later the Georgians related that during their oration, Creek  women appeared, 
joined by the wives of  George Clymer and James Seagrove. State commission-
ers observed that “not one of  them  were pre sent” when federal agents spoke 
the previous day. Creeks and U.S. officials would have known that  women 
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could not enter the square ground while men  were still deliberating, and thus 
their presence indicated the end of  negotiations.40 The Creek  women who 
came to the Treaty of  Colerain implicitly supported the efforts of  the U.S. com-
missioners and undermined the Georgians’ efforts by occupying a traditionally 
male space. The Georgians obliviously proceeded to deliver their talk and 
then retired to await the Creeks’ response.
Benjamin Hawkins, who anticipated the impending clash, waited four days 
to tell Georgia’s commissioners “what the Indians had done.” The Creeks had 
produced a reply unfit for Georgians’ ears. They renounced previous treaties 
at which they had not been united— among them the treaties of  Augusta 
(1783), Galphinton (1785), and Shoulderbone (1786). They had repudiated 
 these treaties at the Treaty of  New York in 1790, which transferred jurisdic-
tion to federal officials. They seemed to think Georgia needed to be reminded 
of   these repudiations. The Creeks cited their return of  some bondpeople and 
said they would return  others. Most importantly, they argued that at the Treaty 
of  New York, Creeks had been “assured by the President of  the United States 
and his Congress that no more demands should be made for Indians lands.” 
The Creeks’ answer, mediated through the American commissioners, and all 
the more shocking for their refusal to deliver it aloud, denied Georgians the 
cession they requested. Although Hendricks, Jackson, and Simms objected, 
Hawkins informed them, “no other answer might be eafected but thro the 
Commissers. of  the United States.”41
Then the Creeks took the Georgians’ hunger meta phors and threw them 
back at them. They claimed that “both sides” stole and maimed hogs and  cattle, 
and that it was unfair for only Creeks to return war spoils. The Indians de-
tailed their land- use and hunger- prevention efforts: “the very streams of   water 
are found valuable for Mills to grind the wheat & Corn that is made on  those 
lands.” Dead pine trees yielded tar. Furthermore, the goods the Georgians gave 
them on previous occasions had turned “rotten & gone to nothing.”42 The 
Creeks reminded Hendricks, Jackson, and Simms that they did farm, and em-
phasized their production of  non- Native wheat as well as Indian maize. They 
needed their land for crop production. Their statement that the Georgians gave 
them useless goods symbolized their lack of  faith in the state at this treaty and 
at  future meetings. The huge quantities of  food that Georgia had supplied for 
the treaty had done nothing to obtain what the state commissioners might 
have considered a good deal.
Hendricks, Jackson, and Simms de cided that their only recourse was to re-
fuse the written talk and to ask for an oral response from the Creeks, who 
received them the following day. During this interaction, the state commis-
sioners protested that it was not their fault that the goods  were rotten, espe-
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cially  because the Creeks neglected to say so at the time they received them 
and “sold us the land for them.” The state representatives considered that con-
tract binding and pressed once more for a cession: “We told you of  the goods 
we brought . . .  they amount to 20,000 Dollars at least. . . .  This  will more than 
pay you for the loss of  skins and meat” the Indians garnered “from that land.” 
“It  will do you good and make us all friends,” they concluded optimistically. 
 After this exchange the Creeks remained  silent, and on the following day Hen-
dricks, Jackson, and Simms once again demanded a reply. “We do not know 
what the  people of  Georgia wish to Learn,” complained a man called the Bird 
Tail King. “Do they think we have not given a determined answer?”43
In the fight between American commissioners and Georgian ones, the U.S. 
agents had emerged triumphant. U.S. officials successfully blocked Georgians’ 
access to Indians, undermined talks crafted by the state agents, and cultivated 
the federal government’s relationship with the Creeks. Creek Indians reminded 
every body that they needed land for their own agriculture. By the end of  the 
treaty it became clear that Georgians could not succeed against the U.S. agents. 
The  battle between U.S. Indian agents and Creeks was still to come. In the 
meantime, the federal government had more pressing concerns.
In addition to interfering with states’ diplomacy with Creeks, Cherokees, and 
the Iroquois, the federal government turned its attention to the Ohio Valley, 
where the Western Confederacy gathered strength. Diplomacy and warfare 
in the north and south retained familiar forms but passed from British to state 
to federal agents. In the Ohio Valley, by contrast, the British retained the up-
per hand in negotiations  until 1795. A conflict called the Western Confeder-
acy War (sometimes the Northwest Indian War) raged on past the War for 
In de pen dence, consuming five- sixths of  the federal bud get between 1790 and 
1795.44 Victual warfare was diff er ent in this region. Natives burned their own 
crops, nearly always destroyed rather than stole American soldiers’ provisions, 
and accepted British meat and grain while ignoring British counseling. Their 
actions lend further specificity to evolving eighteenth- century ideas about hun-
ger and suggest Indians’ abilities to retain power when short on food.
The Western Confederacy consisted of  a number of  Indian tribes— 
Chickamauga Cherokees, Chippewas, Conoys, Creeks, Delawares, Hurons, 
Iroquois, Miamis, Mingoes, Mahicans, Munsees, Ottawas, Potawatomis, Rey-
nards, Sacs, Shawnees, and Wyandots— many of  whom had been forging alli-
ances since before the Revolution. Shawnees introduced Miamis to the British 
in the late 1740s. Delawares and Creeks possessed ties to the Shawnees. The 
Chickamauga Cherokees and Shawnees created an alliance  after 1776. When 
the Shawnees sent the Chickamaugas a war hatchet in 1784, the Cherokees 
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agreed to take hold of  it. Americans’ massacre of  pacifist Delawares at Gnaden-
hütten in 1782 brought Shawnees and Delawares closer together in desires for 
war.  These tribes continued to develop support networks with the British. 
Around 1785, Huron and Ottawa (Wyandot) First Nations granted a tract of  
land at the mouth of  the Detroit River to British Indian department officials 
Henry Bird, Matthew Elliott, Alexander McKee, and Simon Girty. By July 1787, 
while the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia to address the Arti-
cles of  Confederation and the country’s inability to raise an army, “au then tic 
information” circulated about “a confederation” of  Indians “on the North West 
side of  the Ohio [River].” A triumvirate led by Buckongahelas of  the Dela-
wares,  Little Turtle of  the Miamis, and Blue Jacket of  the Shawnees bound 
the Indians together.45 They possessed many grievances against the new United 
States.
During treaties at Fort McIntosh in 1785, Fort Finney in 1786, and Fort Har-
mar in 1789, U.S. officials demanded land while threatening to raze Western 
Confederacy villages. At Fort McIntosh Americans demanded territory from 
Delawares, Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Wyandots. At Fort Finney Americans pres-
sured 230 Shawnee men and  women into ceding land, and despite other Shaw-
nees’ repudiation of  the treaty, Americans recognized cessions made without 
tribal consensus. At Fort Harmar the Americans met the Delawares, Potawat-
omis, Ojibwas, Ottawas, Senecas, Sauks, and Wyandots. Officials warned that 
Indians who refused to engage with the Americans (and, by implication, to 
cede land to them) could “rest assured that the United States  will take speedy 
and effectual mea sures to . . .  reduce you to such terms, as may cause you to 
regret the loss of  so advantageous a peace.” Between 1774 and 1794, Shaw-
nee settlements suffered eight diff er ent assaults. One village called Chillicothe 
was attacked four times even though the Shawnees kept rebuilding it in diff er-
ent locations.46 The Western Confederacy War became a conflict of  ongoing 
attacks and retaliations.
Indians’ defensive tactics left them well positioned to undermine the Amer-
icans. In September 1790 the Miamis burned their own town rather than al-
low advancing American troops to do so. This preemptive destruction meant 
that American soldiers could take no corn; the Indians, on the other hand, 
could find game in the woods and shelter and stored grain in neighboring vil-
lages. Warriors divided into smaller self- sufficient groups of  approximately 
twenty men, who fed themselves by hunting. Twelve hundred warriors could 
kill approximately two hundred deer and two hundred turkeys per day, making 
them less reliant on grain. Indians also continued to expect British assistance.47
The Western Confederacy gathered power. In 1790 the Indians overcame 
American General Josiah Harmar and his men, and their 1791 face- off  against 
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Arthur St. Clair yielded another victory. Afterward, reports circulated of  vin-
dictive Indians stuffing dead soldiers’ mouths with soil in a symbolic act against 
 those who hungered too deeply for Natives’ lands. The Confederacy worked 
to build alliances with southern Indians. In September 1792 Governor William 
Blount of  Georgia wrote, “the Five lower towns of  the Cherokees have de-
clared War against the United States.” By October their numbers had been aug-
mented by Upper Creeks. A 1792 meeting at the Glaize (the area in present- day 
Ohio where the Auglaize and Maumee Rivers meet) drew together Cherokees, 
Chippewas, Conoys, Creeks, Delawares, Hurons, Miamis, Mingoes, Mahicans, 
Munsees, Ottawas, Potawatomis, Reynards, Sacs, and Shawnees.48
By this time the federal government was working to build up its military, 
and fi nally had a stronger apparatus to raise money for soldiers’ pay. Harmar’s 
campaign had consisted of  militia and federal troops who lacked training; 
Arthur St. Clair’s men  were similarly motley. When, in 1792, General “Mad” 
Anthony Wayne accepted command of  the new American Legion, he did so 
with a vision of  order. He drew on support from the new U.S. War Depart-
ment (founded in 1789) and spent a year putting together supplies and men, 
whom he trained in guerrilla warfare.49
In 1793 Wayne went on the defensive to protect his food supplies. “I am 
 here  under the order of  the Commander in Chief, with a Strong Detachment 
of  the Legion . . .  to protect your beef  Catle,” one general proclaimed to sup-
pliers in November 1793. Wayne knew that he had to protect his supply line, 
which stretched over one hundred miles and proved difficult to maintain and 
defend. He stockpiled rations at Greenville and stored smaller caches at other 
forts. The War Department’s agreement with the contractors who provisioned 
the western posts contained stipulations that guards would escort food con-
voys and  cattle, as well as agreements on financial compensation for “losses 
sustained by the depredations of  the  enemy.”50 It was necessary to appoint 
 cattle guards to fill soldiers’ stomachs in a timely manner.
As the Confederacy gained strength, their tactics shifted from the defen-
sive to the offensive. Most information about their strategy came from Wil-
liam Wells, who was raised among the Miamis but turned spy for the Americans 
 after 1793. Indians intended to target Americans’ “plenty of   Cattle & Corn,” 
to attack Wayne’s provisions convoys, “to kill the pack  horses” responsible for 
transporting said provisions, and “to harrass the Army by firing frequently 
upon them in the Night,” Wells warned. He was right; the Indians set fire to 
hay, making it hard for soldiers to feed  horses, transport supplies, or recon-
noiter the area, and they attacked and abandoned wagons loaded with corn. 
The Americans puzzled over the fact that Indians who struck at their convoys 
left edible goods  behind, but Indians possessed  little cause to steal food when 
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they could hunt and when British officials such as Alexander McKee prom-
ised to keep them well fed. Many Americans may not have known about Brit-
ish support, so it is pos si ble that the war further mythologized Native abilities 
to withstand food deprivation. Wayne’s assertion that “The Savages . . .  can’t 
continue long embodied for want of  provisions” was bluster.51 The Confed-
eracy forsook supplies and interfered with Wayne’s operations.
While the Confederacy was fighting Wayne’s Legion, the United States also 
considered diplomatic mediations with  those Indians. The British hoped to 
quash such efforts. A 1793 meeting at Sandusky, near Lake Erie, was U.S. of-
ficials’ last chance to try to agree on a boundary line with an increasingly ca-
pable  enemy. Commissioners Benjamin Lincoln, Timothy Pickering, and 
Beverly Randolph possessed no way of  knowing that the council would never 
take place. In February the War Department prepared to transport Madeira, 
port, rum, and sherry; beef, bread, butter, cheese, ham, and pickled pork; and 
choco late, coffee, sugar, and tea.52
The British set about blocking American food diplomacy and practicing it 
themselves. Since 1792 British governor John Graves Simcoe had lent military 
support to the Western Indians to protect British interests in the Ohio Valley. 
In 1793 Simcoe, possibly  under influence from Joseph Brant, prohibited the 
United States officials from feeding Indians. If  they received “their dinners from 
the party with whom they  were treating,” Simcoe contended, Natives could 
not “treat on in de pen dent grounds.” The Indians “objected to . . .  being sup-
plied by the United States,” he concluded, ignoring half  a  century in which 
Britons had supplied dinner to Indians with whom they had negotiated. While 
Lincoln, Pickering, and Randolph stayed with Simcoe, and then at British In-
dian commissioner Matthew Elliott’s  house on the Detroit River, the Western 
Confederacy gathered at Alexander McKee’s store house at the bottom of  the 
Maumee rapids.53 The Confederacy never met the U.S. commissioners; instead, 
the two parties passed messages through British and Indian intermediaries.
In June 1793 the commissioners sent Mahican Hendrick Aupaumut to try 
to open negotiations by asking  whether the Confederacy would cede the Ohio 
River as a boundary line between Indians and the United States; the Confed-
eracy’s previous reluctance to do so had helped cause the war. The United 
States was offering “a large annual Rent” and permission to “hunt on the same 
lands as long as you can find any game.” Although the Western Confederacy 
split into two camps, a response came only from the Shawnees. Their answer 
was that they could “retreat no farther;  because the Country  behind, hardly 
affords food for its pre sent inhabitants.” Money was “of  no value” to them, 
and “no consideration what ever” would convince them “to Sell the Lands on 
which we get Sustenance for our  women and  children.”  These Indians cited 
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their hunting needs, and argued that the lands west of  the Ohio would not 
support their additional numbers. The Shawnees sarcastically suggested tak-
ing the money the commissioners had proposed giving to the Indians and of-
fering it instead to poor non- Native inhabitants to fund their relocation out 
of  the Ohio Valley. The commissioners interpreted this response as represen-
tative of  the  whole Confederacy, making  future conflict unavoidable.54
British food diplomacy, meanwhile, continued uninterrupted. In 1791 Hen-
drick Aupaumut reported that the British  were encouraging the Shawnees’ 
and Miamis’ desire for war by promising “three years provision.” An interpreter 
reported that  after Harmar’s defeat, Simon Girty supplied the Indians with 
“ great quantities of  provisions” and ammunition. Matthew Elliott even pos-
sessed a boat named “Indian Feeder” (before he changed the name to the “Sha-
wanoe,” a clear nod to the Shawnees). While the Western Confederacy 
awaited word from the American commissioners at Niagara, they received live 
 cattle, bags of  corn, and barrels of  flour, peas, and pork given out at Alexan-
der McKee’s store house.55
 These  were items to please every one:  cattle for  those invested in acquiring 
non- Native domesticates as property; ready- to- eat pork to cater to Indian meat 
preferences; and corn, always corn, to replace what the Indians had burned. 
Gifts of  food gave British officials the confidence to counsel the Indians against 
treating with the Americans. McKee persuaded them not to go to meet the 
commissioners on June 1, the date initially fixed by the Americans.  Later mis-
sives indicated that Simcoe “had positively said, That  there would be no peace,” 
and that McKee had promised them food supplies “in case they went to war.”56
 After receiving the Confederacy’s negative response, the American commis-
sioners gave up. Alexander McKee “ordered three Beeves to be killed in order 
to make a War feast.” A translator reported a Shawnee chief  observing that 
now they would be ready for war, given the fact that McKee “sais we  shall not 
want for Amunition Clothing or Provisions.” Alexander McKee provided both 
a pre sent and  future testament of  British goodwill; he offered meat in prepa-
ration for war, as well as the promise of  food to come. On August 23, 1793, 
Lincoln, Pickering, and Randolph wrote to General Anthony Wayne and in-
formed him that the meeting had failed. In September Henry Knox wrote to 
Wayne in hopes that his Legion would “be adequate to make  those audacious 
savages feel our superiority in Arms.”57
Wayne continued to focus on protecting his supply line, but he also tried 
to create divisions between Indians by fomenting accusations about poison; 
perhaps he hoped to reduce the number of  enemies he would face in the field. 
In January 1794 a Seneca war chief  named Captain Big Tree “put a period to 
his own existance” by committing suicide. Wayne tried to drive a wedge 
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between the Iroquois (who had not yet declared for  either side) and the West-
ern Confederacy, which he did by implying that the Delawares had poisoned 
Captain Big Tree. In a talk sent to the Iroquois he observed that Captain Big 
Tree had engaged in “some Angry talk with the Delawares.”  Whether he “eat 
or drank with them . . .  or  whether they gave him something, that put him 
out of  his reason,” Wayne could not say.58
Next, Wayne cast suspicions on the Miamis. He recalled hearing that the 
previous summer, many of  the Six Nations died, “in consequence of  Some-
thing that you had eat when at the Council with the Hostile Indians at the 
rapids of  the Miami.” “This mode of  Making war,” Wayne continued, “is 
Cowardly & base.” Wayne’s concept of  victual warfare, then, approved of  food 
spoilage but classified alleged poisoning as a dishonorable step too far. In spite 
of  Wayne’s efforts, he worried that the loyalties of  the Senecas remained “cool 
& backward.” Joseph Brant asked the Americans for more time before his Iro-
quois faction de cided  whether to support Britons or Americans. “In such very 
weighty business” it grew impossible to deliberate quickly, Brant claimed. By 
spring of  1794 Joseph Brant’s group had once more declared for war against the 
Americans. This unwillingness to betray the British may suggest the in effec tive-
ness of  Wayne’s accusation. Wayne found the uncertainty exhausting. Writing 
to Henry Knox, he confessed, “it is a very unpleasant kind of  Warfare . . .  with 
famine & faction . . .  altho’ I have hitherto sustained & halted all the attacks of  
this Hydra, yet I feel both body & mind fatigued by the Contest.”59
The Western Confederacy’s numbers, meanwhile, had dwindled. Dragging 
Canoe’s death in 1792 dampened Chickamauga Cherokees’ re sis tance. In No-
vember of  that year Chickamaugas, Creeks, and Shawnees struck Buchanan’s 
Station in Georgia, suffering defeat and significant casualties. In June 1794 the 
Confederacy mounted an attack against Fort Recovery that resulted in the shat-
tering of  their  union. Testimony from a Potawatomi  woman captured during 
the attack described 1,454 Chessaw, Delaware, Eel River, Miami, Ottawa, Po-
tawatomi, Shawnee, Six Nations, and Wyandot warriors who had gathered out-
side the fort’s walls on June  30.60 What the Shawnee Blue Jacket had 
envisioned as an ambush against a party of  dragoons turned into a frontal as-
sault led by the Ottawas. Indians attacked a convoy, stole the  horses, and 
drove off  the  cattle.  After failing to penetrate the fort, the Indians retreated 
beyond the line of  fire, where they “killed & eat several  Cattle & Pack horses” 
in sight of  the garrison. They  were preparing for a long journey, and thus a 
period of  dearth. In late June the Ottawas headed home. The Ojibwas and Po-
tawatomis followed them. By the time that Anthony Wayne built Fort Defi-
ance at the junction of  the Maumee and Auglaize Rivers— the former home 
of  the Indians’ confederacy— Little Turtle had also relinquished his hopes 
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of  defeating the Americans. By August  1794, Blue Jacket presided over a 
heavi ly diminished force of  only three hundred Delawares, one hundred Mi-
amis, two hundred Shawnees, and one hundred other Indians of  vari ous 
tribal affiliations.61
The last military action of  the war, the  Battle of  Fallen Timbers—so named 
 because the ground was “cover’d with old fallen timber prob ably occasioned 
by a tornado”— commenced around 10 a.m. on the morning of  August 20. 
Wayne’s Legion of  three thousand soldiers fought for just over an hour be-
fore defeating the Confederacy. “It is with infinite plea sure that I now announce 
to you the brilliant success of  the Federal Army  under my Command,” bragged 
Wayne to Henry Knox, before devastating the surrounding countryside to en-
sure Natives’ total compliance. The engagement itself  was less impor tant in 
ensuring a lasting victory than Wayne’s postbattle vegetable warfare. Soldiers 
pulled up bean vines, cut pumpkins “to pieces,” and “destroyed all the Vegi-
tables they could find.” For three days Americans wrecked  houses and corn-
fields around the British- held Fort Miamis on the banks of  the Maumee 
River. They laid “waste the villages & Corn fields for about Fifty miles on 
each side of  the Miamis” and then headed  toward the Auglaize River for 
more destruction.62
The aftermath of  Fallen Timbers was similar to revolutionary campaigns 
against the Cherokees and the Iroquois  because in this instance British food 
diplomacy also became in effec tive, but it was diff er ent  because Indians did not 
try to alter diplomacy to maintain the alliance. Wayne urged his men to such 
devastation to “produce a conviction to the minds of  the Savages, that the Brit-
ish have neither the power or inclination to afford them that protection which 
they had been taught to expect.” In some accounts Indians’ faith in the British 
broke during the  battle, when British officials refused to fight or to shelter re-
treating Indians inside Fort Miamis  after their defeat. In other interpretations 
the British refused to provide aid at all. In fact, Indians continued to accept 
provisions from British negotiators for months  after the  battle.63 What did 
change was Natives’ be hav ior  after receiving provisions— and this change was 
in keeping with changes in Iroquois, Creek, and Cherokee country.
Although British food diplomacy continued  after the  Battle of  Fallen Tim-
bers, Indians behaved as if  it was less power ful than it had been in the past. In 
October 1794 Governor Simcoe sent for Joseph Brant, Blue Jacket, Buckonga-
helas,  Little Turtle, and Captain Johnny to ensure that they remained “well & 
regularly Supplied with provision.” Throughout the fall, winter, and follow-
ing spring, British officials kept feeding them beef, butter, flour, peas, pork, 
and rice sent from Detroit via the Maumee River. When the Americans fixed 
on a time and date for a treaty with the Indians in June 1795, McKee and 
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Elliott held “large Feasts, and Drunken parties daily in order to keep the Indi-
ans back from the treaty if  pos si ble.”  These  were the same practices that Brit-
ons used during the Revolution; they gave food to impor tant leaders, they 
offered food to individuals, and they let the rum flow at key moments. And 
yet they failed to poison the Indians against the Americans; the Indians went 
to seek peace terms anyway.64 Britons continued to provide provisions, but 
they lost the ability to offer advice that Indians would heed. Whereas in 1779 
scorched Indian villages and a lack of  British food aid maintained Indian alli-
ances, in 1794 burned villages and generous British food aid lost them.
The following eigh teen months witnessed the transfer of  most non- Native 
po liti cal power from British to American hands in the northwest, and from 
Spanish to American hands in the southeast. In November 1794 John Jay’s 
treaty of  friendship with  Great Britain ensured Britons’ departure from the 
frontier. The United States would sign the Treaty of  San Lorenzo, other wise 
known as Pinckney’s Treaty, the following year— meaning that Creeks lost 
some Spanish support. In the interim the Western Confederacy sought terms. 
In April 1795 the Potawatomis delivered up prisoners in a demonstration of  
goodwill and asked for “something to eat, & not a  little Keg, but a big one.” 
In May the Delawares appeared at Fort Defiance “almost Starved” and re-
quested not only beef  and corn but “a  little Corn to plant,” or “seed Corn.” 
And Blue Jacket appeared to relinquish his British stipend to earn the Ameri-
cans’ trust, and to promise to “Bring his Nation to Make a Village” near the 
Americans if  they would “Supply them with Corn to plant.”65  These appeals 
signified more than physical alimentary need— Delawares and Shawnees im-
plied that they expected provisions but would also supplement American food 
aid with their own, useful agriculture. This compromise played into develop-
ing American ideas about Indians’ lack of  “civility,” which would feature heavi ly 
in the 1790s and 1800s.
In the summer of  1795 over a thousand Indians assembled at Greenville, 
an imposing fort in present- day Ohio surrounded by beautiful meadows. On 
July 30 the Indians relinquished their claim to the Ohio River boundary line.66 
As Indians arrived they made it clear that they anticipated welcoming hospi-
tality. Anthony Wayne, acting as treaty host, promised early arrivals “a  little 
drink to wash the dust out of  our throats . . .  without however, passing the 
bounds of  temperance and sobriety.” Perhaps worried that Wayne would stop 
with the welcoming drink, Le Gris, a Miami leader, told Wayne, “We expect 
to be treated as warriors.” “You have told us we should share your provisions 
whilst we stayed with you.” The Indians, he asserted, “would like some Mut-
ton & pork.”67 In depicting himself  and his fellow men as soldiers, Le Gris set 
himself  on a level with Wayne and demanded a fair share of  meat. He asked 
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for the non- Native protein Indians most preferred but also seemed willing to 
try other alternatives.
The Indians implied that failure to comply with their requests would re-
sult in a failed treaty. The Sun, a Potawatomi chief, complained, “we get but a 
small Allowance.” “We eat it in the morning and are hungry at night,” he said, 
indicating that Wayne was not showing enough generosity. “We become weary 
& wish for home,” he concluded. The Sun suggested that the Americans  were 
willing to provide only the minimum of  diplomatic concessions, but Indians 
expected the liberality of  Americans’ British pre de ces sors.68
Wayne handled the situation by bending on issues of  etiquette, making it 
clear that he remained in charge, and trying to foster dissension between In-
dians. He singled out the Sun by noting that he “alone complains of  scarcity.” 
He asked  those assembled “to consult generally,” and to let him know if  they 
“ really [did] not receive enough.” Pork, he responded, was unobtainable, so 
the Indians could have none of  it. Mutton, he said, “are for the Comfort of  
our Sick,” and, on occasion, for the officers. Wayne acquiesced that sick Indi-
ans “ shall most chearfully share” the sheep, and he would also “with plea sure” 
share a meal of  mutton “with your Chiefs.” When Blue Jacket and his cohort 
arrived, Wayne warned them, “my plate and my  table are not very large,” but 
he hoped “to see all your Chiefs in season and in due rotation.”69 Wayne, by 
relegating sheep to officers and sick men, depriving the Indians of  pork, and 
deciding when and how he would sup with the Indian chiefs, set the tone for 
 future food diplomacy and thus for  future U.S. Indian food policy.
The fact that the Indians agreed to Wayne’s terms suggests that to some 
degree even this newer, restrictive posture was successful.  There is  little evi-
dence in the treaty rec ord that other Native Americans complained about 
meals, provisions, or alcohol, and although treaty rec ords are problematic, of-
ten incomplete documents, it seems odd that observers would have recorded 
one complaint but not  others. Most of  the Indians did not go on rec ord to chal-
lenge the boundary line Wayne proposed. When  Little Turtle said the cession 
the Americans claimed would “confine the hunting of  our young men within 
limits too contracted,” Wayne ignored him. Indians nevertheless exhibited 
their disapproval in other ways—in fact, using one of  the methods Wayne had 
 earlier accused them of. Sixty Potawatomis died  after the council, and although 
the Indians accused the Americans of  poisoning their leaders, the British sus-
pected that it was Native opponents of  the treaty who had murdered  those 
who had acceded to its terms.70
 After the overthrow of  the Western Confederacy, the Americans sought to 
force peace with all remaining hostile tribes. The Southwestern Territorial 
militia struck a major blow against the Chickamauga Cherokee towns of  
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Nickajack and  Running  Water in 1794. Wayne enjoyed success with the Cher-
okees in August 1795  after sending them a message that he had “signed and 
exchanged, Articles of  a permanent peace” with the Western Confederacy. 
By September Wayne anticipated “the pleasing prospect of  eating my Christ-
mas dinner at Waynesborough,” in Pennsylvania; his job was done, but other 
work continued.71
U.S. commissioner Benjamin Hawkins, who would play a significant role re-
vising Indian food policy, had begun to study Native Americans’ grievances. 
In a letter to George Washington he explained that  after “the close of  the war,” 
Americans deliberately forgot “the rights of  the Indians . . .  we seized on their 
lands, and made division of  the same.” Land policy, he argued, was “the source 
of  their hostility,” but he also observed that non- Native diplomats had prom-
ised and then failed to furnish the Indians with “such comforts as they had 
been accustomed to receive” from Britain.72 Hawkins was writing in 1792, not 
1794 or 1795. He was describing the history of  Indian affairs  after the Ameri-
can Revolution, but the government’s quest for Native American land had not 
ceased by the end of  the Western Confederacy War  either. Hawkins seemed 
skeptical that U.S. land policy could ever  favor Indians, but he hoped that some 
wrongs could be righted by reviving British forest diplomacy. That diplomacy 
included attempts to assuage Native hunger.
Yet  there  were numerous instances in the 1780s and 1790s when food ap-
peared not to  matter to Indians. Creeks at Colerain  were unimpressed by Geor-
gians’ claims that they  were hungry. Shawnees and Miamis left Wayne’s 
provisions supplies lying in the road. The Iroquois chewed a root that allowed 
them to ignore hunger but also ate a lot at treaties. Attendees at Greenville 
complained about stinginess and then  stopped complaining even in the face 
of  reduced treaty hospitality. Non- Native observers largely sidestepped  these 
moments to hone in on one organ izing idea: the conviction that hungry Indi-
ans  were violent  people. Federal agents  were paranoid about the consequences 
of  Indian hunger, even when they misunderstood it. That fear was crucial to 
shaping an Indian policy that sought to prevent Indian hunger as it appeared 
to non- Natives, and this willingness made the federal government seem like-
lier to protect Indians’ interests at the expense of  states’ rights. As had Creeks, 
Cherokees, and Iroquois before them, Western Confederacy Indians chose a 
combination of  hunger and federal U.S. food aid by 1795.
Looking at  these events reveals an additional battlefront: the tensions be-
tween Native and non- Native accounts of  history. During the 1780s and 1790s, 
when power relations remained in flux, white negotiators experimented with 
using Native American approaches to interpreting the past. Federal officials 
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rolled back some of  the  earlier British attempts to erase Native  women’s pres-
ence at diplomatic meetings, acknowledged  women’s history of  shaping 
tribal decisions, and recorded interacting with them more frequently. Hawkins 
tried to learn where the United States had made  mistakes. Georgian officials, 
despite their failure to get what they wanted at Colerain, still knew enough 
about Creek history to recognize that an oral speech could carry more legiti-
macy than a written one. When officials slipped up, non- Native leaders at-
tacked their versions of  history—as Red Jacket did when speaking to Timothy 
Pickering in 1791.
Native Americans  were already staunch defenders of  their own history and 
well on their way to winning  battles against hunger when they wanted to wage 
them. British and American officials continued to consider Native American 
interests, but they worried less about the  people of  African descent who had 
fought for them during the war. Formerly enslaved  people had gained a  little 
power by fleeing from rebel American masters and turning into hunger cre-
ators and preventers. Next, they had to make it out of  the former American 
colonies and to Nova Scotia.  There, they experienced hunger that they would 
fail to master. Their fight against hunger had just begun— but luckily for his-
torians they kept careful rec ords of   those strug gles.
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Learning from Food Laws in Nova Scotia
On the first Thursday of  October, 1781, St.
George Tucker, who would go on to write a few lines about hunger personi-
fied, reported almost four hundred dead  horses floating in and sprawled 
along the shore of  the York River in  Virginia. The corpses indicated that Lord 
Charles Cornwallis had ordered the animals killed to save on forage and had 
“no Intention of  pushing a march” from his besieged position at Yorktown. 
Cornwallis was close to surrendering to the American rebels. His men, who 
had been short on provisions even before reaching Yorktown, now battled an 
outbreak of  smallpox.1 Throughout the Revolutionary War, ex- bondpeople 
had prevented British hunger. But when the tides of  the war shifted, the mili-
tary had  little use for black victual warriors, for the provisioners like David 
George and Boston King who had supplied soldiers, or for their families.
Formerly enslaved men,  women, and  children strug gled to obtain British 
help  after Yorktown. Cornwallis ousted the runaways from a hospital at 
Gloucester to save on rations, while dogs ate the amputated limbs left  behind. 
It was during this chaos that Boston King heard rumors that the British  were 
planning to return escapees to former masters, and it was also during this pe-
riod that he recalled his loss of  appetite. Yet  people like Boston King, and like 
David George, who had used provisioning roles to ensure their mobility from 
one colony to another, also managed to leave the former American colonies 
and go to Nova Scotia. David George would dictate his history to the editor 
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of  The Baptist Annual Register. Boston King would take care to indicate that 
his memoir was self- authored, though he likely received some assistance writ-
ing it.2
The food system that  these men and  women encountered and described 
in maritime British Canada in the 1780s emerged from a state of  uncertain 
power relationships that resembled Native and non- Native affairs in the United 
States. In contrast to Indians, however, black and white colonists in Nova Sco-
tia  were relatively powerless in 1783, when they arrived.  These mi grants sought 
power in Nova Scotia in diff er ent ways; black colonists won temporary and 
informal economic power, and white colonists won lasting  legal rights. Dur-
ing black colonists’ first year in Nova Scotia, disor ga ni za tion and lack of  struc-
ture gave them temporary freedom to produce garden vegetables, to fish, and 
to buy and sell what they wanted in vari ous marketplaces, but they rapidly 
lost that mobility and ability. Only white Loyalists— the colonists who had also 
sided with the British during the War for In de pen dence— would gain the  legal 
right to fight hunger, but even they strug gled to convince  Great Britain of  their 
authority during the colony’s founding months.
When white Loyalists fled the mainland American colonies, they trans-
ported ideas about hunger prevention with them. As refugee colonists, they 
advocated for food aid based on their knowledge of  previous colonization ef-
forts. In Nova Scotia they blocked black colonists’ access to land while taking 
more of  it for themselves, and they enacted food laws to avoid famine. Their 
actions became a way to fight white hunger while ignoring— and sometimes 
creating— black hunger.  Because white Loyalists interfered with black  people’s 
food choices while keeping them from obtaining land, their actions in Nova 
Scotia can be characterized as victual imperialism.  These food laws  were so 
consequential  because they  stopped black colonists from producing and ob-
taining edible commodities using the methods that had previously worked in 
land- scarce environments. Black hunger was a product of  several  factors: in-
adequate planning prior to mi grants’ arrival in the province, land dearth, dis-
tance from food- aid distribution centers, unfavorable weather, and, fi nally, the 
introduction of  laws controlling bread production, fish harvesting, and mar-
keting practices.
Accounts of  black hunger in Nova Scotia varied. During the Revolution-
ary War, black runaways had provisioned themselves and could thus at times 
seem to ignore hunger. In Canada observers began to talk more about fam-
ine, and to link its presence to a state of  slavery— even though many of  the black 
colonists had obtained freedom. At the same time, however, black colonists 
did not advocate for the immediate eradication of  hunger, nor did they agitate 
for the right to prevent it themselves. Instead, they drew upon established 
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ideas about aid, charity, and usefulness to make a case to Britain’s abolitionists 
that they should be granted the ability to migrate.  These families once again 
sought to move— using food and information networks— and to escape, one 
last time, to Sierra Leone.
First, self- liberated men and  women needed to get out of  the United States to 
avoid reenslavement by vengeful masters. When General George Washington 
met with Sir Guy Carleton in May 1783 to finalize peace terms, the two men 
disagreed about how to define an American slave.  Earlier, in 1782, when they 
de cided upon the provisional articles of  British surrender, the seventh of   those 
articles stated that the British would withdraw all troops without transport-
ing Americans’ bondpeople out of  the former colonies. Carleton delayed ne-
gotiations in 1783, when he modified his stance and argued that  people who 
had run away to British lines  after proclamations such as Dunmore’s of  1775 
and Clinton’s of  1779 had earned their freedom. By his reasoning the seventh 
article did not apply to  these men and  women, so the British could not be ac-
cused of  carry ing them away. Some British rec ords state that “such Negroes 
as  were taken  after the day of  Treaty, or that came within the Lines,  were given 
up” to the Americans, but the absence of  a date in  these rec ords makes it dif-
ficult to say  whether the “Treaty” mentioned referred to the provisional arti-
cles or the 1783 peace agreement.3 In any case, despite Washington’s 
protestations that the provisional article forbade the removal of  any black 
 people, Carleton had already allowed some fugitives to leave the country. 
 Others would follow in large numbers.
At the end of  the Revolution, over sixty thousand white Loyalists departed 
the American colonies. This diaspora took them to places like  Great Britain, 
Canada (the Maritimes, Ontario, and Quebec), the Ca rib bean ( Jamaica and the 
Bahamas), Florida, and France, and even further afield to Australia and India. 
They transported fifteen thousand enslaved  people with them. Nearly forty 
thousand Loyalists established themselves in the Maritimes— about half  of  
them in Nova Scotia. Slavery continued to exist; some of   these white refugees 
 were southern planters, and their removal from the United States did nothing 
to  free the two thousand bondpeople who traveled with them.4
Nova Scotia was not uninhabited before the Loyalists arrived. Early on it 
was Mi’kmaq territory, invaded by French colonists throughout the seven-
teenth  century. The French had ceded Nova Scotia to the En glish  after the 
War of  the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), and although Mi’kmaq  peoples 
continued to live alongside En glish inhabitants, many of  them had died. Na-
tives, French, and En glish continued to fight over bound aries before, during, 
and  after the War for In de pen dence. In 1779 British officials reported, “The 
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Indians of  Nova Scotia consist[ed] of  about Five hundred  familys, all Roman 
Catholicks, containing near three thousand persons.” Prior to the beginning 
of  the Seven Years’ War, some fifteen thousand non- Natives had lived in the 
borderlands between British Nova Scotia and French Acadia (present- day New 
Brunswick); the victorious British expelled  these Acadians.  After they left, Nova 
Scotia’s population stood at about fourteen thousand  people.5
In addition to the white Loyalists who traveled to Nova Scotia by choice, a 
separate group of  formerly enslaved  people— including three thousand of  the 
men and  women over whom Carleton and Washington had quarreled— moved 
to Nova Scotia as freedpersons. In the last half  of  April 1783, Carleton’s com-
missioners in New York began counting; they recorded 328 men, 230  women, 
and 48  children headed to Nova Scotia. They listed their names, ages, and phys-
ical descriptions in a long document now known as the “book of  negroes.” 
Boston King, the man without an appetite, and his wife, Violet, arrived in 
August. Their ship, L’Abondance (translated as “Abundance”), was an ironi-
cally named testament to their war time past and refugee  future. King would 
become a Methodist minister during his time in the colony.6
More  people continued to migrate; another 165  free blacks  were registered 
when the first two vessels docked in Nova Scotia in June. From April to No-
vember, ships continuously transported  people from New York to the Mari-
times. By November, 2,714 formerly enslaved colonists had gone to Nova 
Scotia, with another 286 slated to depart. Of   these, 1,336  were men, 914  were 
 women, and 750  were  children. Two- thirds hailed from  Virginia, South Carolina, 
Georgia, and North Carolina. The rest came from New York, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania.7
British organizers made some preparations that would hypothetically al-
low the colony to thrive. Land surveys constituted part of  this proj ect, as did 
hunger- prevention efforts. In a January  1783 meeting, the Port Roseway 
Associates— the name the white Loyalists in New York gave to themselves— 
learned that they had “chosen the best Situation in the province for Trade, Fish-
ery, and Farming.” The surveyor general described “the Lands back of  Port 
Roseway, Jordan River, and  towards the An[n]apolis to the good,” but cautioned 
colonists to “expect some indifferent land in  every part of  the Province.” They 
would find that “Strawberry’s are in  great perfection,” as well as “Currants, 
Rasberrys, Cherrys, Gooseberrys, Plumbs, Apples, & Pears and almost  every 
other New  England fruit but peaches at Port Roseway.” They could grow 
“Oats, Barley, Rye, and the best of  Flax,” and during the previous year inhab-
itants had raised “Siberian Wheat in perfection.”8 In this early evaluation, most 
of  the land was marked for farmland, and orchards and fish would provide 
additional sustenance. The double use of  the word perfection in the summary 
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of  this report suggests that land assessors worked hard to portray the terri-
tory as a paradise. The American colonies may have fallen, but refugees could 
build a new Eden to the north.
The British government also or ga nized supplemental provisions for the 
Loyalists’ first months in Nova Scotia. This decision was a standard one; offi-
cials had made similar arrangements for the colony at Liverpool, Nova Sco-
tia, about two de cades prior to the Loyalist diaspora. The Port Roseway 
Associates anticipated receiving food aid for white emigrants and for the en-
slaved  people they brought with them— whom the Associates referred to as 
“servants.”  These bondpeople would receive rations as long as their masters 
traveled in government vessels. Colonists who sailed on their own ships would 
not collect provisions. It is pos si ble that officials imposed this rule in order to 
keep track of  the number of   people entering the province, and to prevent ref-
ugees from claiming more compensation than that to which they  were enti-
tled. Once on the ground, all white and enslaved  people over the age of  ten 
 were to draw an allowance of  six months’ full provisions, while  children would 
get six months’ half  allowance. Accordingly, on March 8, 1783, members of  
the Port Roseway Associates in New York passed a motion that proposed, “that 
each member do immediately give . . .  a correct list of  their names and fami-
lies, with the age of   every person in the  family, describing their sexes, and that 
the same may be attended to with re spect to their Servants.”9 The Associates 
made some efforts to count the number of   people embarking, to make sure 
they would receive food, and to effect this pro cess quickly.
Even before embarkation, white Loyalists tended to challenge the hunger- 
prevention efforts they deemed insufficient, while at the same time ignoring 
the  free black population migrating alongside them. White colonists com-
plained when they learned that the Nova Scotian government had revised 
some of  the provisioning plans. By the start of  1783 Governor John Parr de-
creed from Halifax that although men and boys over thirteen years of  age 
would get six months of  full provisions, half  provisions would suffice for 
 women, and  children  under thirteen would receive one- fourth of  the full 
amount.10
At the end of  March, Rhode Island– born Captain Joseph Durfee, one of  
the key Port Roseway leaders, reported that  after hearing about  these arrange-
ments, some Loyalists “ were much affect’d and discouraged.” He said that 
they had “indulged the Idea . . .  they  were to have the same allowance, as  those 
Loyalists, who went to Nova Scotia” during the previous autumn of  1782. 
Durfee noted that some of  them “ were so much dismayed that I believed many 
of  the number would not go.” The Associates drew on past pre ce dent to claim 
their right to comparable aid, but  there is no evidence in the archival rec ord 
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that they advocated for similar assistance for  free black refugees. When the 
first of   these black colonists arrived in Canada in 1782–1783,  there  were no 
provisions waiting for them— though they may have witnessed white Loyal-
ists’ preparations for themselves.11
British officials did not concern themselves overmuch with complaints 
about provisioning—or the lack thereof— because they did not believe white 
Loyalists’ threats to remain in the United States. Guy Carleton responded to 
Durfee even though Carleton would not take charge as governor- in- chief  of  
Upper Canada  until 1786; technically, Frederick Haldimand still performed that 
role. Carleton also drew on past precedent— and its absence—to explain the 
government’s stance on food aid. His response to Durfee was “to say that Six 
Months Provision was ordered, [and] that all Males and Females upwards of  
ten years of  Age would draw full allowance, which was never done before.” 
Carleton reminded them that the Loyalists who had relocated the preceding 
fall had been “obliged to live the  whole winter on their Provision, and our As-
sociates would (if  they arrive  there early) have equal benefit.” He reassured 
them that the Government would not “set a number of   people down  there, 
‘And say, We  will do nothing more for you; You may starve.  There is no doubt but 
if  they are in want they  will be supplied.’ ” Carleton then switched from this 
amicable tone to one that conveyed his annoyance with the Loyalists’ waver-
ing. “Government did not Chuse to make a bargain with the Association,” he 
chided, “and if  any  were dissatisfied they had better Not Go, if  they could do 
better for themselves.”12 Carleton offered encouragement, restored full pro-
visions to  women, and agreed to feed more  children by pushing the age limit 
for full provisions back to ten instead of  thirteen years of  age. But he also ex-
plained that the government’s food policy would be largely reactive, not pre-
ventative. The government would supply some provisions, but thereafter, if 
 people  were starving, then they would receive assistance.  There was no men-
tion, yet, of  food laws to manage famine in a more coherent way. Ordinary 
 people could question  these decisions but not revise them.
And so, the colonists sailed. One group of  Loyalists arrived on May 4, 1783, 
and established themselves about 130 miles southwest of  Halifax, in Port Rose-
way, which they renamed Shelburne.  Free black colonists lived in predomi-
nantly white communities such as Shelburne or Preston, and they also lived 
in mostly black towns. Ex- bondpeople constituted the majority of  the popu-
lation at Birchtown, Brindley Town, and  Little Tracadie. Birchtown is on the 
Shelburne harbor, four and a half  miles away from Shelburne itself; Brindley 
Town is now called Jordantown, and is about a hundred miles away on the 
opposite, northwestern side of  the peninsula;  Little Tracadie is the farthest 
away from Shelburne, over two hundred miles, on the northeast portion of  
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Nova Scotia. One 1784 Birchtown muster stated that Birchtown officially 
 housed a large portion of   these black refugees—1,521 of  them— but the black 
population in all of  Shelburne County was more likely at least double that 
number.13
Many of  the black colonists, particularly the Black Pioneers, who had fought 
for the British during the war, came with the skills necessary to provide food 
for themselves and their families. Robert Roberts was twenty- four when he 
arrived in Birchtown; his wife, Jenny, was twenty- three. Rec ord keepers listed 
Roberts as a farmer in the Shelburne muster book. Other farmers included 
Richard Laurence and Charles Wilkinson of  Captain Nicholson’s Com pany; 
Anthony Cooper, Henry Darling, Thomas Freeman, Pompey Donaldson, Ja-
cob Williams, and Richard Jarrat of  Captain Scott Murray’s Com pany; and An-
thony Davis, William Fortune, and Peter Daniel of  Captain Jacob With’s 
Com pany.14
Many of  the other occupations recorded suggest abilities to gather, pro cess, 
or prepare foodstuffs. David George was described as a farmer, but his narra-
tive makes clear that his war time activities also included butchering; once in 
the colony, he would become a Baptist preacher. Anthony Post, aged thirty, 
was a miller; Thomas Kane, thirty- one, was a fisherman; Marsh Jones, forty, 
was a gardener; Isaac Taylor, forty- three, was a butcher; John Charles Glass, 
forty, and John Brown, forty- seven,  were both cooks; and men named Fortune 
Rivers and Norfolk  Virginia  were a cook and a baker, respectively.  Women  were 
less likely to have their occupations recorded, but readers might speculate 
about the ways that female travelers aided with or took charge of  food prepa-
ration. Phillis George, David George’s wife, had taken in washing and might 
have continued to do so. John Thomas was a baker, but he died  either en route 
or upon arrival. Perhaps his wife, Elizabeth, took over his work in order to 
feed their  daughter, Christiana, who was nine years old.15
For a very brief  period of  time, the government’s disor ga ni za tion was an 
advantage to black colonists. And the government was disor ga nized in most 
regions of  diasporic Canada. Loyalists arrived in Quebec, for example, to find 
that new towns had no names, only numbers. Birchtown’s black colonists 
thrived in this environment, experiencing a degree of  control over local mar-
kets that mimicked but also improved upon their previous lives as victual war-
riors. Some  people accumulated enough wealth to become an influential 
buying force: when a large number of  black colonists left the Preston- 
Dartmouth region for Sierra Leone in 1792, their imminent departure caused 
the price of  potatoes to drop from three dollars and one shilling to two and a 
half  dollars per bushel, meaning that white potato farmers earned less for their 
produce.16
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During the early 1780s, Nova Scotia did not possess a central marketplace. 
In this regard, it lagged  behind food systems in many areas that belonged to, 
or would become part of, the United States. In the eighteenth- century Missis-
sippi Valley, colonial officials had wavered between allowing slaves to openly 
market their goods and produce and requiring them to carry written permits 
from their  owners. As early as 1763, Savannah’s market had moved to Ellis 
Square, where planters policed the goods that enslaved  people could sell. In 
1784, New Orleans officials had established a fixed marketplace, where they 
required sellers to do business in rented stalls, and made it difficult for bond-
people to obtain stall permits and licenses.17
In Nova Scotia, by contrast, a number of  locations,  either in the center of  
urban areas or along the roads of  the hinterland, served as venues where  free 
black inhabitants could buy and sell produce with relatively  little oversight. 
 There  were “Several markets in Halifax,” and the “Butchers and Fishmongers” 
who “for want of  a public market” set up “shops and stands in diff er ent places 
about the Town.”  These men “hawk[ed] their meat and poultry through the 
Streets.”  People in Preston sold seasonally caught fish— dogfish, eel, flounder, 
haddock, herring, salmon, shad, skate, and sturgeon—to whites in vari ous lo-
cal markets. Remembering the black colonists  after they left, Sir John Went-
worth, lieutenant governor of  Nova Scotia, reflected that they “contributed 
very materially to . . .  supplying this Market with Vegetables and Poultry.” 
Even as late as 1797, when a central market existed, some of   those who re-
mained in British North Amer i ca enjoyed the fact that their produce garnered 
a “ great profit” in Halifax.18 The absence of  food regulations benefitted black 
colonists.
For the most part, the profits and self- sufficiency that former bondpeople 
enjoyed did not last. Land prob lems quickly became apparent in Septem-
ber 1783, when surveyor Benjamin Marston discovered that another surveyor 
had encroached on lands reserved for black colonists by reserving  those lots 
for white emigrants instead. Only 184 of  the 649 Birchtown residents obtained 
land, and  those lots averaged 34 acres, compared to white allotments, which 
averaged 74. By 1785 in Annapolis County, seventy- six  free black  people had 
received land grants of  1 acre each, all in Digby, whereas white occupants each 
had received between 100 and 400 acres.  Here, as well as in Annapolis, black 
refugees spent months waiting for lands that took a long time to be given out. 
In Clements in 1789, 148 out of  184 acres went to ex- bondpeople. Each per-
son was supposed to receive 50 acres, but the transactions on  these grants  were 
rarely confirmed— these families did not get the land promised to them  either. 
At Tracadie, Preston, and Hammond’s Plains, the land was notably barren. By 
1788 most of  the refugees in all of  Nova Scotia had received their lands, but 
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 these lots averaged 40 acres— a significantly smaller allotment than  those given 
to most white colonists. Southern slaveholders in the United States restricted 
slaves’  free time but not their access or ability to grow produce on garden plots. 
British officers during the Revolutionary War left black victual warriors to their 
own devices so that they could feed themselves by stealing. In Nova Scotia, 
black colonists possessed time but no economy of  land.19
In addition to preventing black colonists from receiving land, white colo-
nists also began to seek out better foodstuffs for themselves while controlling 
formerly enslaved  peoples’ access to provisions— thus creating black hunger. 
An anonymous writer of  a 1787 depiction of  Shelburne observed, “Never  were 
known greater mixtures of  privy & meanness than many of  the families  here 
exhibit.” Some  people, most likely whites, “seem passionately fond of  all kinds 
of  delicious food & drink.”  These  people reminded the writer of  what St. Paul 
said “in the Characters of  the Cretians ‘Whose God is their Belly & who glory 
in their shame.’ ” In Halifax, white Loyalists received provisions of  codfish, mo-
lasses, and hard biscuit, with a very occasional supply of  meat; black colo-
nists, by contrast, subsisted on cornmeal and molasses.20 Although provisions 
for white  people could hardly be called luxurious— contrary to the Shelburne 
writer’s claims— these foodstuffs became more prestigious  because some 
 people could not have them.
In other instances, white colonists denied black  people food altogether. In 
Shelburne, all Loyalists  were hypothetically entitled to pork and flour, but black 
“servants” who left the white families with whom they had migrated— either 
through emancipation or by  running away— lost their rights to government- 
issued rations. Often, white employers continued to draw  those provisions in 
their absence. When they provided food aid to former bondpeople, distribu-
tors doled out provisions in Shelburne, meaning that the former slaves who 
lived in Birchtown faced a three- to six- mile trek through frozen woods to col-
lect the same weekly subsistence to which white residents  were also entitled. 
By December 1,784 black  people in Digby had received 12,098 pounds of  flour 
and 9,352 pounds of  pork. This distribution amounted to eighty full days of  
rations for 160 adults and 26  children, total— the only rations they would ever 
receive in Nova Scotia.21 Despite the preparations of  the Port Roseway Asso-
ciates, the skills of  black colonists, and their momentary influence in Nova 
Scotian marketplaces, the pro cess of  obtaining food grew more and more 
difficult.
The state of  usefulness that  free black colonists had enjoyed in Nova Scotia’s 
vari ous marketplaces declined beginning in the mid-1780s as a result of  new 
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food laws— but they  were new only in Canada,  because similar regulations had 
existed elsewhere for centuries.
Governments had passed food laws to fight famine in the medieval and early 
modern periods in Eu rope, and such practices had traveled to the North Amer-
ican colonies.  These laws have come to be known as the “moral economy,” or 
a model in which, during times of  scarcity, common folk stop accepting in-
equalities of  power and wealth to pressure wealthy men into fulfilling their 
end of  the social contract by guaranteeing access to food at a just price.22  People 
did not expect to legislate against hunger themselves, but they did expect the 
government to do it for them.
During the medieval period En glish leaders played their role in the moral 
economy by fixing the price of  bread and allowing the size of  the loaf  to 
change; by the early modern period local governments periodically changed 
both the price of  the loaf  and its size. Price- fixing of  other foodstuffs— codified 
between 1580 and 1630 and published as the Book of   Orders  under Charles I— 
became common in  England during the reign of  the Tudors in reaction to pop-
ulation growth and enclosure. Such practices for regulating grain distribution 
also existed in places like France, where officials controlled the conduct of  
farmers, officials, millers, and bakers.  People asserted their right to be pro-
tected against dearth, and governments passed laws to fight hunger, particu-
larly during war time, and often in reaction to riotous subjects. In the colonies, 
Revolutionary northern state governments, in response to food rioters, sup-
ply strug gles, and the be hav ior of  self- interested colonists during the war, be-
gan to experiment with price- fixing and embargoes.23 In all of   these instances, 
 people pressured the government to fix prices but did not suggest that this right 
should be allocated directly to the  people.
During the late eigh teenth  century much of  Canada’s government over-
sight had occurred at the local level. In Nova Scotia the county court system 
was the primary body responsible for adjudicating questions of  government 
and legality (and thus questions about the moral economy)  until the 1830s. 
At the start of  1784 the Shelburne Courts set about passing food- related laws. 
Joseph Durfee, who had worked with Guy Carleton over the issue of  white 
Loyalists’ provisions, assumed the judgeship over the Court of  Common 
Pleas, and a Court of  Sessions was established to  handle  matters of  everyday 
governance.24
The structure of  land allotments meant that  these laws, and the patterns 
of  marketplace hunger prevention that they codified, affected black residents 
of  Shelburne and Birchtown. In February 1785 the Shelburne court ordered 
that bread sold by bakers “ shall be a six- penny loaf, to Weigh one pound, thirteen 
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ounces. . . .  And that all such Bread  shall be made of  good, sound inspected 
Wheaten flour.” In June of  the same year the court further stipulated that 
 people who sold bread needed to shape it into “single, or double Loaves,” the 
pricing of  which would “from time to time be regulated.”25 Bread laws may 
have meant that  free black bakers, like Norfolk  Virginia, who practiced 
baking as a side occupation and who baked with cheaper cornmeal— a slave 
staple—or rye flour, would find it difficult to conform to government- decreed 
standards of  weight and appearance. The surveyor who reported to the Port 
Roseway Associates had established that rye flour could be grown, but  there 
is  little evidence of  black colonists raising  either corn or rye. Even if  they had, 
it is easy to shape a loaf  of  bread made with wheat flour  because the gluten 
gives the dough structure; dough made from cornmeal and buttermilk, by con-
trast, does not hold its shape well  unless placed in a pan or skillet, where it 
 will form a denser cake. It would have been challenging to bake such bread 
into loaves.
More significantly, the courts also modified the meaning of  the marketplace 
itself, making it harder for freedpersons to hawk edible goods. In May 1785 
the court forbade meat, fish, vegetables, “or other articles of  provisions” from 
being sold “in any street, lane, or on the strand, or shore of  this town, other 
than in the market, or places established by order of  Sessions,” such as “Mar-
kets in King street, and at the Cove.” Not every one adhered to  these laws, as 
evidenced by the fact that even as late as 1800, members of  the Shelburne 
 Grand Jury observed “That the want of  some place as a Market for the recep-
tion of  a Number of  small articles of  the Provision kind, brought by the Coun-
try  People” caused “a Number of  Incon ve niences, & indeed, Impositions.” 
“In many Instances”  these foodstuffs  were “bought up, and sold again at a 
shameful advance.”26 The court complained that “country  people”— likely 
black inhabitants who lived in the country precisely  because of  unequal land 
distributions— were taking advantage of  the lack of  a central marketplace to 
purchase and resell goods for profit.  People still managed to sell provisions in 
odd places and at high prices, but the passing of  such regulations began to limit 
participation in the market economy. For the most part,  free black  people could 
no longer sell their goods where they wished, which meant that if they could 
obtain permission to sell out of  a market stall, they would then need to ad-
here to market prices that delayed profits.
Another set of  rules and regulations passed on April 10, 1786,  limited fish-
ing activities— one of  the main ways in which  people without lands supple-
mented their diet and income. Boston King  later observed that upon first 
arriving in Nova Scotia, white colonists  were too focused on “building large 
 houses, and striving to excel one another in this piece of  vanity.” Only “when 
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their money was almost expended” did  these inhabitants begin “to build small 
fishing vessels”; they realized that they, too, would require additional food 
sources. Once white colonists began to catch, eat, and sell fish, fishing laws 
began to appear. Whites prohibited fishing nets and seines from reaching more 
than a third of  the way into a river; fishing was banned from Saturday to Mon-
day; and erecting a dam on the river was not allowed “ under any pretence 
what ever” as a means to “obstruct the Passage of  the Fish.”27
This practice of  restricting land use near riverfronts deviated from  earlier 
practices. In mid- eighteenth- century Liverpool, for example, all single men 
owned a share in the fish lots laid out along the shores of  rivers and harbors. 
This egalitarian lot- sharing seems to have fallen out of  practice (if  it ever ex-
isted in Shelburne) by the mid-1780s.  These rules also tended to give prefer-
ence to white fishermen:  people who owned advantageous land by the river 
got the first choice of  net placement.  Later remembrances indicated that black 
colonists did not receive riverine land, and subsequent court decisions indicate 
that white Loyalists did in fact restrict black  people’s access to the  water, thus 
making it impossible for  these fishermen to fish in the same way as white Loy-
alists.28 If  a man had to work on a white man’s farm during the week, he 
could not fish on the weekend; and if  he was lucky enough to live on the river 
but far away, the law prevented him from damming it to trap fish.  These regu-
lations allowed whites to gain control of  the fish trade. Although it is difficult 
to prove that whites enacted such laws with the intention to circumscribe black 
access to food, the laws nevertheless threatened black food security specifically.
Land prob lems and changes in the  legal system  were challenging enough, 
but hunger became a real prob lem as a result of  adverse weather. During the 
late 1780s extreme cold weather led to short planting seasons, which in turn 
resulted in sparse crops. Nova Scotian food supplies suffered from the same 
agricultural challenges that plagued upstate New York and the southern states 
during this time period, but  there had been far less time to build up grain re-
serves. Most white Loyalists possessed the means to leave, and the fact that 
many of  them moved closer to Liverpool, Tusket, and Yarmouth underscores 
the real ity of   these food shortages. Some freed blacks followed them, but  those 
without the funds to do so stayed  behind. By the late 1780s, Shelburne was 
turning into a ghost town. In 1785 a nameless slave was hanged in Halifax for 
the crime of  stealing a bag of  potatoes. The cold winters did not help the sit-
uation: some of  the Nova Scotians spent them living in shoddy shelters that 
 were  really holes in the ground with flimsy roofs.29
Poor harvests should have compelled government officials to issue more 
food provisions, as Sir Guy Carleton had said they would, but instead, in 1787, 
the British government ignored its moral economic responsibilities and  stopped 
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sending provisions. The central government had a history of  ceasing provisions 
supplies a  couple of  years into a colony’s development; it halted the arrival of  
foodstuffs two years  after colonization of  Liverpool. Even white colonists wor-
ried about this change; some of  them noted that officials still had not distrib-
uted land, and “ future subsistance by Agriculture has been denied.” They 
complained, “It is now above six weeks since the Salt Provisions provided for 
the use of  the Loyalists have been expended, and now  there remains no provi-
sions of  any kind in his Majesties Stores.” They speculated that the absence of  
land combined with the lack of  provisions meant that “the horrors of  Famine 
must ensue.”30 It is not difficult to understand why the black colonists, denied 
land with even greater frequency than whites and struggling  under the burden 
of  new legislation, likely found this situation even more troublesome.
Whereas in Liverpool  earlier in the  century, where the British government 
had assisted the poor even when general provisioning ceased, in Shelburne the 
local  people tried to exile its poor, mostly black population. In 1789 a body 
called “the overseers of  the poor” sent a petition to the magistrates of  Shel-
burne. They noted, “ there are a  great number of  Black  people, both in this 
Town & in Birchtown, who are in the most distressing Circumstances.”  Because 
“the number of  white  People, whom we have constantly to supply, are very 
considerable,” they explained, “it is not in our power to afford the Blacks that 
assistance” they required. The petitioners pleaded with the magistrates to “ free 
this Infant Settlement from a Burden which it is by no Means in a Capacity to 
bear.”31 Absent from the rec ords are black colonists’ reactions to this petition 
to push them out of  the province.
By the eigh teenth  century, overseers of  the poor had become common to 
deal with growing numbers of  unemployed  people and vagrants, so the of-
fice was not unique to the institution of  slavery. It is difficult to tell what for-
merly enslaved black colonists made of  the fact that the men in charge of  
providing them with aid  were known as “overseers,” or what they thought 
about being described as a burden when white Loyalists’ land interests and leg-
islative changes had taken away their abilities to make themselves useful. The 
overseers clearly hoped that Shelburne magistrates would lean on the British 
government to begin the pro cess of  relocating black colonists. Between 1789 
and 1791 Nova Scotia earned the nickname “Nova Scarcity,” and former slaves 
began to reconsider  whether they wanted to call such a place their home.32 
The combination of  land issues, scanty or non ex is tent provisions, and restric-
tive food laws made Nova Scotia a colony where victual imperialism ensured 
the continuation of  black hunger while at the same time giving displaced white 
Loyalists an advantage over black refugees.
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While the British failed to apportion land in Nova Scotia, a group of  Brit-
ish abolitionists in  England confronted the institution of  British slavery and 
their options for ending it. They had hoped to create an antislavery colony in 
Africa that stood as an example that would convince other countries to eradi-
cate the slave trade, but thus far they had been unsuccessful. Several schemes 
on the upper Guinea coast had failed: the province of  Senegambia, the col-
ony of  Bulama, and the first Granville Town colony of  London’s Black Poor. 
In 1791 Thomas Clarkson, his younger  brother John, Granville Sharp, Henry 
Thornton, and William Wilberforce formed the Sierra Leone Com pany to su-
pervise a new antislavery venture in Africa. On August 19, 1791, John Clark-
son sailed on the Ark from Gravesend to Halifax, arrived on October 7, and 
began making preparations for departure to Africa. In Nova Scotia he wit-
nessed the effects of  hunger on the colony’s black population.33
John Clarkson associated land dearth with hunger, and thus with bondage 
and powerlessness. When he arrived in Halifax, he observed that  because black 
refugees had “never had Lands,” they had been “obliged to live upon White- 
mens property . . .  and for cultivating it they receive half  the produce so that 
they are in Short in a state of  Slavery.” He interviewed vari ous  people in late 
1791, linking land and food absences. “Jacob Coffee” had “served in the army 
last war,” but “never rec[eive]d  either Lands or Provisions.” He made the same 
annotations about a man named Samuel Jones.34 Men and  women without 
land, who had previously provided useful military assistance, now earned pro-
visions instead of  wages. According to Clarkson,  people without land felt 
forced into remaining in Canada  because they depended on whites with farm-
land to give them the  labor that allowed them to earn their bread.
David George and Boston King also described the efforts they made to ob-
tain provisions through usefulness— George,  after receiving government and 
charitable aid, and King, by traveling widely to find work. David George, who 
separated briefly from his wife and  children so that he could work as a preacher 
in Shelburne, returned to find that the new governor, Governor Parr, had ar-
ranged six months of  provisions for the Georges as well as a quarter acre of  
land. The  family still strug gled to establish themselves with a comfortable sub-
sistence, despite George’s efforts to convert  people to the Baptist faith. Dur-
ing a  later, difficult period, a white Baptist colonist named Ann Taylor gave 
him money “to buy a bushel of  potatoes,” from which George produced 
“thirty- five bushels.”35 In his narrative he made sure to explain that this Chris-
tian charity— which came from one person, rather than from the government— 
prompted him to make better plans to become self- sufficient by planting part 
of  her gift to him.
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Boston King survived by moving and attributed his deliverance to his faith 
in God. In 1787, a year of  “dreadful famine,” he left Birchtown  because he 
“could get no employment” and so “travelled from place to place, to procure 
the necessaries of  life” to support him and his wife. He described his resigna-
tion “to the divine  will” and began to pray more. He saved his  family by mak-
ing a chest that a white captain paid for in maize, which gave him “a reprieve 
from the dreadful anguish of  perishing by famine.” “Oh what a wonderful de-
liverance did GOD work for me that day!” he wrote. He also built fishing 
boats in exchange for corn. King favorably compared his ability to work for 
food to the situation of  his “black brethren, who  were obliged to sell them-
selves to the merchants, some for two or three years; and  others for five or six 
years.” Thereafter he resolved “to live by faith, and to put my trust in him, 
more than I ever had done before.”36
Even though David George and Boston King  were only two men, their writ-
ings offer several readings of  what it meant to be hungry and diff er ent strate-
gies to avoid want. During the 1787 famine that King described as “dreadful,” 
 people perished. He wrote that they “fell down dead in the streets, thro’ hun-
ger,” while  those fortunate enough to survive did so by killing and eating “their 
dogs and cats.” He himself  was “pinched with hunger and cold,” and while 
he searched for work he remembered falling “down several times, thro’ weak-
ness,” expecting “to die upon the spot.”37 His hunger was a test from God, 
and his remembrance clarifies the comments that Clarkson had made in his 
observations about black colonists receiving no wages from white landown-
ers. King seemed pleased to earn food instead of  wages, indicating that pay-
ment in foodstuffs was not necessarily a bad  thing as long as it seemed that 
God had willed it. Black colonists may also have believed that this sort of  com-
pensation was tolerable as long as they retained a say in limiting the length of  
their employment. Boston King thought himself  useful, but he also believed 
that God made him fortunately so; it was not his fellow colonists’ uselessness 
but unluckiness and perhaps lack of  faith that forced them to sell themselves 
into a state of  indenture that resembled slavery.
David George’s portrayal of  eating, by contrast, offered black men and 
 women a  great deal more power. One Christian’s charity allowed him to plant 
potatoes and thrive in subsequent months as a Baptist preacher. He told the 
story of  a moment at St. John’s, where he went to baptize other black colo-
nists. George wrote that when he disembarked from his ship, the  people “ were 
so full of  joy that they ran out from waiting at  table on their masters, with 
the knives and forks in their hands, to meet me at the  water side.”38 In this 
vivid image, black  people abandoned their roles as food preparers and serv-
ers, taking with them the cutlery that allowed  people to serve food in a civi-
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lized way. If   these white masters wished to remain satiated, George implied, 
they would need to eat with their fin gers.
Black experiences with hunger  were tied to ideas about charity, freedom, 
and usefulness. In John Clarkson’s estimation, it was difficult to distinguish be-
tween freedom from hunger and freedom from slavery. David George’s ac-
count provided readers with one of  the few pos si ble examples in the early years 
of  British colonization of  Nova Scotia in which black  people created white 
hunger—or at least delayed white Loyalists from eating. His focus on for-
merly enslaved  people  running away from  tables to be baptized at  water’s 
edge, furthermore, prioritized addressing spiritual hunger over physical want. 
Boston King conceptualized hunger as something that made  people physi-
cally weak, and sometimes killed them. It was also something that  people 
could avoid, given the right combination of  providence and hard work. He 
had been ambivalent about migrating to Sierra Leone but changed his mind 
when he heard that colonists would receive “provisions till we could clear a 
sufficient portion of  land necessary for our subsistence.”39 The absence of  a 
time limit on provisions distributions, compared to  those years in Nova Scotia 
when government aid dis appeared, gave him confidence to think that black 
colonists could attain a state of  usefulness—to themselves, to their fellow 
colonists, and perhaps even to the British Crown—in Africa.
Sierra Leone Com pany officials envisioned Nova Scotia’s formerly enslaved 
population as potential mi grants, and Clarkson sailed to Halifax to resettle 
them  because of  the actions of  a man named Thomas Peters. Peters, a Yor-
uba man who had labored on a sugarcane plantation in French Louisiana, had 
run away from slavery in North Carolina, joined the Revolution on the Brit-
ish side, and earned a position as a private in the Black Pioneers. In Novem-
ber 1790, at the age of  fifty- three, he sailed to  England to petition for the black 
colonists’ removal from Nova Scotia to a more advantageous place. Peters 
heard about the plan for a colony in Sierra Leone  after another, unnamed black 
man, who was waiting on a party of   people eating dinner, overheard them talk-
ing about the scheme; he passed the news on to  others.  Here again, colonists’ 
relationships with food ser vice was impor tant—in this case, not  because it of-
fered freedom from hunger, but  because it offered freedom of  mobility. 
When Thomas Peters arrived in London, General Sir Henry Clinton procured 
a meeting for him with Sharp, Wilberforce, and the Clarkson  brothers. Peters 
confirmed that  these men  were indeed envisioning a new colony “on the River 
Sierra Leona” and viewed this plan as a resettlement opportunity. In a bold 
petition to them, he argued that Sierra Leone would be “an Asylum much bet-
ter suited to their Constitutions than Nova Scotia and New Brunswick,” and 
suggested that he and the black colonists be allowed to migrate.40
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The vari ous groups of  black colonists reacted to the idea of  the new colony 
in diff er ent ways. By the time Clarkson arrived in 1791, Shelburne was divided 
between four  free black factions, led by a free- born Barbadian mulatto, Col o nel 
Stephen Blucke; Methodist Boston King; another Methodist preacher called 
Moses Wilkinson; and David George, who led a Baptist congregation. In Halifax 
Clarkson met David George and Stephen Blucke. George expressed enthusiastic 
interest in the Sierra Leone proj ect, whereas Blucke denounced it as a foolish 
death mission. Blucke might already have heard rumors about the unhealthy 
and dangerous environment in Sierra Leone and judged Nova Scotia preferable. 
Stephen Skinner, Blucke’s former militia commander, bribed  others into staying 
with promises of  two years of   free food rations. When another group chose to 
remain  behind, they felt justified in asking Governor John Parr for funds for “a 
Cow & two Sheep,”  because the expense “is by no means adequate to the vast 
expence of  transporting so many of  our fellow Subjects to Africa.”41 By demon-
strating that they required less funding and posed less incon ve nience to govern-
ment, they also used their knowledge of  food aid to loyal subjects. Wilkinson’s 
and King’s congregations, like George’s, prepared to depart.
Clarkson did what he could to promote the new colonization scheme.  After 
witnessing the starving conditions of  landless black colonists, he even made 
land- related promises on behalf  of  the Sierra Leone Com pany that he was un-
authorized to offer.42  Little by  little, prospective colonists and their families 
trickled in from vari ous points to Halifax; by the beginning of  December over 
a thousand  people had gathered to wait for officials to sort out provisions and 
shipping  matters.
At the very end of  December, Clarkson received a joint petition from 
Thomas Peters and a man named David Edmonds on behalf  of  the  people 
bound for Africa. Anticipating that this year would be “the larst Christmas day 
that we ever  shall see” in Amer i ca, they asked him “to grant us one days alow-
ance of  frish Beef  for a Christmas diner.”43 The men knew that the Nova 
Scotian government had failed to prevent black hunger, but they nevertheless 
appealed to the established notion that organizers of  new colonial proj ects 
would provide them with food aid during times of  cele bration. Yet this beef  
was not meant to sustain them in the long term; it was a symbolic request 
that asked Clarkson and the other gentlemen to make a gesture of  good faith. 
This was the colonists’ last request for food aid in Nova Scotia. It, along with 
Thomas Peters’s, was also one of  their first petitions. They set sail for Sierra 
Leone in January 1792.
De cades  later, during the mid- nineteenth  century, En glish reformers would 
argue that only hunger could teach the poor the morality they needed to want 
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to  labor virtuously.44 Authors like Boston King, who contended that hunger 
could be avoided through a combination of  hard work and God’s grace,  were 
already articulating the morality and work ethic that anticipated  these En glish 
Poor Law reforms by almost half  a  century. When Thomas Peters and David 
Edmonds requested beef  for a Christmas dinner in light of  provisioning fail-
ures in Nova Scotia, they  were appealing to British imperial agents’ sense of  
moral obligation, but they did so while planning to be useful in Sierra Leone— 
both men would seek po liti cal office  there.
The colonists who sailed  were entering a fluid, expanding Atlantic World. 
That world had connected  people, plants, and animals at least since Eu ro pe-
ans had invaded North Amer i ca, but the black refugees who sailed  were some 
of  the first to cross back across this oceanic network to Africa. In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, it was pos si ble to imagine lines that forcibly con-
nected enslaved Africans to the Ca rib bean and the Ca rib bean to North Amer-
i ca. In the eigh teenth  century, imperial officials and ordinary folks  imagined 
new connections between the former American colonies and Nova Scotia, and 
between Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone.
Black colonists used food and information networks to leave the former 
American colonies, but most of   those networks froze up in Nova Scotia.  After 
food laws went into effect, Boston King and David George did not try to ad-
dress their hunger by procuring, producing, or preparing food, even though 
they possessed  those skills. They had to prove their usefulness in other ways 
 because white Loyalist lawmaking had inhibited the abilities of  black colonists 
to participate in the Nova Scotian food system. Even the black colonists as-
sociated with food preparation in Canada— the men and  women who may 
have been servants or may have been enslaved— tended to ignore their food- 
related responsibilities when given the opportunity, casting their forks and 
knives aside.
The black colonists’ time in Nova Scotia taught them new strategies about 
old practices. It showed them how conventional food laws could be used to 
control the lives of  other  people, and it also illustrated the potential of  failure 
when hunger prevention was left jointly in the hands of  local courts and dis-
tant government. When Clarkson made his offer of  migration, a third of  the 
population de cided to take their chances in Sierra Leone. Imperial officials like 
Clarkson and the other members of  the Sierra Leone Com pany had learned 
to look further abroad to help the British Empire expand. They also drew lines 
between North Amer i ca and India as it became clear that the empire’s inter-
ests lay further east to make up for its lost North American colonies.45
Timothy Pickering knew about this imperial expansion, and he wanted 
Native Americans to know about it in ways that served the interests of  the 
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United States. So when he met Cornplanter in 1791 to deliver his history lec-
ture, Pickering also offered a lesson in demography. “ Brothers, on the other 
side of  the  Great  Water, far beyond the nations of  white  people,” he told the 
Iroquois, “ there are many nations of  Indians who have dark skins, black hair 
& black eyes, like you. But  these Indians are farmers, carpenters, Smiths, Spin-
ners and weavers, like the white  people.” The existence of   these Indians mat-
tered to Pickering, but it was not his main point; “above all tea is brought from 
 those countries, and from  those countries alone,” he explained.46 Historians 
could say a lot about this comparison: about the importance Pickering placed 
on tea, which  after all had mattered so much to the colonists who rebelled 
against  Great Britain; about his conflation of  Native Americans with Indians 
from India and evolving notions of  race in the eigh teenth  century; and about 
 whether Pickering spoke out of  malice or ignorance.47
For our purposes, the moment is significant  because Pickering was trying 
to use this information to convince Cornplanter that by becoming farmers and 
weavers, the Six Nations could also grow and enjoy the tea they drank at trea-
ties. The federal government was making plans for its own food policy and 
thus its own hunger- prevention initiatives, ushering in a new era of  American 
victual imperialism.
Part Three
Power Waning
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Victual Imperialism and U.S. Indian Policy
In 1791, Timothy Pickering, U.S. Indian agent, 
recited to the Seneca named Cornplanter a false history of  Eu ro pean self- 
sufficiency and Native hunger in early Amer i ca, in which Indians hungered 
 because they hunted and non- Natives flourished by eating the abundant yields 
of  their farms. Pickering hoped that his interpretation of  the past would per-
suade Cornplanter and other Indians to change their methods of  food produc-
tion and conform to the U.S. government’s new policy, known then as the 
“Plan of  Civilization.” The time had come, Pickering argued, for Indians to 
“adopt some of  the ways of  the white  people. Instead of  depending on hunt-
ing,” he urged, “let your  children be instructed in farming, raising of   cattle, 
Sheep and hogs.” Federal officials created this strategy to alter Native cattle- 
raising, agriculture, pricing, and eating habits in order to legitimize the gov-
ernment’s landgrabs.1 Their choices signaled a transition from a food policy 
of  diplomatic exchange and aid distributions to one that succeeded in chang-
ing Native food systems, and a transition from a weak federal Indian policy to 
one that sought greater power in the country’s Native American foreign af-
fairs. The 1790s witnessed the rise of  American victual imperialism.
The U.S. government could not take large amounts of  Native land  until In-
dians lost the power to fight hunger themselves. During the 1780s and 1790s, 
U.S. Indian commissioners had copied generous British diplomacy  because 
they feared Native hunger. As the federal government gained an advantage over 
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the states, U.S. officials tried to decrease the cost of  such practices by telling 
Native Americans about alternative ways to prevent hunger: by producing 
crops, meat, and dairy. The Plan of  Civilization relied upon the idea that Indi-
ans who  adopted American notions of  proper husbandry could become use-
fully in de pen dent, and could use less land to do so.2
A few prob lems delayed the plan’s implementation. First, non- Native offi-
cials misunderstood Indian appetites and remained uncertain about the extent 
to which starvation was truly a prob lem. Second, Indians already grew crops; 
Americans’ destruction of  corn bushels during the Revolutionary and West-
ern Confederacy Wars provided evidence of  extensive Native farming. Al-
though it was hard for U.S. officials to accept Indian agricultural methods, it 
was equally difficult to convince Indians to farm when Native  women already 
did so. Fi nally, several groups— Western Confederacy Indians, some Creeks, 
and some Iroquois— refused American officials’ offers to implement the plan 
in their villages. Ultimately, the federal government managed to push the pol-
icy through  because some factions of  Creeks, Buffalo Creek Senecas, Gene-
see Oneidas, Onondagas, and Senecas proved willing to collaborate with U.S. 
officials.3 Once officials had changed the ways that Indians prevented hunger, 
the government could step in to convince Indians that it could prevent Native 
hunger more efficiently than Indians.
By the mid-1810s the Plan of  Civilization’s promoters had succeeded in de-
creasing food aid and distributing provisions that physically sickened Native 
Americans. The scheme, rather than preventing Indian hunger by transform-
ing Indians into husbandmen, instead ate up Indians’ territory while killing 
Indians. The Plan of  Civilization was a federal land and food policy that per-
vaded interactions between Indians and federal Indian agents, and it shows 
how ideas about hunger prevention served as both a diplomatic tool and a 
weapon from the 1780s to the 1810s.
Victual imperialism in the new United States was slightly diff er ent from 
the victual imperialism that  free black colonists encountered in Nova Scotia, 
underscoring the necessity of  insisting on precise definitions for the term 
across time and space.4 In Nova Scotia the local courts  were effective, and 
centralized government was not. White Loyalists exercised what  little power 
they had by stopping black colonists from getting land rather than by taking 
it from them. They emphasized concomitant laws that created controls on 
black  people’s food access. Diplomacy between white and black colonists did 
not exist  because diplomacy requires some balance of  power, and in Canada 
white colonists claimed the majority of  power. In the United States, by con-
trast, victual imperialism consisted of  the institutionalization of  a central-
ized, federal food policy— built on the introduction of  plowing,  cattle 
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ranching, and then price- fixing food laws— that facilitated sales and seizures 
of  Native American territory.
American victual imperialism worked alongside the Native and non- Native 
diplomacy that continued into the 1810s. Victual imperialism and food diplo-
macy both mischaracterized Native hunger while encouraging select groups 
of  Indians to collaborate with non- Native officials to implement and enforce 
changes in the food system. Once this pro cess was underway, victual imperi-
alism replaced food diplomacy, and Native Americans lost this par tic u lar  battle.
Although vari ous eighteenth- century authors had written about attempts to 
“civilize” Indians throughout the colonial and postwar period, it was only in 
the late 1780s and early 1790s that vari ous men connected this proj ect to the 
prevention of  Native hunger. They suggested making changes to crop produc-
tion, hunting customs, and education; their ideas formed the basis for the 
federal government’s Plan of  Civilization. Samuel Kirkland, a white Christian 
missionary, had lived with and preached to Iroquois and Stockbridge Indians 
in vari ous villages since the 1760s. He received funding from the Society in 
Scotland for Propagating Christian Knowledge, and direction from its board 
in Boston.5
Descriptions of  Iroquois hunger permeate the journal entries that Kirkland 
penned in the late 1780s. In early April 1789, Oneidas and Tuscaroras had been 
fasting and praying “on account of  the scarcity of  provisions.”  Later that month 
 others told him that they  were considering dispersing for the year so that shared 
foodstuffs stretched further. That May, he recorded a meeting with “an aged 
Indian” who worried that “God is angry with us Indians. We are reduced to 
extremity. Never was such a time with us Indians. We are very hungry and 
almost starved. . . .  My  family have not tasted any bread, or meat, for many 
days; nothing but herbs and sometimes small fish. I am so weak I  can’t hoe 
my corn.”6 The year 1789 had been a year of  hunger and near famine, but men-
tions of  hunger had long featured in Natives’ interactions with non- Natives. 
The Iroquois  were dealing with this period of  scarcity in familiar, useful ways: 
by overstating their hunger and refusing to hoe corn in order to receive more 
food aid, by imbuing fasts with religious meaning, by dispersing to avoid over-
stressing grain reserves, and by turning to fishing and gathering.
A reform of  Indian be hav ior would address  these prob lems of  hunger, Kirk-
land thought, and so he eagerly reported instances when Native Americans 
asked for or approved of  his changes. In December 1789 he spoke to Seneca 
chief  Big Tree (Karontowanen, sometimes called  Great Tree— possibly the 
same man whose suicide Anthony Wayne  later tried to exploit) and Captain 
Isaac (Tolaghdowane). Kirkland intended to gradually remove “Your wandering 
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manner of  life, your strong attachments to the customs of  the  Fathers, & 
your prejudices against the white  people in general.” He believed that Indians 
could become good Christians by embracing his ideas about civility and per-
manent settlement in a fixed location. Like other critics, Kirkland wanted In-
dians to become more sedentary, which would in turn promote the sort of  
productive farming he envisioned while also reducing conflict between Na-
tives and non- Natives. That year he described Buffalo Creek and Genesee Onei-
das, Onondagas, and Senecas asking him “to make provision for the education 
of  some of  their youths.”  These Indians had asked Kirkland to adopt Native 
 children “into [his]  family” and teach them “the en glish language, to read & 
write the same.” He noted that “The other kind of  schooling” needed to take 
place “in their respective Villages.”7
That other schooling— instruction in non- Native agricultural methods— 
soon became clear. In 1791 Kirkland wrote down his ideas and requested 
funding from Scotland. He envisioned a school “in the vicinity of  Oneida” near 
a non- Native village. He hoped to admit two Seneca  children, one or two Onei-
das, and one Onondaga and Cayuga. White  children would matriculate 
alongside Indians. They would all learn history, law, government, arithmetic, 
and to read and write En glish and Indian languages. The curriculum also in-
cluded instruction in “the art of  husbandry” but failed to distinguish this hus-
bandry from extant Native agriculture. The editor of  Kirkland’s journals 
observes that Kirkland intended  children to cultivate plots near the school, and 
that each Indian village would also gain a resident farmer. Once Indians es-
tablished agriculture suitable to non- Native standards in their villages,  women 
would go to work houses to learn to read and write and then would take courses 
in domestic economy, spinning, and weaving.8 Kirkland’s plan rested on the 
school’s proximity to non- Natives, on teaching academic knowledge alongside 
practical skills, on changing Native gender roles, and on removing Indian 
 children from villages.
 There are reasons to be skeptical of  Kirkland’s assessment of  Native hun-
ger and his ideas about ameliorating it. For one  thing, he seemed ignorant of  
the fact that Native Americans already knew history, and had their own meth-
ods of  recording the past. For another, he was not self- sufficient, so he was 
the wrong person to change Indian agriculture by example. His itinerant 
preaching contradicted his model of  a more settled life, and at vari ous points 
in his diaries he admitted depending on Indians for food. In January 1785 he 
lived “almost intirely on strawberries, with now & then a  little fish” while 
preaching to Stockbridge Indians. His Christian spirit flagged “for want of  sus-
tenance.” Stockbridge Indians shared food with him, but it was not enough; 
the Indians consequently “consented to release me till the latter part of  the 
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summer, by which time they expected the fruits of  the Earth would enable 
them to afford me some  little subsistence.” Four years  later, in 1789, he con-
fessed the pressing necessity of  making “some improvements in husbandry 
& cultivation so as to raise my own provisions in the vicinity of  Oneida, or I 
 shall remain  under embarrassed circumstances during my  whole life.”9 Kirk-
land’s “embarrass[ment]” may have been a  simple description of  his financial 
situation, but his inability to grow the crops he urged other men to plant prob-
ably made him into an awkward figure of  uselessness. It is also pos si ble that 
Kirkland’s hunger— which he was less capable than Indians of  enduring— made 
the Iroquois and Stockbridges doubt his ability to prevent theirs.
This was victual imperialism in action; it was a plan to reform Indian hus-
bandry while taking Indian land. The preacher not only passed messages be-
tween and translated for the Iroquois and the U.S. government; he also funded 
his school from the donations of  land speculators.  After the Revolution Kirk-
land’s missionary zeal gave way to his own financial concerns— not least of  
which involved acquiring a tract of  Oneida land, which he subsequently ex-
panded by aiding other speculators and Mas sa chu setts and New York state 
officials (who also sought cessions). Ultimately, Kirkland’s school succeeded, 
but not in the form intended. New York governor George Clinton authorized the 
school’s charter in January 1793. The school house burned down, and though 
another one was rebuilt around 1794, the Society in Scotland refused to fund 
it. The repaired school became Hamilton College, which educated white 
pupils, not Indian ones.10 Kirkland’s attempts at reforming Native crop pro-
duction and education, consequently, did not enjoy widespread success.
Other men  were ready with alternative suggestions for changing Indian hus-
bandry while eyeing Indian land. Timothy Pickering also penned ideas for 
“the means of  introducing the art of  husbandry, and civilization, among our 
Indian neighbours” in 1791. Samuel Kirkland had corresponded with Picker-
ing about his idea for a school, and they agreed on some points but not  others. 
Both men thought that proper male husbandmen should cease hunting and 
ranging and farm in one place, while  women should no longer farm. Like other 
American officials both Pickering and Kirkland planned to stop  women’s ag-
ricultural  labor by encouraging them to become spinners and weavers. Pick-
ering believed that Kirkland’s approach could succeed in teaching “Indian 
youths” to farm, but unlike Kirkland he worried about what would happen 
when  those men returned “to their own country” and, in his words, reverted 
into “mere Savages.”11
“The remedy Seemed obvious” to Pickering. He proposed leaving  children 
in their villages, educating them with just a  little “reading, writing and arith-
metic,” and allowing them to “practically learn the art of  husbandry” through 
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instruction by non- Native teachers who would reside among them. He pro-
posed, as further encouragement, sending “a cow, a yoke of  oxen, a plough, a 
cart, and the other proper instruments of  husbandry” to three separate Iro-
quois locations. Pickering even drew up a bud get for the U.S. government to 
consider.12 His approach preempted backsliding, did not require removing 
 children from villages, and defined non- Native husbandry through a detailed 
discussion of  domesticated animals, meat and dairy production, and plow ag-
riculture.
This focus on  cattle and plows revealed some of  the contradictions of  pro-
posals for this initiative.  People voiced conflicting ideas about corn, wheat, and 
beef  during this time period. In  Virginia, planters shifted their focus from to-
bacco to wheat production, which in turn demanded the plow, but further 
south the loamy soils  were so poor that  until the mid- nineteenth  century even 
Anglo- American farmers eschewed plows. Some  people simply became un-
interested in owning land altogether, particularly in certain regions of  Ken-
tucky, Mary land, and Tennessee. Indians may have preferred to grow and eat 
corn, and indeed some non- Native writers (from Benjamin Franklin to doc-
tor Benjamin Rush to poet Joel Barlow) championed it. Other Americans, 
however, would come to believe that wheat was a cheaper, more elevated, 
and nutritious grain than maize.13
Plow and wheat agriculture required more farmland— not less, as Picker-
ing claimed— than the hoe and corn agriculture on which Indians had previ-
ously relied. Iroquois hoe use produced crop yields that surpassed non- Native 
ones, and it kept soils healthier for longer.  Cattle presented another prob lem: 
American breeders remained insecure about their  cattle, which seemed wilder 
and bonier than well- bred British  cattle.14 Pickering, who assumed that enthu-
siasm for the plan would spread from village to village, ignored the practical 
considerations necessary to ensure successful implementation.
And then  there was the prob lem of  Pickering’s perception of  Native hun-
ger. By summer of  1791 he was arguing that his version of  the plan was a good 
one  because he mistakenly assumed that Indians’ requests for provisions 
stemmed from useless, insatiable appetites rather than adherence to established 
diplomatic practices. When pitching his plan to Indians, he emphasized the 
potential abundance of  Indian food production. In a conversation with Corn-
planter, Pickering championed the superiority of  American husbandry, describ-
ing a society in which each man played a specialized role. Farmers farmed, 
but they  were the endpoint of  a long system that enabled them to do so. Smiths 
forged “plough- irons, hoes, axes, scythes, and all other iron tools” that made 
it easier (he thought) to plow fields. Carpenters built “houses and barns” for 
storing food, in addition to “ploughs, carts, and other  things . . .  for the use 
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of  the farmers.” With  these types of  aid farmers raised “abundance of   cattle 
and corn, wheat and other grain,” which in turn let them feed “thousands of  
families” as well as their own. If  they  adopted this system, Pickering implied, 
Indians would not need to ask the Americans for rations  because they would 
raise their own surplus. Even at a time when Pickering was heavi ly involved 
in conducting Indian diplomacy, he did not understand that Indians asked for 
food  because they expected rather than needed it. The  people to whom Pick-
ering reported trusted his assessment of  the situation; Secretary of  War Henry 
Knox, who approved of  Pickering’s scheme, convinced George Washington 
to follow Pickering’s recommendations.15
Some Iroquois did seem amenable to receiving the animals and undertak-
ing the farming reforms that  were integral to the Plan of  Civilization— prob-
ably  because they already farmed and owned domesticated animals. Seneca 
leaders Big Tree and Captain Isaac, who in 1789 heard Kirkland’s description 
of  his school, said that they would “submit wholly” to Kirkland in the  matter 
of  its location. In 1791 Big Tree and some other Senecas (Half  Town and Corn-
planter) asked at a meeting if  federal officials would “teach us to plough and 
to Grind Corn,” and offered “to Send nine Seneka boys to be  under your care 
for education.” Part of  this request was posture; Indians already ground corn 
(though it is unclear  whether Big Tree was referring specifically to men, in 
which case they might indeed have needed to learn to grind corn). Plow agri-
culture would have been less widespread. George Washington agreed condi-
tionally to the application. He delegated Secretary of  War Henry Knox to say 
that the U.S. preferred to keep Indian  children in Native villages, and would 
send “one or two Sober men to reside in your Nation, with proper implements 
of  husbandry.” In March 1792 the U.S. Senate agreed to devote $1,500 for 
“clothing, domestic animals and implements of  husbandry, and for encourag-
ing useful artificers to reside” in the villages of  the Six Nations. By 1796 that 
annuity had grown to $4,500.16
Efforts further south mirrored  those in New York and Pennsylvania; offi-
cials described the Plan of  Civilization, and some Indians voiced assent (though 
perhaps not enthusiasm). The 1790 federal Treaty of  New York with Creeks 
led by Scots- Creek Alexander McGillivray offered the opportunity to promote 
the idealized version of  non- Native husbandry to the Creeks  under McGilli-
vray’s influence. This treaty— which confirmed a land cession Creeks had 
made at the 1783 Treaty of  Augusta, returned land ceded in 1785 at Galphin-
ton, and transferred what remained of  Creek territory from Georgia to federal 
jurisdiction— offered U.S. officials the leverage to promote a shift in Indian food- 
production methods. In return for good be hav ior the U.S. proposed to adjudi-
cate  future land sales (as they did at Colerain) and to “furnish gratuitously . . . 
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useful domestic animals, and implements of  husbandry.” This gift would en-
sure that “the Creek nation may be led to a greater degree of  civilization, and 
to become herdsmen and cultivators.” Timothy Pickering phrased it differ-
ently in a letter to George Washington, in which he suggested that  these pre-
sents would change Creeks “from hunters to husbandmen.”17
Some Creeks— such as the “New Order” Creeks who already owned 
 cattle— would have appreciated such valuable domesticated animals. Calves 
and cows cost approximately ten dollars, and beef  steers sold at two and a half  
dollars per year for  every year the animal had lived. Bacon sold for around 
thirty cents per pound.18  Here too, however, U.S. officials directed their “civi-
lizing” hunger- prevention efforts at Creeks who already raised  cattle, perhaps 
having stolen them during the Revolutionary War.
By portraying the farm implements and animals as pre sents, treaty nego-
tiators could claim to be stopping Native hunger, practicing diplomacy, and 
pursuing their civilization agenda. The Treaty of  New York stated, “No citi-
zen or inhabitant of  the United States  shall attempt to hunt or destroy the 
game on the Creek lands.” The government, by restating its interest in stop-
ping non- Native incursions, committed to rec ord federal recognition and pro-
tection of  Creek- owned land. Although this stipulation had appeared on 
other treaties, it had proved difficult to enforce; back in the 1750s Creeks had 
complained about non- Natives who deliberately overhunted deer in and near 
Creek territory, which kept Creeks from profiting from deerskins.19 In 1790, 
U.S. officials connected drought to crop failure, attacks and murders against 
white invaders, victual warfare against the  horses and  cattle that accompanied 
them, and famine— sometimes more  imagined than real. Their efforts to se-
cure animals for Indians must be read as preemption against  imagined Indian 
hunger and its violent consequences.
Cherokees also encouraged Americans’ hopes that Indians would “become” 
husbandmen, and it was not coincidental that observers connected Native will-
ingness with Native want. In January 1792 a group of  Chickamauga Chero-
kees “surprized” Henry Knox “with a vizit.”20 They reminded him of  the terms 
of  the 1791 Treaty of  Holston and said they had come to claim “the annual 
allowance of  Goods.” The Cherokees also requested “some ploughs and 
othe[r] implements of  husbandry, as mentioned in the treaty.” In 1794 a group 
of  Cherokees comprising “three old Fellows and a Squaw” approached a fort 
and begged for food. Observers said they  were “almost starv’d with hunger” 
and fed them. The Chickamaugas’ 1792 visit may have startled Knox, given 
their previous British loyalties— but Dragging Canoe’s death had changed the 
face of  affairs. The 1794 travelers may have been starving, or they may have 
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been using a hunger meta phor that non- Native observers misinterpreted. By 
reaffirming treaties, asking for plows, and playing on American perceptions 
of  Native hunger, Cherokees managed to get Americans to distribute trade 
goods, farm implements, and food aid. In 1796 George Washington sent a talk 
to the Cherokees that made clear the additional— and by then standard— 
expectation that Native  women would become spinners and weavers if  they 
wanted to receive such distributions.21
Not all Indians rushed to implement the U.S. Plan of  Civilization; it met 
with re sis tance from Indians who had a stable relationship with the federal gov-
ernment and from hostile groups too. The Seneca named Cornplanter was 
one of  the first to point out the inconsistencies in the Americans’ policy. Corn-
planter had fought for the British in the American Revolution but had been 
working with the Americans since then. In the same speech that reminded 
listeners of  George Washington’s reputation as a “town- destroyer,” Corn-
planter described the current state of  Indian villages. “The Game which the 
 Great Spirit Sent into our country for us to eat, is  going from among us,” he 
observed in a December 1790 message to Washington. Although he claimed 
that the Senecas believed that the  Great Spirit “intended, that we Should till 
the ground with the plough,” Cornplanter wondered  whether the Americans 
“mean to leave us and our  children any land to till.”22
In his reply to Cornplanter, Washington promised “that all the lands Secured 
to you by the [1784] treaty of  Fort Stanwix . . .  are yours . . .  only your own 
acts can convey them away.” He liked Cornplanter’s focus “on the Subject of  
tilling the ground” and pledged that “the United States  will be happy to afford 
you  every assistance.”23 At least at this point, Washington’s Indian policy as-
sumed that Indians could and should deal with hunger themselves but needed 
new strategies to do so.
At this moment, however, Native Americans remained skeptical of  the fed-
eral government’s stance on land cessions. During the same meeting where 
Cornplanter said that Senecas  were invested in plow agriculture, he also asked 
for a return of  land that the Six Nations had ceded to the United States at the 
1784 Treaty of  Fort Stanwix (the Six Nations had refused to ratify the cession 
once they returned home, but the government acted as if  the cession  were 
valid). Washington refused Cornplanter’s request. Other members of  the Six 
Nations showed even less enthusiasm for plows and domesticated animals. 
Samuel Kirkland sighed at Oneidas’ and Tuscaroras’ “cool reception to the be-
nevolence & generosity of  Congress.” They “cared nothing for oxen, or 
plows.” By contrast, even though Cornplanter had expressed concern, his “at-
tachment and fidelity . . .  could be relied upon,” both in 1791 and 1792. From 
166  Chapter 7
his seat on the New York- Pennsylvania border, Cornplanter continued to lis-
ten to the Americans  because Iroquois factionalism made him less willing to 
ally with Mohawk Joseph Brant and the Seneca Red Jacket.24
Joseph Brant continued to distrust the U.S. government, and he mocked the 
Plan of  Civilization; he was familiar with the longer history of  American bar-
barities like the  Sullivan Campaign. From  Grand River he monitored goings-
on in the United States while continuing to influence the British  under the 
lieutenant governorship of  John Graves Simcoe in Upper Canada. Although 
Brant assured Americans that he would negotiate with them, in his interac-
tions with other Indians he made it clear that he would not. In 1792 he ridi-
culed George Washington’s invitation to Philadelphia, “particularly” the part 
related “to planting & Sowing.” This offer “was not impor tant” to Brant, “for 
he already knew how to plough & to Sow.” Brant also refused to travel to Phil-
adelphia for fear that “the hostile Indians . . .  would See and blame him.” His 
influence over the Western Confederacy Indians had waned before this time 
 because of  Western Indians’ longstanding suspicions of  the Iroquois. Many 
Americans did not place much faith in Brant’s ability to negotiate with the 
Western Indians: Anthony Wayne said that Brant was “too late, to render us 
any ser vice with the hostile Indians.”25 It is uncertain what the Americans made 
of  Brant’s critique of  the government’s Indian food policy.
To say that the Western Confederacy offered a lukewarm reaction to U.S. 
proposals would be putting it generously. In March 1791 George Washington 
sent a talk to the Miami and Wabash tribes, indicating the Americans’ desire 
to make the Indians “understand the cultivation of  the earth” and to teach 
them “how much better it is . . .  to have comfortable  houses, and to have plenty 
to eat and drink . . .  than to be exposed to all the calamities belonging to a Sav-
age life.” In this assessment Indians lived in a catastrophic state of  imperma-
nence and want. Secretary of  War Henry Knox sent a speech the following 
year to Chippewas, Delawares, Miamis, Ottawas, Potawatomis, Wyandots, 
“and all Other tribes residing to the Southward of  the lakes east of  the Missis-
sipi, and to the Northward of  the River Ohio.” The Americans invited them 
to Philadelphia, where the United States sought “the opportunity of  impart-
ing to you, all the blessings of  civilized life.” Such largesse included the chance 
“to cultivate the earth, and raise corn . . .  oxen, sheep and other domestic ani-
mals, to build comfortable  houses, and to educate your  children, so as ever to 
dwell upon the land.” Washington’s message conveyed a threat in case the In-
dians refused his invitation: if  they chose to reject the way of  life he offered, 
he warned, “your doom must be Sealed forever.”26 The United States issued 
threats even when it was incapable of  making good on them; the Western In-
dians would defeat Arthur St. Clair  later in 1791.
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The Western Confederacy rejected the plan. “The  great spirit” gave them 
“land and fill[ed] it with abundance of  wild creatures,” the Wyandots, Otta-
was, Chippewas, Delawares, and Munsees said.27 They did not want to become 
husbandmen  because the  Great Spirit had provided them with animals that 
ensured not only a subsistence but an abundance. They also continued to en-
joy eating British provisions, which helped support them through the West-
ern Confederacy War.  Later, in 1793, the Shawnees would refuse on behalf  
of  the confederacy to negotiate a new boundary with the Americans at San-
dusky. Anthony Wayne met  those Indians in  battle one last time at Fallen Tim-
bers in 1794— and his victory and the subsequent Treaty of  Greenville in 1795 
changed the face of  affairs.
The Treaty of  Greenville, in combination with mid-1790s treaties between the 
United States and  Great Britain and the United States and Spain, enabled the 
government to adopt a less compromising Indian food policy from a position 
of  greater strength.28 During the 1790s and early 1800s, Creek, Cherokee, and 
Iroquois collaborators helped U.S. Indian agents turn the ploughshares of  ag-
riculture into the sword of  victual imperialism. Officials, in response to Indian 
claims about hunger, expanded their victual imperialism to include the intro-
duction of  fixed prices for foodstuffs.  Because Native Americans approved of  
this price- fixing, the U.S. government was also able to standardize methods of  
distributing provisions, and to begin thinking about ways to cut down on the 
quantities of  food they dispensed. By the 1810s  these changes had reduced In-
dian land holdings, circumscribed the amount of  food aid given to Indians 
(who  were portrayed as increasingly hungry), and turned such food aid into a 
weapon that destroyed Native bodies.
U.S. officials could not promote the Plan of  Civilization without help from 
Native collaborators, who advised them on every thing from land cessions to 
Indian tastes— sometimes to the detriment of  other Indians. Hendrick Aup-
aumut aided the Americans in 1793 by telling them about Native food prefer-
ences, but his efforts  were likelier more useful to Americans than they  were 
to Native Americans. It was Aupaumut who suggested that the Americans save 
money by substituting flour instead of  corn “ every fourth day” of  provisions 
distributions to the Iroquois.  There is some evidence that increased wheat con-
sumption was tied to increased risk of  anemia— though, of  course, late- 
eighteenth- century eaters would not have put it in quite  those terms.29
Other Indians facilitated land sales. The U.S. government arranged the 
Treaty of  New York through the cooperation of  Alexander McGillivray. It was 
 because of  McGillivray that Creeks received “a Number of  Ploughs & other 
implements of  husbandry” from James Seagrove. For his part McGillivray 
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secured a spot as a brigadier general in the United States army, as well as the 
right to import tax- free goods through Pensacola, Florida. Although the prac-
tice of  making side deals persisted, the men making them fall into and out of  
the rec ords. Alexander McGillivray died in 1793. By that point in time, Corn-
planter had fallen from power, and Dragging Canoe was also dead.30 New part-
nerships would form as a result of  Benjamin Hawkins’s work with southern 
Indians.
In A Sketch of  the Creek Country in the Years 1798 and 1799, first published in 
1848 by the Georgia Historical Society, U.S. Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins 
described his approach to the Plan of  Civilization and his method of  forging 
collaborative ties with Native Americans. Hawkins’s travels to Indian towns 
to provide instruction in plow use resembled Samuel Kirkland’s methods 
 earlier in the de cade. Like Pickering, he did not want to send Indian  children 
to faraway schools, and he expanded on both Pickering’s and Kirkland’s ideas 
by constructing a model farm. He also distributed provisions. One striking dif-
ference between the southern arm of  the Plan of  Civilization and its north-
ern counterpart was the order in which Hawkins hoped to “convert” Indians: 
he focused on  women first and men second. He theorized that if  he could con-
vince  women to spin they would grow in de pen dent of  their husbands, thus 
forcing Native men to farm to reestablish their wives’ dependence on them. 
Hawkins needed to balance Indian practices, government wishes to reduce the 
cost of  gifted trade goods and provisions, and the maintenance of  peace be-
tween non- Natives and Natives. Hawkins occupied an ambivalent position 
from his post in Indian country: he was an elite white American, but he also 
understood Creek customs better than other officials  because of  his commit-
ment to living with Indians.31
A “well cultivated and planted” fruit and vegetable garden; an orchard of  
peach trees; plans to fence his fields; residence among the Lower Creeks on 
his own farm; his distributions of  provisions when he deemed it suitable:  these 
 were the actions and possessions that Benjamin Hawkins used to bolster his 
authority. He wanted to use his farm “to introduce a regular husbandry to 
serve as a model and stimulus, for the neighboring towns who crowd the 
public shops  here.”32 Hawkins set up his farm in a location where he believed 
the Creeks seemed most likely to seek trade goods and gifts of  food in lieu of  
growing provisions for themselves. He hoped that his garden’s bounty would 
champion farming to the Indians he perceived as idle. His efforts had a better 
chance of  succeeding than Kirkland’s in part  because Hawkins could, by 
growing his own food, also play the role of  a generous host.
It is almost certain that Hawkins, like so many before him, labored  under 
the mistaken belief  that hungry Indians depended on him.  These convictions 
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existed in tension with Hawkins’s realization that the Creeks  were good at feed-
ing themselves. He had gained experience in Indian diplomacy at the Treaty 
of  Colerain, where he became familiar with con temporary assessments of  In-
dians’ appetites. Creeks made an exception in allowing Hawkins to become 
self- sufficient. Usually when they allotted garden plots to the non- Natives who 
lived among them, Creeks controlled the amount of  food residents could grow 
 because they expected men to purchase most of  their produce from Creek 
 women.33 It is pos si ble Hawkins did not know about this limitation.
Sometime in 1798 or 1799, it became clear that the plan to farm by exam-
ple was not winning many followers. Writing in the third person, Hawkins 
stated his doubts “of  succeeding  here in establishing a regular husbandry.” If  
his approach did not gain adherents, Hawkins de cided that he would move 
his farm away from the town, “and aid the villages where success seems to be 
infallible.”34 Previous experience had taught him not to hope for immediate 
victory in altering Indian farming, but he also wrote a backup strategy that 
would fudge the number of  converts by providing aid only to the villages that 
already seemed amenable to Hawkins’s methods. His tactics also borrowed 
from Pickering’s ideas, which provided for the presence of  American Indian 
agents in Native villages as a stopgap against young men relapsing back into 
hunting habits and, more significantly, as a preventative against famine.
 There was no need to implement his backup plan  because he found Indi-
ans who  were willing to work with him. He related varying success in the 
thirty- seven Creek towns he charted on the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers, as 
well as among the Cherokees. He bestowed the most praise on Natives who 
used plows, raised  cattle, and enslaved Africans. The Creek called the Bird Tail 
King, who had mocked the Georgians at Colerain, lived at Hitchetee, where 
he resided on a plantation “well fenced, and cultivated with the plough.” 
Hawkins spent a day with the Bird Tail King in the spring of  1799, bringing “a 
plough completely fixed” and showing him “how to use it.” Hawkins reported 
that the Bird Tail King preferred the plow “over the slow and laborious hand 
hoe.” His description of  a Creek man’s opinion about hoe efficacy transferred 
responsibility for agriculture into male hands. Hawkins seemed happy to see 
that the Bird Tail King’s  family had “more than doubled their crop of  corn and 
potatoes.” They “begin to know how to turn their corn to account, by giving 
it to their hogs,” he wrote. Hawkins also reported that some of  the Chero-
kees “old and young appear to be happy” about the growth of  their farms, 
“vegetables to be had in plenty . . .  bacon, colewarts, and turnips, at several 
 houses,” and an increase in “their stock of  hogs and  cattle.”35
Not only did Hawkins demonstrate his eagerness to live among the Indi-
ans and serve as a visual example of  how to farm; he also traveled to vari ous 
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villages and made sure that Indians used American plows properly, produced 
corn to feed their animals rather than themselves, and grew abundant provi-
sions that Hawkins deemed suitable for Natives. It is in ter est ing to note that 
some of   these crops could not be eaten. Hawkins reported offering Creeks 
“cotton and flax seed” to plant in 1797.36 His reforms reveal the conflicting 
ideas that undergirded U.S. victual imperialism: assumptions that Indians 
would grow edible crops, and expectations that Indians would produce cash 
crops instead of  grains.
It must be remembered that  there was  little reason for Indians to worry 
about what Americans thought of  their food production, and so  there  were 
limits to the extent to which Native Americans proved willing to collaborate. 
Creeks and Cherokees continued raising domesticated animals in ways that 
suited them. One Creek chief, Toolk- au- bat- che Haujo, owned five hundred 
 cattle, but “although apparently very indigent,” observed Hawkins, “he never 
sells any.” Instead, Toolk- au- bat- che Haujo offered “proofs of  unbounded hos-
pitality; he seldom kills less than two large beeves a fortnight, for his friends 
and acquaintances” despite the fact that “The town is on the decline . . .  badly 
fenced . . .  [and] the land is much exhausted with continued culture.” Although 
the town’s soils suffered from depletion, Toolk- au- bat- che Haujo refused to 
sell  cattle for cash, as Hawkins and  others encouraged him to do, and Hawkins 
made no mention of  manure fertilization. Toolk- au- bat- che Haujo slaughtered 
domesticated animals as prestige gifts to obtain and maintain the loyalty of  
other Indians. In other towns Hawkins critiqued Indian animal usage for dif-
fer ent reasons. In describing a village below “Coo- sau- dee,” Hawkins lamented 
the fact that the Indians kept no  cattle and only owned “a few hogs and  horses.” 
Their pig raising did not meet with his approval  either; they used to possess 
“the largest and best breed of  hogs in the nation, but have lost them by care-
lessness or inattention,” he wrote.37
While some southern Indians annoyed U.S. officials by raising livestock in 
irregular ways,  others worried observers by refusing to plant crops as regu-
larly as their non- Native counter parts. Hawkins described the Cussetas, by 
then the largest village of  the Lower Creeks, who “associate, more than any 
other Indians, with their white neighbors.”  These Indians, according to 
Hawkins, “know not the season for planting, or if  they do, they never avail 
themselves of  what they know, as they always plant a month too late.” They 
became “fond of  visiting” the whites nearby, and their young Indians “are more 
rude, more inclined to be tricky, and more difficult to govern, than  those who 
do not associate with them.” Other Indians continued to ask for provisions. 
Creek  women came to Hawkins to ask for corn and salt. They also crept onto 
Hawkins’s fields to steal vegetables such as cabbage.38 Even Lower Creeks, who 
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had in the past enjoyed peaceful relationships with U.S. agents and the coun-
try’s inhabitants, proved reluctant to adopt the Plan of  Civilization in its en-
tirety. Creeks who lived near whites seemed disinclined to farm, and such 
nearness, according to Hawkins, bred rudeness, unruliness, and discontent.
In addition to trying to “reform” Indian agriculture and animal use, Hawkins 
made two other significant changes. First, he began to fix prices for food and 
regulate its sale in response to the Indians who asked him to do so. By 1799 he 
had set the costs of  Indian- produced bacon, beef, butter, capons, cheese, corn, 
eggs, field peas, fowls, ground peas, hickory nut oil, pork, potatoes, and pump-
kins. Whereas before his residency “ there was no market for provisions,” and 
“The wants of  the traders  were few,” he had established “a regular market” 
and instituted a system of  “weights and mea sures.”39 In 1807, he prohibited 
white traders living in town from trading livestock,  because their prices inter-
fered with Indians’ profits. Hawkins observed that Indians themselves had  little 
regard for conventional pricing. He complained that Creeks priced  cattle high 
 because they had been “accustomed to sell fowls, bacon, and beef  at Pensac-
ola, at an extravagant price” and now expected “the same” at home, “making 
no allowance for the expense of  carriage or between the war and peace price 
of  provisions.” Creeks charged lower prices for pork and corn than merchants 
in Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, New York, and Philadelphia around the same 
time period, and they charged more than the market price for summer but-
ter.40
On the one hand, Hawkins’s price- fixing initiatives  were more indicative of  
early modern and colonial moral economies— and thus of  continuity— than 
of  a major transformation in Indian country. When prices favored Creeks, 
Native  women who grew, raised, and prepared most of   these foodstuffs, and 
who competed with the garden produce sold by enslaved Creeks, likely ap-
preciated the fact that Hawkins made it easier for them to sell their food.41 On 
the other hand,  there was change  here too in Indians’ desires to be able to in-
tervene more decisively in price- fixing choices. When prices seemed unusual, 
the autonomous act of  deciding costs prob ably mattered more to Indians than 
profits.
The second major change that Hawkins introduced in the south was a con-
tinuation of  Anthony Wayne’s reform of  U.S. food diplomacy at Greenville, 
which had set a pre ce dent for limiting food aid. Hawkins subsequently reduced 
alcohol distributions at treaties, cut gifts of  trade goods, and insisted upon the 
use of  rations as payment for ser vices rendered. Indian advisors had urged U.S. 
officials to regulate alcohol use at treaties. In 1793, for instance, Hendrick Au-
paumut claimed that “a dram  after each council” would suffice,  because if  
attendees reached the point of  demanding rum by the cask it would not do to 
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refuse them— but the consequences would be dangerous. At a 1797 meeting 
with unidentified southern Indians (prob ably Cherokees), Hawkins described 
receiving an application from the Indians that he “indulge them with a  little 
whiskey.” Hawkins “answered no, not one drop till the business they convened 
on was completely adjusted.” He reported that “ after some hesitation, the 
chiefs agreed that this decision was just” on account of  the injuries “done them 
when in a state of  drunkenness.”42
Anthony Wayne had acted similarly at the Treaty of  Greenville, and  Little 
Turtle would echo this sentiment in 1802, when he asked President Thomas 
Jefferson to prohibit the sale of  liquor not only in Indian camps at treaties but 
also in their towns. Hawkins gave flaxseed and cotton to the Creeks in lieu of  
giving away pre sents. He observed that Indians seemed skeptical about the de-
crease in gift giving. In 1801 he bragged that the Creeks, who used to be “the 
most numerous, proud, haughty and ill behaved Indians in the agency South 
of  Ohio,” changed their ways when he  limited them to one thousand rations 
a year.  These he apportioned “only to use on public business and at the re-
quest of  the agent.” Although “This regulation” of  distributing rations as pay-
ment “was disliked at first,” by 1801 a Creek chief  “ going to the frontiers  will 
come 20 or 30 miles to me to know if  I have any commands which he can ex-
ecute to get an order for provisions.”43
Changes to pricing and diplomacy helped to create a paradoxical food policy 
that characterized Indians as si mul ta neously self- sufficient, needy, and violent. 
 These Indians could agree with Hawkins that drinking alcohol was a  mistake, 
which theoretically paved the way to greater in de pen dence from the United 
States. They also, however, continued to steal “hogs, beef  and  horses”  after be-
ing denied pre sents.44 But whereas during the 1780s and 1790s the U.S. govern-
ment had responded to such contradictions by practicing generous diplomacy, 
its stance on Indian affairs shifted between the late 1790s and early 1810s.
 These efforts constituted an entering wedge that, in the late 1790s, the U.S. 
government used to reduce their food aid to Indians. In 1796 the Americans 
moved into Niagara, announcing as they did so that they would stop feeding 
the Indians who traveled  there. This move to reduce provisions distributions 
affected Indians from Creek country to Iroquois territory. In 1796 Timothy 
Pickering wrote to his successor as secretary of  war— James McHenry— and 
suggested that American generosity had to end. “While the Indian war con-
tinued at the westward, and a British war was apprehended,” he explained, 
“the Government was unceasing in its endeavours to Secure the friendship of  
the Six Nations.” Treaties “ were held and liberal Supplies furnished.” “Now,” 
however, “circumstances are so changed as to render a restriction of  Such Sup-
plies both proper and practicable.” Pickering encouraged McHenry to con-
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fine his bud get to the annuity advanced to the Indians. From  these funds, 
blacksmiths would receive money to forge plows and shoe  horses, and offi-
cials would pay schoolmasters to teach and enforce the art of  American- style 
husbandry. “Provisions and cloathing,” Pickering cautioned, should be “issued 
very Sparingly.” Although he admitted that no one would be able to enact  these 
changes immediately, the Americans could “curtail” the supplies “more and 
more,  until the expenditures come nearly to the fixed annuity.”45
 These trends conformed to broader developments in U.S. policy. Correspon-
dence in the late 1790s reveals the War Department critiquing military com-
manders for holding talks with Indians (which resulted in “ great and 
unnecessary expenditures of  the public provisions”). In May 1800 the U.S. gov-
ernment moved to standardize the distribution of  foodstuffs to Indians. A 
representative from the Ways and Means Committee observed to the House 
of  Representatives that the prices for rations had risen in previous years. Bud-
get makers strug gled to track  these costs. Diff er ent military posts recorded 
their distributions of  provisions for Indians inside the accounts with “the usual 
supply of  army provisions”; no separate account of  Indian rations existed. The 
committee suggested the need for separate accounts so the government would 
“know how much money is expended in this manner.”46 Rations for Indians 
 were to come from military bud gets, but they  were to be kept distinct from 
bud gets for soldiers— and they  were to be distributed by nonmilitary men. This 
was the triumph of  a commodity- exchange economy. The Americans suc-
ceeded where Jeffery Amherst and Frederick Haldimand had failed. The 
feasts, the gifts of  animals, the providing of  food on the way to treaties, and 
even the military rations distributed in larger quantities to Indians than they 
 were to non- Natives became subservient to rations as payment. This was the 
endgame of  Indians’ fight against hunger on their own terms.
The first two de cades of  the 1800s witnessed pan- Indian movements led by the 
Shawnees Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, further fractures in Creek country that 
led to the Red Stick war, and the War of  1812, which revived U.S.- British an-
tagonism. Indian portrayals of  their hunger varied widely during this period. 
During the early 1800s, Indians whom Benjamin Hawkins had convinced to 
farm began selling their surplus produce at the prices he had fixed, rather than 
depositing it for communal crop storage. In July 1805, a Creek called Hopoie 
Mico blamed Hawkins for the death of  two Native girls. “You know this  enemy 
called hunger,” he said, and chastised Hawkins for his inability “to save many of  
our  little ones from being murdered” by it.47 Hawkins was not yet himself  an 
opponent of  the Creeks, but the Creeks  were fighting a proxy war against the 
personified adversary that Hawkins’s policies had helped to create.
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Creeks  were hungry— some  were even  dying of  starvation— but they also 
continued to ignore and embrace hunger in symbolic acts. In 1811 Tecumseh 
had appeared in Creek towns to rally Indians to war against the Americans. In 
August 1812— one month  after the beginning of  the War of  1812— unidentified 
Indians (likely Red Sticks) committed victual warfare. They “Murdered a young 
man[,] . . .  Burnt Several Cabins,” and began “Collecting their  Cattle . . .  to 
drive to the Nation.” It was no  mistake that Tenskwatawa called for a total es-
chewal of  non- Native foodstuffs among Iroquois, Chickamauga, Creek, Dela-
ware, Miami, and Shawnee followers. Alcohol, bread, and the meat of  
domesticated animals became anathema, as did tools forged in the American 
style, such as plows. Tenskwatawa, like the Delaware prophet Neolin before 
him, wanted Indians to return to a diet of  beans, corn, maple sugar, and deer 
meat— the diet of  a semisedentary, hunting  people.48
 These calls did not stop Creeks from eating  cattle, but they ate them only 
when necessary. In addition to stealing  cattle, the Red Sticks also started “to 
destroy the  cattle, hogs, fowls, implements of  husbandry” and to throw “hoes 
and axes into the rivers.”49 Indians sometimes wrecked non- Native foodstuffs, 
sometimes stole them, and sometimes made it difficult to continue produc-
ing them. Supposedly hungry Creeks killed and ate non- Native sources of  meat 
and broke the non- Native tools used to produce crops and prevent hunger. By 
the 1810s Red Stick Creeks implied that Indians should share hunger with each 
other in victual warfare against American victual imperialism and its Native 
collaborators.
In the aftermath of  the War of  1812, federal Indian policy transformed food 
aid into a tool of  destruction. Americans halted their attempts to reduce food 
distributions during the conflict— some 5,257 Indians received provisions at 
American posts in 1814, for example, and a Chippewa speaking for Chippewa, 
Ottawa, Potawatomi, Seneca, and Wyandot Indians in 1815 could still request 
“plenty of  food” and receive it— but this response became unusual. Benjamin 
Hawkins reported Creek complaints that the U.S. government had withheld 
their annual annuity payments in 1812, 1813, and 1814. More significant still 
was that in 1817, Creeks whose annuities had been reinstated and who received 
provisions had to pay for their provisions using part of  that annuity.50 The 
United States had begun to charge for food aid and to use it in a way that en-
couraged Indian indebtedness.  After the War of  1812 the government fi nally 
managed to quantify and standardize the amount of  food required to placate 
Indian allies.
Some American officials even hoped that such provisions would wreak 
havoc on Native bodies. In 1815 Benjamin Stickney, Indian agent at Fort Wayne, 
wrote to the secretary of  war and described the “observations” he “had the 
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opportunity of  making.” Stickney had discovered “that three or four months’ 
full feeding on meat and bread, even without ardent spirit,  will bring on dis-
ease, and, in six or eight months,  great mortality.” Stickney joined Edinburgh 
doctor William Robertson, American Benjamin Rush, Mahican Hendrick Au-
paumut, and other commentators on Native health, but the aims had changed. 
Stickney wanted to sicken Indians rather than keep them healthy. He paused 
long enough to won der  whether it would “be considered a proper mode of  
warfare” to encourage this growth of  disease. But he did not ponder the ques-
tion for long,  because the costs compensated for his moral reservations: 
“more Indians might be killed with the expense of  $100,000 in this way, than 
$1,000,000 expended in the support of  armies to go against them,” he con-
cluded. Even without the destructive effects of  alcohol, the writer could tell 
that wheat and meat had deleterious effects on Indians. By 1822 Stickney was 
a subagent to the Ottawas and earned $500 per year. His appointment, signifi-
cantly, had been made by the War Department— rather than by the president 
or by one of  the more knowledgeable superintendents of  Indian Affairs.51
Stickney was a minor official in the overall structure of  the U.S. government. 
 There does not seem to be correspondence confirming that significant politi-
cians and military strategists took his suggestions seriously. It is, however, in-
structive that Stickney felt comfortable making  these suggestions,  because they 
indicated how far the victual imperialistic aspects of  the Plan of  Civilization 
could be pushed. The answer to the question of   whether Stickney’s strategy 
counted as warfare was irrelevant. Federal Indian agents did not need to offer 
Indians food that killed them off   because they had become power ful enough 
to lie about Indian hunger and to take land in other ways. At the same time 
that the U.S. government began to deemphasize food diplomacy and to dis-
tribute foodstuffs that fostered disease, it acquired Native ground.
Landgrabs may have started as individual state actions, but they gradually 
became federal policy that hungrily consumed Indian land. The states acquired 
territory, to be sure. The Creeks knew Governor Blount of  Georgia as Fusse 
Mico, or the Dirt King. The Cherokees called him the Dirt Captain. But rep-
resentatives for the United States won land cessions from Indians at Fort Stan-
wix in 1784, Fort McIntosh in 1785, Galphinton in 1785, Hopewell in 1785, Fort 
Finney in 1786, Shoulderborne in 1786, Fort Harmar in 1789, New York in 
1790, Holston in 1791, Greenville in 1795, Colerain in 1796, Big Tree in 1797, 
Fort Wilkinson in 1802, Fort Wayne in 1803, Washington in 1805, and at the 
Treaty of  Fort Jackson in 1814.52
Although this was a period of  sweeping policy changes,  these de cades  were 
also characterized by continuity in the form of  Indian re sis tance. In an 1805 
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speech to a Christian missionary at Buffalo Creek, the Seneca Red Jacket of-
fered his interpretation of  early American history.
 There was a time when our forefathers owned this  great island. . . .  The 
 Great Spirit had made it for the use of  Indians. He had created the buf-
falo, the deer, and other animals for food. He had made the bear and 
the beaver. . . .  He had scattered them over the country, and taught us 
how to take them. He had caused the earth to produce corn for bread. . . .  
But an evil day came upon us. Your forefathers crossed the  great  water, 
and landed on this island. Their numbers  were small. They found friends 
and not enemies. . . .  We gave them corn and meat, they gave us poison 
(alluding, it is supposed to ardent spirits) in return. . . .  Yet we did not 
fear them. We took them to be friends. They called us  brothers. We be-
lieved them, and gave them a larger seat. At length their numbers had 
greatly increased. They wanted more land; they wanted our country. . . .  
Wars took place. Indians  were hired to fight against Indians, and many 
of  our  people  were destroyed. They also brought strong liquor amongst 
us. It was strong and power ful, and has slain thousands.53
The history that Red Jacket narrated stood in sharp contrast to the one that 
Timothy Pickering recited to Cornplanter in 1791 and may even explain why 
Red Jacket was so critical of  Pickering’s recitation at the time.54 Pickering’s 
En glishmen  were self- sufficient husbandmen who fed starving Indians. Red 
Jacket’s Indians  were self- sufficient hunters and farmers who offered food to 
starving En glish even when  those invaders asked for land. The man who heard 
this speech assumed that the poison to which Red Jacket referred was liquor—
he glossed poison with the parenthetical phrase “alluding, it is supposed to 
ardent spirits”— but Red Jacket mentioned “strong liquor” as a separate com-
modity a few lines  later.55 It seems likelier that Red Jacket was describing 
 actual poison, which early En glish colonists employed against Indians. Col-
onists, and then white American inhabitants, reciprocated food gifts with poi-
son, land hunger, and eventually war.
By the 1810s the U.S. government had won power over Indians by engag-
ing in victual imperialism— specifically, by implementing the Plan of  Civiliza-
tion: a federal food policy that reduced Indian hunting, encouraged  cattle 
ranching, fixed prices, interfered with grain production, reworked gender roles, 
and reduced food aid. These methods reveal the unrelenting, daily erosion of  
Indian food sovereignty, which occurred alongside American landgrabs. It was 
this interference with Native food systems that facilitated Indian land losses.
Some of   these customs  were more transferable than  others. U.S. Indian 
agents  were not the only  people to practice victual imperialism by fixing prices 
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for food, and Native Americans  were not the only  people to lose the fight 
against hunger  because they lost the authority to fight hunger themselves. 
When black colonists left Nova Scotia, ideas about food laws and hunger pre-
vention traveled with them to Africa. The pro cess of  colonization in Nova Sco-
tia sent  people across the ocean to Sierra Leone with collective ideas about 
the new, less compromising iteration of  British food aid, and about the type 
of  victual imperialism  people practiced by institutionalizing colonial laws. 
Strategies for confronting hunger changed again in Africa. It was access to food 
that would shape black Loyalists’ relationships with white leaders in Sierra Le-
one, it was hunger prevention that would foster their sense of  po liti cal iden-
tity, and it was food laws that would ultimately create conflict with Africans 
and spark a food riot with drastic results.
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Black Loyalist Hunger Prevention 
in Sierra Leone
Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson  were hungry, 
and they  were not alone. In October 1793 their hunger drove them from Free-
town, Sierra Leone, to London,  England. They had lived in Freetown for just 
over a year. Before moving to that small British colony on the upper Guinea 
coast, Anderson and Perkins had been enslaved in Revolutionary South Caro-
lina, where they declared allegiance with their feet by  running to the British 
during the war. Isaac Anderson threw in with the British as early as 1775, and 
in 1776 left for New York with Lord William Campbell. A man named John 
Perkins had enslaved Cato Perkins in Charleston, South Carolina— Perkins 
prob ably ran to the British during the siege of  Charleston and possibly made 
it to New York with General Clinton. Thereafter the two men had lived  free 
in Nova Scotia, before the Sierra Leone Com pany offered them the opportu-
nity to migrate. In Freetown, Anderson, Perkins, and their fellow  free black 
colonists distrusted the white  people who now ruled them. In a move that by-
passed the authority of  their governor, the two men had traveled to  England 
to directly petition the Sierra Leone Com pany. In London, they sent a draft 
of  their petition to John Clarkson, their former governor in Sierra Leone, who 
now lived in  England; they hoped he would listen to them and offer advice 
about approaching the com pany.1
Anderson and Perkins disliked their prospects in Africa. The Freetown col-
ony was faltering, and although they hoped for “Land and [to] be able to make 
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a Crop to support us” before the advent of  “the rainy Season,” the com pany had 
not yet allotted land. This prob lem echoed their experiences in Nova Scotia. 
Then as now, “Health and Life” remained “very uncertain,” and the govern-
ment was hampering their abilities to be useful to themselves and to the col-
ony.2 Their petition would go unanswered; less than a month  later they 
complained to John Clarkson that the Sierra Leone Com pany intended to ig-
nore them without providing “any answer” and instead planned to send them 
“back like Fools” to Freetown. The Sierra Leone Com pany’s decision to treat 
Perkins and Anderson as powerless supplicants would fuel a swift campaign 
that convinced formerly enslaved black colonists to advocate for the right to 
prevent their own hunger as po liti cal insiders in Sierra Leone.3
From 1792 to 1800 Freetown’s black colonists— also referred to hereafter 
as “black Loyalists” and “Nova Scotians”— won several  battles in the fight 
against black hunger.4 The Nova Scotians arrived in Africa in 1792 imbued with 
a sense of  how to use food laws to exert dominance, and within half  a de cade 
they had learned to behave as British subjects entitled to enforce that power. 
Whereas in Nova Scotia white Loyalists’ food laws had controlled former bond-
people’s access to food, in Sierra Leone black colonists gained the right to 
enact their own antihunger rules, which white colonists uniformly approved, 
beginning in 1793.  These Nova Scotians fought famine first by regulating their 
trade in alcohol, bread, fish, and meat.  Later, the black Loyalists tried to regu-
late the trade of  Africans, particularly Susu and Temne.  These laws enabled 
former victual warriors to try to become victual imperialists by altering Afri-
can food sales while occupying African land. This attempt failed  because vio-
lent Temne and Susu reactions to colonists’ price- fixing encouraged white 
councilmen in Sierra Leone to curtail black Loyalist lawmaking;  those coun-
cilmen would  later try to interfere with Africans’ trade.
Black Loyalists won impor tant victories, but they lost the war, which was 
a shorter, more condensed affair than the conflict Native Americans had 
fought. Indians had been fighting the war against hunger before colonists ar-
rived in North Amer i ca in the fifteenth  century, preventing famine with ex-
tensive crop production and seasonal hunting. The black colonists  were 
latecomers to autonomous hunger- prevention efforts; during the colonial pe-
riod their cash- crop production had fed white slave masters, who regulated 
when, what, and how enslaved  people ate, and during the war self- liberated 
bondpeople’s roles as victual warriors largely focused on dealing with white 
hunger. Formerly enslaved  people had witnessed the po liti cal power of  
food laws during the 1780s in Nova Scotia, but  these Nova Scotians had not 
won the right to in de pen dently pass legislation. They gained that right in 
Sierra Leone.
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In the space of  eight years, power waxed and waned as black Loyalists 
claimed, exercised, and lost their right to legislate against hunger at the end 
of  the eigh teenth  century— and suffered the dramatic, violent consequences. 
In September 1800 black colonists in Freetown engaged in an event that re-
sembled early modern food riots, with one exception: black colonists pro-
tested in 1800 not to urge the government to fix food prices, but to reclaim 
their right to fix prices and address hunger themselves. Their riotous actions 
in 1800 began with price- fixing, and this decision was not diff er ent from the 
previous few years. But between 1796 and 1800— once tensions appeared 
between black colonists and Africans— white officials who had grown anx-
ious about black colonists’ power had tried to limit black price- fixing. Other 
food riots began when officials could not protect the rights of  ordinary 
 people, but in Sierra Leone black colonists had already earned the po liti cal 
and  legal power to prevent hunger. The 1800 event was also notable  because 
white officials misrepresented it as a significant break with past be hav ior. 
They called it a “rebellion” rather than a riot, which made it seem as if  the 
previous de cade of  black Loyalist petitioning and lawmaking had been ille-
gitimate. Black colonists lost power as white officials seized control of  the 
historical narrative.
This par tic u lar historical narrative has multiple beginnings and a sprawling 
chronology that stretches before and  after the years of  the Revolutionary 
War. It begins with enslaved  people’s lack of  access to food during the colo-
nial period, their flight to the British during the Revolutionary War, their re-
emergence as  free victual warriors, and their escape from the former 
American colonies. It begins in Nova Scotia, where, during the late 1780s, 
British failures to apportion land, coupled with restrictive food laws, moti-
vated discontented black colonists to leave Nova Scotia. It begins in London, 
where a group of  British reformers examined their most recent failure to 
build an antislavery colony on the upper Guinea coast: the Granville Town 
colony settled by London’s Black Poor ( people of  African descent who mi-
grated to London in the last quarter of  the eigh teenth  century). That last 
group of  colonists had reckoned with hunger in London itself  during the 
harsh winters of  1784–1785 and 1785–1786. Their experiences with food aid 
resembled David George’s: charitable bakers in London used private funding 
to bake quarter loaves of  bread for them.5
It begins in Africa, on the upper Guinea coast itself. The Granville Town 
colonists  there  were victims of  the same sort of  bad planning that character-
ized settlement in Nova Scotia. Olaudah Equiano, the former slave and anti-
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slavery writer, lived in London before the Granville Town colonists’ departure 
and worked as a government commissary. He reported “the flagrant abuses 
committed by the agent,” Joseph Irwin, who was in charge of  making provi-
sions arrangements for the emigrants. Such corruption impeded migration. 
The first Granville Town colonists sailed from  England to the upper Guinea 
coast in the spring of  1787. Once  there they obtained land from an African 
subruler, a Temne man named King Tom (also known as Pa Kokelly).6 They 
died in huge numbers from disease. In 1789 they sealed their fate by goading 
a passing ship into burning the town of  another leader named King Jimmy. 
Jimmy gave the colonists three days to vacate and torched the town to cin-
ders, scattering the colonists.7
The first colonists’ experiences demonstrated the uncertain success of  co-
lonial proj ects and emphasized to the Sierra Leone Com pany that new colo-
nists would require more government structure and careful planning to thrive. 
When a thousand black colonists, led by the Reverend John Clarkson, sailed 
from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone in January 1792, they landed at the former 
Granville Town colony. They renamed it  Free Town, which became Freetown. 
They built Freetown in the shadow of  mountains that appeared “to rise grad-
ually from the sea to a stupendous height, richly wooded and beautifully or-
namented.” David George, who with the majority of  his Baptist congregation, 
sailed on one of  the ships in a voyage that took seven weeks, wrote that one 
of  the mountains “appeared like a cloud to us.” Boston King also undertook 
the voyage with his wife, Violet, who caught “a putrid fever” and died at the 
start of  April, less than a month  after the  couple arrived.8
During  these early years, hungriness characterized colonists’ existence; they 
tried to avoid it but also came to expect it during certain months. The name 
“Sierra Leone” came from a Portuguese term meaning “lion mountain”—so 
named to denote the sound of  thunder during the seasonal rains. The rainy 
season began in May or June, visited daily downpours on the colony  until Au-
gust, and decreased by September or October. During that time it became 
tricky to produce crops and shelter animals. That summer of  1792 was said to 
be “One of  the wettest rainy seasons in West African history.” In addition, colo-
nists worried about the aggressive predators surrounding the colony. It was not 
uncommon for large leopards to carry off livestock, such as goats, but small 
insects also posed huge prob lems. When he was governor in 1796, Zachary 
Macaulay awakened at two in the morning to find that “an army of  black 
Ants . . .  had Spread over the  whole room, blackening the walls, the floor & the 
bed Curtains.”  These pests wreaked havoc on poorly constructed structures for 
storing food, and two of  the colonists burned their  house down  after a failed 
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attempt to eradicate them.9 Unstable relations with Africans, council corrup-
tion, and storage issues resulted in additional provisioning prob lems.
By the eigh teenth  century the upper Guinea coast was populated by 
Limba, Bullom, Temne, Baga, Loko, Susu, Mandingo, Koranko, and Fula 
 peoples. Beginning in 1727 the Fula extended their dominance from Fouta 
Djallon coastward, subjecting the  peoples of  the Nunez River and the Susu 
of  the Pongo River to a tributary alliance. This expansion was driven by a ji-
had, which started as a reaction against the slave trade and as an attempt to 
spread Islam but gradually became bound up in the economies and politics of  
Carl Bernhard Wadström, “A General Sketch of the Harbour of Sierra Leona, pointing out the 
Situation of the New Colony,” in An essay on colonization, particularly applied to the western coast 
of Africa, with some  free thoughts on cultivation and commerce; also brief descriptions of the 
colonies already formed, or attempted, in Africa, including  those of Sierra Leone and Bulama 
(London: Printed for the author, by Darton and Harvey, 1794–1795). Courtesy of the Library 
Com pany of Philadelphia.
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slavery. Mande and Fula marabouts, or learned men, also spread Islam peace-
fully throughout Sierra Leone.10
By 1792 Freetown’s colonists interacted most frequently (and sometimes 
aggressively) with the Temne. The Koya Temne lived along the coast of  Free-
town and further inland, where they ran into the Masimera Temne. To the 
north of  the Masimera  were the Marampa Temne, and to the south  were the 
Yoni Temne. Many Susu intermarried with the Temne and settled peacefully 
among them. The Bai Farma was the top Temne ruler and governed at Ro-
baga. The Naimbana, whom the British called King Naimbana, ruled from Ro-
bana and was next in the hierarchy. The Sierra Leone Council obtained land 
from him, which Naimbana viewed as a rental but which Sierra Leone coun-
cilmen believed was a permanent purchase.11  These obstacles blocked black 
colonists’ abilities to grow crops and fueled resentment against Africans.
At first a few white men  were responsible for the colony’s internal and ex-
ternal policies and relations. The colony’s all- white council not only strug gled 
with the Temne but fought among themselves. British- Temne relations  were 
often tense and characterized by mutual suspicion. At one point Temne lead-
ers even accused a British sailor of  poisoning one of  Naimbana’s sons, Henry 
Granville Naimbana, with a cup of  chamomile tea. Alexander Falconbridge, 
a white slave ship surgeon turned abolitionist, complained that the Sierra Le-
one Com pany chose John Clarkson over him as superintendent. Falconbridge 
likely died of  alcoholism. Falconbridge’s wife, Anna Maria, remarked that of  
the remaining councilmen, “never  were characters worse adapted to manage 
any purpose of  magnitude.”12
Upon landing in Africa, Clarkson discovered that Governor Henry Dalrym-
ple had defected to found a rival colony at Bulama, so he took charge. As su-
perintendent, however, Clarkson possessed no further power over fellow 
council members Dr. John Bell (physician), James Cocks (surveyor), Richard 
Pepys (works engineer), Charles Taylor (doctor), John Wakerell (storekeeper), 
and James Watt (plantation man ag er). Bell drank heavi ly and died in mid- 
March; Cocks possessed  little practical experience; Pepys was a poor planner 
and unwilling to accept advice; and Taylor proved uninterested in tending to 
the sick. Councilmen allowed themselves extra food and liquor while the rest 
of  the colonists ate reduced rations, and they sold ship’s stores to Africans in-
stead of  distributing them. By March 1792 provisions  were slim, and in April 
colonists  were eating half  rations. In May, Clarkson, with dismay, reported 
 people “ dying for want of  food.” Only in mid-1792 did John Clarkson convince 
the Sierra Leone Com pany to name him governor.13
Other hunger- prevention initiatives in the colony relied on inconsistent ship-
ping patterns, which  were sometimes inhibited by the maritime activities of  
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noncolonists. From 1792 to 1801 the Sierra Leone Com pany sent at least sixty- 
seven ships to obtain produce along the coast, and between 1795 and 1801 at 
least ten vessels brought produce into Freetown, but over half  of  the out going 
voyages took place early on, in 1793. When corrupt officials could procure sup-
plies, they possessed no place to put them. Ships strug gled to land on the rocky 
shore. When American vessels provided beef, molasses, and pork, the casks 
washed away in the tide. John Clarkson complained that careless storage of  
“damaged cheese and biscuits, with other articles in a state of  putrefaction” 
created “a stench” around the shoddily built store house that mingled with 
the slurry of  rot “allowed to lie and soak into the ground.” The French as-
saulted Freetown in September 1794 (a result of  the French Revolutionary 
Wars), uprooted crops, killed one person, and wounded four. This strike was 
significant on its own merit for destroying supplies, but during the attack the 
Bai Farma also captured several colony ships, which further impeded ocean-
going capabilities. Fishing may have become dangerous  after the French at-
tack, and colonists who had witnessed the circumscription of  fishing activities 
in Nova Scotia would have found the situation familiar. Freetown’s officials, 
by taking an antislavery stance and harboring runaways, also risked conflict 
with the African headmen who supplied the colony with food.14
Colonists traded with Africans through coastal, riverine, and overland 
routes but had  little control over what they received. The caravan trade linked 
to the interior brought  cattle, gold, ivory, and enslaved Africans to the coast; 
the trade on the coast exchanged salt and kola nuts for meat and interior 
trade goods; and the one across the ocean required enslaved African bodies in 
exchange for guns and manufactures. The landlord- stranger relationship un-
dergirded trade in the region. Landlords  were African elites, and strangers 
 were Eu ro pean, Euro- African, or African foreign residents. Landlords lodged 
and fed caravans, served as brokers, and provided commercial information 
and credit. Trade alliances  were bound up in other networks of  kinship, age 
groups, royal re distribution cir cuits, and secret socie ties (or power associa-
tions: the Poro for men and the Sande for  women), which the Fula estab-
lished in Temne territory. The Sierra Leone Com pany had, since 1791, tried 
to enter the currents of  riverine trade, which supplied goods to the Nunez 
and Pongo traders. This strategy took two approaches: officials tried to open 
negotiations with the Fula in Fouta Djallon to get them to divert commerce 
from the Pongo and Nunez to Freetown, and they tried to set up trading set-
tlements at caravan terminals and to manipulate prices, which would give 
them control of  legitimate commerce (trade in goods not associated with 
slavery).15
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 These trade networks yielded vari ous provisions from the Africans who 
remained in control. Crucial upland- variety rice came via merchants from 
the Sherbro and Fouta Djallon, kola nuts from between Cape Mount and 
the Sierra Leone estuary, and salt (for preserving meat) from tide pools in the 
region north of  Freetown. The Bullom Shore, on the northern estuary of  
the Sierra Leone River, provided rice and sugar for a  limited time, before a 
wage disagreement between the Sierra Leone Council and the Bullom ended 
the arrangement. By October 1792, as many as 150  people “of  the Timmany 
nation” came daily bearing bananas, cassava, limes, oranges, pineapples, and 
plantains. “Timmanies, Bullams, [and] Mandingoes” also provided rice, yams, 
and livestock.16
 Because food from Africans arrived via distant networks and required daily 
replenishing, colonists also tried to avoid scarcity by consuming Sierra Leone 
Com pany rations and eventually growing their own produce. The Sierra Le-
one Com pany had planned for colonists to receive “full Provisions for three, 
and half  Provisions for three other Months.” The British government had 
promised the white Loyalists who went to Nova Scotia six months of  full pro-
visions (and six months of  half  provisions for  children), so it seems probable 
that colonial planners thought that  people of  African descent  were somehow 
engineered to survive on less food. They  were not. During the colony’s first 
two and a half  years, the Sierra Leone Com pany said that it spent £20,000 on 
provisions.17 Although it is difficult to find precise descriptions of  black Loyal-
ists’ rations, partial data can be compared to other con temporary figures, such 
as  those for the white Loyalists in Nova Scotia, returns for the British military, 
and settlement plans for the Jamaican Maroons who arrived in Sierra Leone 
in late 1800.
Consumption estimates changed with the weather. In the  middle of  the 
rainy season, August 1793, Zachary Macaulay said that colonists could con-
sume half  a ton of  rice per day. By September, when the population stood at 
1,052 (995 black men and  women and 57 whites), he thought that slightly more 
than a third of  a ton of  rice was eaten daily. Using the higher figure, each mem-
ber of  the population would have eaten .95 pound of  rice per day; using the 
lower estimate, each would have consumed two thirds of  a pound.18 This quan-
tity of  rice was commensurate with rations for British soldiers and the Ma-
roons who arrived from Nova Scotia in 1800, suggesting that additional 
similarities prob ably existed in the quantities of  meat, flour, and alcohol that 
black Loyalists received. From the Maroons’ rations one could guess that black 
Loyalist  children received no meat in their ration despite the fact that the com-
pany had originally planned that they would. When John Clarkson reduced 
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rations, meat supplies decreased, and men lost their flour, but  women and 
 children retained it.  People grew supplemental fruits and vegetables on the 
land they  were able to obtain from the Temne.
Once the 1792 rainy season passed, the surviving colonists produced and 
stored beans, cabbages, cassava, cresses, ground nuts, maize, pumpkin, purs-
lane, rice, tropical fruits, sweet potatoes, and yams. They raised fowls and hogs 
and hung “beef  and pork” for smoking. John Clarkson described their craze 
“for building boats” and their intention to fish. By 1795 the Sierra Leone Council 
was trying to encourage black colonists to grow certain crops and raise cer-
tain animals— cabbages, cassava, Guinea, Indian, and Barbary corn, sugarcane, 
yams, pigs, and  cattle— but colonists themselves also retained a say in how 
they fed themselves.19
Colonists’ efforts to build a better food system began with personal nego-
tiations with John Clarkson during his superintendency and then governor-
ship. The Nova Scotians pushed Clarkson to regulate the sale and distribution 
of  foodstuffs. Thomas Peters, who had successfully petitioned for the colo-
nists’ relocation from Nova Scotia and for the 1791 distribution of  Christmas 
beef, became a vocal critic of  Clarkson and tried to put himself  in charge. Pe-
ters lost the authority to challenge the provisioning situation  after someone 
accused him of  stealing food— “Some hams & other articles of  Diet”— from 
a dead man who had owed him money. This confrontation resolved itself  when 
Peters died of  a fever in June of  1792. Although some colonists, like Peters, 
sometimes clashed with John Clarkson, their negotiations  were characterized 
more by accommodation than by conflict. “The  people are full of  complaints 
at the method of  serving their provisions; some of  them getting too much, 
 others too  little, and some nothing at all,” Clarkson observed in April 1792. 
“The applications to me from such  people are very distressing, for I have not 
the comforts they require,” he worried.20
Colonists urged Clarkson to consider ways to ameliorate the situation. In 
August, Nova Scotians again petitioned Clarkson and complained “of  the ex-
travagant charge made by the fishermen”— their fellow colonists in Freetown. 
They made this complaint before the French attack in 1794, at a time when 
the fishing was good. Clarkson solved the prob lem by meeting with one Rob-
ert Horton, making him promise to lower prices and to sell fish within the 
colony “before he offered them for sale to other  people.”21 This compromise 
established mi grants’ ability to challenge prices, led to additional regulation 
in distribution patterns (sales to colonists now took pre ce dence over sales to 
outsiders), and enabled the Nova Scotians to broaden access to fish harvests. 
It also increased black mi grants’ po liti cal participation by giving them some 
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say in colonywide food regulations, which in turn opened the door to addi-
tional interventions in Freetown’s food system.
Clarkson was willing to address black Loyalists’ complaints by instituting 
fixed prices, but he decried the Sierra Leone Com pany’s rationing. He argued 
that “vice and  every species of  wickedness and discontent are spreading in the 
colony from so many  people living together, having nothing to do, and their 
provisions found them.” He thought it wrong that lazy colonists knew they could 
expect provisions, though he admitted that the prob lem existed  because land 
distributions had stalled. Boston King might have agreed with Clarkson, who 
seemed to be saying that  people should work to receive charitable food assis-
tance. Clarkson changed the com pany’s provisioning structure by requiring 
 people to  labor for food. In May 1792, at a time when  people  were  dying from 
hunger, he set wages at two shillings per day. Every one had to work two days 
out of  the week, and colonists bought full rations for six pence or half  rations 
for three pence.22  Because it was difficult to obtain money from anyone ex-
cept com pany officials, Clarkson’s decision meant that  those who refused to 
work could not buy rations, and even  those who did work  were still expected 
to pay to feed themselves.
The Nova Scotians seized the first opportunity to refine Clarkson’s system 
of  exchanging  labor for rations; their actions signaled more readiness to insti-
tutionalize their food- related rights. When in November 1792 Clarkson halved 
rations, Nova Scotian John Strong proposed that if  Clarkson did not possess 
enough stored provisions, he and  others would “work one day for the half  rai-
sions” rather than the two days originally mandated. Clarkson could pay the 
remaining wages in com pany credit, Strong said. Other black Loyalists argued 
that if  Clarkson decreased their provisions he should reduce their workload 
and warned that a failure to do so would create conflict. They indicated that 
Clarkson had commodified their  labor by fixing a price for food, and that a 
change in work conditions mandated an adjustment to the cost of  provisions. 
Clarkson, who worried that extra pay would encourage drunkenness, com-
promised by crediting each Loyalist’s account.23
 These agreements in 1792 established significant standards.  People learned 
that their abilities to fight hunger fluctuated with the rainy season, the avail-
ability of  ships, trade with Muslim merchants and the Temne, Susu, and Bul-
lom who provided provisions, and Nova Scotians’ abilities to produce and store 
meat and vegetables and to fix prices for fish and  labor. Although colonists 
sometimes critiqued John Clarkson’s policies, he was willing to work with 
them to modify the food system. Together they fixed food prices, managed 
distribution networks, and readjusted rates of  working for food. Colonists also 
requested the right to sit on juries. Clarkson sailed for London in Decem-
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ber 1792, planning to return, but the Sierra Leone Com pany fired him— shortly 
before his wedding— when he was in  England. Governorship would pass back 
and forth between several new officials. From afar, Clarkson received word that 
by January land surveying had ceased, and “ there [was] neither beef, Pork, 
flower or any kind of  provision sufficient to last the colony a week.”24 When 
Cato Perkins and Isaac Anderson approached Clarkson in 1793, he may have 
possessed the desire to help them, but he had no authority to do it. Neverthe-
less, his governorship had taught colonists to demand freedom from scarcity.
When food shortages continued, the Nova Scotians traveled to London, wrote 
letters and petitions, and then pushed for greater repre sen ta tion.25 In 1792, the 
Freetown government changed to include elected positions that came with the 
right to legislate against hunger, and representatives began  doing so in 1793. 
The act of  fixing prices became one of  colonists’ most effective hunger- avoiding 
strategies, which offered the additional benefit of  enlarging colonists’ po liti-
cal rights. Given the fact that  humans must eat to survive, laws about food 
would have pervaded po liti cal participation in the colony on a daily, visceral 
level.  These regulations, which granted more freedom to black Loyalists, also 
created conflict with the Temne and Susu by interfering with their food sys-
tem. Black Loyalists, in trying and failing to become victual imperialists, pre-
cipitated conflict with Africans, clashes with the white Sierra Leone Council, 
and, ultimately, a riot in 1800.
 After John Clarkson left Freetown, William Dawes became governor. Even 
some white colonists thought that this leadership change boded poorly. Anna 
Maria Falconbridge contrasted his “austere, reserved conduct” with Clarkson’s 
“sweet manners,” and his “rigid military education” left  little room for flexi-
bility. Dawes was not widely liked, and colonists lost faith in his ability to rep-
resent them. When in October 1793 the colonists went over Dawes’s head 
and sent Isaac Anderson and Cato Perkins to London to make their petition, 
the men talked about po liti cal economy.26
In addition to highlighting the absence of  land and their inability to grow 
crops, the colonists complained about their lack of  control over prices. They 
associated this disorder with debt and slavery, just as they had in Nova Scotia. 
The com pany store charged “extortionate” prices, they complained. Perkins 
and Anderson stated that Governor Dawes dishonestly “put thirty Gals. of   water 
into a Peck of  rum . . .  & then [sold] it to us for a Shilling a Galln. more than we 
ever paid before.” Anna Maria Falconbridge confirmed that Dawes was exert-
ing his control over “almost  every kind of  provisions in the neighbourhood.” 
“We must  either get into debt or be starved,” Clarkson recorded the Nova Sco-
tians saying. In 1794 the colonists wrote that in Clarkson’s absence they had 
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dubbed Freetown “A town of  Slavery.”27 The black Loyalists accused Dawes 
not only of  withholding their right to set prices, but also of  setting unfair prices 
himself. Falconbridge’s observations suggested that this tendency extended be-
yond rum to encompass other edible commodities. Black colonists argued 
that they faced an unwelcome choice: they could go into debt by paying exor-
bitant prices, or they could go hungry. Their petition foreshadowed new ef-
forts to legally combat famine.
Vari ous white leaders disliked many of  the would-be famine fighters. But 
Freetown was an antislavery colony, and even if  white officials complained 
about some black mi grants, they had to reconcile their feelings with reform-
ers’ mission to establish a home where formerly enslaved  peoples could 
become self- governing— thus convincing observers that freed slaves would 
not become useless. At one point in 1796 Zachary Macaulay might have writ-
ten a thesaurus entry on disagreeable  people. He described elected black rep-
resentatives as “artful,” “busy, bold, & blind,” “disaffected,” “factious,” “hot,” 
“ignorant,” “irresolute,” “noisy,” “passionate,” “pestilent,” “Selfish,” “timid,” 
and “void of  princi ple.”  These men came to office  because abolitionist Gran-
ville Sharp, in discussions about the first Sierra Leone colony settled by the 
Black Poor, had proposed a system of  colonial self- governance.  After 1792 
Governor Dawes and Zachary Macaulay implemented a similar system by 
encouraging colonists to elect representatives.  These men, called Hundre-
dors and Tythingmen, appear in council minutes in December 1792.  Every 
ten  house holders formed a tithing,  every ten tithings formed a hundred, ten 
freeholders elected a Tythingman, and  every ten Tythingmen elected a Hun-
dredor. Collectively, the Hundredors and Tythingmen proposed regulations 
that the Sierra Leone Council usually approved, even in 1793, when Ander-
son and Perkins petitioned the Sierra Leone Com pany, and throughout 1796, 
when Macaulay complained about elected legislators.28
As the black Loyalists continued to experience scarcity, they bound the  legal 
system more firmly to the food system. Evidence of  black colonists’ interven-
tion became vis i ble in the courts, where colonists had won the right to sit on 
juries. By 1793, when three white sailors came on shore and “killed a duck be-
longing to one of  the Settlers,” the thieves  were tried “by Judge McAuley and 
a Jury of  twelve blacks.” The jury sentenced one man to a lashing and imposed 
fines on the other two. Although the master of  the sailors’ ship dubbed the 
court “a mockery on all law and justice,” one of  the sailors was nevertheless 
“whipped by a black man.” Had the black Loyalists remained in the United 
States, they would have been disallowed from holding office or serving on ju-
ries.29 In Freetown, they enjoyed both of   these rights. The incident’s focus on 
poultry was significant, first,  because it punished an attack on edible poultry, 
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and second,  because it played out in the sort of   legal space that had previously 
worked against black colonists in Nova Scotia.
Less than a year  after taking office, in 1793, the Hundredors and Tything-
men enacted food laws that regulated the prices of  black Loyalist– produced 
commodities, and they tried to control Africans’ abilities to sell meat in the 
colony.  These legislators  were not reacting to or battling the state; they  were 
working with and helping to constitute the government. Having witnessed 
Clarkson and then Dawes fixing prices during their governorships, the black 
Loyalists asked their Hundredors and Tythingmen to set colonywide prices 
for bread and meat, and to control alcohol distribution, just as white colonists 
had done when fighting hunger in Nova Scotia. In 1793, the Hundredors and 
Tythingmen, with the Sierra Leone Council’s approval, proposed laws that 
standardized prices for beef, goat, pork, and sheep mutton. Zachary Macau-
lay had conducted experiments with colonist Pompey Young to price bread at 
three pence in 1794, but a 1795 resolution of  the Hundredors and Tything-
men introduced additional regulations that raised the price to four pence half  
penny per pound. When the Hundredors and Tythingmen proposed fining 
anyone in the colony convicted of  selling liquor or wine without a license, the 
governor and council went so far as to deem their resolution “highly proper 
& expedient” before passing it. By this point in time, black Loyalists and white 
councilmen  were collaborating to build the colony’s food system.30
By 1795 black Loyalists’ food laws also aimed to control the prices of  edi-
ble goods that Africans brought into the colony, thus prompting conflict— 
despite initial good relations.31 In 1795, the Hundredors and Tythingmen 
recommended that the governor and council “issue an order to prevent strang-
ers selling Meat in the Colony by Retail.” Susu men had brought “some fine 
 Cattle” into Freetown but refused to sell them  unless the Nova Scotians al-
lowed them “to kill them and sell them out by the Pound.” The Nova Sco-
tians did “not think that is proper” and requested “that no strangers or  People 
that doth not belong to the Colony should bring live stock  here and kill them.”32 
In this context, “by Retail” meant sales of  prebutchered meat— likely  cattle and 
goats slaughtered according to Muslim dietary laws. Colonists wanted the Susu 
to sell only live animals  because it became difficult to regulate prices for butch-
ered meat.
The Nova Scotians’ use of  the word strangers evoked and also revised the 
landlord- stranger relationship. Within Sierra Leone, Temne elite offered pro-
tection as landlords of  British and Nova Scotian strangers. At the same time 
that Freetown’s residents  were strangers, early Muslim immigrants in Free-
town  were also strangers. Africans initially implemented the landlord- stranger 
relationship to allow foreigners to influence African social structures in ways 
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that fostered accommodation and assimilation rather than control.33 By call-
ing Susu traders “strangers,” the Nova Scotians claimed landlord status over 
them, but in passing a regulation that ignored strangers’ food practices, they 
refused to compromise. It is clear that the council voiced no objections.
It is difficult to know what Loyalists intended by enacting  these laws. 
Maybe they meant to try to exercise power by claiming the  legal muscle de-
nied to them in Canada, and maybe they only wanted to avoid hunger. So 
much of  their intentions remains unrecoverable from the archival rec ord; his-
torians can only turn to African reactions to understand the laws’ effects. In 
the late 1790s Temne words and actions indicate dissatisfaction. In 1798 a 
ruler named King Tom— likely a diff er ent leader than the first King Tom as-
sociated with Granville Town colonists— appeared at a palaver (or meeting) 
and claimed that Zachary Macaulay “had spoiled the Country . . .  by lower-
ing the Price of  Produce.” He cited the decreased cost of  rice and argued 
“that if  Mr. Macaulay wished to do good to the Country, he must again give 
the same.” Macaulay refused and was told that he had to agree or leave the 
country. Macaulay “could not do the one, nor yet would he do the other,” 
and so King Tom “departed in  great Anger.” It is unclear  whether prices  really 
had decreased. The colony could not have retained much control over prices 
outside of  Freetown, given their de pen dency on African trade networks for 
food. In 1802, Freetown suffered  because slave ship captains  were demanding 
high prices for produce.34 Macaulay’s interaction with King Tom thus be-
comes difficult to explain, but the impor tant point is that King Tom held the 
colony responsible for shifting prices.
Other incidents indicate additional, more widespread conflict between col-
onists and Africans. In 1797 Macaulay reported a  great “Mortality among the 
Settlers hogs.” No one could detect a cause  until an unidentified “Native was 
caught in the very act of  laying Ratsbane enclosed in Cassada near some Hogs, 
evidently for the purpose of  killing them.” Macaulay speculated that had the 
man succeeded, “the Natives wd. have . . .  begged the dead body of  the owner, 
and thus have had a Supply of  fresh meat at very  little expence.” It is pos si ble 
that the poisoner planned to sell the carcass back to the colonists. In 1798 a 
storekeeper in Freetown reported “that Several of  the Com pany’s  cattle had 
recently dis appeared.” He conjectured “from vari ous circumstances it was 
probable they had been drawn into the woods by Natives &  there Slaugh-
tered.”35 Africans drew suspicion when domesticated  cattle went missing, 
suggesting a larger history of  animal theft and reciprocal mistrust. Perhaps 
colonists wanted to disallow Temne sales  because they possessed no way to 
identify stolen animals if  the animals  were already dead, and perhaps fears 
about contaminated produce prompted regulations about meat sales.
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Black Loyalists aimed  these food regulations at Africans during a time when 
they sought Temne land, which raises the question of   whether their reform 
of  Freetown’s food system involved victual imperialism. Africans’ poisoning 
and theft of  animals certainly counted as victual warfare. In Nova Scotia vict-
ual imperialism  limited black colonists’ access to food and land; in Sierra Le-
one  those mi grants tried to become victual imperialists themselves. Black 
Loyalists in Freetown prevented their own hunger by controlling access to 
food, which involved self- regulation— but it also involved attempting to regu-
late African food distribution while living in Temne territory. As Nova Scotians 
became dissatisfied with their lands on the coast of  Freetown and built into 
the mountains, they encroached on Temne lands. As late as 1798 the Nova Sco-
tians complained that  because “the land allotted to them” was “Still the Sub-
ject of  dispute with King Tom, they  were wholly deprived of  the means of  
engaging in cultivation.”36 Therefore it might be said that the Temne resisted 
black Loyalist victual imperialism by maintaining control of  land, while both 
Temne and Susu  people used victual warfare to push back against black Loy-
alists’ animal regulations. The Nova Scotians strug gled to be effective imperi-
alists not only  because the Susu and Temne objected to black Loyalists’ food 
laws, but also  because the Sierra Leone Council began to ignore them too.
When Temne- Nova Scotian conflict became obvious in the late 1790s, the 
Sierra Leone Council  stopped approving of  the Hundredors’ and Tythingmen’s 
laws and scaled back the self- governance that legitimized black Loyalists’ hunger 
prevention. An encounter in December 1796 pre sents one of  the first instances 
of  a white official challenging an elected black Loyalist’s policies. Zachary Ma-
caulay described his discovery of  Hundredor Ishmael York “Selling rum to the 
Natives at . . .  a Sixpence more [per] Gallon from Natives.” York argued that “He 
did not See why any one Shd. interfere in his trade with the natives.” Macaulay, 
unmoved by York’s logic, revoked his liquor license.37 York was implying that 
colonists should enjoy more preferential prices than Africans. In his meeting 
with Macaulay York specifically averred his right to fix his own prices— though 
he did not attempt to introduce this price differentiation as a colonywide law. 
York would join the group of  men who in 1800 became protestors.
Not only did the Sierra Leone Council curtail black Loyalists’ abilities to 
set prices; it also  stopped enforcing Nova Scotian animal codes. “Many  cattle 
belonging to the Colony  were killed by the Natives” in 1799. When some of  
the culprits had been identified, “a serious complaint was made to King Tom, 
who promised redress.” Before he could remedy the  matter, however, “another 
Cow . . .  was stolen in the same manner.” In an act of  Nova Scotian– imposed 
justice, the colonists “armed themselves, went in to King Tom’s Territory,” and 
seized several suspects. Governor Thomas Ludlum reported that King Tom 
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gained “an advantage” by capturing three colonists and then arguing that the 
council’s lack of  consent for colonists’ actions negated his obligation to pay 
for the animals. Councilmen sought no reparation, and indeed Ludlum’s re-
port of  the incident indicated a growing divide between the council and the 
Nova Scotians with re spect to their ideas about government.38
It seems likely that colonists used extralegal vio lence to solve the  matter 
 because they doubted the council’s willingness to administer their laws. This 
was not just an episode of  one white councilman forbidding a Nova Scotian 
politician to charge what he wanted; it was a rec ord of  disintegrating coopera-
tion between black citizens and the council. The most persuasive explanation 
for this reversal in policy is that councilmen deemed it expedient to acqui-
esce to elite landlords’ power in order to avoid more serious vio lence.
In 1798 the black Loyalists again asserted their po liti cal rights. They ap-
pointed Methodist preacher Mingo Jordan as judge, and Isaac Anderson and 
John Cuthbert became justices of  the peace.  These actions  were not radical; 
they merely built on the government that the Hundredors and Tythingmen 
established  after 1792. Jordan, Anderson, and Cuthbert assumed elected posi-
tions  because of  a pre ce dent in the appointment of  an all- black jury and in 
the formulation of  Hundredor- and Tythingmen- conceived (and council- 
approved) laws. In 1800 it was their positions as officeholders and their his-
tory of  lawmaking that should have legitimized the Hundredors’ and 
Tythingmen’s revived attempt to fix food prices during the so- called rebellion.39
In September 1800 elected black Loyalists in Freetown posted laws that fixed 
prices. But  those laws provoked a much diff er ent response: by December the 
men had been accused of  rebellion and banished, bayonetted, sentenced to 
hard  labor, or hanged. According to the Sierra Leone Council, on 10 Septem-
ber elected leaders Isaac Anderson, James Robertson, Nathaniel Wansey, and 
Ansel Zizer revealed a document that has come to be known as the “code of  
laws”— which fixed prices for foodstuffs—at the  house of  Abraham Smith. The 
men encouraged  others to join them, reposting a revised code on the 25th. 
The laws set prices for butter, cheese, salt beef, salt pork, rice, rum, and sugar, 
and declared that anyone who refused to sell foodstuffs to other black Loyal-
ists and who was then “found carry ing” such commodities “out of  the Col-
ony” would incur a fine. The document also delineated punishments for 
adultery, stealing, and Sabbath breaking, denied the white governor and Si-
erra Leone Council the authority to interfere in domestic affairs, and warned 
that black Loyalists had to abide by the code or leave Freetown.40
When Governor Thomas Ludlum learned of  the laws, he accused the 
elected men of  rebellion. He armed com pany employees and amenable black 
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Loyalists and sent them  after the “rebels,” which precipitated a scuffle. David 
Edmonds, who had once joined Thomas Peters in petitioning John Clarkson 
for Christmas beef, was wounded in the head. Robertson was captured, Zizer 
surrendered, and Anderson and Wansey (though stabbed with a bayonet) es-
caped to rally about fifty of  the three hundred colonists. By the 27th “intelli-
gence was received that the Hundredors & Tythingmen . . .  were in a state of  
open rebellion.” Posted at a bridge, they “cut off  all communication between 
Freetown & the Country . . .  and  were receiving hourly supplies of  men & pro-
visions from both.” They stole one gun, as well as shot, powder, money, mats, 
hides, liquor, sugar, tea, and clothing from councilmembers’  houses. King Tom 
may have suggested that he would become involved.  After a weeklong stand-
off  the British ship Asia arrived, carry ing forty- five British soldiers plus Jamai-
can Maroons from Nova Scotia, who captured enough black Loyalists to force 
a peace between black colonists and the councilmen in October. By Decem-
ber, armed with a new royal charter, the Sierra Leone Council convened a mil-
itary tribunal, meted out punishment, and revoked all black colonists’ rights 
to elect representatives.41
On the one hand it could be argued that the event was a rebellion. It was 
the culmination of  a fight— evident throughout the 1790s in disagreements 
over a quitrent tax— over land. White leaders certainly disapproved of  many 
of  the black Loyalists who won office in the 1798 elections. The black Loyal-
ists  were armed, and their pilfering from the  houses of  white councilmen re-
sembled the victual warfare of  the Revolutionary War. King Tom’s willingness 
to lend support implies black Loyalist– Temne cooperation rather than friction. 
The council suggested that many colonists denounced their fellow black Loy-
alists’ actions by recording the “general indignation at the power assumed by 
the Hundredors and Tythingmen in pretending to bind them by new laws.” 
In executing and banishing the Loyalists, and in the language used in post- 
September accounts, the white council treated the event as a rebellion. It 
must also be admitted that eighteenth- century  people did not always distin-
guish between riot and rebellion.42
Yet previous black Loyalists’ po liti cal involvement, the actions of   those col-
onists in 1800, and the delay between land fights and the 1800 event should 
make readers pause before accepting that the 1800 event was a rebellion. This 
protest was an act of  hunger avoidance that represented continuity with the 
early 1790s rather than a sudden departure from the past. The Nova Scotians 
had spent most of  the 1790s claiming their right to fight hunger as British colo-
nists. “If  we are his [King George III’s] subject[s],” they had reasoned in 1798, 
they possessed the “right to appleyed to government to see ourselves righted 
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in all the wrongs which are Done to us  here.” In 1800 the black Loyalists  were 
restrained in the face of  Ludlum’s reaction to their price- fixing, prob ably 
 because they maintained faith in their ability to use the government to obtain 
redress. They attacked no towns, burned no farm buildings or plantations, and 
killed, decapitated, and maimed no whites. The men  were armed, but it is un-
clear how many guns they possessed and  whether the middle- aged rioters 
could commit physical vio lence. The elections took place in 1798, and the 
council resolved to abolish the quitrent in 1799, meaning that colonists— who 
 were allowed into office— would have waited almost a year to rebel over land 
or po liti cal issues that had seemingly been resolved. Although the authors of  
the code did not obtain unan i mous support, it seems odd that colonists would 
object to the idea of  the code of  laws  because lawmakers had been legislating 
for seven years. With re spect to King Tom, descriptions of  his willingness to 
intervene are varied— the Sierra Leone Council claimed that “intelligence was 
received” that the colonists obtained assistance from the interior, but did not 
state who supplied the information or where the assistance originated.43
A real rebellion close to Freetown and the biases of  the Sierra Leone Com-
pany and Council provide additional support for refusing to call the event a 
rebellion. Nearby events in the years before the Loyalists’ arrival  were per-
haps more appropriately dubbed rebellions. Between 1783 and 1796 a slave 
uprising of  Temne, Baga, and Bullom  people had occurred in the Mandingo 
and Muslim state of  Moria, to the north of  Freetown.  Those rebels had set 
fire to crops. The black Loyalists did deny the white Sierra Leone Council the 
authority to intervene in domestic affairs, but they did not seem to expect 
white officials to vacate their positions as mediators between Crown and col-
ony. To call the event a rebellion is to replicate the language of  the white 
councilmen, who may have obscured details. An 1802 report stated its inten-
tion to explain the Sierra Leone Com pany’s financial failures, and the council 
and com pany needed a scapegoat to avoid blaming themselves for poor man-
agement.44
Although the word riot carries problematic connotations  today, understand-
ing food riots on their own terms makes apparent the similarities between 
food riots and the Freetown event. Between 1550 and 1820 two- thirds of  all 
riots in  England  were food riots. Between 1776 and 1779 protesting crowds in 
Amer i ca gathered on more than thirty diff er ent instances. In eighteenth- 
century En glish riots, price- fixing was the most noticeable unifying  factor, con-
stituting 35   percent of  riotous be hav ior between 1782 and 1812. A spate of  
En glish food riots occurred at the exact same time as the one in Freetown—154 
from 1800 to 1801. As in Sierra Leone, many began in September of  1800. 
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Hunger- fighting black Loyalists  were similar in  these ways to many other 
eighteenth- century British subjects, and similar, too, to other nonwhite com-
munities that drew upon Eu ro pean influences in their nation- building efforts.45
The 1800 protest fits into patterns of  riotous be hav ior— the entrave or block-
age; the agrarian demonstration; the price riot or taxation populaire; and the 
market riot. In the entrave,  people prevented the export of  grain from a rural 
area, whereas in an agrarian demonstration farmers destroyed their produce 
before it could depart. In the price riot,  people seized food, set what they 
deemed a “just” price, and sold it. In a market riot, urban crowds acted against 
local magistrates, commercial bakers, butchers, or millers to force a price re-
duction. Nova Scotians tried to prevent food from leaving Freetown, as in the 
entrave; they set prices, as in the price riot; and they criticized government of-
ficials, as in the market riot. Black Loyalists, in regulating prices and prevent-
ing foodstuffs from leaving the colony, demanded po liti cal rights by behaving 
like food rioters, even though the council called them rebels.46 When hunger 
was concerned, price- fixing could be a legally sanctioned action, or it could 
be an act of  po liti cal protest.
The black Loyalists resembled other food rioters, but they also differed from 
them  because they rioted not to push for new rights but to reclaim old ones: 
life, liberty from a state resembling bondage, and freedom from want. The 
commodities the rioters targeted, the composition of  participants, and the pun-
ishments they incurred also make Freetown unusual. Nova Scotians, like Eu-
ro pe ans, tried to regulate prices of  staple commodities, but they also policed 
meat, alcohol, and butter consumption, and in 1800 they did not try to fix bread 
or flour prices. In many riots  women started  things  because they remained un-
likely to face capital punishment.  Women in Freetown do not seem to have 
participated in the riot, possibly  because they  were excluded from voting for 
Hundredors and Tythingmen in 1797. They do appear in the rec ords as shop-
keep ers, and riot leaders requested protection for their  women and  children. 
Most food riots  were leaderless and carried out without arms.47 At least ac-
cording to the council, the Sierra Leone riot had leaders, some of  whom pos-
sessed arms.
The riot also differed from  those in  England in the severity of  its 
repercussions— death rates  were higher in Freetown. Cato Perkins survived 
by offering to negotiate between the council and the rioters, the majority of  
whom came from his Huntingdonian Methodist congregation. Isaac Ander-
son was hanged.48 The 1800 event was remarkable not only  because the pro-
testors had already learned what it was like to be granted the authority to 
legislate against hunger, and not only  because they  were fighting to win back 
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that right, but  because the white Sierra Leone Council was so determined to 
use a diff er ent word to erase  those efforts from history.
“Whites live better perhaps than you do,” Governor Zachary Macaulay admit-
ted to the black Loyalists in 1795. To colonists who asked, “why should not 
we have the same[?]” Macaulay responded that when black colonists could 
“Write as well, figure as well, Act as well, think as well as they do . . .  you  shall 
have a preference.” That year, however, he thought  there was not “an office 
in the Colony filled by a white, which a Black could fill with any propriety.”49 
By initially establishing prices for alcohol, bread, and fish, and regulating the 
sale of  meat,  free black Loyalists did what they could to claim authority using 
the lower po liti cal offices granted to them. They privileged their ability to fight 
hunger over their relationships with Africans— and despite Macaulay’s reser-
vations about black politicians, at first they did so with the blessings of  the Si-
erra Leone Council.
John Clarkson and then the Sierra Leone Council opened the door to 
changes in government by approving the creation of  black- Loyalist politi-
cians, price- fixing, jury ser vice, and legislation. Only in the late 1790s did whites 
question  these decisions. Colonists did not riot just  because they  were hun-
gry. During and  after the Revolutionary War, black  people had ignored, 
caused, and embraced scarcity. Their food- related protest in 1800 was a po liti-
cal, or ga nized act that gave shape to black colonists’ anger and quest for Brit-
ish subjecthood. Even if  readers wish to call the 1800 Freetown incident a 
rebellion, considering its similarities to food riots contextualizes the laws that 
black Loyalists enacted to avoid hunger. They lost the fight against hunger 
not  because the laws  were in effec tive, but  because a lifetime of  enslavement 
had slowed their abilities to pen their own history.
Hunger- prevention attempts altered victual imperialism in Sierra Leone, 
which began as a black- Loyalist effort to change the food system while infring-
ing on land use and transformed into white leaders’ attempts to change food 
production while interfering with trade. Black Loyalists, like their contempo-
raries in Britain and the American colonies, sought more control of  their lo-
cal economy through price- fixing. While eyeing Temne land, they favored laws 
that regulated the edible commodities that they daily produced, bought, and 
sold. The po liti cal authority to fight hunger became just as crucial as the abil-
ity to actually do so. The Sierra Leone Council overruled them. Councilmen 
called protestors rebels and executed them, likely  because they thought it more 
strategic to privilege good relations with Africans. In August 1808 the British 
Crown assumed formal rule of  Freetown.  After the Crown took control, the 
colony shifted its position on victual imperialism by trying to change the state 
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of  trade in the region. Officials focused their efforts on convincing Africans 
that commercial cash crops, rather than the slave trade, presented a profitable 
alternative.50
At the very end of  the eigh teenth  century, the fight against hunger became 
nearly inseparable from the intellectual and po liti cal questions that peopled 
asked when they crossed the Atlantic. In making and then unmaking black vict-
ual imperialists, the white Sierra Leone Council first legitimized and then 
erased a de cade of  black- Loyalist lawmaking. The council’s description of  the 
1800 “rebellion” becomes a significant contradiction,  because it was not a de-
viation from the colony’s history. Calling the 1800 event a riot recognizes that 
the Loyalists  were acting not as rebellious slaves but as emancipated po liti cal 
participants. Although  these colonists gained only transient freedoms through 
their food laws, their narrative offers an opportunity to look forward and back-
ward in time to consider how hunger prevention in Sierra Leone brought 
 people together— and drove them apart.
No Useless Mouth is a study of  hunger during the 
American Revolution in Indian country and the original thirteen colonies, with 
Atlantic World nodes that look outside the theater of  war. In turning from 
Native Americans to formerly enslaved  people, it follows the  people whose 
participation in the conflict meant that they had to flee further afield if  they 
wanted to survive. I have  adopted this Atlantic perspective that includes Nova 
Scotia and Sierra Leone— what scholars would call a circum- Atlantic 
approach— because I think it helps us to see the War for In de pen dence differ-
ently in terms of  power relationships, to make comparisons between food 
policies, and to distinguish between  people who benefited and  people who 
suffered from hunger- prevention efforts in the British Atlantic World.1
Scholarship on the Atlantic World has taught historians that they should 
look beyond the concept of  the nation or state when assessing power relation-
ships. The notion of  nations was still developing in the eigh teenth  century, 
but questions about who sought, won, and lost power  were much older. If  
readers are willing to move past the idea of  the nation and its institutions as 
the foundations of  power—as  people at the time had to do— then it is hard to 
ignore the Native American polities that wielded power over Eu ro pe ans dur-
ing the sixteenth, seventeenth, eigh teenth, and nineteenth centuries. This book 
is not the first to consider formerly enslaved  people’s flight to Nova Scotia and 
Sierra Leone alongside other events in the American Revolution or the Age 
Conclusion
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of  Revolutions more broadly— but it is the first to explore how the  people who 
lived in this dynamic world experienced hunger.  After the Revolutionary War 
it was not certain that the United States would last beyond a generation. This 
state of  instability made the United States similar to precarious British colo-
nies in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, not diff er ent from them.2
Adopting an Atlanticist approach to this period makes clear the similarities 
and differences between food policies that emerged before, during, and  after 
the Revolutionary War. Both the British and American officials who distrib-
uted food aid during the War for In de pen dence did so in a disor ga nized 
manner— Americans to a greater extent— and they did so in response to Na-
tive expectations that had cohered during the colonial period. During the post-
war era U.S. food aid was preemptive, in British Nova Scotia it was reactive, 
and in Sierra Leone it was largely unnecessary  after the colony’s first year. Na-
tive Americans intervened in the theorization of  food policies  earlier than 
black  people, and for a more extended period of  time, which encompassed 
centuries of  Native sovereignty, diplomacy, and in de pen dent po liti cal and  legal 
systems. During the  later years considered in this book, however, white Indian 
agents privileged their food laws over Native practices, sometimes at the re-
quest of  Indians themselves. Formerly enslaved colonists, by contrast, de-
manded the po liti cal rights to create their own  legal frameworks to regulate 
the food system.
It is clear that some folks prevented hunger  earlier than historians have 
claimed, but it is also apparent that hunger prevention was just one small  battle 
in the fight against hunger; hunger endurance and creation often mattered 
more. Native  women controlled the provisions necessary for war. Chickam-
auga Cherokees and Creeks fed themselves by stealing  cattle and  horses dur-
ing the 1770s. When, in 1779, American soldiers invaded Iroquoia and set fire 
to huge amounts of  Seneca and Cayuga corn, they created a period of  starva-
tion that no one could prevent but some could endure. Throughout the war 
self- liberated former slaves filled British stomachs by stealing grain and  cattle, 
and occasionally lost their appetites.  After the War for In de pen dence, more 
 people began to treat hunger as something avoidable. U.S. Indian officials set 
food prices and centralized markets to protect the corn, beef, and pork that 
Native Americans raised. Ex- bondpeople who escaped to present- day Canada 
and starved  there, and then migrated to a new colony in Sierra Leone, cre-
ated a government that allowed them to circumvent famine. The costs of  try-
ing to stop its deadly effects  were sometimes too high.
Indians and formerly enslaved  people lost the fight against hunger not 
 because they became bad at stopping it but  because imperial officials gathered 
enough information to circumscribe Native Americans’ and black colonists’ 
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abilities to prevent hunger themselves. Knowledge acquisition gave  these white 
officials a specific kind of  power over Native and black revolutionaries: the 
power to reinterpret histories of  hunger.
Before the American Revolution, Edinburgh doctors like William Robert-
son and British generals like Jeffery Amherst knew too  little; during the colo-
nial period non- Native observers could not with accuracy assess Indian hunger. 
Native Americans knew how to fight famine by drawing on deep reserves of  
the grain that Native  women produced, relying on specific famine foods, and 
dispersing into small bands during long winters and years of  crop failure. Brit-
ish and American officials never managed to interpret black and Native hun-
ger accurately  because discourses of  hunger  were ever changing. What 
mattered was that  after the Revolutionary War, they gained the know- how to 
say that they could evaluate hunger and to argue that they  were better placed 
to prevent it. British officials began learning  these lessons before the Revolu-
tionary War. American agents improved their knowledge during the 1790s 
 because their power strug gles with state officials over Native American affairs 
had forced them to work hard to practice food diplomacy. They had received 
education about Native appetites and how to satisfy and then manipulate  those 
appetites as they implemented a policy of  victual imperialism. Black colonists 
gained the power to prevent their own hunger through observation and knowl-
edge acquisition: first, they watched white colonists draw on previous coloni-
zation attempts to learn how to pass food laws in Nova Scotia, and then they 
reproduced similar laws in Sierra Leone. Once white officials in Sierra Leone 
realized how much conflict  those black colonists’ laws caused, they  stopped 
black colonists from dealing with hunger on their own and then acted as if  
they had not in the past sanctioned the passage of  similar legislation.
Government officials who delegitimized Native and black hunger- 
prevention efforts interfered with other  people’s food sovereignty.3 They de-
cided that Indians and formerly enslaved  people  were unqualified to decide 
what to grow, sell, cook, and eat, and they made it harder for  those communi-
ties to feed themselves. Their actions ignored centuries of  Native hunger pre-
vention and erased a short de cade of   free black colonists’ efforts to act similarly. 
Though scholars should be cautious about drawing a solid line from the eigh-
teenth  century to the pre sent, it is arresting that  today, black  women’s lifetime 
risk of  being diagnosed with diabetes is over 50  percent, and Native Ameri-
cans are much likelier than white Americans to develop diabetes and obesity.4 
A historian cannot help but be informed and influenced by the con temporary 
issues unfolding as she writes.
In the opening pages to No Useless Mouth, I noted that my periodization for 
this book— taking a long view of  the American Revolution and distinguishing 
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the era from the military conflict itself— was a choice I made that was deter-
mined by the school where I teach.5 Having recently moved to Cardiff  Univer-
sity, I am struck by the degree to which my colleagues think about history in 
practice. My pre de ces sor edited an award- winning collection about teaching 
history, to which many of  my colleagues contributed, and I inherited her team- 
taught class (or module, in British academia) that emerged alongside that vol-
ume.6 In the United Kingdom our teaching must be driven by our research. 
 These observations are not meant to imply that other historians fail to consider 
how history is used, but to admit that I had not thought about our discipline as 
extensively as I might have done  until I reached the final stages of  revising this 
book. Revision is a never- ending pro cess; historians come back to arguments 
they have made in de cades past and adjust them, and other scholars challenge 
and reinterpret other historians’  earlier publications. I have made peace with 
the state of  this book by drawing on the British meaning of  the term revision, 
which my students invoke to mean that they are studying for final exams. This 
book is nearing its end, but I may never stop revising its subject  matter.
No Useless Mouth concludes that white officials in the United States and the 
British Empire won the fight against hunger by seizing control of  history to 
rewrite past and pre sent repre sen ta tions of  Native American and black hun-
ger.7 History does affect practice, and practice  will shape history.
This book began as a study of  food, and its only argument was that food was 
impor tant— often more impor tant than other historians had conceded. Over 
time that argument changed as the focus shifted to hunger, or food’s absence, 
and how  people characterized it before, during, and  after the American Revolu-
tionary War. I set out to write an antideclension narrative  because I thought 
that too many histories characterized the American Revolution as a disaster for 
Native American and enslaved communities, and my reading of  food exchange 
and destruction during the war contradicted  these interpretations.
Upon reflection, I realize that I have also written a declension narrative, but 
my history offers a diff er ent chronology of  the shifts in Native American power, 
and finds parallels between  these shifts and the gains and losses in power that 
formerly enslaved  peoples experienced in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone. This 
book thus recasts an Iroquois Civil War as a time when the Haudenosaunee 
retained and then expanded their power. It shows that the Revolution in Creek 
and Cherokee country was a period of  im mense confusion and disor ga ni za-
tion that contributed to a fear of  power ful, starving, and violent Indians. Black 
colonists had to wait  until they had relocated to Africa to intervene in food 
policies, but once in Sierra Leone they enjoyed nearly a de cade of  po liti cal par-
ticipation built on protective food legislation before losing the power that 
they too had gained.
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This book takes as its starting point the conviction that the American Rev-
olution cannot be  limited to the years or the geography of  the military con-
flict, nor can it be comprehensible without considering the enslaved  people 
and Native Americans whose lives that conflict disrupted. No Useless Mouth’s 
expansive periodization and willingness to cross traditional national bound-
aries invites comparison of  how Americans and Britons treated the  peoples 
who had allied with them during the war. The British government supported 
and then failed its black allies, who would come to identify as British subjects. 
Lord Dunmore offered them freedom, but then other officials changed the 
state of  affairs, first with inadequate war time provisioning and protection, then 
in the government’s cessation of  food aid during famine in Nova Scotia, and 
fi nally in the Sierra Leone Council’s revocation of  rights that had given black 
colonists the ability to address  these failures. Native Americans  were not Brit-
ish subjects, and Britons tried harder to accommodate them— even if  Indians 
required no such accommodation. At first blush it seems that the early years 
of  the war did not substantively change Indian country; kinship networks, in-
tertribal alliances, intratribal conflict, and negotiations with non- Natives 
from a position of  strength remained the order of  the day. But the four de-
cades  after the war witnessed foreign policy decisions that rearranged Native 
Americans’ relationships with the United States.
I have written this book for readers interested in food and in history. To food- 
studies scholars I have offered a study of  Native American and black hunger 
during the American Revolution, which seemed to me to be absent from stud-
ies of  food during the colonial period, the American Revolutionary War, and 
the Early Republic. I have also tried—by positioning food diplomacy, victual 
imperialism, and victual warfare on a scale from accommodating to violent 
be hav ior—to provide a model for understanding peaceful and violent food- 
related actions and events from the 1750s to the 1810s. I  will refrain from claim-
ing that I do not want  people to use this model; I hope that  people do begin 
to use  these terms, but I also insist that they  will require adjustment. My own 
research has shown that food diplomacy, victual warfare, and victual imperi-
alism  were diff er ent across time and space. I want  people to experiment with 
 these terms in other regions of  the Atlantic World, and perhaps beyond it, so 
that scholars can continue to think through ways of  understanding how  people 
dealt with scarcity.
In the hope that even more scholars  will wish to write about histories of  
food and hunger, I would like to offer some suggestions for research and writing 
themes that I think worthy of  pursuit.  These include accommodation and 
vio lence, food policy, and the proj ect of  contextualizing hunger. Hunger 
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prevention can involve cooperation, as when  people at Thanksgiving sit 
down to share a  family feast. But when hunger is not about cooperation, it is 
often about vio lence. The first Thanksgiving meal was a fraught affair be-
tween Pilgrims and Wampanoags.8 During the American Revolution  people 
stole animals and burned crops when peaceful food exchanges failed, and 
some forms of  food diplomacy themselves involved the wrecking of  provi-
sions. Hunger- prevention programs— which  people portrayed as positive 
efforts— also enabled subtle and more overt forms of  vio lence, from attempts 
to control what  people could eat to distributions of  debilitating foodstuffs.
Hunger prevention informed food policies, which also merit further com-
parisons and careful thinking. Such policies might be better understood by con-
sidering distributions of  food aid, interventions in production methods, uses 
of  the marketplace, and policy’s relationship with the  legal system. Writers 
need to ask when food aid was distributed, who took charge of  distribution, 
and who received the foodstuffs and  under what conditions. They should know 
who won the authority to approve or reject production methods, and  whether 
 those declarations accompanied other initiatives, like landgrabs. Scholars 
should observe when governments, states, and cities centralized their market-
places, but they should not assume the benevolence or malevolence of  such 
centralization. If   there  were food laws about aid, production, or marketplace 
sales, then it is worth asking who was responsible for passing  those laws, whom 
the laws helped, and who suffered  under them.
Last and most impor tant is the theme of  contextualizing what hunger 
meant during diff er ent times around the Atlantic World. To contextualize 
hunger, writers must try to have a sense of  the baseline state of  being ade-
quately fed for the periods and places that interest them. They should know 
what foods  people ate on a normal day in a year of  unremarkable weather, 
what provisions they consumed during leaner times, and how often they had 
to resort to this diet.9 It is acceptable for the baseline to be ineffable, but writ-
ers should talk about what makes it that way. They should investigate how 
 people described hungriness: With exaggeration? In formal diplomatic set-
tings? By referencing deaths by starvation? It is worth trying to separate 
peckishness, hunger, starvation, and famine. Writers must remain willing to 
see real hunger in the historical sources, but their first reading should be per-
formed with a healthy level of  skepticism, especially if  the  people whose hun-
ger is described are not the same  people writing the rec ords. Authors should 
try as much as pos si ble to cross- reference claims about hunger with the sup-
posedly hungry  people’s actions, with reports of  the environment at the 
time, and with interdisciplinary research on the plants and animals that lived 
in  those places.
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Any discussion of  hunger must contextualize what that state of  being meant 
to the  people who grappled with it,  because without this context it is impos-
sible to assess power relations between parties who negotiated over their right 
to food. During the American Revolution  people used the three related be-
hav iors of  food diplomacy, victual warfare, and victual imperialism in their 
preparations for and reactions to hunger, which allowed them to create food 
systems that every one could—at varying times, and for diff er ent reasons— 
shape to claim power. Ideas about, countermea sures against, and reactions to 
deprivation all  shaped food policies— from the settled Iroquois territory be-
neath Lake Ontario, to the mountains, rivers, swamps, and valleys of  Creek 
and Cherokee country, to a field in the Ohio Valley where trees lay scattered 
by tornadoes, to the cold, rocky soils of  Nova Scotia, and to the rain- soaked 
colony of  Freetown, Sierra Leone.
What is so arresting about the American Revolution is that in the de cades 
that followed the war, white officials working for the U.S. and British govern-
ments chose to act as if  only their abilities to prevent hunger counted. U.S. 
Indian agents took one of  many Native claims about hunger at face value and 
then imposed on Indians a static, unchanging notion of  Native appetites that 
required more and more stringent intervention from the government. In Si-
erra Leone, British officials panicked about the freedom they had given to black 
legislators to deal with hunger. The Revolutionary War, the new country it 
created, and the exodus it encouraged  were disruptive, and  people wrote dis-
honestly about  these events and institutions  because the world was watching.
When Timothy Pickering told Cornplanter that early colonists thrived while 
Native Americans wanted food, when Andrew Pickens recalled a campaign 
against the Cherokees in which the Americans benevolently de cided to refrain 
from destroying Cherokee corn, when federal officials elided Native  women’s 
 labor by pretending that Indians did not farm, and when the Sierra Leone 
Council characterized normal price- fixing be hav ior by black Loyalists as evi-
dence of  rebellion,  these men  were trying their best to control the historical 
narrative by misrepresenting hunger prevention in history. Pickering’s En-
glishmen  were supposedly able husbandmen, Pickens’s soldiers  were con-
cerned about Cherokee abilities to provision themselves, U.S. officials  were 
unable to recall an entire war in which the American army destroyed Native 
cornfields, and the black Loyalists’ decision to pass food legislation in 1800 was 
a rebellious deviation from past activities.  These acts of  willful forgetfulness 
or outright mendacity, call it what you  will, turned out to be key pivot points 
in the telling of  history and the courses of  nations and  peoples.
Historians are not fortune- tellers. We are incapable of  predicting the  future 
with any certainty, and our ability to assess the past with accuracy is a skill 
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that we are constantly developing. But our capacity to write with confidence 
about the past is one of  the best ser vices we can offer in the interest of  good 
citizenship.  Until a country reckons with its history— recognizing that the birth 
of  empires and nations involved conquest, colonization, contradictory trade 
policies, displacement, enslavement, land seizures, and refugee crises— its citi-
zens cannot be good citizens  because they  labor  under delusions about their 
country’s past benevolence. I therefore think it of  the utmost importance to 
expose  those moments in the histories of  the United States and  Great Britain 
when government agents actively worked to distort history. That is what they 
did  after the American Revolution, and that is the story that No Useless Mouth 
tells.
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of  cake per day. I thank Lisl Prater- Lee for too many swim- meet sandwiches 
to count, and for cheering me on in and out of  the pool. The history and En-
glish departments helped me figure out how to think and to write. Classes 
with Bob Brigham, Miriam Cohen, Rebecca Edwards, Priscilla Gilman, Lydia 
Murdoch, and Everett Weedin  were foundational. Special thanks go to James 
Merrell, who taught me a few crucial  matters of  form and style as I began to 
study food in early Amer i ca, and who continued to provide feedback when it 
came time to revise this book.
At the University of  Texas at Austin, Carolyn Eastman offered vital sup-
port, first as I thought about cannibalism and then as I began to write about 
food. Erika Bsumek, Elizabeth Engelhardt, Neil Kamil, Robert Olwell, and 
James Sidbury offered some of  the first commentaries on  these pieces of  
work. Marilyn Lehman was a gradu ate coordinator extraordinaire. I owe 
gratitude to Rachel Ozanne for her excellent taste in polka dots, for her will-
ingness to eat my cookies, and for constituting one- half  of  the House of  
Rachels. Ben Breen, Felipe Cruz, and Alexis Harasemovitch Truax conjure 
grilled sausages around a camp grill, floating conversations in Krause Springs, 
and early after noon trips to the Salt Lick. Libby Nutting and Dharitri Bhat-
tacharjee  were  there to catch up over coffee when we  were all in town. An-
gela Smith made an excellent bicycling companion. I am also obliged to the 
Subalterns for facilitating work/life balance through poorly played soccer, and 
for Draught House gatherings with José Adrián Barragán, Juandrea Bates, 
Chris Dietrich, Jonathan Hunt, Renata Keller, Sarah Steinbock- Pratt, Clau-
dia Rueda, Kyle Shelton, Cameron Strang, Sundar Vadlamudi, and Susan 
Zakaib.
I did a lot of  eating on the road. On return visits to Austin, Rebekah 
Brewer, Richard Huey, their kids Sophia and Hendrix, Jimmy Myers, Caroline 
Foley, and Jay Wiltshire  were always willing to meet on Sundays for dim sum. 
Josh Keidaish and Krisna Wymore provided a fabulous home away from 
home; thank you for (fi nally) taking me to Polvos. Rachel Laudan provided a 
thoughtful, generous sounding board over cups of  coffee. In New Haven, 
Alejandra Dubcovsky did the same. Jamie Miller and Sarah Kinkel’s knowl-
edge of  beer and sushi vastly improved life  there. Amanda Behm knew the 
best places to eat cheese. Kristina Poznan and Leslie  Waters fed me incredible 
Hungarian food in Williamsburg. Tater tots with Ted Andrews in Providence 
fueled me almost as well as the conversation. In Boston and then Philadel-
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phia and Baltimore, Chelsea Backer and Nick Lekow offered excellent com-
pany for Szechuan, and delightful home- brewed beverages. Christopher 
Heaney was  there to talk writing and weird history in Austin and Philadel-
phia. In New York, Kofi  and Whitney James never failed to host dinner with 
enchiladas, or to meet for amazing Turkish food. Chris Dietrich and Verónica 
Jiménez Vega provided dinners of  fish tacos, trekked to the East Side for 
breakfasts of  scones and tea, and to the West Side for Hungarian pastries.
Meals at conferences have yielded opportunities to talk through ideas in 
pro gress. I had so much fun eating Mexican in London with Kelly Watson 
and Caroline Dodds Pennock, and discussing (but not practicing) cannibalism. 
I remember catching up over drinks—at the AHA with Laurie Wood, and at 
the Britain and the World conference with Mikki Brock. I ate far too much 
Indian food with Jessica Hower in Southampton. I am indebted to Christian 
Ayne Crouch for a London breakfast over which she shared a  great deal of  
practical book writing tips and valuable opinions about ways to supplement 
my spice cabinet. Claire Jowitt has been generous with her time and willing 
to share strategic advice, and I  will remember several delicious dinners in 
Paris. I always look forward to meals at conferences with Kate Grandjean, 
and I think of  a long walk to the Green Goddess in New Orleans.
I acknowledge all members of  The Junto: A Group Blog on Early American His-
tory, and particularly Benjamin Park for starting the  whole  thing, and for 
meeting me for a Tex- Mex breakfast on a Houston- to- Austin trip. I admire 
Juntoists Sara Georgini and Tom Cutterham for insisting at yearly BGEAH 
meetings that food should always come on plates. I thank Christopher Jones 
for grilling inspiration and conversations about black voyagers, Sara Damiano 
for tacos and her thoughts on  women’s history, and Joe Adelman for talking 
teaching and for giving me major pancake goals.
Many scholars have a temporary academic center or home that  shaped 
their thinking and writing, and the McNeil Center was mine. I thank Daniel 
Richter for being the best of  directors, and for providing tough and honest 
feedback during this foundational year. Amy Baxter- Bellamy and Barbara Na-
tello ensured that their doors  were always open, and alerted hungry fellows 
when seminar leftovers  were available. I cannot overstate the value of  lunches 
from vari ous food trucks with the entire 2011–2012 cohort, especially Sari 
Altschuler, Chris Parsons, Nenette Luarca- Shoaf, Dael Norwood, Seth Perry, 
Nic Wood, and next- door office mates Whitney Martinko and Matt Karp. Jes-
sica Roney and Adam Choppin supplied many expertly crafted cocktails and 
dinners, and a place to stay in Philadelphia. It was an honor to cook for them; 
a  simple chicken soup with dumplings shared with them, Lexi, Glenda Good-
man, and Mitch Fraas  will stick with me for a long time.
212  aCknoWl edgMents
Moving to  England has been such an adventure in teaching, thinking, and 
eating. In Exeter, I think of  Richard Toye and Kristine Vaaler having us over 
for fish suppers, and meeting for dinners out in town. Fish and chips always 
tasted better  after bike rides to Dart’s Farm and the Turf  Locks with David 
Thackery. I have good memories of  Chinese takeaway shared with Tehyuhn 
Ma and Andrew Heath, and am glad that they introduced me to the Peak Dis-
trict in Sheffield. Exploring Somerset’s cideries was much more fun with Ka-
trina Gulliver alongside me. In Wales my Cardiff  colleagues, especially Padma 
Anagol, Lloyd Bowen, Emily Cock, David Doddington, Federica Ferlanti, 
Mary Heimann, James Ryan, Bronach Kane, Eve MacDonald, Jan Machielsen, 
Angela Muir, Helen Nicholson, Kevin Passmore, Ian Rapley, Shaun Tougher, 
Stephanie Ward, Keir Waddington, and Mark Williams, provided friendship, 
advice, coffee, crisps, pints, and necessary lunches at Aberdare Hall. It’s been 
a blast living in Bristol. I thank Billy Davis for nights of  red wine, Spanish 
hampers, and the occasional barbecue. I’m so glad that Ryan Hanley and Jes-
sica Moody moved to town, and I look forward to many more Thanksgiving 
and Christmas dinners, harborside drinks, and picnics in the park. I’ve also 
enjoyed sharing pints with vari ous Americanists who have come to visit, es-
pecially Ann  Little, Drew Lipman, and Jessica Roney.
I owe a  great deal to my students at the University of  Southampton, par-
ticularly the 2015–2016 cohort of  “Amer i ca: From Revolution to Republic.” 
Teaching the events and aftermath of  the American Revolution, and hearing 
students’ takes on  those occurrences, helped give shape to this book. I am 
enormously grateful to my Southampton colleagues, particularly Mark Corn-
wall, David Cox, Chris Fuller, George Gilbert, Neil Gregor, Maria Hayward, 
Jonathan Hunt, Nick Karn, Claire Le Foll, Sarah Pearce, Christer Petley, 
Charlotte Riley, Francois Soyer, and Helen Spurling, for collegiality, friend-
ship, and the occasional pint at the Crown. Kendrick Oliver, Chris Prior, and 
Mark Stoyle kindly read my work, and I hope improved it. Chris Woolgar was 
a model mentor; it was a privilege to share teaching and office lunches to-
gether. I thank Priti Mishra for her presence next door, and for occasionally 
eating far too much cheese with me. I  don’t know what I would do without 
Eve Colpus, who was always willing to catch up over Thai food. I am glad 
that it took less than a year to confirm our red and white wine preferences.
At Cornell, I thank Michael McGandy, first for his unflagging support 
on this proj ect and then for his thoughts on all  things bourbon- related. 
I thank Bethany Wasik for her Twitter support and wise footwear choices. I 
thank Kate Gibson at Westchester Publishing Ser vices for overseeing produc-
tion, and Kelley Blewster for her meticulous copyediting.
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Where  there is food,  there is  family. I write with memories of  my dad, 
the first Dr. Herrmann. I cannot narrow down my mom’s cooking to one 
meal, so  will call up the image of  every thing bagels with lox and scallion 
cream cheese during weekends at home. Thank you for every thing, Mom— 
but especially for teaching me to love food and cooking. I think fondly of  eat-
ing with Amy and Peter Coppernoll, but nights of  tapas and wine in Barcelona 
stand out the most. Life in  England makes the prospect of  Thanksgiving in 
Oklahoma less feasible than in past years, but during that season I always 
think of  bowling for salami with the Nevards and Erlichs. In San Antonio, 
Don, Andrea, and Sean Palen provided days of  excellent card games, and deli-
cious spaghetti.
Over the course of  writing this book and the search for academic jobs, 
dumplings and the quest to find the best of  them provided grounding. I am 
so lucky that Marc Palen has been willing to seek them out with me. From 
Boston, to New York, to Sydney, Saigon, Southampton, Exeter, London, and 
Bristol, it’s been an adventure. I thank him for loving me, even when I’m hangry.
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Vari ous books and articles have  shaped my 
thinking for this book, and scholars  will be able to infer a lot about them from 
my endnotes. My approach to the primary sources requires a  little bit more 
background.
When I started the research for this book in 2010, it would have been im-
possible to proceed without a car. As a New Yorker who learned to drive 
about a year before I moved to Austin in 2007, it always felt strange to get into 
my new (used) car and to drive from Austin to one coast or another. I was the 
fortunate recipient of  fellowships on the East Coast and the West Coast of  
the United States, and I had funding from my department to go to London. 
So  after a few weeks in Ottawa, I drove from Austin to Williamsburg,  Virginia, 
and from  there up and down the East Coast and throughout North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia. I drove back to Austin, flew to London for a 
summer of  research, returned, and then drove east to Philadelphia for a year. 
 After that, I drove from Austin out to San Marino, California, and back again. 
I ended up in New Haven, where my faithful  Toyota Corolla had to be sold 
 because it could not come with me to  England.
This book’s endnotes indicate where in my travels I located a par tic u lar 
source. Although some of   these documents have by now appeared online or 
in printed collections,  there are several stops on my archival route that I think 
worth visiting if  scholars would like to reproduce my research. What follows 
is a rough description of  key archives and collections in the order in which I 
explored them.
In Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada holds microfilm copies of  docu-
ments available in Halifax. The Shelburne historical rec ords collection was 
especially impor tant for court rec ords relating to white and black colonists, 
and the William  A. Smy transcripts gave me a sense of  which documents 
about Native Americans I needed to look at in London. If  researchers find 
themselves in Ottawa, they should endeavor to eat at the ByWard Market, 
and the scones at the SconeWitch, right by the archives, are worth having.
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At the John D. Rocke fel ler Library in Williamsburg,  Virginia, the Corn-
wallis Orderly book, Dunmore’s correspondence, and the Robert Car ter let-
terbooks helped me to think about formerly enslaved  people. Visitors should 
check the calendar of  the Omohundro Institute to see if  any colloquia are 
scheduled;  there  will be coffee, baked goods, and intellectual nourishment.
 After Williamsburg, I drove to Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania, home 
to the David Library of  the American Revolution. This is an unmissable stop 
for U.S. scholars interested in British documents, though as the library’s name 
indicates, historians of  vari ous stripes are welcome  there. This microfilm li-
brary provided access to the British Headquarter Papers— useful for commen-
tary on British strategy, provisioning, and Indian affairs north and south— and 
some of  the War Department Papers, which I used to wrap my head around 
southern Indian affairs in the postwar period. Rented housing is available, but 
I recommend carefully reading instructions about using the kitchen, as one 
unnamed historian may or may not have broken the garbage disposal when 
she put too many onion skins in it.
Following a month in Washington Crossing, I spent six weeks driving back 
and forth between Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. I spent the 
most time at the Georgia Department of  Archives and History in Morrow, but 
the hours back then  were  limited, and I had to pass the time on the archive’s 
closed days with side trips to the North Carolina State Archives, the South 
Carolina Department of  Archives and History, the South Carolina Historical 
Society, the Southern Historical Collection, the South Caroliniana Library, 
the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, and the Georgia Historical 
Society— the last of  which helped with the section of  this book that deals with 
the Treaty of  Colerain. In Morrow, transcripts of  Creek and Cherokee letters 
reproduce documents that are other wise scattered across the United States, 
but they need to be used with some care  because they are transcripts rather 
than original documents. I have dealt with this prob lem by quoting from them 
as sparingly as I could.
 After this southern trip I went back to Austin to stow my car. I would like 
to tell you about all the food in Austin, but my editor has given me a word 
limit. Tacodeli is where readers should get their breakfast tacos (with cho-
rizo and eggs, or eggs and steak) and their pork mole tacos; Papalote is 
where they should eat turkey mole tacos and ceviche tostadas. Every one 
should drink horchata and Mexican martinis. I refuse to argue about barbe-
cue and authenticity.
Thereafter, I flew to the East Coast. I started in Philadelphia on a recon-
naissance trip that would serve me well the following year, looking initially at 
the Cadwalader papers to get to know George Croghan. A month  later, in 
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Boston, the Mas sa chu setts Historical Society provided access to the  Sullivan 
Transcripts and some of  Samuel Kirkland’s letters, which illuminated the 1779 
campaign against the Iroquois. Of  real importance  were the Timothy Picker-
ing papers on microfilm, which have molded much of  what I have to say in 
this book about history. I strongly recommend visiting Chinatown on week-
ends for dim sum, and Pho Basil by the MHS for very delicious bo kho.
New York came next. I depended on Maruzzella for a lot of  penne alla 
vodka, and at the New York Public Library I consulted a mix of  original man-
uscripts and material copied from other archives. The Philip Schuyler papers 
 were essential for learning about Indian Affairs from the American perspec-
tive and for recovering some Six Nations’ voices. Photostats of  the British 
Headquarters Papers, which the David Library also has on microfilm,  were 
useful for getting a head start on the research I needed to do in London.
Across the ocean, the British Library  houses the voluminous Haldimand 
Papers, which  were crucial for learning about British Indian policy. The BL 
also provided access to papers on Sierra Leone, and  those documents could 
be cross- referenced with the more extensive Colonial Office rec ords on Nova 
Scotia and Sierra Leone in the National Archives at Kew. I would recommend 
that travelers visit Brick Lane on Sunday for the street market  there, and 
Dumplings Legend for very good soup dumplings, but trips to Borough Mar-
ket are also advisable.
Once in Philadelphia and New Haven I was primarily concerned with 
writing up my findings. I did, however, spend a month looking at the An-
thony Wayne Papers at the Historical Society of  Pennsylvania.  These contain 
commentary on the Western Confederacy War, and I was able to cross- 
reference them with the Wayne Papers at the Clements Library in Ann Arbor. 
Between academic years in Philadelphia and New Haven, I spent a month at 
the Huntington Library in San Marino, where I learned a lot from Zachary 
Macaulay’s papers about  those key years in Sierra Leone. In Philadelphia, re-
searchers should head to the Italian Market for a nosh, to Han Dynasty for 
fiery Szechuanese (I love the eggplant and the cold noodles with chili oil), and 
to Dim Sum Garden for my favorite soup dumplings in the world. Frita Bati-
dos’ chorizo frita is a reasonable reward for a day in the archives in Ann Ar-
bor. In New Haven, scholars should listen to arguments in  favor of  vari ous 
pizza offerings, and then go to Pepe’s and get a pepperoni, anchovy, and garlic 
pie. The fried chicken, collard greens, and candied yams at Mama Mary’s are 
also incredible.
Manuscripts  were indispensable, but I also used printed source collections 
to write this book.  These included Vincent Carretta’s Unchained Voices (Lex-
ington, 1996), The Papers of  Henry Laurens, edited by David  R. Chestnutt 
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(Columbia, 1968–2002), Thomas  H. Foster’s Collected Works of  Benjamin 
Hawkins (Tuscaloosa, 2003), Christopher Fyfe’s “Our  Children  Free and Happy” 
(Edinburgh, 1991), The Journals of  Samuel Kirkland, edited by Walter Pilkington 
(Clinton, 1980), The Papers of  Sir William Johnson, edited by James  Sullivan 
(Albany, 1921–1965), and American State Papers, Class II, Indian Affairs, edited 
by Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, 1832).
American State Papers is now available online, as are numerous other sources. 
Since I started the research for this book, online databases have made pos si ble 
extensive primary- source research with considerably less travel. For students 
based in the United Kingdom or without the departmental funding to under-
take expensive research trips, I would recommend exploring databases like 
The Internet Archive (where one can find all of  the Johnson papers digitized 
and word searchable), Documenting the American South, Found ers Online, and 
the Papers of  the War Department.
The best advice I can offer about this research is that commentary about 
hunger is everywhere in the archives. As long as historians and historians in 
the making are prepared to recognize unconventional attitudes about it, they 
 will find it  there.
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Notes
I have referenced names and places as they  were spelled in the manuscripts,  unless 
other wise noted [in brackets].
List of Abbreviations
AWP Anthony Wayne Papers, 0699, Historical Society of  Pennsylvania, Phila-
delphia, PA
BHQP British Headquarters Papers, New York Public Library, New York, NY
BL British Library, London, UK
CL Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI
CRSG Colonial Rec ords of  the State of  Georgia, ed. Allen D. Candler (Atlanta, GA: 
Franklin Printing and Publishing Com pany, 1904–1986), 31 vols.
DLAR The David Library of  the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, 
PA
GDAH Georgia Department of  Archives and History, Morrow, GA
GHS Georgia Historical Society, Savannah, GA
HL Huntington Library, San Marino, CA
HRBML Hargrett Rare Books and Manuscripts Library, Athens, GA
HSP Historical Society of  Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
JDR John D. Rocke fel ler Library, Williamsburg, VA
LAC Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON
LOC Library of  Congress, Washington, DC
MHS Mas sa chu setts Historical Society, Boston, MA
NCSA North Carolina State Archives, Raleigh, NC
NYPL New York Public Library, New York, NY
PCL Perry Castañeda Library, University of  Texas at Austin, Austin, TX
PHL The Papers of  Henry Laurens, ed. David R. Chestnutt (Columbia, SC: Uni-
versity of  South Carolina Press, 1968–2002), 16 vols.
PSP Philip Schuyler Papers, MssCol2701, New York Public Library, New York, 
NY
PSWJ The Papers of  Sir William Johnson, ed. James  Sullivan (Albany: University 
of  the State of  New York, 1921–1965), 14 vols.
SCDAH South Carolina Department of  Archives and History, Columbia, SC
SCHS South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, SC
SCL South Caroliniana Library, Columbia, SC
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SHC Southern Historical Collection, Louis Round Wilson Special Collections 
Library, University of  North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC
TNA The National Archives, Kew, UK
TPP Timothy Pickering Papers, P-31, Mas sa chu setts Historical Society, Bos-
ton, MA
Introduction. Why the Fight against Hunger Mattered
1. [Journal of  Timothy Pickering], 5 July 1791, ff. 84a–85, reel 60, TPP.
2. George H. Clarfield, Timothy Pickering and the American Republic (Pittsburgh: Uni-
versity of  Pittsburgh Press, 1980), chap. 9, esp. 117–19; Alyssa Mt. Pleasant, “In de pen-
dence for Whom?: Expansion and Conflict in the Northeast and Northwest,” in The 
World of  the Revolutionary American Republic: Land,  Labor, and the Conflict for a Conti-
nent, ed. Andrew Shankman (New York: Routledge, 2014), 120–21.
3. For early colonists, see Rachel B. Herrmann, “The ‘tragicall historie’: Cannibal-
ism and Abundance in Colonial Jamestown,” William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 1 ( Jan-
uary 2011): 47–74; Michael A. LaCombe, Po liti cal Gastronomy: Food and Authority in the 
En glish Atlantic World (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 90–107. 
For Native farming, see Jane Mt. Pleasant, “A New Paradigm for Pre- Columbian Agri-
culture in North Amer i ca,” Early American Studies 13, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 374–412.
4. Thomas Abler, Cornplanter: Chief  Warrior of  the Allegany Seneca (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2007), 1–2.
5. I have drawn on several versions of  this creation story, relying most on the one 
recorded by John Norton (an  adopted Mohawk member of  the Iroquois) in the early 
nineteenth  century  because I assume it is the one Pickering might have known. Nor-
ton was the nephew of  Mohawk Joseph Brant, and Pickering would come to work 
extensively with the Iroquois, though it must be acknowledged that Norton wrote most 
of  his version  after 1810. For Norton’s telling, see The Journal of  Major John Norton, 1816, 
ed. Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 88–91; Jef-
frey Glover, “ Going to War on the Back of  a Turtle: Creation Stories and the Laws of  
War in John Norton’s Journal,” Early American Lit er a ture 51, no. 3 (2016): 599–622, esp. 
600. For  others, see “The Iroquois Creation Story,” in The Norton Anthology of  Ameri-
can Lit er a ture, 5th ed., ed. Nina Baym (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 23–27; Demus 
Elm and Harvey Antone, The Oneida Creation Story, trans. and ed. Floyd G. Lounsbury 
and Brian Gick (Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press, 2000), 8–9 (for Norton, and 
comparisons to Huron takes on the myth), 11–27 (for a comparison of  the diff er ent 
accounts), 17 (for variant spellings of  the twins’ names), 30–61 (for an Oneida- language 
interpretation of  the myth); Anthony Wonderley, Oneida Iroquois Folklore, Myth, and 
History: New York Oral Narrative from the Notes of  H. E. Allen and  Others (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 2004), xix (for myths as genre), 57 (for French versions), 
62–68 (for a 1915 account by James Dean).
6. For hunger experienced by Spartans in the Ancient World, see Rachel Laudan, 
Cuisine and Empire: Cooking in World History (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
2013), 65. For hunger endured by female saints, see Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast 
and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of  Food to Medieval  Women (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of  California Press, 1987), 2, 5. For famine, see Cormac Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short 
History (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University Press, 2009), 6–7; David Meredith and Deb-
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orah Oxley, “Food and Fodder: Feeding  England, 1700–1900,” Past & Pre sent 222, 
no. 1 (February 2014): 163–214, esp. 213.
7. Frederick Haldimand to Lieutenant Col o nel Mason Bolton, Quebec, 29 Septem-
ber 1780, ff. 146–47, Add. MS 21764, BL. For the Revolution as a disaster for Indians, 
see Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1972), viii; Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Coun-
try: Crisis and Diversity in North American Communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 108; Timothy Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early Ameri-
can Frontier (New York: Viking, 2008), 192–93. For interpretations of  change as a posi-
tive force in Native communities, usually during eras before the American Revolution, 
see Kurt A. Jordan, The Seneca Restoration, 1715–1754: An Iroquois Local Po liti cal Econ-
omy (Gainesville: University Press of  Florida, 2008), 18, 318; David L. Preston, The Tex-
ture of  Contact: Eu ro pean and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of  Iroquoia, 
1667–1783 (Lincoln: University of  Nebraska Press, 2009), 13; Jon Parmenter, The Edge 
of  the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534–1701 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 
xxix, xxxii– xxxiii. For limits on the experience of  black revolutionaries, see Trevor Bur-
nard, “Empire  Matters? The Historiography of  Imperialism in Early Amer i ca, 1492–
1830,” History of  Eu ro pean Ideas 33 (2007): 87–107, esp. 105; Manisha Sinha, “To ‘Cast 
Just Obliquy’ on Oppressors: Black Radicalism in the Age of  Revolution,” William and 
Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 ( January 2007): 149–60, esp. 150.
8. Amanda Moniz, From Empire to Humanity: The American Revolution and the Ori-
gins of  Humanitarianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), esp. 171.
9. Henry Knox to Anthony Wayne, War Department, 21 June 1794, f. 23, vol. XXVI, 
Anthony Wayne Papers, HSP. Recent scholarship on the American Revolution disagrees 
about  whether it is characterized more by continuity or by change. For continuity, see 
Jessica Choppin Roney, “1776, Viewed from the West,” Journal of  the Early Republic 37, 
no. 4 (Winter 2017): 655–700, esp. 659; Serena R. Zabin, “Conclusion: Writing to and 
from the Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly 74, no. 4 (October 2017): 753–64, 
esp. 757. For arguments in  favor of  change and continuity, see Alan Taylor, “Introduc-
tion: Expand or Die: The Revolution’s New Empire,” William and Mary Quarterly 74, 
no. 4 (October 2017): 619–32, esp. 619, 621; Paul A. Gilje, “Commerce and Conquest 
in Early American Foreign Relations, 1750–1850,” Journal of  the Early Republic 37, no. 4 
(Winter 2017): 735–70, esp. 736.
10. For a similar point about periodization, see Taylor, “Introduction: Expand or 
Die,” 619; Michael A. McDonnell and David Waldstreicher, “Revolution in the Quar-
terly? A Historiographical Analy sis,” William and Mary Quarterly 74, no. 4 (October 2017): 
633–66, esp. 657; Alyssa Mt. Pleasant, Caroline Wigginton, and Kelly Wisecup, “Ma-
terials and Methods in Native American and Indigenous Studies: Completing the Turn,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 75, no. 2 (April 2018): 207–36, esp. 227. See also Shaun 
Tougher, “Periodization,” in A Practical Guide to Studying History: Skills and Approaches, 
ed. Tracey Loughran (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 31–45.
11. As late as 1993, the Cambridge History of  American Foreign Relations paid  little at-
tention to Indians, beginning instead with a discussion of  George Washington, John 
Adams, and Thomas Jefferson and the postrevolutionary foreign policy they envisioned 
while facing east across the Atlantic. That volume refers to thirteen treaties that the 
U.S. signed with Eu ro pean powers between 1789 and 1815, overlooking at least six-
teen additional treaties between Native Americans and the U.S. government between 
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1784 and 1814. Although the new 2013 edition incorporates Native American history, 
it is still unusual to consider Native affairs foreign affairs  after the 1795 Treaty of  Green-
ville. The newest Cambridge history of  U.S. foreign relations talks briefly about Indi-
ans’ involvement in the War of  1812 and their meeting with Andrew Jackson in 1814, 
but largely passes over the period between 1795 and the 1820s. Bradford Perkins, The 
Creation of  a Republican Empire, 1776–1865, vol. 1, The Cambridge History of  American 
Foreign Relations, ed. Warren I. Cohen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 1–6, 77 (for the thirteen treaties); William Earl Weeks, Dimensions of  the Early 
American Empire, 1754–1865, vol. 1, The New Cambridge History of  American Foreign Rela-
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